PEOPLE`S FRIENDSHIP UNIVERSITY OF RUSSIA NAMED AFTER PATRICE LUMUMBA (RUDN UNIVERSITY)

As a manuscript

MUGABI Brian

COOPERATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN NORTH-EAST AFRICA IN 2007-2020 (THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA)

Specialty 5.6.7 History of International Relations and Foreign Policy.

THESIS

for a PhD Degree in History

Scientific Supervisor:
Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor
Nigusie Kassaye Wolde Michael

Moscow – 2024

Федеральное государственное автономное образовательное учреждение
высшего образования
«Российский университет дружбы народов имени
Патриса Лумумбы»

На правах рукописи

МУГАБИ Брайан

**СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЙ В БОРЬБЕ
ПРОТИВ ТЕРРОРИЗМА НА СЕВЕРО-ВОСТОКЕ АФРИКИ В 2007-
2020 гг. (НА ПРИМЕРЕ РЕСПУБЛИКИ СОМАЛИ)**

Специальность 5.6.7 История международных отношений и внешней
политики

ДИССЕРТАЦИЯ
на соискание ученой степени
кандидата исторических наук

Научный руководитель:
доктор исторических наук, профессор
Ныгусие Кассае Вольде Микаэль

Москва – 2024

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The relevance of the study. At the beginning of the 21st century, terrorism has become a global security threat. No State in the world is immune from manifestations of terrorist activity, which entails untold misery and suffering of innocent people. The main goal of international terrorism today seems to be the implementation of an alternative global political development project. It is impossible not to note that never before in the history of mankind have terrorist organizations set themselves such global tasks.

Terrorist organizations have become noticeably more active in recent years. At the same time, the number of terrorist attacks and the number of groups is growing, the scale of their activities is expanding, the nature of the terrorist acts themselves is becoming more complicated, which are becoming more sophisticated and taking on various forms. The range of objects and targets of the militants is expanding. Most often, the victims of militants are people who have nothing to do with specific events in politics or various kinds of conflicts. The devaluation of human life in the minds of people has become a defining goal for terrorists. For a long time, the events of September 11, 2001 were considered the highest point of the development of the phenomenon of "terrorism". However, the culminating event in the transformation of the terrorist threat was the formation of the "Islamic State" in the Middle East. The expansionist approach of this organization has led to a colossal surge in terrorist activity that has shocked the entire world community. Since the formation of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the number of terrorist attacks in the world has increased several times.

Modern Africa has been firmly engulfed by a network of international terrorist organizations. On the African continent, the security problems caused by the activities of terrorist groups are particularly acute for the countries of North-East Africa, which is largely due to the socio-economic and environmental realities of the region.

The most active extremist activity is demonstrated by the Al-Shabaab organization, which carries out terrorist acts in the territories of Somalia, Ethiopia,

Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda and other countries, which emphasizes its regional character. The cross-border nature of Al-Shabaab's activities is manifested in its cooperation with the Al-Qaeda terrorist group, which carries the threat of the expansion of this group's activity into neighboring regions, which poses a serious challenge to existing political regimes and the developing economic integration of African countries. The coordination of the efforts of the two terrorist groups underlines the relevance of conducting a multifactorial systematic analysis of the problem of combining the efforts of international organizations in order to develop an optimal strategy for combating terrorism and ensuring peace and stability in the region.

The relevance of the research topic is also emphasized by the fact that the spread of terrorism, in the absence of cooperation of international organizations on this issue, threatens the growth of related threats, such as the intensification of religious extremism, the proliferation and illegal trafficking of weapons, drug trafficking, slave trade, hostage-taking, etc. In addition, modern forms of terrorism are characterized by increasing scale, cruelty and cynicism; Modern terrorist acts not only lead to massive human casualties, but also often cause the destruction of cultural property that cannot be restored. Thus, an examination of these processes using the example of Northeast Africa shows that the region is becoming a projection of global threats of our time.

Literature review. Over the past few decades, researchers from different countries have shown great interest in the conflicts unfolding in Africa.

The historiography in Russian can be classified into various categories. The *first one* includes the works of Russian scientists engaged in the study of militant religious extremism, including studies that examine the extremist activities of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and in neighboring regions. This issue is covered in the works

of L.V. Ivanova[1]; I.V. Ponomariov[2]; A. S. Aliaskhabov[3]; R. R. Karimov, G. Yu. Karimova[4], who analyze the ideology, goals of the Somali organization Al-Shabaab, recruitment procedures and membership in it.

In the research work of L. L. Fituni and I. O. Abramova[5], the authors extensively demonstrated how international terrorism has been propagated by political, ethnic, religious, and ideological extremism. F.O. Trunov[6] elaborates on the fact that Al-Shabaab threatens global security and analyses the role of some international actors, such as Germany, as far as contributing to peace in Somalia is concerned.

Other Russian authors explore the religious and historical foundations of violent wars in Africa that are motivated by interpretations of Islamic prophecy. Their articles looks at how several Islamic prophecies have been utilized all throughout the continent to support and legitimize violent acts, like as armed insurgencies and extremist movements. A.D Savateev[7] examines the intricate relationships between political motives, societal conditions, and religious beliefs that contribute to violence in Africa through the examination of historical events and religious texts. The paper presents a critical analysis and offers insights into how religious ideology shapes disputes.

---

[1] *Иванова Л.В.* «Аш-Шабаб» в Сомали: надежда на мир или угроза миру? // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2013. № 12. С. 23-26.

[2] *Пономарев И.В.* Сети «Аш-Шабаб» в Восточной Африке. Азия и Африка сегодня. 2018. № 9. С. 33–39.

[3] *Алиасхабов А.С.* Международное сотрудничество в борьбе с терроризмом: правовой аспект // Вестник молодого ученого Кузбасского института. 2021. С. 76–79.

[4] *Каримов Р.Р., Каримова Г.Ю.* Трансформация международного терроризма в современном мире // Право: ретроспектива и перспектива. 2022. №. 3 (11). С. 14–18.

[5] *Фитуни Л.Л., Абрамова И.О.* Агрессивные негосударственные участники геостратегического соперничества в «исламской Африке» // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2014. № 12 (689). С. 8–15.

[6] *Трунов Ф.О.* Участие ФРГ в борьбе с международным терроризмом на территории Сомали // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2017. Т. 17. № 4. С. 710–726.

[7] *Саватеев А.Д.* Исламская цивилизация в Тропической Африке. Москва. 2006. 303 с.; *Savateev A.* Muslim prophets-revolutionaries in Sub-Saharan Africa: prophetic movements in the history of the continent// In book: Digest of World Politics. Annual review. Vol. 10 (Pp.80–129). January. 2020.

V.N. Plastun[8] explored the problems of states' actions to resolve intra-state conflicts in his writings. The author offers firsthand accounts and reflections on his experiences during the conflict, shedding light on the realities and challenges faced by Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The review likely evaluates the book's contribution to understanding the Afghan War, its relevance to historical research, and the quality of the author's insights and analysis. Given some of the similarities between the extremist actions conducted by fundamentalists groups in Afghanistan and Somalia the work is of great insight into triggers and motivations of terrorism.

The collective monograph "Islamic Radical Movements on the political map of the modern world: the Sahara-Sahel zone and the Horn of Africa"[9] reveals polemical trends in Islamic studies and features of Islamic radicalism in Africa as a whole and in its individual subregions, which have experienced an unprecedented increase in Islamic extremism over the past decades.

The works of A.G. Regenstein and O.V. Reaganstein[10] highlighted the main activities of Al-Shabaab and its impact on security from the point of view of maintaining internal political stability and regional resistance to the proliferation of terrorist activities in neighboring countries.

The *second category* includes the works of Russian scientists, which analyze the conflict in the Horn of Africa and its consequences. Authors such as V.M. Kassae Nygusie[11] consider the historical role of Ethiopia and Somalia in the development of the Horn of Africa. It is noted that Ethiopia provides a reliable security presence not only in this region, but also throughout Africa, which is partly the result of a

---

[8] *Пластун В.Н.* Рецензия на книгу: Изнанка афганской войны 1979–1989гг.: Дневниковые записи и комментарии участника. М.: Ин-т востоковедения РАН, 2016. https://vestnik.nsu.ru/historyphilology/files/5bbdf4b91d19893fda38f9e9168f20ed.pdf [Accessed 08.04.2024]

[9] Исламские радикальные движения на политической карте современного мира.: зона Сахары-Сахеля и Африканский Рог. Т. IV. Коллективная монография / под ред. И.В. Пономарева М.: ИАфр РАН. 2020. 220 с.

[10] *Рагунштейн А.Г., Рагунштейн О.В.* Террористическая деятельность группировки «Аль-Шабаб» как угроза безопасности в странах Африканского Рога // Ученые записки. 2020. Т. 56. № 4. С. 170–181.

[11] *Michael N.K.W.* Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia: Lexington Books, 2023.Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2023. P. 298.

strong state created by leaders such as Emperor Haile Selassie. Kassae Nygusie[12] notes the deteriorating situation in the Horn of Africa, highlights the crisis in Somalia, and examines the political processes and relations in the Horn of Africa region. His work allows us to understand the dynamics and security challenges in the Horn of Africa and how they affect Somalia. In his other works, Professor V.M. Kassae Nygusie[13], analyzing the features of the political development of Africa in the postcolonial period, gives a detailed assessment of the results of decolonization in the context of ethnic, military and political aspects of the formation of African states. This issue is also raised in the works of S.V. Kostelyants[14], N.I. Piskunova[15], L.O. Zatolokina[16] and others.

The *third category* includes Russian scholars who have analysed peace keeping efforts and role of different actors in fighting against Al-shababab. Scholars like A. Mansur and S.A. Bokeria[17]; R.D. Sakoeva[18]; V.A. Shagalov[19] whose scholarly works are about African peacekeeping deployments, will also be highlighted. UNISOM, IGASOM, AMISOM, EUTM, and most recently, ATMIS (African Union Transition Mission in Somalia) have all participated in peacekeeping

---

[12] *Кассае Ныгусие В.М.* Африканский рог: прошлое и настоящее. Электронный научно-образовательный журнал «История». Институт всеобщей истории РАН, Государственный академический университет гуманитарных наук, ООО «Интеграция: Образование и Наука». Том 13. 2022. Вып. 3.

[13] *Кассае Ныгусие В.М., Ивкина Н.В.* Особенности политического развития Африки в постколониальный период // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. Москва. 2020. Т. 20. № 1. С. 22–38.

[14] *Костелянец С.В.* Конфликты в Африке: причины, генезис и проблемы урегулирования (этнополитические и социальные аспекты) // Восток. Афро-Азиатские общества: история и современность. 2014. №. 4. С. 196-202.

[15] *Пискунова Н.И.* Внутриполитические трансформации в странах Африканского Рога: тенденции и\или угрозы? //Вестник МГИМО Университета. 2008. №. 1. С. 83-106.

[16] *Затолокина Л.О.* Эфиопо-эритрейский конфликт: путь к примирению //Азия и Африка сегодня. 2020. №. 5. С. 36-41.

[17] *Mansur A., Bokeriya S.* Mandates in the success of a peacekeeping missions: a case study of Liberia // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2018. № 7. P. 47–52.

[18] *Сакоева Р.Д.* Миротворческая миссия Африканского Союза в Сомали. Социально-политические и историко-культурные аспекты современной геополитической ситуации: материалы III международной научно-практической конференции и круглого стола, Сочи, 09–11 апреля 2019 года. Т. 3. Издательство «Перо», 2019. С. 189–194.

[19] *Шагалов В.А.* Миротворческая операция ООН в Сомали в 1992–1995 годах // Ученые записки Казанского университета. Серия Гуманитарные науки. 2005.Т. 147.№ 1. С. 157–177.

missions in Somalia. Referring to the works of these researchers allowed the author to study the set of measures that the international community has applied to solving the problem of terrorism in East Africa.

V.K. Parkhomenko[20] in his scientific work analyses American involvement in the fight against Al-Shabaab in its war against terror as one of the major powers. In addition, D.S. Magomedov[21] in his work indicates cooperation and coordination between major powers such as the United States and Africa in the fight against terrorism. Based on the works of these authors, the dissertation assessed the role of the United States as the only great power that has officially declared war on terrorism in strengthening regional security against non-traditional threats.

The *second group* of histography is devoted to African scholars with extensive research on the impact of violent non-state actors such as Al-Shabaab and counter-terrorism measures by state and international institutions in the Horn of Africa, which includes the following authors A.M. Ali[22]; J. Makanda[23]; W. Reno[24]; N.G. Debisa[25]; K.L. Zimmerman[26]; E. A. Ekanem[27]; P. Kagwanja[28].

---

[20] *Пархоменко В.К.* США - Сомали: эскалация американского участия в войне против «Аш-Шабааб» // США и Канада: экономика, политика, культура, 50(12), 2020. С. 100–113.

[21] *Магомедов Д.С.* Партнерство США и стран Африки в борьбе против терроризма при администрациях Дж.У. Буша и Б. Обамы // Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право. Т. 11. № 5. 2018. С. 164–181.

[22] *Ali A.M.* The Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin – a profile of the first Somali terrorist organization//Joint Kenya-Uganda Border Security and Management Workshop organized by IGAD Capacity Building Programme Against Terrorism (ICPAT), Jinja, Uganda, April. 2008. P. 28–29.

[23] *Makanda J.* Fighting Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: The Role of Ordinary Kenyans in Kenya's Military Intervention in Somalia and the Fight against al-Shabaab // Journal of African Union Studies. 2019. Vol. 8. № 1. P. 33-49.

[24] *Reno W.* The politics of security assistance in the horn of Africa //Defence Studies. 2018. Vol. 18. №. 4. P. 498–513.

[25] *Debisa N.G.* Security diplomacy as a response to Horn of Africa's security complex: Ethio-US partnership against al-Shabaab //Cogent Social Sciences. 2021. Vol. 7. № 1. P. 1–19.

[26] *Zimmerman K.L.* Al-Shabaab and the challenges of providing humanitarian assistance in Somalia //Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights. 2011. URL: https://www.academia.edu/ 48888932/Al_Shabaab_and_the_Challenges_of_Providing_Humanitarian_Assistance_in_Somali a [Accessed date: 20.07.2022].

[27] *Ekanem E.A.* Al Shabaab and its Violent Extremism in Kenya // Saudi J. Humanities Soc Sci. 2022. Vol. № 5. P. 188-204.

[28] *Kagwanja P.* Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers, old strategies //African Security Review. 2006. Vol. 15. № 3. P. 72–86.

The conclusions of K.P. Apulli[29] on the situation in the region under study after the completion of the Djibouti peace process under the leadership of the United Nations are especially valuable for characterizing the capabilities of the United Nations in solving complex tasks of ensuring international security. Further studies on Al-Shabaab's trans-boundary attacks and affiliations to a global Jihad network are being analyzed by other African scholars such as D. Agbiboa[30]. Another author A.F. Aphiah[31] also delves into analysing Al-shabaab extremist action in the region and pays more attention on the negative effects of the terror activities. Somali scholars such as, I.S. Mohammed[32], I.S. Abdisalam[33], I.H. Mohamed[34] examine the evolution of Al-shabaab and its extremist actions based on native insights and understanding of the terrorist group.

The ***third group*** of historiography includes western scholars on the topic related to international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, such scholars include D. Shinn[35], H. G. Enhart and K. Petretto[36], who analyze the EU's comprehensive work as far as stabilizing Somalia is concerned. He mentions how Somalia's case can pose transnational security challenges due to Al-Shabaab's links and in the case of Somalia have been widely covered by several western affiliations with Al-Qaeda. As a result, he questions whether the EU's comprehensive approach

---

[29] *Kasaija P.A.* Somalia after the United Nations-led Djibouti peace process, African Security Review. 2011. Vol. 20. № 3. P. 45–53.

[30] Agbiboa D. Ties that bind: The evolution and links of Al-Shabab. Journal of the Round Table. 2014. Vol. 103. № 6. P. 581–597.

[31] *Afriyie F.A.* Terrorism and its Negative Effects on Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Al-Shabaab // European Scientific Journal ESJ. 2019. Vol. 15. № 11. P. 63.

[32] *Shire M.I.* Dialoguing and negotiating with Al-Shabaab: the role of clan elders as insider-partial mediators // Journal of Eastern African Studies. 2020. Vol. 15. № 1. P. 1–22.

[33] *Issa salwe A.* Somalia and the Islamist War: Assessing the Probability of Al-Shabab Winning or Losing the War with Somalia // Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal. 2022. Vol. 9. № 6. P. 281–290.

[34] *Ingiriis M.H.* The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement's recruitment project // Small Wars & Insurgencies. 2020. Vol. 31. № 2. P. 359–380.

[35] Shinn D. Fighting terrorism in East Africa and the Horn // Foreign Service Journal. 2004. Vol. 81. № 9. P. 40.

[36] *Ehrhart H.-G., Petretto K.* Stabilizing Somalia: can the EU's comprehensive approach work? // European Security. 2013. Vol. 23. № 2. P. 179–194.

towards Somalia is working. In the work of P.D. Williams[37], the author analyses the African Union's response to Al-Shabaab operations and undertakes an in-depth examination of AMISOM's peacekeeping mission in Somalia, have written extensively about Al-Shabaab as a terror group and the African Union's strategy.

Thus, the author comes to the conclusion that in the presence of comprehensive works on the topic of terrorist activities of various groups in East Africa, the problems of the activities of international organizations in the fight against the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab, raised by the author in this dissertation, are poorly addressed in Russian and foreign scientific discourses.

The object of research is security in Northeast Africa in the context of increasing international terrorist activity.

The subject of the study is the activities of such international organizations as the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, etc. in the fight against the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab.

The purpose of the thesis is to identify the nature and features of the activities of international organizations using the example of the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union and other institutional structures in the fight against the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

To achieve the above-mentioned research study's purpose, the following tasks must be completed.

• Explore the origins of the Somali conflict and the rise of Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization with an extremist ideology.

• Identify the influence of Clanism and its association with the Somali conflict.

• Elaborate the consequences of Al-Shabaab's transboundary operations, particularly in Northeast Africa region.

• Assess the role of African troop-contributing countries in peace enforcement.

---

[37] *Williams P.D.* War and Conflict in Africa. Journal of International Peacekeeping in Africa. 2012. Vol. 19. № 2. P. 251–252.

• Highlight the challenges of existing counter-terrorism approaches

• Study the contribution of various regional and international organizations to the deployment of peacekeeping forces in the Northeast Africa region.

• Elaborate the advantages of a harmonized and coordinated peace-building strategy in Somalia.

The chronological scope of the study covers the period from 2007 to 2020. Al-Shabaab emerged in 2006, but after the start of a peacekeeping regional mission conducted under the mandate of the African Union with the approval of the United Nations in Somalia in 2007, it began its active activities. The upper limit of the study is associated with a reduction in the number of cross-border attacks, which allows us to consider 2020 as the end of the period of the active phase of Al-Shabaab's activities.

The Source base review

In order to achieve the author's goal and solve the research task, a group of sources were involved, analyzed, and systematized, and this can be divided into several groups.

The first group includes *normative and legislative* documents of a binding nature, which include international legal documents such as the UN Charter[38], the Founding Act of the African Union[39], the Law on Combating Terrorist Bombings adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 15, 1997[40], as well as international conventions. In particular, the author relied on the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1999[41].

---

[38] U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html. [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[39] African Union. (2003). Policy framework for the establishment of the African Stand by Force and the Military Staff Committee. Addis Ababa. [Accessed date; 21.06.2023].

[40] U.N. General Assembly. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/Special/1997%20International%20Convention%20for%20the%20Suppression%20of%20Terrorist.pdf [Accessed date 21.06.2023].

[41] U.N. General Assembly Resolution. International convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism. https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-11.pdf. [Accessed date 21.06.2023].

The second group of sources includes *clerical documents*, including materials from international and regional organizations, submitted by various administrative reports and memos of IGAD[42], IGASOM[43], AMISOM[44], East African Reserve Forces[45], reports of the UN Security Council[46] and the UN Office for Counter-Terrorism[47], country reports on terrorism prepared by the U.S. Department of State[48], the Russian report on combating international terrorism, presented before By the United Nations[49]. These documents provide an objective picture of the mechanisms of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism and the promotion of peace in Somalia. These documents also provide the institutional and legal framework within which efforts are being made to combat Al-Shabaab.

The third group includes media sources represented by declarations, strategies published by various international organizations. The work used the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006[50], the African Union Framework

---

[42] Intergovernmental Authority on Development, September 29, 2008. Communique of the Extra-Ordinary Meeting of the IGAD Council of Ministers. https://igad.int/communique-of-the-extra-ordinary-meeting-of-the-igad-council-of-ministers/ [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[43] Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). 24th Ordinary Session of IGAD Council of Ministers 17 - 18 March 2005, Nairobi (Kenya). https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/communiqu%C3%A9-24th-ordinary-session-igad-council-ministers-somalia-18th-march-2005 [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[44] African Union. (2017). January 27, 2017.Main successes of the AU in Peace and Security, challenges, and mitigation measures in place. https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20170127/main-successes-au-peace-and-security-challenges-and-mitigation-measures-place. [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[45] East African Region (2014), Agreement on the Establishment of the East African Standby Force (EASF). https://www.easfcom.org [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[46] UNSC, 2 October 2009. Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1872. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%202009%20503.pdf [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[47] United Nations (UN) General Assembly, 18. December 2015. 'Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism'. UN doc. A/RES/70/120. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/429/12/PDF/N1542912.pdf?OpenElement [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[48] U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism. 2022. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2022/ [Accessed date: 16.07.2023]

[49] United Nations. Russia's report to the United Nations on the elimination of terrorism. 2019. https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/75/int_terrorism/russia_e.pdf [Accessed date: 16.07.2023]

[50] United Nations. The United Nations Global Counter-terrorism strategy. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n05/504/88/pdf/n0550488.pdf?token=fGHMq141pQNfGF9Gp1&fe=true 2006. [Accessed date: 16.07.2023].

Program on Combating Terrorism of 2015[51], the European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy of 2005[52], the European Union Security Strategy for Africa[53], the U.S. Counter-terrorism strategy.

The fourth group of sources comprises *statistical materials* from the military Balance handbook[54], the Global Terrorism Database 2022[55] and the Global Terrorism Index of 2023[56], the Refugee Population Statistical Database[57], and the Uppsala Conflict Database[58], etc.

Thus, the presented source base is representative and allows one to explore the chosen topic in detail and comprehensively.

Research methodology. Several experts have proposed a plethora of theoretical models to explain what motivates terrorism, using the Al-Shabaab insurgency as a case study to carry out heinous atrocities against other people, especially civilians. Some have used religion to justify their acts of violence, claiming that something in their faith, as well as the clan-based system, inspires them to commit large-scale violence.

The *theory of neoliberalism* proposed by R. Keohane and J. Hiring allows us to consider the activities of such international organizations as the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, etc. in the fight against terrorism as

---

[51] African Union. The African union counter-terrorism framework. 2015. https://peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-counter-terrorism-framework [Accessed date:16.07.2023].
[52] African Union. The African union counter-terrorism framework. 2015. https://peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-counter-terrorism-framework [Accessed date:16.07.2023].
[53] European Commission. (2005). EU strategy for Africa: towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/eu-strategy-for-africa.html [Assessed date: 21.06.2023].
[54] The Military Balance 2022. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003294566 . [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].
[55] Global Terrorism index 2022. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GTI-2022-web-04112022.pdf [Accessed date: 21.06.2023]
[56] Global Terrorism Index 2023 - Institute for Economics & Peace. URL: https://www.economicsandpeace.org/report/global-terrorism-index-2023/ [Accessed date: 14.02.2024].
[57] UNHCR - Refugee Statistics. Somali Profile. https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/som [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].
[58] Uppsala Conflict Database. https://ucdp.uu.se/country/520 [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

contributing to international security.

The author proceeded from the principles of *historicism, objectivity, reliability, and systematics*. The principle of historicism made it possible to consider the problems of the development of terrorist activities of the Al-Shabaab group in Northeast Africa in their chronological and causal dynamics. The principle of objectivity allowed us to consider historical facts related to various programs of international organizations involved in regulating the terrorist activities of the Al-Shabaab group from the point of view of analyzing the causes and consequences of various foreign policy actions, as well as the national interests of various actors. The principle of reliability made it possible to study each phenomenon in the totality of its positive and negative sides. In particular, the author considered both the positive aspects of the AU's peacekeeping activities in Somalia and the negative ones. The use of the above principles and methods ensures the scientific validity of the provisions and conclusions formulated by the author. The system-structural approach made it possible to consider the activities of each international organization as part of a common policy to combat international terrorism in Northeast Africa.

Methods of research. General scientific methods such as analysis, synthesis, and induction were utilized in this work. These methods helped to identify the main prerequisites and causes of the Somali conflict, as well as the common and unique features that led to the rise of Al-Shabaab as an Islamist militant extremist group. Additionally, special historical methods were employed: the historical-genetic (retrospective) method was used to determine the characteristics of clannism, which remains a central aspect of the conflict. The historical-comparative method enabled the comparison of various researchers' and experts' viewpoints and approaches to the issues being examined.

The author adhered to the principles of historicism, objectivity, reliability, and systematicity. The principle of historicism allowed for the consideration of problems in their development and interaction, establishing connections between the present, past, and future. The principle of objectivity facilitated the examination of historical

facts based on objective laws, avoiding bias and distortion. The principle of reliability ensured that each phenomenon was studied in its entirety, considering both its positive and negative aspects. The application of these principles and methods guarantees the scientific validity of the author's provisions and conclusions.

The scientific novelty of the dissertation is as follows:

– in the context of manifestations of international terrorism in Northeast Africa, the mechanisms for launching the peace-building process in this region have been identified;

– the stages in the development of the Somali conflict from 2007 to 2020 are highlighted. This period is characterized by increased support from the international community and countries that have provided their peacekeeping contingents to combat the threats of international terrorism in Northeast Africa;

– the features of the strategy and methods of resolving security problems in Northeast Africa by external actors are revealed, taking into account their attitude to the participants in the conflict landscape of the region, including clan militias, field commanders, local administrations, regional peacekeeping forces, etc.;

- the causes of the stability of the Somali conflict are revealed, despite numerous peace initiatives and the intervention of reputable international organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the Intergovernmental Organization for the Development of East Africa (IGAD), etc.;

– based on the systematization of data on terrorist organizations at the macro-regional, regional and local levels, it has been proved that Northeast Africa has become a springboard for a wide range of organizations of international terrorism. This threat entails not only the destabilization of the situation on the entire African continent and in Northeast Africa, in particular, but also lead to unpredictable consequences around the world;

– english-language sources were introduced into scientific circulation, which made it possible to more fully explore the problem of cooperation between the

United Nations, the European Union, the African Union and other organizations in the fight against terrorism in Northeast Africa.

The main provisions for Defense:

1. The historical roots of the crisis in Northeast Africa demonstrate that the artificial division of territory and the violent policy of Great Britain, which ignored the ethnocultural unity of local peoples, laid the foundation for subsequent conflicts and political instability. A striking example of the "divide and rule" policy was the situation in Somalia, where colonial borders imposed by the metropolis divided the territories of Somali tribes. On the one hand, this contributed to the growth of national identity and disparate anti-colonial movements, however, in the post-colonial period, the fragmentation of tribes caused territorial disputes and inter-clan confrontation. These structural factors have caused the difficulties of Somalia in building a unified and stable State, which persist in modern conditions, exerting a destructive influence on the region of Northeast Africa.

2. The collapse of State institutions in Somalia and the subsequent increase in the terrorist threat are associated with political fragmentation, inter-clan conflicts and the inability of the central government to maintain stability and security in the country. The lack of effective governance after the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 created favorable conditions for the radicalization and expansion of the influence of extremist groups such as Al-Shabaab. These groups use the power vacuum and socio-economic problems to strengthen their positions, which significantly hinders the process of peaceful settlement and restoration of the Somali State.

3. The radicalization of Al-Shabaab and its cross-border activities are due to political instability in Somalia and international support for global jihadist networks, which has turned the group into a serious regional threat. By joining the international Al-Qaeda movement and using tactics borrowed from global terrorist organizations, Al-Shabaab expanded its activities beyond Somalia, carrying out terrorist attacks in Kenya, Uganda and other countries. This cross-border activity based on religious,

nationalist and clan motives threatens the security of the entire region and requires a comprehensive international approach to contain it.

4. Among the regional mechanisms that are involved in combating the terrorist threat in the Northeast Africa region, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are the most effective. In particular, the AU, through the AMISOM mission and coordination with international partners, plays a key role in countering terrorism and stabilizing Somalia, demonstrating the effectiveness of regional approaches to conflict resolution. The AMISOM mandate, based on pan-African principles and the support of the African Union Peace and Security Council, has made it possible to secure key facilities, train Somali forces and conduct operations against Al-Shabaab. This demonstrates the importance of regional solidarity and self-determination of African countries in the fight against extremism and restoring stability in the region. While the AU is engaged in peacekeeping, IGAD plays a key role in peace-building in the Horn of Africa, contributing to stabilization and conflict management, despite institutional constraints and difficulties in coordination between member countries. Through its efforts, IGAD has advanced the process of establishing interim governance structures in conflict regions such as Somalia, strengthening the foundations for a peaceful settlement. The East African Community has shown its limited effectiveness. Despite certain achievements, such as the creation of specialized anti-terrorist units and international cooperation, anti-terrorist measures did not take effect due to lack of resources, corruption and the difficulty of coordinating actions. The countries of the East African region must continue to work together to strengthen their positions, share intelligence information and implement effective counter-terrorism strategies to ensure the security and stability necessary for the social and economic development of the region.

5. The UN experience in Somalia has demonstrated that peacekeeping missions in unstable regions often face resistance from armed groups and require an operational approach that is not always available to UN forces due to funding problems, lack of combat reserves and dependence on the national interests of

participating States. The UN's desire to organize coordinated actions to combat terrorist threats requires a reliable system of interaction between countries, the allocation of specially trained contingents, as well as the creation of independent reserves to effectively counter extremist threats. The example of the UN's fight against Al-Shabaab has shown that in order to increase the effectiveness of its operations, the UN should consider the possibility of forming special volunteer forces, which will reduce the impact of national interests and accelerate the response to challenges posed by groups such as Al-Shabaab.

6. The European Union's security strategy in Northeast Africa is largely determined by geopolitical interests and security, rather than the real well-being of the local population. Despite the existence of training and strengthening programmes for Somali security forces, as well as operations aimed at combating piracy and terrorism, the EU strategy often ignores local solutions and the specific needs of Somali society. This leads to inefficiency and insufficient sustainability of the measures taken. The study shows that in order to achieve sustainable peace and development in Somalia, it is necessary to integrate approaches based on local initiatives and take into account the socio-political context, which in turn requires a revision of traditional models of international intervention.

7. Despite the active participation of regional and international organizations in maintaining stability in the Northeast Africa region, non-State actors in the form of elders and religious leaders, who have great influence in public relations, are of fundamental importance. These groups not only serve as important links between State institutions and the population, but are also able to effectively neutralize the challenges associated with the radicalization of young people. However, despite the positive influence of these actors, there is a risk of their politicization and loss of traditional authority, which may negatively affect their legitimacy in the eyes of local communities. Given the weakness of government structures and the presence of Al-Shabaab in the region, it is necessary to take into account cultural and historical contexts when developing counter-terrorism strategies.

The theoretical significance of the thesis research lies in the fact that the totality of the results obtained by the author, theoretical conclusions and provisions makes a certain contribution to the theory and history of international relations, including on the African continent. The problems of peacemaking and peace-building in the country of Northeast Africa are considered on the example of Somalia. Her example shows the importance of a comprehensive study of security issues and, in particular, approaches to combating terrorism in order to address the growing instability in Somalia and neighboring countries.

The theoretical significance of the study also lies in conducting an in-depth analysis of Al-Shabaab tactics and the influence of this group not only in Somalia, but also in Northeast Africa, which allows us to determine the potential damage from Al-Shabaab's extremist activities.

Practical significance of the study is multifaceted. First of all, the dissertation can serve as a guide for African politicians in their quest to make more effective strategic decisions that meet the interests of national security. Finally, this dissertation can help Russian politicians and influential people in determining the optimal mechanism for cooperation with Somalia and other African countries in strengthening peace and security and combating terrorism in the region. The results of the research can be used in the preparation of courses on the theory and history of international relations and foreign policy of African countries, especially in the Northeast Africa region.

The reliability and validity of the conclusions of the present research is ensured by a rich and representative source and information base, a systematic approach to the description and analysis of the posed problem and the implementation of research tasks, and the application of different scientific research methods. This enabled the author to ensure the validity and reliability of scientific results. The present work is based on verifiable data and facts, which are also consistent with the papers previously published by the author on the topic of the thesis.

Approbation of the research results. The main results and conclusions of

the dissertation are reflected in 6 scientific publications, of which 5 articles are published in peer-reviewed scientific publications included in the List of the Higher Attestation Commission and the List of the PFUR, and 1 article in publications included in web of Science.

Structure of the thesis

The thesis consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion, and a list of sources and literature, and abbreviations.

CHAPTER I: GENESIS OF SOMALIAN CRISIS

1.1. Historical background of the Crisis

Colonial History of Somalia

The implementation of colonial projects in Africa usually took three steps. Negotiations of protection treaties between African tribal chiefs and European colonial institutions constituted the first phase; the Somali situation reflects this pattern. Lewis points out that the first formal agreement between the British colonial government and the elders of the Somali tribe was signed in 1827. The British East African Company represented the interests of the British government in a professional manner, whereas clan elders acting on behalf of Somali clans without formal education or representation highlighted a considerable power asymmetry in this interaction[59].

Reports from different parts of Africa emphasize how these accords were unilaterally drafted by legal professionals in the capital cities of Europe, using their mother tongues. These specialists then convinced African leaders to sign these treaties, frequently without realizing the far-reaching and detrimental consequences. Furthermore, colonial authorities misrepresented these treaties to the native population as agreements made voluntarily, hiding their true goal of annexing their whole area through force[60].

The diverse interpretations attached to the 1889 treaty between Ethiopia and Italy serve as an example of the ambiguity that characterizes these kinds of accords. Interestingly, the Italian version of the Treaty of Wuchale claimed Ethiopia was under Italian control, whereas the Amharic version—signed by Menelik alone—merely gave him the right to use Italian diplomatic channels for international affairs. After Ethiopia defeated the Italian army in the famous Battle of Adowa in 1896, both

---

[59] *Lewis H.S.* A Modern History of Somalia; Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. By I.M. Lewis. London: Longman1980 // Africa. 1981. Vol. 51. № 4. P. 898–899.
[60] *Khayre A.A.M.* Somalia: An Overview of the Historical and Current Situation // SSRN Electronic Journal. 2016. P. 1–50.

countries signed a new agreement that nullified the controversial Wuchale agreement and required Italy to recognize Ethiopia's absolute sovereignty[61].

The next stage of the colonial project was the official drafting of agreements between colonial powers to formally recognize each other's newly conquered territory. Regarding the Somali territories, a significant milestone was achieved in 1889 with the agreement between Britain and France to draw boundaries between their respective colonies. In a similar spirit, Britain and Italy established another pact in 1891[62].

The final stage of colonialism began with the use of physical conquest and exploitation. Because of its strategically important location, Somalia became the center of heated colonial rivalry by the late nineteenth century. Furthermore, the Horn of Africa region gained greater strategic significance with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. As a result, the colonial powers divided Somali territory area notable for its extraordinary homogeneity arbitrary into five separate sections[63].

• Italy extended its control over southern Somalia from 1885 to 1893, leading to the formation of what was later known as Italian Somaliland[64].

• Likewise, the British established the Somaliland Protectorate in the northern region of Somalia.

• Similarly, the northern strip of land was annexed by the French, who later dubbed it French Somaliland.

• Moreover, Jubaland, the southwest region of Somalia, was annexed by Britain beginning in 1886.

• However, in 1925, the Italian colonial government annexed a piece of Jubaland that the British colonial authority had previously given up. In the

---

[61] Ethiopian Foreign Policy. Treaty of Wuchale 1889 Ethio-Italian. URL: https://www.ethiopianforeignpolicy.com/treaty-of-wuchale-1889-ethio-italian/. [Assessed date 15.07.2023]

[62] *Lewis I., Laitin D.D., Samatar S.S.* Somalia: Nation in Search of a State // Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines. 1988. Vol. 22. № 2. P. 359.

[63] *Khayre A.A.M.* Somalia: An Overview of the Historical and Current Situation // SSRN Electronic Journal. 2016. P. 1–50.

[64] *Bakonyi J.* Authority and administration beyond the state: local governance in southern Somalia, 1995–2006 // Journal of Eastern African Studies. 2013. Vol. 7. № 2. P. 272–290.

meantime, Jubaland's western region remained a part of Kenya throughout British colonization[65].

Like other parts of Africa, the division of Somalia was mostly driven by rivalries and interests of the European community, with little regard for the needs and aspirations of the Somali people. The preservation of African societal integrity was not as important to the colonial powers as the exploitation of Africa's natural and human riches.

Like people in other colonized areas, the people of Somalia fiercely and selflessly resisted colonial incursion into their homeland. The most significant and long-lasting resistance within Somali borders was led by Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, a nationalist rebel leader, talented poet, and respected religious figure. It is clear that Sayid Mohamed wanted to bring the Somali people together in the fight against colonial oppression. It seems intentional that a religious scholar spearheaded the opposition to imperial imposition. Indeed, Muslim academics saw colonial occupation as a surrender to non-believers, as seen in other African contexts. This emphasizes how religion affects power relations in Somalia, a topic that will be covered in more detail in the sections that follow.

After that, Sayid Mohamed started a campaign to educate the Somali people about the negative effects of colonial intrusion. Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hasan is credited with saying: "Infidel invaders have encroached upon us; they seek to corrupt our ancient religion, usurp our lands, seize our livestock, raze our villages, and subjugate our children." After that, Sayid Mohamed sent letters to several colonial governments in different parts of Somalia, pleading with people to band together and fight back against the colonizers. In a same vein, he wrote to colonial powers, saying, "I have no fields to cultivate, no gold or silver for you to steal; there will only be strife in my domain." Go to your own land and leave my land if you want peace."

---

[65] *Simpson G.L.* The 1925 Cession of Jubaland: A View from Great Britain's Imperial Periphery // Journal of Global South Studies. 2020. Vol. 37. № 1. P. 1–30.

Meanwhile, Sayid Mohamed was able to enlist a formidable force comprising tens of thousands of soldiers[66].

Many military expeditions were initiated by the British colonial authority in cooperation with Ethiopia and Italy. Nonetheless, the Dervishes successfully obstructed the coordinated attempts of the colonial army by employing guerilla tactics that were typified by hit-and-run tactics. Resistance movements began to arise in various parts of Somali-held territory as a result of the Dervishes' military campaign, which was directed at freeing Somali territories from foreign rule. In 1920, the British colonial forces finally defeated the Dervishes after twenty years of resistance. They did this by using the first-ever systematic aerial bombing of Africa targeting Taleh, the Dervish headquarters and command center. The desire of the Somali people to free their nation from colonial oppression did not lessen even after the armed rebellion was routed[67].

The UN General Assembly was consulted on the matter when the four-power commission was unable to come to a decision over Somalia's future. The General Assembly decided in November 1949 to declare the former Italian Somaliland a trust territory, to be governed by Italy for ten years until it gained complete independence[68]. It was specifically stipulated, therefore, that Italian rule over the colony must not, under any circumstances, continue into 1960. The General Assembly claimed to have taken into account the "wishes and welfare of the inhabitants of the territories," but the United Nations members ignored the Somali Youth League's protests against the return of Italian authority.

Due to the failure of attempts to unite the Somali-inhabited areas into a single state, Somalia's lands continued to be divided and under the control of several

---

[66] *Samatar A.I.* Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention // The Journal of Modern African Studies. 1992. Vol. 30. № 4. P. 625–641.

[67] *Osman A.* The role of inequality in the collapse of the Somali state // Journal of Somali Studies. 2019. Vol. 6. № 2. P. 51–74.

[68] *Mohamed I.T.* Remembering the UN Resolution placing Somalia under international Trusteeship. 1949. URL: https://hiiraan.com/op4/2019/nov/166212/november_21_1949_remembering_the_un_resolution_placing_somalia_under_international_trusteeship.aspx. [Assessed 15.07.2023].

foreign governments. Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary, openly supported the idea of unifying all of Somalia under one government, although Britain's actions frequently showed a divergence from this declared course of action. The UN General Assembly's Advisory Council moved forward without hindrance with the transfer of territory, even though Somali parties made strong requests that it handle the problem and return the relevant areas to the Somali people. Many analysts think that the nationalist struggle for independence was bolstered and expedited by the transfer of the Haud and Reserved territory without consulting the Somali people, ultimately resulting in the merger of Italian and British Somalilands[69].

As previously stated, Italy was once more given control over southern Somaliland; this time, it was designated as a United Nations trust territory. It is crucial to remember that this arrangement was different from earlier administrations at least in theory. The UN resolution contained precautions meant to keep the local population safe. As an example, the General Assembly required that "a declaration of constitutional principles guaranteeing the rights of the inhabitants" of the area be included in the Trusteeship Agreement. In order to assist Italy in carrying out its obligations, the UN also established an Advisory Council made up of members from Colombia, Egypt, and the Philippines[70].

Laitin and Samatar list a number of variables that contributed to the rise in nationalist awareness and the movement to unite all Somali-inhabited areas[71].

• First of all, nationalists hoping to free their country from colonial partition and domination had their hopes rekindled by the long-lasting memory of the fierce Dervish nationalist resistance against colonial powers.

• Second, nationalist sentiment was directly bolstered by the unintentional reunification of Somali regions, first by the Italians and then by the British.

---

[69] *Andrew R.B.W.G.* The Somali Coasts: An Account of the T. A. Glover Senegal-Somali Expedition in the Somalilands and Eritrea // The Geographical Journal. 1934. Vol. 83. № 2. P. 81.
[70] *Khayre A.A.M.* Somalia: An Overview of the Historical and Current Situation // SSRN Electronic Journal. 2016. P. 1–50.
[71] *Samatar A.I.* Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention // The Journal of Modern African Studies. 1992. Vol. 30. № 4. P. 625–641.

• Thirdly, the realization that colonial powers were not unbeatable as seen by the setbacks that Italy, Britain, and Ethiopia each experienced also had a role in the changing terrain. The Somali Youth League, the first Pan-Somali nationalist party, emerged faster than expected due to the expectation of a possible re-partitioning of Somalia.

Together with coalition partners like the Somali National Front (SNF) and Somali National League (SNL), the Somali Nationalist Party (SNP) pledged to reinvigorate and improve the coordination of their efforts to free all of Somalia from colonial rule. The attempts by colonial powers to stifle independence movements were ineffective, especially after Ethiopia adopted harsh measures including mass deportations, imprisonment, and summary executions to put an end to the emerging resistance. After lengthy political and military operations, two Somali territories gained independence, marking a partial victory for Somali nationalists' aspirations.

In conclusion, just like in many other African countries, the historical trajectory of colonialism in Somalia is characterized by multiple phases that include negotiation, exploitation, resistance, and ultimately struggles for independence. African tribal leaders and European colonial powers negotiated protection contracts during the first phase, which was indicative of the latter's widespread power disparity and manipulation. Clan elders in Somalia, who lacked formal education and representation, interacted with British East African Company representatives in a way that clearly illustrates this disparity.

In later stages, official agreements were drafted by colonial powers to acknowledge each other's territorial gains, frequently with little regard for the needs and desires of native populations. Following physical conquest and exploitation, Somalia's advantageous location served as a battlefield for colonial rivalry. The disdain for local sovereignty and cohesiveness was further shown by the arbitrary split of Somali territory among European powers.

The violent and tenacious resistance against colonial interference was personified by individuals such as Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, whose leadership inspired a sense of Somali nationalism. The yearning for freedom endured

in the face of colonial attempts to put a halt to independence movements, and as a result, some Somali provinces eventually gained partial successes and achieved independence.

Additional difficulties emerged in the post-colonial era, such as the failure of initiatives to bring Somali-inhabited regions under a unified administrative authority. Despite this, nationalist movements persisted in organizing due to recollections of opposition, inadvertent reunions, and the understanding that colonial forces were not unbeatable. This newfound desire for self-determination was demonstrated by the rise of nationalist parties such as the Somali Youth League. All things considered, the colonial history of Somalia is representative of larger trends in exploitation, resistance, and the final fight for independence seen throughout Africa. Colonialism's legacy continues to influence Somali politics and society, highlighting how crucial it is to comprehend past processes in order to solve current issues and promote national development and reconciliation.

Independence History

Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland became independent in 1960 and then combined to form the new Somali Republic. An important point of emphasis in the 1960 Somali constitution's preamble is the recognition of "the sacred right of self-determination of people solemnly consecrated in the Charter of the United Nations[72]." But in spite of this declaration, recently independent nations such as Somalia were obliged to follow the international legal doctrine of uti possidetis juris, which requires recognition of all colonial borders, no matter how arbitrary they may be. However, Somalia found itself in a difficult situation when these two values collided: the need to protect neighboring governments' territorial integrity and the right of its people to self-determination.

As mentioned earlier, the Somali people have a strong sense of national identity based on shared borders, a language that is mutually understandable with slight regional differences, similar cultural customs, a single religion, and a deeply

---

[72] Somali Constitution 1960. https://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Somalia-Constitution-1960.pdf . [Accessed: 17.06.2022].

held belief that almost all Somalis are descended from one another. Somalis have thus faced great difficulties in following borders that were arbitrary drawn by the departing colonial governments, so subjecting their relatives to foreign rule. thus, "Somalia was a 'nation' before it became a state." In this sense, the constitution formalizes the desire to bring all of Somalia together. For example, Article 6 of the 1960 constitution states that "The Somali Republic shall encourage solidarity among the peoples and promote, by legal and peaceful means, the union of Somali territories[73]."

Somalia, despite its current reputation as a conflict-ridden nation and a failed state due to the activities of the Al-Shabaab terrorist group, once enjoyed a period of prosperity. During the 1970s, its capital city, Mogadishu, was celebrated as a vibrant center of culture, history, and natural beauty, earning it the epithets "jewel" and "Pearl of the Indian Ocean." At that time, Mogadishu showcased a rich blend of Italian colonial heritage, exemplified by landmarks like the grand Mogadishu Cathedral, alongside symbols of Somali identity and pride, such as the venerable Arab'aRukun Mosque, which has stood for over seven centuries[74].

In contrast to nations such as Uganda, which encountered immediate political upheaval following independence, typified by events like the deposition of President Kabaka Mutasa by Prime Minister Obote in 1966[75], Somalia experienced a distinct trajectory. In 1967, Somalia's President Aden Abdulle Osman, known as "Aden Adde," conceded electoral defeat and peacefully transferred power to the winner, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke. This marked a significant milestone, representing the inaugural instance in African political history where a sitting head of state voluntarily ceded authority to a democratically elected successor.

After independence Mogadishu was meticulously maintained, maintaining

---

[73] *Samatar A.I.* Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention // The Journal of Modern African Studies. 1992. Vol. 30. № 4. P. 625–641.

[74] Maruf. Inside Al-Shabaab: The secret history of al-Qaeda's most powerful ally.: Indiana University Press. 2018.

[75] *Adamu I.A.* Historical Perspective on the Socio- Political Relationship of Nigeria and Uganda. 1960-2015. 2016.

standards of safety, cleanliness, and developmental growth. The government underscored its commitment to the capital's advancement by serving as the host city for the summit of the Organization of African Unity, subsequently renamed the African Union (AU), in July 1974. This concerted effort bore fruit in 1975, as Somalia experienced peak economic performance, reflected in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Notably, Somalia's GDP per capita surged to $168, surpassing that of Burundi, which stood at $112[76] during the same period.

After independence Somalia underwent distinct phases of governance characterized by stability, collapse, and subsequent efforts at reconstruction. Specifically, the country experienced three decades of relative political stability from 1960 to 1990, followed by a period of complete state breakdown and lawlessness spanning two decades from 1991 to 2011 as shall be analyzed in the following chapters. Presently, Somalia is engaged in an ongoing process of state rebuilding, commencing in 2012. During the 30-year period of stable governance, Somalia was governed by two civilian administrations, led by Aden Abdullah Osman Daar from 1960 to 1967 and Abdirashid Ali Shermarke from 1967 to 1969, respectively, alongside a military regime under the leadership of General Mohamed Siad Barre from 1969 to 1991[77].

Military Rule

President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was slain on October 15, 1969, by one of his bodyguards while on a visit to the northern part of the country, just seven months after he took office and possibly hinting at future events. A military coup d'état overthrew the democratically elected civilian government of Somalia on October 21, 1969, barely one week after the president's murder. The Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), led by Major General Mohamed Siyad Barre, essentially took over the government. It is important to remember, though, that military takeovers of power on the African continent were not exclusive to Somalia. Following the wave

---

[76] Macro trends. Somalia GDP 1960-2024. https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/SOM/somalia/gdp-gross-domestic-product. [Accessed 20.06.2023].

[77] *Костелянец С.В.* Конфликты по-африкански: динамика и способы урегулирования //Азия и Африка сегодня. 2010. №1. С. 40–43.

of decolonization in the 1960s, coup d'états emerged as the predominant means of bringing about political change in post-independent Africa[78].

The military coup was first welcomed by most people as a positive development, and General Siyad Barre came to power amid a wave of passionate populism. There was hope that the entrenched corruption and nepotism that had undermined the nascent state institutions under civilian administration would be eradicated by the disciplined military. In fact, the military government's early years were devoted to strengthening internal control and expanding state power over the whole country, including the most isolated areas. The adoption of the Latin script for the hitherto unwritten Somali language was one of the military government's first noteworthy initiatives and achievements. The government launched a massive literacy drive that was directed at both far rural communities and urban areas[79].

The military administration encountered comparable political, social, and economic challenges to those faced by the preceding civilian government, leading to a repetition of limited policy choices. In its response, the military regime opted to suspend the constitution, thereby revoking numerous guaranteed rights. An illustrative incident occurred in 1975 when ten religious figures were subjected to court-martial and subsequently executed after publicly expressing opposition to a proposed law advocating gender equality, citing its perceived conflict with Islamic law[80].

A coup d'état attempt by some Majeerteen (prominent Somali sub-clan of the Harti, which falls under the Darod clan) military personnel to take over led Siyad Barre to employ a nepotistic policy designed to hold onto power at all means. The military government ruthlessly put an end to the uprising after the failed coup

---

[78] *Шагалов В.А.* Гражданская война в Сомали и миротворческая операция Африканского союза // Ученые записки Казанского университета. Серия: Гуманитарные науки. 2011. № 1. С. 207–216.

[79] *Dahir A., Sheikh Ali A.Y.* Federalism in post-conflict Somalia: A critical review of its reception and governance challenges //Regional & Federal Studies. 2021. P. 1–20/

[80] *Anzalone C., & Hansen S.J.* "The Saga of Mukhtar Robow and Somalia's Fractious Politics." War on the Rocks, January 30. https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/the-saga-ofmukhtar-robow-and-somalias-fractious-politics/. 2019. [Assessed date 20.05.2023]

attempt in 1978 by putting the coup attempt's captured leaders to death. In fact, the government tried the leaders of the abortive military takeover on accusations of treason, and after a military tribunal found them guilty, immediately put them to death. Moreover, the military regime's security apparatus actively pursued the family members and clan associates of the coup organizers. As a result, the military government used force and repression to maintain its hold on power[81].

Clan affiliation was utilized by all armed opposition groups to the dictatorship, not just the military administration. New recruits were attracted along clan lines. As a result, clan dynamics became more militarized and politicized on both sides. For example, when military officers from the Darod clan founded the first armed opposition group in 1978, it was called the Somali Salvation and Democratic Front (SSDF). Similarly, the second clan-based resistance organization, the Somali National Movement (SNM), was established in London at the beginning of 1981 by members of the Isaq clan, which is primarily situated in northwest Somalia (modern-day Somaliland). Moreover, while living in exile in Rome in 1989, some Hawiye clan members established the United Somali Congress (USC), another rebel group. As a result, the growth of armed opposition groups made Siyad Barre's grip on power tenuous[82].

As a result of the structural factors mentioned above, the military regime grew weaker and Siad Barre was eventually overthrown by armed groups led by his political rival, General Farah Idid of the Somali National Alliance. In 1991, this unrest sparked a civil war in Somalia. These disputes are mostly the result of structural root causes, which also explain why Al-Shabaab, a well-known armed group and officially recognized terrorist organization, continues to carry out terror attacks[83].

---

[81] *Hussein A.* The Future Constitutional Structure of the Somali Republic: Federal or Decentralized Unitary State? https://www.hiiraan. com/op2/2011/apr/the_future_constitutional_structure_of_ the_somali_republic_federal_or_decentralized_unitary_state.aspx. [Accessed date: 20.05.2023]

[82] *Faleti S.A.* Termination of Protracted Social Conflicts in Africa. In I. O. Albert (Ed.), Perspectives on Peace and Conflict in Africa. 2006. P. 1–50.

[83] *Gerhart G.M., Woodward P.* The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations // Foreign Affairs. 2003. Vol. 82. № 6. P. 174.

The military government carried out a number of development projects prior to the boundary dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977–1978. There was also no armed opposition to the government. However, it all changed when Ethiopia, with the help of some communist countries, defeated the Somali army and troops quickly left the Ogaden region as shall be analyzed below[84].

Brief History of the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia 1977 – 1978. The roots of the Ogaden War can be attributed to the disputed territorial claims over the Ogaden region, predominantly inhabited by Somalis and situated within Ethiopia's borders. Somalia, under the leadership of President Siad Barre, pursued the annexation of the Ogaden territory, invoking historical, ethnic, and ideological justifications. Conversely, Ethiopia, governed by president Mengistu Haile Mariam during the onset of the conflict, vehemently contested Somalia's claims and upheld its sovereignty over the region[85].

The Ogaden region was home to approximately half a million Somalis, constituting over one-fifth of the Somali population in East Africa. Tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia escalated in 1975 following a severe drought that ravaged the Ogaden, resulting in thousands of deaths. The Ethiopian government, preoccupied with quelling uprisings in Eritrea, failed to address the escalating food crisis. In response, the Somali government provided significant aid to the nomadic communities in the Ogaden, whose livelihoods were threatened by the depletion of pastureland[86].

In 1977, diplomatic efforts mediated by the USSR between Ethiopia and Somalia aimed to resolve the Horn of Africa's fate. However, negotiations quickly stalled over the issue of Ogaden control, leading Somalia to express pessimism about reconciliation. Cuban President Fidel Castro's visit to Somalia shortly, thereafter,

---

[84] *Lewis I.M.* Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa // International Affairs. 1964. Vol. 40. № 1. P. 153–153.
[85] *Sheik-Abdi A.* Somali Nationalism: Its Origins and Future // The Journal of Modern African Studies. 1977. Vol. 15. № 4. P. 657–665.
[86] *Turton E.R.* The Impact of Mohammad Abdille Hassan in the East Africa Protectorate // The Journal of African History. 1969. Vol. 10. № 4. P. 641–657.

intended to broker peace, further underscored Somalia's insistence on self-determination for the Ogaden people. However, Castro's apparent support for Ethiopia during the visit soured relations between Somalia and Cuba[87].

Furthermore, the Soviet Union criticized Barre's administration for undermining the prospect of a united socialist front in East Africa. In response, Barre urged the Soviets to reaffirm their allegiance to Somalia and renounce their Friendship Treaty with Ethiopia. However, the Soviets strengthened their ties with Mengistu's regime, escalating financial support and providing military aid to Ethiopia. This shift in allegiance prompted Somalia to declare the Friendship Treaty null and void, expel Soviet military personnel, and sever diplomatic ties with Cuba.

On November 18, 1977, the Somali Mission to the United Nations denounced the Soviet Union's unilateral violation of the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, leading Somalia to revoke the treaty, demand the withdrawal of Soviet personnel, and sever diplomatic relations with Cuba[88].

Consequences. The refugee crisis precipitated by the Ogaden War has wrought catastrophic consequences across East Africa. Despite Siad Barre's adept management of clan rivalries through the promotion of Somali pan-nationalism during his tenure, by the late 1980s, inter-clan conflicts had escalated to unprecedented levels. The disparate clans coalesced around a singular objective: the removal of Siad Barre from power.

Three principal opposition factions emerged to orchestrate his ouster: the United Somali Congress, led by the Hawiye Clan; the Somali Patriotic Movement, spearheaded by the Ogaden clan; and the Somali National Movement, led by the Isaak clan.

By 1989, annual funding from the United States had dwindled to less than $9 million, while the disbandment of the Soviet Union rendered both superpowers increasingly indifferent to affairs in East Africa.

---

[87] *Мазов С.* Холодная война в «сердце Африки». СССР и конголезский кризис, 1960–1964. Litres. 2022. С. 724.

[88] *Львова Э.С.* К истории колониального раздела Африки //Под небом Африки моей. История, культура, языки народов Африки. 2015. С. 18–23.

By 1991, with international aid to Somalia nearly exhausted, Barre fled Somalia for Kenya in a convoy of tanks. His departure left rival factions to vie for control, resulting in the Hawiye Clan assuming power in southern Somalia, and the Isaak and Ogaden Clans asserting authority in the north[89].

The absence of a central authority precipitated further discord and fragmentation among the warring factions.

Figure 1. A Map showing the Ogaden region located in the Horn of Africa

Source: Research and Action for Peace. https://ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/ethiopia-ogaden-2007-first-combat-deaths/.

1.2. State Collapse and Threat of Terrorism

Throughout the Cold War era, Somalia was consistently sought after by major powers in order to either align with or remain within their geopolitical sphere, primarily due to its strategic geographical position. However, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Somalia's significance waned, and the major powers withdrew their support, leaving Somalia to fend for itself. During the final decade of military

---

[89] *Лебедева М.М.* Политическое урегулирование конфликтов: подходы, решения, технологии. М.: Аспект пресс. 1999. С. 271.

rule, Somalia transitioned into what William Reno categorizes as a "shadow state," wherein military officials utilized state institutions for personal gain, resembling characteristics of a patrimonial regime[90].

It is obvious that officials disobeying a country's constitution and other legal frameworks can lead to violent conflict. In "Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007—2017," the author Paul D. Williams uses a folktale from Africa to illustrate what Somalia would look like after a state collapse. An antelope and a lion are the subjects of this fable, which tells the following story: "Each morning the lion wakes up and knows that he must run faster than the antelope or he will starve. The antelope wakes up and knows that he must run faster than the lion to survive. So, whether you are a lion or an antelope when the morning arrives, you had better be running." This parallel emphasizes the ongoing sense of discomfort that follows the state's collapse, which is marked by chaos and anarchy[91].

By creating an "informal network" of people or groups to repress the public and take advantage of resources, the military regime's leadership began the process of undermining the government's institutions, including the military, police, and other branches of government. Warlords, rebels, and faction leaders used these alleged inequities as a justification to try to overthrow the military rulers. But they were unable to agree on a workable plan for power sharing, which caused internal strife among them. As Somalia approached the verge of a clearly evident state collapse, the Secretary- General Kofi Annan wisely noted that the country had "lost its standing as a member of the international community," which had led to a decline into a state of protracted lawlessness and widespread violence. International legal standards outline strict requirements for states to attain international recognition.

---

[90] *Осминина М.А., Смирнова О.А.* Анализ нестабильной ситуации на Африканском континенте: сравнительный анализ, характеристики //Система ценностей современного общества. 2010. № 14. С. 142–147.
[91] *Williams P.D.* War and Conflict in Africa. Journal of International Peacekeeping in Africa. 2012. Vol. 19. № 2. P. 251–252.

Nonetheless, once a state achieves recognition, the presumption of its continuity is upheld and judicially affirmed[92].

It must be emphasized that the de jure Somali state continued to exist even though there was no government to represent Somalia in the first ten years after the military dictatorship collapsed. In a similar vein, even after interim governments were established in 2000 and a permanent federal government was established in 2012, these governments have struggled to maintain effective control over the whole country[93].

In the latter ten years of its rule, from 1980 to 1990, the military government imposed more and more harsh policies. The 1989 Human Rights Watch report on Somalia and reports from multiple other human rights organizations provide proof of this tendency[94]. These stories indicate that a large number of civilians, estimated in the hundreds of thousands, were killed without authorization by the military administration. Furthermore, these findings show that rebel factions widely abused human rights. After the military government was overthrown in 1991, the country was divided into areas ruled by warlords, clan chiefs, and local governments because rebel leaders could not agree on a system of power distribution. As such, examples indicate instances of human rights violations and humanitarian crises persisted and, in some cases, escalated.

According to P.T. Coleman[95], conflict emerges from power disparities among groups, wherein one group subjugates the other across various facets of societal life.

---

[92] *Burgess S.* A lost cause recouped: Peace enforcement and state-building in Somalia// Contemporary Security Policy. 2013. №. 34. P. 302–323

[93] *Dahir A., Sheikh Ali A.Y.* Federalism in post-conflict Somalia: A critical review of its reception and governance challenges //Regional & Federal Studies. 2021. P. 1–20.

[94] Human Rights. Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1989 - Somalia, 1 January 1990, https://www.refworld.org/reference/annualreport/hrw/1990/en/35330 [Accessed date: 12.05.2024]

[95] *Coleman P.T.* Conflict, Complexity, and Change: A Meta-Framework for Addressing Protracted, Intractable Conflicts—III, Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology. 2006. Vol.12. № 4. P. 325–348.

Additionally, Ehrunger[96] posits that intergroup rivalry serves as a primary catalyst for enduring violence. Conversely, Deaustch[97] contends that oppression serves as the fundamental catalyst for conflicts; for instance, the Darrod clan under Siad Barre exploited the Hawiye clan led by Farah Aidid[98].

Conflicts are therefore deemed as an outcome of a combination of factors. According to Deaustch[99], oppression is the root of all conflicts. Conflicts are therefore caused by a mix of social-ethnic and interstate concepts that challenge existing practices. In Somalia one the of the issues leading to Gen Siad Barre overthrow was marginalization of other clans and hence oppression of his opponents from opposing clans such as Hawiye. Therefore, in Somalia's case oppression of disputing factions is seen as one of the driving factors that led to the civil war[100].

Although the aforementioned experts have differing perspectives on what creates intractable wars, they all agree that social, political, and economic marginalization are key contributors to the genesis of the conflict. Apart from social, political, and economic marginalization, extreme and extremist ideologies advocated by major terrorist groups, particularly Al-Shabaab, have played a significant influence in the current Somalia conflict.

Theoretical Challenges of Somalia Statehood. Somalia has posed a challenge to traditional theories of state formation and nation-building in late-developing countries. Indeed, some scholars have emphasized the obstacles encountered by Somalia in terms of state creation and national unity, in contrast to

---

[96] *Ehringer M.A., Rhee S.H., Young S. et al.* Genetic and Environmental Contributions to Common Psychopathologies of Childhood and Adolescence: A Study of Twins and Their Siblings. J Abnorm Child Psychol. 2006. Vol. 34. P. 1–17.

[97] *Deutsch M.* A Framework for Thinking About Oppression and Its Change. Soc Just. Res. 2006. Vol. 19. P. 7–41.

[98] *Abrahamsen R.* Return of the generals? Global militarism in Africa from the Cold War to the present //Security Dialogue. 2018. Vol. 49. №. 1–2. P. 19–31.

[99] *Coleman P.T., Deutsch M.* Psychological Components of Sustainable Peace. : Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.

[100] *Anzalone C., & Hansen S.J.* "The Saga of Mukhtar Robow and Somalia's Fractious Politics." War on the Rocks. 2019.

earlier modernization theory on the social and cultural foundations that underpin cohesive nation-building[101].

While Somalia has long been seen as a unique example of cultural, religious, and ethnic homogeneity (i.e., important features of nation-building) in the African context, these experts argue that before and after colonialism, this notion of a unified nation was more of an ideal than a reality. In their works on the issues facing the Somali state, S. Samatar and D. Laitin[102] point out that Somalia has long been a nation in quest of a state, with the link between nationhood and statehood remaining as thorny as ever.

The above-mentioned scholars' perceptive observations are supported by historical truth, which shows that the Somali political system before colonization remained a collection of small kingdoms, city-states, and segmented clan entities. Moreover, political disunity also persisted even after the colonial rule in which three European powers; Britain, France, Italy occupied Somali coastal territories. Moreover, the expanding Ethiopian Empire in the nineteenth century also seized a vast part of Somali interior provinces. Because of this colonial legacy, Somalis were separated into five colonial entities as earlier stated and remain scattered in four countries: The Somali Republic, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

Initially, the geopolitical significance of Somalia's strategic location engendered competition among colonial powers seeking dominance over the region. By the 1950s, the Horn of Africa was enmeshed within the framework of the Cold War, primarily due to its proximity to critical passages like the Suez Canal and the oil-rich Gulf area[103]. Additionally, Somalia has emerged as a locus where divergent identities, namely Arabness and Africanness, contend and intersect[104]. This

---

[101] *Balthasar D.* State Making in Somalia under Siyad Barre: Scrutinizing Historical Amnesia and Normative Bias. The International Journal of African Historical Studies. 2018. Vol. 51. № 1. P. 141–162.

[102] *Silinsky M.* [Review of Somalia-Nation in Search of a State, by D. D. Laitin & S. S. Samatar]. Journal of Third World Studies. 1988. Vol. 5. № 1. P. 230–232.

[103] *Generoso F.* Russian interests in the Horn of Africa: A Red Sea foothold? // South African Journal of Internarional Affairs. 2022. Vol. 29. № 4. P. 549–570.

[104] *Adedeji A.* Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: Zed Books, 1999.

intersectionality further manifests in the religious divide between Christianity and Islam, with Somalia aligning itself with the Muslim cause in the Horn of Africa[105], thus engendering tensions with predominantly Christian nations like Ethiopia and Kenya. Owing to its strategic importance, Somalia has garnered attention from global terrorist factions, identifying it as a prime theater for advancing global Jihadist ideologies.

According to S. Touval[106], three factors, in particular, contributed to the growth of Somali nationalism. Resentment of multi-colonial administrations, religious animosity toward both Christian European powers and Ethiopia, and purposeful incitement by multiple governments are among these factors. As a result, strong irredentism has fueled nationalist sentiment in the Horn of Africa, with the goal of creating a Greater Somalia state. In practice, both the civilian regime (1960-1969) and the subsequent military government (1970-1979) in Somalia prioritized the realization of the Greater Somalia initiative as a fundamental national objective during the period from 1969 to 1991[107]. This endeavor, however, led Somalia into direct confrontation with international treaties safeguarding the sanctity of colonial-era borders, precipitating enduring conflicts with neighboring states[108].

Moreover, Somalia's involvement in conflicts engendered by the Greater Somalia project perpetuated tensions with neighboring countries. Nevertheless, the erosion of Somali nationalism commenced with Somalia's military defeat in the war against Ethiopia in 1977/78 and the establishment of the independent Republic of Djibouti in 1977[109], both of which were perceived as setbacks to the overarching vision of a unified Greater Somalia.

---

[105] *Ndzovu Hassan J.* "Religious Indoctrination or Marginalization Theory? Muslim-Christian Public Discourses and Perceptions on Religious Violence in Kenya. 2017.

[106] *Sheik-Abdi A.* Somali Nationalism: Its Origins and Future. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 1977. Vol. 15. № 4. P. 657–665.

[107] *Omeje K.* "Exploring the Governance, Security and Development Nexus: Africa Rising?". 2020.

[108] *Ndidzulafhi I.S.* Municipal border disputes in Vhembe district municipality, Limpopo province of South Africa. African Geographical Review. 2021. Vol. 40. №. 4. P. 339–352.

[109] *Mohamed K.* "Djibouti: Between War and Peace". Review of African Political Economy. 1996. Vol. 23. № 70. P. 511–21.

Additionally, the authoritarian policies of the military regime, coupled with the emergence of armed opposition factions rooted in clan affiliations, further undermined Somali nationalism. Consequently, the divergent forces of Somali clan-based particularism overwhelmed the unifying forces of nationalism, which had already been significantly weakened during the period of dictatorship (1969-1991), culminating in the disintegration of the Somali state in 1991[110]. Since then, Somalia has symbolized the world's longest-standing example of state disintegration.

Finally, there is a schism between the state and society. The fact that Somali society is based on the clan system and Islam, whereas modern nation-states are based on secular philosophy and the European model of statehood, has strained state-society relations tremendously. The state's broad infiltration of society collided ineptly with clans and Islam, igniting a self-defense mechanism that prompted rebellious approaches.

As a result of stressed state-society interactions, three conflicting ideologies emerged: 1. Clannism; 2. Islamism; 3. Nationalism, despite the fact that these ideologies are dynamic, cross-current, and frequently overlap.

Clannism is a system of society based on clan affiliation. Somali culture is patriarchal and traditionally centered on patrilineal clans or tribes. Additionally, Somalia is a lineage-based society, where virtually all members of society are identified in part by their clan family. Somali clannism is fluid, complex, and frequently misunderstood. An argument can be made that clannism especially since the collapse of the state in 1991–forms the basis for most of the core social institutions and norms of traditional Somali society, including personal identity, rights of access to local resources, customary law, blood payment groups, and social support systems[111].

[110] *Ingiriis M.H.* "From Grievance to Greed in Somalia: The Formation, Failure and Fall of the United Somali Congress (1989-1991)." 2019. Vol. 59. № 3. P. 783–814.

[111] *Hummel K.* The 2022 Somali offensive against Al-Shabaab: Making enduring gains will require learning from previous failures.URL: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2022-somali-offensive-against-al-shabaab-making-enduring-gains-will-require-learning-from-previous-failures/ [Accessed date : 15.01.2024]

Additionally Islamism by definition comprises of a broad set of political ideologies that utilize and draw inspiration from Islamic symbols and traditions in pursuit of a sociopolitical objective. The aims and objectives of these movements vary widely, as do their interpretations of Islamic tradition and practice, and, as such, the precise scope and definition of the term remain debated. In the case of Somalia, it's imperative to focus on Sufi Islam. Traditionally, the practice of Islam in Somalia has been described as moderate "veil lightly worn." Islam was and remains integrated into local customs. The strict, conservative Wahhabist practice of Islam in neighboring Gulf States was largely unknown in Somalia and considered foreign to Somali culture. Sufi brotherhoods are the oldest and most widespread Islamic organizations in Somalia and cut across clan affiliations. These religious orders are moderate and embrace peaceful co-existence with secular political authorities[112]

Finally, Nationalism refers to identification with one's own nation and support for its interests, especially to the exclusion or detriment of the interests of other nations. In regard to Somalia the notion of nationalism was only introduced during the struggle for independence and was later taken on by the subsequently formed Somali governments. However, in a clan-divided society like Somalia, a focused relation between clans and any incoming state is inevitable, which is the 'pre-eminent theatre for social intercourse and collective conflict'.[113]

Its therefore worth noting that the notion of their incompatibility, conflictual, and eventual mutual exclusion had prevailed in the absence of a reconciliatory solution through proper social contracts and regulations. As a result, one of three systems has won at every historical crossroads, while the other two have fled, waiting for a favorable time to return.

For example, throughout the war for independence and subsequent years of

---

[112] *Michael W.S.* Jihadi governance and traditional authority structures: al-Shabaab and Clan Elders in Southern Somalia, 2008-2012, Small Wars & Insurgencies. 2020. Vol 31. №. 6. P. 1174–1195

[113] *Idil A. Osman.* School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies / This thesis is submitted to Cardiff University in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. March. 2015.

nation-building, nationalism triumphed (1960-1991)[114]. Similarly, in the 1980s, violent political clannism arose in response to the collapse of governmental legitimacy and claimed complete triumph by toppling the state in 1991[115].

Clannism in the context of Somali conflict. Somalia is normally described as a "clan society" and the classic anthropological texts have ascribed an almost fatalistic clan identification to Somalis. The Samaale clans (Darood, Dir, Hawiye and Isaak) are seen as the "pure" or "ideal" Somalis, the Sab (Rahanweyn and Digil) along with the Cushitic peoples (Shebele and Gabwing) are deemed as a deviation[116].

This was nothing more than the ideological construct of the ruling group, which was supported by colonial social engineering, and reinforced by successive post-colonial governments. Historical research reveals a much more complex picture, in which the Samaale are in fact one branch of a common Cushitic tree that came through historical circumstance to exercise military domination over the others.

Figure 2. Diagram showing major clans and sub – clans in Somalia

Source: Classification Somalia Group project. https://somaliaprojectwinning.weebly.com/classification.html.

---

[114] *Gilkes. P.* "National Identity and Historical Mythology in Eritrea and Somaliland." Northeast African Studies. 2003. Vol. 10. № 3. P. 163–187

[115] *Jeng A.* The African Union and peacebuilding in Somalia. In Peacebuilding in the African Union: Law, Philosophy and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2012. P. 234–276.

[116] *Anzalone C., & Hansen S.J.* "The Saga of Mukhtar Robow and Somalia's Fractious Politics." War on the Rocks. 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/the-saga-ofmukhtar-robow-and-somalias-fractious-politics/ [Assessed date 20.05.2023]

The militarization of clan.

In post-colonial times, clan had a primarily social significance. As a result of colonial legacy and the maintenance of these vices by post-colonial regimes that clan militarism became important. This can be traced in two major factors:

• The "divide and rule" strategy maintained by former President Siad Barre, which intensified during the decade and reached its peak in 1990-1.

• The clan-based mobilization strategy adopted by the Somali National Movement following the loss of nearly half its forces in the 1988 battles. Until 1988, the SNM was a multi-clan army; thereafter it was a federation of clan militias, and its non-Isaak members and recruits were mostly encouraged to create or join other movements.

Therefore, despite the fact that Somalia portrays itself as a homogeneous black people society, Somali individuals are generally divided along clanal lines, with clans receiving greater allegiance than the state. As demonstrated above Samaales and Sab clans are the most powerful. This complicates things further since you have more units with more varied allegiances that are competitive rather than complementary. Inter-clan conflicts define the major clan and sub-clan ties. Land settlements, natural resource access, and resource allocation and distribution are all affected by these divisions. Water and pasture access, as well as trade, are contentious issues.[117]It is therefore worth noting that the disagreements among these clans are a result of many factors, the most important being competition over state power.

Consequently, in Somali genealogy most Somalis are born into one of six 'big tent' clans. Four of these clans the Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Isaaq, collectively known as 'Samaale' as earlier indicated share the closest linguistic and cultural ties. These historically nomadic clans together constitute somewhere around 75% of all ethnic Somalis.

Two more clans the Digil and Rahanweyn of southern Somalia, sometimes

---

[117] *Muhammed M.H.* Future Possibilities for Transitional Justice in Somalia // Üniversitepark Bülten. 2018. Vol. 7. № 2. P. 108–118.

called Digil-Mirifle together comprise about 20% of all ethnic Somalis. These have historically practised a more sedentary lifestyle of farming and/or pastoralism. Additionally, and in contrast to the borderline xenophobia of many Samaale clans, Digil and Rahanweyn clans have had a custom of assimilating clansmen, from non-ethnic Somalis to former slaves and their descendants.

Indeed, in the Rahanweyn's language their clan's name means "large crowd". A divide between Samaale clans and the Rahanweyn and Digil clans is pointedly evident when Samaale clan members use the derogatory word sab (translation: "ignoble") when referring to some of their Rahanweyn and Digil Somali brethren. Somalis further classify themselves into sub clans, or even sub-sub clans and beyond. For example, in the Isaaq clan, which falls under the umbrella "Samaale" clan structure, there are no less than three (some scholars say as many as eight) sub clans: The HabarAwal, HabarJaalo, and the Harhajis. The HabarAwal are then divided into at least two sub-sub clans: the Sa'ad Muse and the Lise Muse and so on[118].

Classification can even occur within a household: if a man has multiple wives, for instance, some household members may emphasize the clans, sub-clans, or sub-sub-clans of one maternal line over another. Additionally, not all Somalis agree on the lineage affiliations of other Somalis. The Somali genealogy system offers individuals a seemingly endless array of ways to connect with or distance themselves from fellow Somalis, which may be its underlying purpose.

The Somali lineage system achieves this. While outsiders might view it as an impractically complex and shifting genealogy, many Somalis perceive it as a practically complex and adaptable system. If a water hole or grazing area becomes too crowded, a sub-clan or sub-sub-clan can break away and take control of it. Similarly, if one clan monopolizes a commercial area to the detriment of others, several sub-clans can combine their resources to create a competing enterprise[119].

---

[118] *Brian J.H.* Introduction: The myth of 'Somalia', Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 2010. Vol. 28. № 3. P. 247–259.

[119] *Ingiriis M.H.* "From Grievance to Greed in Somalia: The Formation, Failure and Fall of the United Somali Congress (1989-1991)." 2019. Vol. 59. № 3. P. 783–814.

Figure. 3. Diagram Showing Clan Power Sharing in Somali Federal Government

Source: Wikimedia,2020.https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:4.5_Somali_federal_govern ment_clan_power-sharing_system.png

In the above diagram the observably the Hawiye comprise the majority in power sharing followed by Darood then Rohanweyn represented by Digir&Mirife respectively.

Table 1

List of Somali Presidents and their Clan belonging from 2000 to 2023.

Time Period	Period / Names	Clan
27th / 08/ 2000 to 14th/ 10/ 2004	Transitional Government of Somalia (2002 – 2004)	Hawiye
	Abdiqasim Salad Hasan	
14th/ 10/2004 – 29th/ 12/ 2008	Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (2004 – 2012)	Darod
	Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed	
31st/ 01/ 2009 – 20th/ 08/ 2012	Sharif Sheikh Ahmed	Hawiye

16th/ 09/ 2012 – 16th/ 02/ 2017	Federal Republic of Somalia (2012 – Present)	Hawiye
	Hassan Sheikh Mohamud	
16th/ 02/ 2017- 23rd/ 05/ 2022	Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed	Darod
23rd/ 05/ 2022- Incumbent	Hassan Sheikh Mohamud	Hawiye

Source: Compiled by the Author using information from world Atlas. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/presidents-of-somalia-since-1960.html

It's important to highlight that clan dynamics laid the foundation for a failed Somali state shortly after gaining independence in 1960. In what was intended to be a unified Somalia, northerners from the former British Somaliland (primarily the Isaaq and some Dir) occupied most technical positions. Meanwhile, individuals from the former Italian Somaliland (mainly the Darod and Hawiye, excluding the Rahanweyn and Digil) assumed many political roles[120].

This distribution of roles is sometimes attributed to the differing levels of educational preparation provided by the British and Italians prior to independence. The British, thinking mass education was too uncertain in nomadic cultures, set up only a few schools in their part of Somalia, but schools which offered a high standard of education. A select few Somalis were then sent to British universities. By contrast, the Italians introduced mass education, but at a low standard and with a heavy hand (Somalis were expected to adopt the laws, customs and economic preferences of the Italian state). At independence, then, certain Somalis were better positioned to seize political and economic spoils, but almost always in the company of clansmen. Consequently, centers of governmental power and authority came to be associated not with the state so much as with clans[121].

Arguably had the filling of governmental positions not been so segregated and the allocation of governmental power more genuinely broadened, unified Somali

---

[120] *Sheik-Abdi A.* Somali Nationalism: Its Origins and Future. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 1977. Vol. 15. № 4. P. 657–665.
[121] *Silinsky M.* [Review of Somalia-Nation in Search of a State, by D. D. Laitin & S. S. Samatar]. Journal of Third World Studies. 1988. Vol. 5. № 1. P. 230–232.

statehood might have been advanced. As it was, the immediate post-independence era was marked less by national unity and more by heightened clan rivalry. This rivalry culminated in October 1969 with the assassination of Somalia's president, Abdirashid Ali Shermaake, a member of the Darod clan.[122].

The military seized control, transitioning the government to military rule under Major-General Mohammed Siyaad Barre, also a Darod. Barre's regime initially sought to eliminate clan divisions through an ideological blend of Leninism, Marxism, the Koran, Maoism, and Mussolini's principles, collectively termed 'scientific socialism'. As part of scientific socialism all political parties were banned except Barre's Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party, the premise being that parties were merely products and tools of clans. People were forcibly settled on communes where clans were deliberately mixed. It became illegal for Somalis to inquire about or refer to a person's lineage, not even at weddings, burials or religious rites[123].

All Somalis were to call each other jaalle, or 'comrade'. Traditional institutions were dismantled, replaced by government-appointed officials. As noted earlier, Barre's rule was eventually challenged after his failed Ogaden campaign. When faced with the prospect of losing power, he quickly abandoned efforts to stamp out clannism and instead resurrected and ratcheted up clan differences. But he also continued to outlaw and undermine traditional clan institutions, such as shir councils. Simultaneously he turned inward to his own clan base to the point that his government came to be known amongst Somalis as MOD: Mareehaan, Ogadeni and Dulbahante, three sub-sub clans of the Darod clan to which he, his mother, and son-in-law belonged. These actions were to have lasting consequences.

As noted above, the Barre regime in its latter years had stressed clan divides yet continued to outlaw diya-groups. As a result, when the regime fell in 1991 and Somali clans scrambled to seize what was left of the Somali state, many were killed in the chaos. Barre-inspired rhetoric had primed clansmen to expect such killing

---

[122] *Amare T.* International relations in the Horn of Africa (1991–96). Review of African Political Economy. 1996. Vol. 23. №. 70. P. 499–509.
[123] Ibid.

from others. Yet the regime had also precluded the formation or adequate functioning of diya-groups which could have adjudicated conflicts and maybe mitigated violence [124].

Conclusively, In the first section of the thesis covering history of Somalia the paradoxical nature of Somalia conflict stating some of the background causes of the conflict is mentioned. I have argued that colonial legacy is at the center of Somali conflict given its divide and rule policy.

The aspect of clannism is another vital aspect that explains the ongoing conflict in Somalia. While recognized the importance of clan identity within Somali society, I argued that the politicization of this identity is a fueling factor for the ongoing instability.

Consequently, I have outlined the historical differences between Ethiopia and Somalia that led to the famous and yet detrimental Ogaden conflict. An end to politically motivated clan skirmishes can be one attempt to resolve the paradoxical history of Somalia that has been defined by conflict and instability.

For the area of political institutions, a clan-based power-sharing formula would produce a broad-based legitimate regime in Somalia.

The Somalis as indicated above are fortunate to have a unifying identity that can be emphasized, and that has its own conflict-resolution mechanisms. Consequently, using Hadrawi's peace caravan as an example, I suggest that appropriate peace education programmes should be designed and delivered formally and informally to counter radicalization. It is imperative to note that Somalia's protracted conflict has multiple and complex causes as evidenced in my narration of its history and association with conflict.

Comprehensive strategies that deal with all of the stated factors at different stages are necessary for creating a durable peace in Somalia. This research is needed in order to provide policymakers and stakeholders with practical suggestions for addressing this problem.

---

[124] *Brian J.H.* Introduction: The myth of 'Somalia', Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 2010 Vol. 28. №3. P. 247–259.

1.3. Foundation of Al-Shabaab Militant Group & Trans- boundary activities

Al-Shabaab was formed as a radical offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which, in 2006, controlled Mogadishu. The Islamist group, which controls about half of south-central Somalia, is estimated to have between 7,000 to 9,000 fighters, mainly recruited within Somalia but also from Western countries[125]. Al-Shabaab originally emerged as a remnant of al Itihaad al Islamiya (AIAI)–a Wahhabi Islamist terrorist organization which arose in Somalia in the 1980s with the intention of replacing the regime of Mohammed Said Barre with an Islamic State. In 2000, AIAI remnants mostly young members reformed into Al-Shabaab and were incorporated into the ICU as its radical youth militia[126].

The origins of Al Shabaab, prior to its role as the military arm of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), are somewhat unclear. Initially led by Aden Hashi Ayro, who had previously been associated with the Islamist movement Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) since 1991, Al Shabaab's roots trace back to Ayro's involvement in the AIAI, which disbanded in 1997. Following the dissolution of the AIAI, Ayro joined the ICU, a faction within the Somali court system aimed at asserting authority over Somalia. It is possible that Ayro led a loosely organized group of AIAI militants before affiliating with the ICU, suggesting that Al Shabaab may have had some existence prior to its formal role as the ICU's military wing. However, Al Shabaab primarily developed within the framework of the ICU, with Ayro playing a key role in recruiting and training its fighters.

Under Ayro's direction, Al Shabaab carried out ruthless attacks that elicited condemnation from both local and international communities, as well as disapproval from much of the ICU leadership, including Hassan Dahir Aweys, another former AIAI member and prominent ICU leader who reportedly exerted spiritual influence

---

[125] *Daniel E.* Ties that Bind: The Evolution and Links of Al-Shabab, The Round Table. 2014. Vol. 103. № 6. P. 581–597.

[126] *Anne S. & Ardian. S.* The Jihad in Kenya: Understanding Al-Shabaab Recruitment and Terrorist Activity inside Kenya in Their Own Words, African Security. 2019. Vol. 12. № 1. P. 3–61.

over Al Shabaab. Alleged early activities of Al Shabaab include multiple killings of international workers in Somaliland—the northwestern region of Somalia—between 2003 and 2005, along with the desecration of an Italian cemetery in 2005. Furthermore, Al Shabaab endorsed violent reprisals against employees of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) following the assassination of several ICU members in 2005, purportedly by the TFG.

The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) briefly seized control of Somalia's center and southern areas in the middle of 2006. Aden Hashi Ayro promoted linking the Somali struggle to a wider international jihadist agenda, but other leaders of the ICU gave precedence to nationalist goals and the creation of an Islamic state inside Somalia's boundaries. But in December 2006, the ICU was driven out of Mogadishu by Ethiopian forces backed by rival warlords and troops of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). On December 27, 2006, the ICU was formally dissolved after suffering a severe loss. Al Shabaab, Ayro's faction, carried on with its operations in spite of this setback.

The Ethiopian intervention in December 2006 marked a watershed in the development and radicalization of Al-Shabaab. First, it provided Al-Shabaab with the opportunity to draw on deep-seated Somali hostility towards Ethiopia as a result of historical differences that were mentioned in the above subchapters to recruit thousands of nationalist volunteers[127].

Second, the intervention forced Al-Shabaab to adopt an effective guerrilla-style operational strategy as a means of resisting Ethiopian advance into the South. The reason for this strategy was informed by the desire to circumvent and attack Ethiopian troops from a position of advantage rather than meet them straight on as would be in a conventional war. In here the enemy concentrations are generally avoided as enemy strengths. Instead of attacking the enemy (Ethiopian troops) strength, the goal was the application of Al-Shabaab concentrated strength against

---

[127] *Mohamed H.I.* From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: how the Ethiopian intervention and the 'War on Terror' exacerbated the conflict in Somalia, Third World Quarterly. 2018. Vol. 39. № 11. P. 2033-2052.

selected Ethiopian forces weakness. This maneuver enabled Al-Shabaab to rely on speed and surprise.

Third, by forcing the Islamic Courts Union leaders who had exerted a level of moderating influence on Al-Shabaab to flee Somalia, the invasion allowed the group to become even more radical, while at the same time severing its ties to other Somali organizations. Although the Ethiopian invasion succeeded in routing the ICU and pushing Al-Shabaab to the south of the country, it failed to end Islamic radicalism in Somalia; in fact, it was a primary factor in the ultra-radical turn of Al-Shabaab, transforming the group from a small, relatively unimportant part of a more moderate Islamic movement into the most powerful and radical armed faction in the country.

In 2009 Ethiopia withdrew its troops from Somalia, replaced by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) composed of thousands of Ugandan and Burundian peacekeeping forces[128].

Since 2008, Al-Shabaab has demonstrated that it has the operational capability to launch deadly attacks against outposts of the West and perceived enemies outside Somalia. In October 2008, Al-Shabaab coordinated five suicide bomb attacks that hit the UN Development Programme compound, the Ethiopian consulate and various government offices, killing several dozen.

In September 2009, Al-Shabaab bombed the African Union peacekeeping mission in Mogadishu, killing more than 20 people and damaging the offices of a U.S. firm that was purportedly providing support to peacekeepers. In July 11, 2010, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for suicide bombing of two groups of fans watching the World Cup in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, which killed more than 70 people, including one American citizen. The Ugandan attacks, according to Al-Shabaab, were launched to punish the country for its role in assisting AMISOM forces in Somalia, in the same way that the recent Westgate attack was launched to punish Kenya for its military operations in Somalia since August 2011[129].

[128] *Dawit Y.W & Daniel G.K.* AMISOM: charting a new course for African Union peace missions, African Security Review. 2017. Vol. 26. № 2. P. 199–219.
[129] *Simone P.* Fuelling the fire: Al-Shabaab, counter-terrorism and radicalisation in Kenya, Critical Studies on Terrorism. 2022. Vol. 15. № 2. P. 356–380.

Forging ties between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. Al-Qaeda operated in Sudan in the early 1990s as host of the Islamist regimes of Omar al Bashir and Hassan al Turabi[130]. However, the organization soon set its sights on war-torn Somalia when it learnt that American troops were going to be deployed there in order to restore order and provide supplies to the local population. Addressing a core group of Al-Qaeda members in late 1993, Bin Laden declared: "The American army now they came to the Horn of Africa, and we have to stop the head of the snake… the snake is America, and we have to stop them. We have to cut the head and stop them". Following discussions between Al-Qaeda's military wing commander Abu Hafs al Masri and AIAI's military wing commander Shaykh Hassan Awey's, four Al-Qaeda instructors were sent to Somalia to "train other Somalis" linked to the AIAI in advanced combat tactics and weapons. According to the Al-Shabaab Media Foundation, Al-Qaeda's official propaganda wing, these instructors taught Somali Islamists "the tactics of guerrilla warfare, in addition to taking part in a number of combat operations against the Americans"[131].

The relationship between Al-Qaeda and the AIAI leadership continued after the US withdrew from Somalia. In 1996, Al-Qaeda moved its base to the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, where Bin Laden forged a close relationship with the Taliban. A number of key members of the AIAI leadership travelled with Al-Qaeda to Afghanistan to receive training in Al-Qaeda's combat strategy, including suicide attacks and simultaneous bombings of different targets. One of them was Aden Hashi Farah Ayrow, a senior AIAI military commander[132].

Propaganda materials released by Al-Shabaab suggest that Ayrow grew "fond of the way Al-Qaeda worked and admired its doctrine, its strategy to change the Islamic world, and its call for jihad against Christians. Ayrow met many mujahedeen

---

[130] *Agbiboa D.E.* Terrorism without Borders: Somalia's Al-Shabaab and the global jihad network // Journal of Terrorism Research. 2014. Vol 5. № 1. P. 27–31.

[131] *Daniel A.* Shifting the Battleground: The Transformation of Al-Shabab and the Growing Influence of Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn, Politikon. 2015. Vol. 42. № 2. P. 177–194.

[132] *Daniel E.A.* Terrorism without Borders: Somalia's Al-Shabaab and the global jihad. Journal of Terrorism Research.

brothers in various positions within the organization, and he also met Shaykh Usama Bin Laden. The report further noted that at the end of this first tour of Afghanistan, Ayro had become "a military encyclopedia, he was unparalleled in the Horn of Africa region. He took Shaykh Usama's advice and returned to Somalia in order to spread the idea of global jihad and the path of Al-Qaeda - confronting the Christian world"[133]. Starting in late 2001 the US war on terror in Afghanistan dispersed the organization and forced it underground as its personnel were attacked and its bases and training camps destroyed.

Since 2009, Al-Shabaab's deepening ties with Al-Qaeda has had profound effects on its structure and operational strategy.

First, Al-Shabaab's affiliation with Al-Qaeda significantly altered its leadership component. After the death of its leader, Aden HashiAyro, in May 2008, Al-Shabaab's command structure welcomed a number of Al-Qaeda core members into top leadership roles[134].

Second, until 2008, Al-Shabaab made use of relatively conventional guerrilla tactics in its attacks against the invading Ethiopian forces. However, the group's increasing ties with Al-Qaeda has led it down the path of suicide attacks as a means of achieving its ends. Reflecting a shift largely driven by its growing friendship with Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab has emphasized the development of training camps for suicide bombers across Somalia and beyond.

In fact, Al-Shabaab has been linked to the training of Nigeria's Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram meaning "Western education is unlawful" in Hausa - which has killed over 10,000 people since its founding in 2002.

In August 2011, General Carter Ham, Commander of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) claimed that Boko Haram is financially sponsored by Al-

---

[133] RIAC. Islamic Extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/en/extremism-africa. [Accessed date: 16.07.2023]

[134] *Ashley E. & Georg S.H.* The invention of 'terrorism' in Somalia: paradigms and policy in US foreign relations, South African Journal of International Affairs. 2009. Vol. 16. № 2. P. 215–244.

Qaeda and Al-Shabaab[135]. He also alleged that both jihadist groups shared training and fighters with Boko Haram. He described that as "the most dangerous thing to happen not only to the Africans, but to us as well."

The role of internet has been key in Al-Shabaab operations, its therefore instructive to note that the growth of information and communication technology (ICT) has enhanced the recent transformation of Al-Shabaab, enabling the group not only to stay in contact with the extended jihadist family, but also attract and recruit foreign fighters.

ICT has also allowed Al-Shabaab to tap into wealthy Salafi networks keen on supporting Al-Qaeda's global jihad campaign. For-instance in August 2009, Al-Shabaab launched an online fundraising forum that raised 40,000 USD from members of the Somali Diaspora for the transnational jihadist cause[136].

K. Galvin engaged in qualitative research in the field of arts and humanities argues that "the internet has enabled terrorist organizations to research and coordinate attacks. Al-Shabaab's need to expand their propaganda to a global audience and communicate with ethnic diaspora and international supporters has embarked on the internet[137]. To foster public awareness and sympathy and convey their messages to international audiences with whom it would otherwise be difficult to communicate", as evidenced during the Westgate attack in Kenya. Al-Shabaab used a Twitter handle to disseminate messages goading Kenyan authorities and claiming responsibility for the deadly attack[138].

Finally, ICT has allowed Al-Shabaab to tap into wealthy Salafi networks keen on supporting Al-Qaeda's global jihadist campaign. In continuation with Al-Shabaab

[135] UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND. General Ham Assumes Command of U.S. AFRICOM. https://www.africom.mil/Story/8065/general-ham-assumes-command-of-us-africom. [Accessed date: 16.07.2023].
[136] Country Reports on Terrorism 2019. URL: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Country-Reports-on-Terrorism-2019-2.pdf [Accessed date: 16.07.2023]
[137] *Hay R., Clarkin M., & Galvin, K.* Screen Producers' Association Australia: Conference 2003. Metro. 2004. Vol. 139. P. 150–157.
[138] *Vieira N.* The Westgate Attack: An analysis of Twitter's ability to re-narrate a historical event and an examination of its use during a crisis event. 2015. https://scripties.uba.uva.nl/document/613607. [Accessed date: 16.07.2023].

transnational activities, one of the Al-Shabaab fighters Abdullah (Somalia) who was training to be a pilot and had researched terrorism-related areas such as how to breach a commercial plane's cockpit, during a hijack which on 16th December 2020 transferred to the US from the Philippines, was to face a long list of terrorism offenses, including aircraft piracy and conspiring to murder US citizens[139].

Al-Shabaab's interplay between identities. The leadership of Al-Shabaab has focused on promoting both Muslim and pan-clan identities, though the importance of these identities varies depending on the leader's position, inclinations, or connections, as well as the specific conflict situation. In the group's early days, a Somali identity was highlighted, especially in reaction to the Ethiopian invasion. Nationalist and religious identities worked in tandem, strengthening each other. Although Al-Shabaab's leaders publicly denounced nationalism, they used it as a tool for recruitment. The exit of Ethiopian troops in 2009 reduced the emphasis on national identity, but it resurged when Kenyan forces entered the fray in 2011 and Ethiopia re-engaged.

Despite this, Al-Shabaab has successfully integrated nationalist recruits into its jihadist ideology. The role of clan identity within the group has grown as it has expanded its territorial control and set up a shadow government. Initially, the group's ideology and Salafi jihadist identity were paramount for its leadership, but clan loyalty has increasingly overshadowed other identities. This transition started in 2009, when a wave of new recruits joined Al-Shabaab during its expansion in southern Somalia. Many of these recruits held strong clan affiliations, which diluted the group's ideological focus.

Observers note that defectors from Al-Shabaab are more likely to identify themselves by their clan or Somali identity rather than primarily as Muslims. This focus on clan identity is unsurprising given that Al-Shabaab pressures clans to supply recruits. Consequently, the analytical organization Sahan has suggested that much of Al-Shabaab's support comes from clans with local grievances and

---

[139] *Shay S.* Al Shabaab and the 9\11 Style Terror Plot. International Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT). 2021.

communities lacking alternatives, rather than from genuine ideological alignment with jihadists. This highlights the primary importance of clan identity for many associated with the group.

Nonetheless, Al-Shabaab skillfully manipulates various identities to achieve its strategic aims. The group leverages multiple identity politics to advance its objectives, including the concept of Islamic brotherhood, which undermines clan-based politics. This supra-clan identity appeals to younger generations disillusioned by the divisive impact of clan identity on politics.

Trans-boundary activities of Al-Shabaab militant group in Somalia. Some analysts like M. Crenshaw, an expert in terrorism studies, argue that terrorist groups have made calculated decisions to engage in terrorism from a historical perspective and that terrorism is a "political behavior resulting from the deliberate choice of a rational actor[140].

Since 2008, Al-Shabaab has transformed itself; this time from a predominantly nationalist organization with the localized agenda of driving the Ethiopians from Somalia to a 'hybrid movement' that has increasingly embraced the Al-Qaeda led the global jihad against the West[141].

On several occasions, the leaders of Al-Shabaab have pledged the group's allegiance to Al-Qaeda. Muktar Robow (Somalia), former deputy leader and spokesman of Al-Shabaab, for example, stated that Al-Qaeda is the mother of the holy war in Somalia: "We are negotiating how we can unite into one, and we will take our orders from Sheikh Osama bin Laden because we are his students". Similarly, in a statement made in January 2010, Al-Shabaab stated that the "Jihad in the Horn of Africa must be combined with the international jihad led by the Al-Qaeda network"[142].

---

[140] *Crenshaw M.* The Causes of Terrorism: Comparative Politics. 1981. № 4. P. 379–399.

[141] *Mugabi B.* Al-Shabaab terror activities: a threat to regional & international security // Asia and Africa Today. 2021. № 4. P. 66.

[142] France 24. Trading bullets for ballots, former al Shabaab No. 2 tests Somalia's democratic process. https://www.france24.com/en/20181125-somalia-elections-al-shabaab-former-deputy-candidate-democracy-mukhtar-robow. [Accessed date: 16.07.2023].

Al-Shabaab's growing friendship with Al-Qaeda had profound effects on its structure, targets, and operational strategy. Until 2008, Al-Shabaab used relatively conventional guerrilla tactics in its attacks against the invading Ethiopian forces. However, the group's increasing ties with Al-Qaeda have led it down the path of suicide attacks as a means of achieving its objectives, and the group has claimed responsibility for several bombings, including suicide attacks in central, northern Somalia and Mogadishu[143].

As part of Al-Shabaab's transnational activities, Abdullah was allegedly part of an Al-Shabaab operation dubbed "Jerusalem will never be Judaized", which was launched in response to the Trump administration's decision to move its embassy in Israel to the city of Jerusalem**[144]**. Further investigations on Abdullah portrayed that he was being directed by a senior Al-Shabaab terrorist who was responsible for the 2019 coordinated attack on a luxury hotel and office complex in the Kenyan capital Nairobi.

Al-Shabab's explosive attacks led to AMISOM application of three lessons in Urban Warfare as stated former Ugandan contingent commander Brig. Paul Lokech who outlined them as follows.

1. First study the people, one must understand the enemy in detail from a military and political sense, but also from a cultural sense.

2. Second know the territory, key terrain in a city is the micro level one shouldn't rely of street signs and most buildings as warfare points rather use prominent buildings and monuments instead since they usually remain intact.

3. Finally, one ought to study the opposition weapon and equipment. It's important to understand if the equipment's in question can be employed in an urban environment. These lessons and more enabled AMISOM to liberate Mogadishu since it was one of the strong holds for Al-Shabaab.

---

[143] JSOU. Countering the al-Shabaab Insurgency in Somalia: Lessons for U.S. Special Operations Forces. 2014. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111shrg49640/html/CHRG-111shrg49640.htm [Accessed .16.07.2023].
[144] BBC. FBI accuses man of al-Shabab-led '9/11-style' plot. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55340294. [Accessed date: 16.07.2023].

Al-Shabaab Leadership. Al-Shabaab's leadership is firmly established, with Ahmed Diriye as its emir since September 2014, following the death of the group's founder, Ahmed Godane, in a U.S. airstrike. The primary leadership entity is the executive council, consisting of 7–14 members, complemented by a consultative shura that does not have formal decision-making power. Although al-Shabaab recruits locally, its executive council has traditionally been composed of Somalis, with clan identities playing a significant role in its makeup. Despite rejecting clannism, the executive council's structure roughly follows the 4.5 clan balance formula, which distributes power among the four major Somali clans and includes some representation for other clans[145].

The current leaders of al-Shabaab have a more indigenous background, with their key experiences rooted in Somalia. Unlike previous leaders, they have had minimal interaction with global jihadist figures and limited exposure to functioning societies outside Somalia. Their identity is shaped by Somalia's history of state collapse, foreign interventions, and the evolution of al-Shabaab. Emir Diriye favors a consensus-based approach to decision-making, differing from the authoritative style of his predecessor, Godane[146].

Initially, there were doubts about Diriye's ability to unify the group, but he has managed to keep the organization cohesive. The current executive council operates with limited internal conflicts, though there have been signs of power struggles, particularly involving Mahad Karate. Prominent leaders within al-Shabaab have included Mahad Karate, Abukar Ali Aden, Hussein Ali Fiidow, and Ali Dheere.

Figure 4.

Diagram showing Al-Shabaab Operations by Type.

---

[145] Stanford. Centre for International Security and Cooperation // Al Shabaab. URL: https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-shabaab [Accessed date: 15.01.2024].
[146] Hummel K. The 2022 Somali offensive against Al-Shabaab: Making enduring gains will require learning from previous failures. URL: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2022-somali-offensive-against-al-shabaab-making-enduring-gains-will-require-learning-from-previous-failures/ [Accessed date: 15.01.2024].

Al-Shabaab Operations by Type

Source: Intelligence Fusion. The Threat of Al-Shabaab to Somalia in 2019. https://www.intelligencefusion.co.uk/insights/resources/intelligence-reports/the-threat-of-al-shabaab-to-somalia-in-2019/.

Table 2

Al-Shabaab's Transnational Attacks, 2010 - 2019

Date of Attack	Nature of Attack	Registered Victims
July 11, 2010	Simultaneous suicide bombings in Kampala	74+ Killed, 85+ wounded
September 21, 2013	Attack on Westgate mall in Nairobi Kenya	68 killed
June 16, 2014	Attacks on several targets in the Kenya town of Mpeketoni	49+ Killed
November 22, 2014	Attack on bus with 50 passengers who were travelling from Mandera to Nairobi	28 killed
January 15,2019	Militants besieged the five star Dusit D2 Hotel in Nairobi	21 killed

Source; Compiled by author from Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabaab

Table 3

A Comparative Statistical Demonstration of Somali, Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan Internally Displaced Persons from 2015 – 2022

Year	Country of Origin	Persons
2015	Somalia	1,223,000
2015	Democratic Republic of Congo	1,500,000
2015	South Sudan	1,697,000
2016	Somalia	1,107,000
2016	Democratic Republic of Congo	2,230,000
2016	South Sudan	1,854,000
2017	Somalia	825,000
2017	Democratic Republic of Congo	4,480,000
2017	South Sudan	1,899,000
2018	Somalia	2,648,000
2018	Democratic Republic of Congo	5,512,000
2018	South Sudan	1,352,000
2019	Somalia	2,648,000
2019	Democratic Republic of Congo	5,512,000
2019	South Sudan	1,352,000
2021	Somalia	2,968,000
2021	Democratic Republic of Congo	5,339,000
2021	South Sudan	1,369,000
2022	Somalia	3,864,000
2022	Democratic Republic of Congo	5,686,000
2022	South Sudan	1,475,000

Source: UNHCR website. Refugee Data Finder. https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=sTK2c9

Conclusion

Al-Shabaab is recognized as a terrorist organization by numerous governments and international bodies, including the United States, the United Nations, the African Union, and the European Union.

Al-Shabaab is a complex organization with a multifaceted identity. Unlike many other actors in the conflict, its leaders share core religious and political beliefs, emphasizing their superiority over the Somali government, opposition to foreign interventions, and the establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia based on Sharia law. Its adversaries include the Somali Federal Government, AMISOM, Turkey, and the United States.

Al-Shabaab aims to expel foreign forces, defeat the Somali Federal

Government and Federal Member States, and establish an Islamic state in Somalia according to its interpretation of Islam. The organization combines insurgency, terrorism, shadow governance, and mafia-like activities. While some senior figures have become power-hungry or motivated by greed, others remain ideologically driven.

CHAPTER II: REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN SOMALIA

2.1. The Role of the African Union in the Fight against Terrorism in Somalia

Role of the African Union Peace and Security Council

Ugandan President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni have campaigned for regional peacekeeping as a key component of Africa's peace building efforts. "Pan African principles have guided Uganda's involvement," he said, adding that "African challenges may best be tackled through African-based solutions". His reference to Pan African principles may help to explain why, despite Al-Shabaab threats and transnational attacks targeting troop contributing countries, African countries dominate most of the peacekeeping bodies in Somalia[147].

When looking at the African Union's participation in the war against terrorism in Somalia, it's crucial to know where the organization's authority comes from. The African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the body in charge of conflict prevention, management, and settlement. It's an important part of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which is the umbrella term for the African Union's principal instruments for achieving peace, security, and stability[148].

The PSC was established as a collective security and "early warning" mechanism designed to enable swift and effective responses to conflicts and crises. Its primary duties include conducting early warning and preventive diplomacy, facilitating peacemaking, setting up peace-support operations, and, in some cases, recommending actions within Member States to enhance peace, security, and stability[149].

Additionally, the PSC assists with peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction,

---

[147] *Mugabi B.* Al-Shabaab terror activities: a threat to regional & international security // Asia and Africa Today. 2021. № 4. P. 66.

[148] *Васильев А.М.* Африка и вызовы XXI в. М.: «Восточная литература» РАН, 2012. С. 374

[149] *Коновалов И.П., Шубин Г.В.* Современная Африка: войны и оружие / И.П. Коновалов, Г.В. Шубин. М.: «Социально-политическая мысль». 2012. С. 476.

humanitarian aid, and disaster relief. Its authority is derived from Article 20 of the Constitutive Act and Article 2 of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Council[150].

Key powers of the PSC under Article 7 of the Protocol include:

• foreseeing and preventing conflicts and wars, as well as policies that might lead to genocide and crimes against humanity;

• engaging in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace-support missions.

For a long time, continental efforts to combat terrorism have been in place. In 1992, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) passed a Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States during its 28th Ordinary Session in Dakar, Senegal, committing the Union to fighting extremism and terrorism[151].

At its 30th Ordinary Session in Tunis, Tunisia, in June 1994, the OAU issued the Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations. This declaration condemned all forms of extremism and terrorism, whether driven by sectarianism, tribalism, ethnicity, or religion. It also classified all terrorist activities, techniques, and practices as criminal and committed to enhancing cooperation to combat them[152].

During the 35th Ordinary Session of the OAU Summit in Algiers, Algeria, in July 1999, the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism was adopted. The Convention required States Parties to criminalize terrorist activities under their national laws as defined by the Convention. It established state jurisdiction over terrorist activities, provided a legal framework for extradition, extra-territorial investigations, and mutual legal assistance, and outlined

---

[150] African Union. 22nd Meeting, 5th, January 2005. Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Support of the African Union to the Transitional Institutions in Somalia. AUC PSC/PR/2 (XXII).https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/2420/2005_22_PR_R1E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[151] Ibid.

[152] African Union. 12 to 14 July 1999; Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Council (Durban: AU, 2002), Art. 7-8. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

areas of collaboration among states. The Convention took effect in December 2002, and 40 countries have ratified it to date.

The AU High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa, held in Algiers in September 2002, adopted the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism to give concrete expression to Member State's commitments and obligations under the 1999 Convention and other international instruments. The Plan of Action proposed actual CT measures that significantly addressed Africa's security concerns, including police and border control, legislative and judicial measures, terrorism financing, and information exchange[153].

The African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in Algiers in 2004 as part of the implementation of the Acton Plan of 2002 to serve as a structure for centralizing information, studies, and analyses on terrorism and terrorist groups, as well as developing Counter-Terrorism capacity building programs[154].

The ACSRT also serves as a venue for Member States and Regional Mechanisms to engage and collaborate. The Center plays a key role in guiding the African Union's CT initiatives, and it collaborates with a number of regional and international partners to ensure that CT efforts across the continent are coherent and coordinated[155].

The African Union Peace Keeping Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). On January 19, 2007, the African Union Peace and Security Council established the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) also authorized the Mission through Resolution 1744 (2007).

---

[153] African Union. 9 July 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. Addis Ababa: African Union Commission. Articles 3 (a, b, f), 6(a). https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[154] African Union. 28 February 2004. Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security. Article 13. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-en.pdf [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[155] *Baldwin D.A.* The concept of security //Review of international studies. 1997. Vol. 23. № 1. P. 5–26.

Initially mandated for six months, AMISOM's mandate has been extended multiple times, including until November 30, 2015, by UNSC Resolution 2182 of October 24, 2014, which also modified aspects of the Somalia sanctions regime. AMISOM's mission was to support Somalia's dialogue and reconciliation efforts and provide security for key infrastructure and Federal institutions[156].

AMISOM was also expected to aid in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan and create the security conditions necessary for humanitarian aid delivery. The UNSC Resolution 2182 permitted AU Member States to maintain a maximum force of 22,126 troops[157]. Since August 2014, AMISOM military and police contingents have been present. Somalia recognizes the Mission's achievements, including securing the airport, the port, the presidential palace, and the road connecting the presidential compounds.

The development and mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) must be understood in light of the ongoing failure to deploy IGASOM following the IGAD meeting in March 2006. On January 19, 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established to demonstrate regional commitment to the fight against terrorism and the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia. AMISOM has had collaboration between the troop-contributing countries, unlike the divides that restricted IGASOM's deployment[158].

Since then, AMISOM provided professional training to Somalia's national forces, aided in the political transition, supplied humanitarian aid, and launched powerful operational operations against Al-Shabaab strongholds. AMISOM was regarded as a neutral party to the crisis from the moment it intervened, having engaged with Somali transitional leaders.

---

[156] African Union. Guideline on the Role of the African Standby Force (ASF).https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/01-asf-in-hands-guidelines.pdf [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[157] UNSC. Resolution 2182 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7286th meeting, on 24 October 2014. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2182 [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[158] AMISOM. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2628 has authorized the African Union Peace and Security Council to reconfigure AMISOM and replace it with the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), with effect from 1 April 2022. https://amisom-au.org/amisom-background/ [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

When the possibility of removing AMISOM soldiers was discussed, the international community urged troop-contributing countries and the Somali government to keep troops on the ground, citing the potential for insecurity as a result of their withdrawal. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) continued to work closely with AMISOM to ensure that security responsibilities were transferred from AMISOM to Somali security forces[159].

AMISOM Force Organization. The AMISOM force was divided into several sectors that were in charge of different areas and these sectors were led by different contingent forces so each sector was over seen by a separate contingent force as shall be observed below[160].

- **Sector 1.** This was initially headquartered in Mogadishu and predominantly under the domain of the Ugandan Contingent. This sector covered the Banadir, Middle Shabelle and Lower Shabelle regions.

- **Sector 2**. This was headquartered in Kismayu and predominantly under the domain of the Kenyan Defense Forces it was to work with the anticipated Sierra Leone contingent. This sector covered the Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba regions.

- **Sector 3**. This was headquartered in Baidoa and predominantly under the supervision of the Burundian contingent. This basically covered the Bay and Bakool regions.

- **Sector 4.** This was headquartered in BeletWeyne and was under the responsibility of the Djiboutian contingent. This was required to cover the Hiraan region.

It's worth noting that later, UN Security Council resolution 2124 of 12

---

[159] *Lotze W.* Strengthening African peace support operations. Berlin: German Peace Operations Center (ZIF). 2013. http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Walter_Lotze_Dec_2013.pdf [Accessed date. 23.05.2023].

[160] AMISOM. AMISOM Military Component. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2628 has authorized the African Union Peace and Security Council to reconfigure AMISOM and replace it with the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), with effect from 1 April 2022. https://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/ . [Accessed date. 23.05.2023].

November 2013 authorized a troop increase to 22,126 through the inclusion of an Ethiopian contingent. This therefore took effect starting January 2014, when the Sector organization was modified to[161]:

- **Sector 1.** This covered regions of Mogadishu, Banadir and Lower Shabelle. The contingent in charge was the Uganda Peoples Defense Forces.

- **Sector 2.** Regions covered included Dobhey, Lower and Middle Juba. The Kenya Defense Forces contingent, with the Sierra Leon contingent were in charge of this operation. Initially the two forces Kenyan and Sierra Leon also operated in a Sector Kismayu' until they left so as to be replaced by the Ethiopian troops in January 2016.

- **Sector 3.** The regions covered here included Baidoa, Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions overseen by the Ethiopian contingent.

- **Sector 4**. The regions covered here include BeletWeyne, Hiiraan region under the supervision of the Djiboutian contingent.

- **Sector 5.** The regions covered under this sector included Jowhar and Middle Shabelle region. These regions were under the supervision of the Burundi contingent.

It's imperative to also mention that in January 2017 Kismayo was mentioned as a separate sector. This was to be known as sector 6 which was under Col. Paul Njema of the Kenyan Defense Forces and later replaced by Col Frederic Ndayisaba. Sector 6 became a multinational sector composed of Burundian, Kenyan and Ethiopian troops based in Kismayo[162].

Figure 5. A Map of Somalia Showing all the sectors of AMISOM and their Contingents

---

[161] United Nations. UN Security Council Resolution. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2124 [Accessed 21.06.2022].

[162]*Gelot L.* Civilian protection in Africa: How the protection of civilians is being militarized by African policymakers and diplomats //Contemporary Security Policy. 2017. Vol. 38.№ 1.P.161–173.

Source; Above Top Secret; AMISOM may fall apart if EU Cannot Settle Funding Issues With the AU. https://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread1176438/pg1

Table 4

AMISOM Troop Contributing Countries

Country	Armed Personnel		Year of Deployment
	Military	**Police**	
Uganda	6,223	201	March 2007
Burundi	5,432		December 2007
Ethiopia	4,395		January 1, 2014
Kenya	3,664	48	February 22nd ,2012
Djibouti	960		December 2011
Republic of Sierra Leon	850		
Federal Republic of Nigeria		200	
Republic of Ghana		56	
Total	21,524	552	

Source: AMISOM official website. https://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/
In view of the above data the following can be said.

Uganda: With 6,223 troops overall, Uganda has made a major contribution to AMISOM since its founding in March 2007. Uganda's commitment to regional

peace and security initiatives in Somalia is demonstrated by its early involvement.

Burundi: Burundi also contributed significantly to AMISOM, sending 5,432 soldiers there in December 2007. This indicates Burundi's readiness to take part in international initiatives aimed at bringing Somalia under control and countering extremism in the area.

Ethiopia: Ethiopia deployed 4,395 troops to AMISOM on January 1, 2014, joining the organization after Burundi and Uganda. Ethiopia's engagement demonstrates its willingness to support regional stability initiatives as well as its awareness of the security ramifications of the unrest in neighboring Somalia. It should also be noted that Ethiopia's first deployment was in 2006 before AMISOM peace keeping mission had started.

Kenya: On February 22, 2012, Kenya sent 3,664 troops to participate in AMISOM. Kenya's decision to send troops to AMISOM was probably motivated by its close proximity to Somalia as well as its own security worries about cross-border threats from Al-Shabaab.

Djibouti: With 960 soldiers stationed, Djibouti began its participation in AMISOM in December 2011. Djibouti may have been encouraged to participate in the expedition due to its strategic location close to Somalia and its desire to reduce security hazards in the area.

The AMISOM troop contributing countries such as Republic of Sierra Leon, Federal Republic of Nigeria and Republic of Ghana are the major exceptions given that they don't come from the East African region where the threat of Al-Shabaab is more eminent.

Table 5

AMISOM Force commanders from 2007 to 2021

Names of Force commanders	Nationality		Time frame			Notes	
Head	Deputy	Head	Deputy	Head	Deputy	Head	Deputy
Maj. Gen Levi Karuhanga	Maj. Gen. Juvenal Niyoyunguruza	Uganda	Burundi	14th February 2007 – 3rd March 2008	December 2007 - August 2009	Foreign Trainings from Egypt, China, Nigeria and Kenya. Died in 2015 serving as	Killed in suicide bomb blast at AMISOM headquarters on 17 September 2009
Maj. Gen Francis okello.	Maj. Gen. Cyprien Hakiza	Uganda	Burundi	3rd March 2008 – 7th July 2009	August 2009 – April 2010	Uganda's Current Head of National Defence College	
Maj. Gen Nathan Mugisha	Maj. Gen. Maurice Gateretse 2.Maj. Gen. AudaceNduw umunsi	Uganda	1. Burundi 2. Burundi	7th July 2009 – 15th June 2011	April 2010 June 2010	Currently Uganda's Deputy Head of Mission Somalia	
Maj Gen Fred Mugisha	Maj. Gen. Salvatore Harushimana	Uganda	Burundi	15th June 2011 - 2nd May 2012	2011 – 2013	Received Foreign trainings in Soviet Union, Tanzania, USA, China, Egypt, India and South Africa	
Lt Gen. Andrew Gutti	Maj. Gen. Salvatore Harushimana	Uganda	Burundi	3rd May 2011 - 16th Dec 2012	2011 2012	Current Chairman Court Martial	
L.T. Gen. Silas Ntingurirwa	Maj. Gen. Simon N. Karanja Maj. Gen. Geoffrey BarabaMuhees	Burundi	1.Kenya 2. Uganda	16 December 2013 - 15th December 2014	9 April 2012 - December 2013		

Lt. Gen. Jonathon KipkemoiRono	Maj. Gen. Francis KimeuNthenge	KENYA	KENYA	December 2014 – December 2015	November 2013 – September 2013		
Lt. Gen. Osman Noor Soubagleh	Maj. Gen. Mohammed EshaZeyinu	Djibouti	Ethiopia	18th July 2016	30th September 2016		
Lt. Gen. Jim Beesigye Owoyesigire	Maj. Gen. Charles Tai Gituai	Uganda	Kenya	31 January 2018 - 31st January 2019	February 2018 - February 2019		
Lt. Gen. TigabuYilma Wondimh unegn	Lt. Gen. James NakibusLakara	Ethiopia	Uganda	January 2019 August 2020	February 2019		
Lt. Gen. Diomede Ndegeya	1.Maj. Gen. George Owinow 2. Maj. Gen.	Burundi	Kenya Ethiopia	August 2020 December 2021	September 2020 January 2021 – December 2021		

Source: Compiled by the Author using information from AMISOM website. https://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/

The above table clearly shows a list of AMISOM commanders from 2007 – 2021, goes on to indicate the countries they come from and when they took charge. Based on the data provided, Uganda has had more representation of contingent and force commanders followed by Burundi. The same countries have the highest numbers in as far as troop contributing countries are concerned and were still the first countries to contribute their troops as part of AMISOM peacekeepers. However even with the extended levels of training seniority and mandate given to the AMISOM military leadership. Al-Shabaab though weakened remains a security threat not only to Somalia but even to the neighboring countries.

Table 6

RELEVANT UNSCR ON AMISOM AND SOMALIA

UNSCR	DATE ADOPTED	KEY DECISIONS
RESOLUTION 1744	FEBRUARY 20TH 2007	Authorizing the establishment of AMISOM within six months, with the mandate of protecting the Transitional Federal Government
RESOLUTION 1772	August 20, 2007	Renewal and extension of AMISOM's mandate by six months. It also resolved to take action against parties threatening AMISOM, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Somali peace process
RESOLUTION 1801	February 29th 2008	Renewal and extension of AMISOM's mandate by six months. It also authorized the mission to take necessary measures in order to ensure the security of key infrastructures
RESOLUTION 1831	August 19th 2008	Renewal of AMIOSM Mandate
RESOLUTION 1844	November 20th 2008	Calling upon states to prevent individuals threatening Somalia's TFG and AMISOM from entering into or transiting their territories
RESOLUTION 1863	July 9th 2009	Renewal of AMISOM Mandate
Resolution 1910	January 28, 2010	Extension of AMISOM's mandate to 31 January 2011.
Resolution 1964	December 22, 2010	Extension of AMISOM's deployment to 30 September 2011. It also recommended that the mission's strength be increased from 8,000 to 12,000 troops.
Resolution 2002	July 29, 2011	Imposition of tough sanctions against parties threatening the security of Somalia, obstructing the inflow of humanitarian assistance, and those violating an arms embargo and international law in the country
Resolution 2010	September 30, 2011	Extension of the deployment of AMISOM troops until 31 October 2012
Resolution 2036	February 22, 2012	Widening of AMISOM's operational scope to four sectors as set out in the Strategic Concept of 5 January 2012. It also boosted AMISOM's force strength from 12,000 to a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel, comprised mainly of troops and personnel of FPU
Resolution 2073	November 7, 2012	Renewal of AMISOM for four months and expansion of the UN logistical support package for the mission to include funding for an additional 50 civilian personnel
Resolution 2093	March 6, 2013	Called on the Secretary-General to continue to provide a logistical support package for AMISOM, for a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel until 28 February 2014 and to ensure the accountability and transparency of expenditure of the UN funds as set out in paragraph 4 of Resolution 1910
Resolution 2102	May 2, 2013	Establishment of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)
Resolution 2124	November 12, 2013	Extension of AMISOM's mandate and increase of its force strength from 17,731 to a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel, until 31 October 2014
Resolution 2158	May 29, 2014	Extension of UNSOM's mandate for a period of 12 months
Resolution 2182	October 24, 2014	Extension of AMISOM's mandate until 30 October 2015. The Council reiterated that the arms embargo on Somalia shall not apply to deliveries

		of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training, intended solely for the development of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia
Resolution 2221	May 26, 2015	Extension of UNSOM's mandate until 7 August 2015
Resolution 2232	July 28, 2015	The Council emphasized the importance of continuing offensive operations against Al-Shabaab
Resolution 2245	November 9, 2015	UNSOA changes to UNSOS and is responsible for support to AMISOM, UNSOM and the Somali National Army
Resolution 2289	May 27, 2016	Authorizing a short technical rollover of AMISOM until 8 July 2016. This is aimed at allowing Council members time to assess the results of their 17-22 May Somalia-focused visiting mission to the Horn of Africa and the possible implications for the AMISOM mandate
Resolution 2297	July 7, 2016	Extension of AMISOM's mandate until 31 May 2017
Resolution 2346	March 23, 2017	Extension of the mandate of the UNSOM until 16 June 2017
Resolution 2355	May 26, 2017	Extension of AMISOM's authorization until 31 August 2017 with a maximum strength of 22,126 uniformed personnel.

Source: Compiled by the Author using United Nations and AMISOM websites. https://www.un.org/en/. https://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/

The table above indicates resolutions from the UN Security Council concerning Somalia over a considerable amount of time. These resolutions probably cover a broad spectrum of political, security, humanitarian, and human rights issues related to the circumstances in Somalia. The key decisions of these resolutions are also mentioned.

The above-mentioned UN Security Council resolutions generally represent the efforts of the international community to address the country's long-running conflict, instability, and humanitarian issues. They could include actions to combat terrorism and piracy, foster peace and security, assist state-building and governance endeavors, facilitate humanitarian aid, and bolster international support for Somalia's recovery and development.

Every resolution that reflects shifting conditions on the ground and global agendas is probably going to build on the ones that came before it. These resolutions are also a reflection of the Security Council's cooperation with regional bodies like the African Union and its attempts to coordinate global reactions to the Somalia crisis.

To conduct a thorough examination of these resolutions, it would be necessary to look into their precise goals, language, state of execution, and practical effects. Furthermore, examining the resolutions reflects on the coherence, efficacy, and limitations of the international community's response to Somalia and offers important insights into the larger prospects and challenges in dealing with the country's conflict and instability.

Table 7

Showing AMISOM Budget summary, 2013 – 2016

Budget Line	2013	2014	2015	2016
Military component	226,809,726	270,261,584	278,879,302	281,506,596
Police component	18,905,880	29,492,320	12,648,120	18,962,080
Civilian Component	14,107,535	12,298,257	16,891,673	14,744,429
Operational Cost	12,230,647	12,919,064	12,796,702	14,629,113
Other Support	2,255,000	8,248,578	4,943,579	4,958,444
Program Projects	6,213,976	8,393,661	6,595,041	19,664,012
Grand Total	280,522,763	341,613,464	332,754,413	354,464,673

Source: Williams P. D. Fighting for Peace in Somalia: Oxford University Press, 2018.

All things considered, the data points to a dynamic resource allocation across various military and security operation components, reflecting shifting security challenges, shifting priorities, and initiatives to improve operational effectiveness and efficiency. However even with the above stated budget allocation which is mostly funded by the European Union counter- terrorism financing as indicated in the AMISOM budget is not sufficient and should be enhanced with more initiatives based on good political will.

Table 8

Showing Operational Challenges of AMISOM

1. Contingents spread across sector boundaries	2. Inadequate force protection equipment	3.Reliance on local interpreters inhibits operational security	4. Lack of command and control system betweenAMISOM and SNA
5. Inadequate communications	6. Inadequate medical care and training	7. No Hand over/Take over procedures for officers during rotation	8. Absence of DDR-SSR coordination
9. Inadequate force Multipliers	10. Lack of night Casualty evacuation capability	11. No plan for Military draw down and increase in FPUs	12. Inter clan and political conflicts
13. Inadequate maritime security capabilities	14. Strategy to open the MSRs	15. Absence of stabilization plan	16. Lack of proper human resource management for the SNA
17. Insufficiently agile logistics support	18. Inadequate Coordination between AMISOM and Partners	19. Inadequate QIPs in liberated areas	20. Insufficient SNA Support
21. Limited night Fighting capabilities	22. Lack of rapidly deployable reserve Unit	23. Lack of infrastructure development plan	24. Lack of militia integration plan
25. Inadequate spare parts for maintenance	26. Old, outdated maps	27. Insufficient force levels	28. Lack of strategic vision for 2016 elections

Source: Williams P. D. Fighting for Peace in Somalia. : Oxford University Press, 2018.

In Conclusion. The African Union (AU) and its peacekeeping mission in Somalia, known as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), have played a significant role in attempting to restore peace and stability to the war-torn nation. Since its inception in 2007, AMISOM has been tasked with various mandates, including supporting the Somali government, combating insurgency, and facilitating humanitarian assistance.

There is little doubt that AMISOM's presence has helped to reduce conflict and offer some level of stability in some regions. It has assisted in reducing the

power of extremist organizations like Al-Shabaab and helped stabilize areas that the Somali government controls bit by bit. Furthermore, the operation has given the Somali National Army (SNA) vital training and capacity-building support, improving its ability to handle security issues on its own.

Notwithstanding these endeavors, the peacekeeping force has encountered many obstacles that have restricted its efficacy in attaining enduring peace in Somalia. The conflict's intricate and deeply ingrained nature, which is marked by long-standing political rivalries, clan dynamics, and governance concerns, is one of its main problems. Since security is the main focus of AMISOM's mandate, it has had difficulty addressing larger governance and socioeconomic challenges that are essential to long-term stability.

Moreover, AMISOM has faced logistical challenges that have limited its capacity to completely carry out its mandate, including as a lack of supplies, machinery, and personnel. Insurgent organizations like Al-Shabaab have also posed a serious security threat to the mission, killing peacekeeping personnel, and impairing their ability to carry out their duties.

The inability of the nation's providing troops to coordinate and cooperate with the Somali government and other foreign players involved in the peace process in Somalia has also impeded AMISOM's efficacy. The absence of a cohesive approach and well-defined withdrawal plan has exacerbated the challenges in attaining enduring peace.

In conclusion, despite the African Union's and AMISOM's admirable efforts to advance stability and peace in Somalia, a number of internal and external reasons have hindered the mission's success. A multimodal strategy will be needed to solve these issues, including improving stakeholder cooperation, tackling socioeconomic gaps, fortifying governance frameworks, and guaranteeing sufficient funding and support for peacekeeping efforts. Somalia can only become a more peaceful and peaceful nation by making consistent and coordinated efforts.

2.2. IGAD in the Framework of Peace Building

With its organizational principles and objectives. IGAD has a well-established working and decision-making framework, as outlined in Articles 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the Agreement, to ensure efficiency and successful performance of its purpose. The Assembly of the Heads of States and Government is at the very top of the organizational hierarchy, with the primary task of making policies, controlling, and directing the organization's functions[163].

The Council of Ministers, which is made up of Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the Member States, is the next level of decision-making after the Assembly and is tasked with providing advice to the Assembly as well as reviewing the organization's operations through the Secretariat. The Committee of Ambassadors and the Secretariat are the other two institutions, and they are in the duty of advising the Executive Secretary and carrying out the Executive Secretary's decisions, respectively[164].

Informed by one of its founding principles, that of peaceful settlement of inter and intrastate conflicts, and with the aim of promoting peace and stability in the conflict-prone Horn of Africa region, IGAD has been involved in the management of the intrastate conflicts in the region. Notably, IGAD remained visible in the management of Sudan, which resulted in the establishment of the Republic of South Sudan in 2011. In the recent past, IGAD has been engaged in negotiating the South Sudan Conflict that has been ongoing since 2013 [165]. The focus is however not on South Sudan but rather on IGAD's efforts in the management of the Somali conflict as discussed in the subsequent sections.

---

[163] IGAD. January 2016. Regional Strategy Volume 1: THE FRAMEWORK Intergovernmental Authority on Development- IGAD. https://igad.int/download/igad-regional-strategy-volume-1-the-framework-en-fr/ [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[164] IGAD. 30 JANUARY 2011 'Communiqué of the 17th Extra-Ordinary Summit of IGAD Heads of State and Government on Somalia'. https://igad.int/wp-content/uploads/ 2011/01/283_Communique-of-the-17TH-Summit.pdf. [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[165] IGAD. Report on Lessons for IGAD Mediation Arising from the South Sudan Peace Talks 2013-2015. https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/lessons-igad-mediation-arising-south-sudan-peace-talks-2013-2015 [Accessed date: 10.05.2024].

IGAD and the peace process in Somalia. IGAD's commitment to Somalia's restoration of order cannot be overstated. It is crucial to remember, however, that the international community began attempting to control the conflict in 1992 with the commencement of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM-I). UNOSOM-I was established as the first humanitarian intervention by the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 751, 767, and 775, with the restrictive purpose of constructing humanitarian corridors and peace zones to facilitate relief distribution to the affected population. The intervention not only failed to meet its very narrow mandate due to a delay in its introduction and limited resources, but it was also criticized for exacerbating the crisis by offering warlords a sense of legitimacy that they rarely deserved.

In response, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 814, establishing UNOSOM-II with a broader mandate that overlapped with a unilateral US deployment, United Task Force Somalia (UNITAF). Both initiatives failed to bring peace to Somalia, and their withdrawal in 1995 left the country in far worse shape than it had been before the interventions. As a result of Somalia's prolonged lawlessness, neighboring countries (the majority of which are IGAD members) have been forced to launch bilateral and multilateral peace efforts aimed at stabilizing the country and the region[166].

The departure of UN-backed peacekeepers from Somalia came at a time when IGAD Member States decided to resurrect the sub-regional group as IGAD, with a broader purpose that included ensuring regional peace and security. Member States utilized the IGAD banner to launch peace negotiations in Somalia, in contrast to its predecessor, IGAD, whose initial objective did not encompass regional politics, peace, and security as outlined in the IGAD founding Agreement of 1996.

The IGAD Member States therefore needed to focus on state building in Somalia in order to improve Somalia's formalized engagement in international

---

[166] *Mays T.* The African Union's African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Why Did It Successfully Deploy Following the Failure of the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM). Peace operation training institute. 2009. https://www.peaceopstraining.org/cotipso/theses/the-african-unions-african-mission-in-somalia-amisom-why-did-it/ [Accessed date: 08.01.2024].

relations. Furthermore, Somali citizens, particularly those who had been pushed into refugee status in neighboring states, required established institutions of government through which their demands could be met.

Furthermore, political stability and the presence of a legitimate central government in Somalia were expected to counter international terrorism in the region by addressing concerns such as ungoverned spaces that are seen as advantageous hideouts, breeding grounds, and transit places for terrorist groups.

IGAD supported bilateral actions by neighboring countries aimed at stabilizing Somalia. In 2002, however, IGAD took a more formal approach to the Somali crisis by launching a mediation peace process in the Kenyan town of Eldoret. In contrast to previous initiatives such as the Arta and Sodere peace processes, which were marked by the exclusion of certain factions of Somali leadership, 2002-2004 period was seen as more inclusive, taking into account not only elders representing various clans but also warlords whose significant control in various parts of Somalia was acknowledged[167].

In 2004, a drought Transitional Federal Charter was completed after nearly two years of mediation, establishing the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). The TFG Charter, which was envisaged as Somalia's highest legislation, explicitly defined the transitional government's organization. Article 11 of the Charter, for example, called for a decentralized administration with a Transitional Federal Government[168].

The establishment of such a governance structure for Somalia was considered by IGAD as a critical step toward the ultimate stability of Somalia and the Horn of Africa region. After years of chaos and anarchy, TFG gained international acclaim,

---

[167] Status of mission agreement between the transitional federal government of the somali federal republic and the African union mission in Somalia. 6. March. 2007. Status-of-Mission-Agreement-on-AMISOM.pdf (amisom-au.org) [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[168] Transitional Federal Charter of Somali Federal Republic. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SO_040129_Transitional%20Federal%20Charter%20of%20the%20Somali%20Republic.pdf [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

reigniting hopes for political stability and a new beginning in the formation of a state.

However, such dreams were crushed when the newly formed TFG was unable to relocate from Nairobi to Mogadishu, Somalia's capital, and establish an operational base. Exclusion claims and the external nature of the mediation procedure were also recognized as key issues by the TFG. TFG's legitimacy and ability to wield power across Somalia's whole territory were jeopardized by such charges.

In order to restore a central administration and a feeling of normalcy in Somalia, IGAD recognized the need to provide security in support of the TFG. Through the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, IGAD decided to send a peacekeeping mission to Somalia (IGASOM) and sought approval and financial backing from the African Union[169].

The African Union Assembly endorsed the request, recognizing the importance of the peacekeeping mission in facilitating the TFG's transition from Nairobi to Somalia and ensuring the long-term implementation of the mediation process's goals.

To appease Somali MPs who were opposed to the deployment of Ethiopian troops, front line states including Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti were exempted from supplying troops to IGASOM, leaving Uganda and Sudan to contribute troops to the mission. IGASOM was never operationalized, not only because of lack of funding and political commitment on the side of member countries, but also because the founding agreement that did not include an institutional structure to accomplish such a goal.

The Ethiopian government assisted the group's evacuation to Baidoa and then Mogadishu. TFG's shaky credibility was further damaged by the move, which was seen as an Ethiopian enterprise aimed at serving Ethiopian interests. IGAD

---

[169] IGAD REGIONAL STRATEGY VOLUME 2: January 2016. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 2016. – 2020.file:UR:%20IGAD%20RS_implementationplan_final_v6%20(1).pdf [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

maintained TFG as the only legitimate government of Somalia, despite its marginal legitimacy among various factions and failure to exercise its authority nationally, a position that prevented any type of mediation between the Union for Islamic Courts (UIC) and TFG. The UN Security Council's attempt, through Resolution 1775, to have IGAD and the African Union carry out military training for Somalia was similarly hampered by a still-in-effect UN military embargo.

Because the TFG was unable to impose its authority effectively, Somalia increasingly fragmented, posing a threat to regional and global security as ungoverned places became safe havens for nurturing international terrorism. Furthermore, the rise of the Al-Shabaab, a self-proclaimed terror group, increased piracy off the coast of Somalia, and the ever-increasing numbers of refugees seeking shelter are strong evidence of IGAD's inability to restore semblance of normalcy and long-term stability in Somalia.

The African Union then established AMISOM, a peacekeeping mission in Somalia, in response to a suspected drive by terrorist groups to turn ungoverned spaces into breeding grounds for international terrorism, as part of UN Security Council Resolution 1772. The deployment of AMISOM revealed IGAD's institutional failure to resolve notably obstacles to the TFG's establishment of a presence and legitimate authority in Somalia. While appreciating IGAD's achievements in stabilizing Somalia, there are legitimate questions regarding the organization's institutional capability to effectively handle such a complex conflict and assure the restoration of Somalia's state, and hence stability in the Horn of Africa.

Challenges of IGAD. Institutional weaknesses, among other sociopolitical problems, have been linked to IGAD's low success in achieving political stability in Somalia. At least according to the wording of its founding Agreement, IGAD lacked a variety of instruments for dealing with complicated inter and intrastate issues from the start. According to Article 7(g) of the Agreement, the construction of mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution through dialogue would be pursued in order to maintain regional peace and stability. It can thus be

claimed that the Agreement's failure to operationalize IGASOM as planned in 2005 was owing not just to a lack of financial and human resources, but also to a lack of legal institutional underpinning.

The fact that the Somalia war is characterized by amorphous groupings that are constantly changing in terms of actors and interests in the conflict challenges Pacific conflict management strategies such as negotiation and mediation, which are institutionally preferred by IGAD. The Somalia conflict, according to Vinci, is characterized by militia organizations with varying formation goals and clan ties. Because of the ongoing lawlessness, the organizations have morphed and transformed in terms of actors and goals, making any meaningful kind of negotiation difficult. On this basis, Member States with past border conflicts with Somalia, like Ethiopia and Kenya, have periodically launched unilateral military actions to preserve their national interests, which they perceive as being threatened by the prolonged instability and internal dynamics of Somalia[170].

For example, Ethiopia sent its troops in Somalia in 2006 to dislodge the UIC, whereas Kenya engaged in unilateral military action against the Al-Shabaab in 2011. Both states justified their military engagements by citing Article 51 of the UN Charter and acting on the invitation of a legitimate government, respectively.

The failure of some Member States to avoid unilateral military engagements on a collapsing state like Somalia suggests that IGAD is institutionally incapable of controlling activities by its members in relation to regional conflicts. This not only diminishes its legitimacy as an institution, but it also hurts its position as a regional body.

Another institutional barrier that IGAD faced is decision-making inside the organization. As stated in Article 9 (4) of the IGAD Agreement, decisions within IGAD are made by consensus of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Given that Member States' interactions are marked by suspicion and rivalry, as

---

[170] IGAD Security Sector Program. Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat. March,2016 https://igadssp.org/index.php/documentation/4-igad-report-al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security. [Accessed date: 25.10.2020].

discussed earlier, I believe that member states are unlikely to agree to some measures, such as military enforcement, even if it is presumed to be the most appropriate.

The failure of the IGASOM mission in Somalia can be traced back to such a flaw in IGAD's decision-making mechanism[171].

Furthermore, IGAD lacked an organizational judicial entity to resolve disputes among member states and to deal with situations that may necessitate such a strategy. According to Article 7 (g) of the IGAD Agreement, conflict resolution is based on political discussion. However, the Somalia conflict has evolved in terms of participants, concerns, and interests, necessitating a shift in strategy, including the use of judicial proceedings on occasion.

Due to its coastal location and the absence of an effective central government, Somalia has been unable to assert its sovereign rights over its territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone as outlined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The issue is compounded by IGAD's lack of a permanent naval force to address the increasing instances of piracy off Somalia's coast and the absence of a judicial system to prosecute piracy and related crimes such as terrorism. Consequently, countries like Kenya have formed bilateral agreements with Western nations like the United States and international organizations such as the European Union to prosecute Somali pirates, aiming to safeguard their geostrategic and geopolitical interests from the threat of piracy in Somali waters.

Despite the fact that IGAD had legal identity and had formed specialized agencies in accordance with its original purposes, it had extremely limited ability and authority, as all of the specialized agencies are still in their infancy. I believe that if operationalized, the envisioned specialized institutions such IGAD Business Forum, IGAD-Civil Society Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations Forum, and IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union would have a significant impact on

---

[171]IGAD. Communiqué Of the first Interministerial meeting on the Nairobi action plan on durable solutions for Somali refugees and reintegration of returnees in Somalia. https://igad.int/documents [Accessed 22.03.2018].

achieving long-term peace in Somalia's failed state. While the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was regarded as one of IGAD's most complex institutions, it faced the problem of efficiently recognizing potential disputes and resolving them at an early stage. This is because of tense ties among Member States, which prevented critical information from being shared.

Some IGAD Member States experienced historical border skirmishes with Somalia since their independence in the early 1960s, as previously mentioned in this study. The OAU's adoption of the uti possidetis concept, which required states to inherit the colonial entity's existing borders in the same state as they were at independence, did not alleviate the problems, particularly in Somalia. The vision of a Greater Somalia was supported, leading in ongoing border tensions with Kenya and Ethiopia, which occasionally exploded into inter-state violence, most notably in the Shifta and Ogaden wars.

Sharing enough and trustworthy information, which is important for CERWARN's successful implementation, became increasingly difficult as a result of these strained connections. As states focus on alliance creation and power play by offering help to liberation movements and other sorts of opposition groups in neighboring states, suspicion and rivalry among IGAD Member Nations are blamed for the continued internationalization of domestic issues. For instance, Sudan backed the Lord's Resistant Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda, whereas Uganda backed the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), according to Adar. In Somalia, for example, IGAD members hindered each other's unilateral peace measures in the early phases of the conflict. Kenya's 1996 unilateral approach was harmed by Ethiopia's more inclusive Sodere effort. The IGAD's ineffectiveness in restoring political stability in Somalia is partially to blame for member countries political skepticism and mistrust.

2.3. Role of EAC Member States in the Fight Against Al-Shabaab

Despite efforts to see that this promise is kept, the struggle against terrorism and the promotion of peace, safety, and security within the East African Community Partner States has remained elusive. East Africans agree that peace and security are per-requisites to social and economic growth within the Community." Al- Shabaab's transnational actions have harmed not only regional peace, but also social and economic reform. This chapter will look at how different East African Community and regional partner countries have dealt with the threat of Al-Shabaab terrorism.

As of 2018[172], below is how some of the East African member countries most affected by Al-Shabaab dealt with the subject of terrorism and counter-terrorism.

Somalia. Somalia remains the primary country in the region where Al-Shabaab has its most powerful bases and can carry out its deadly operations while dominating a large area.

In 2018, AMISOM, the Somali National Army (SNA), and the United States, along with other armed partner operations, exerted significant pressure on Al-Shabaab. Despite these efforts, the terrorist group continued to control large areas of Somalia[173]. Al-Shabaab retained its capacity to execute high-profile attacks using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, mortars, and small arms.

ISIS-Somalia, another violent non-state actor mainly operating in Puntland, expanded its activities and gained influence in Mogadishu through intimidation and extortion, all while declaring conflict with Al-Shabaab.

Somalia persisted as a sanctuary for terrorists, despite military actions and law enforcement efforts that led to several arrests and convictions. Terrorists exploited

---

[172] African Union Peace and Security Council. 'Communiqué Adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU). https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/comm.1108-en.pdf. [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[173] United Nations office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA. Global Humanitarian overview report, 10 December 2020.file:///C:/Users/mentor/Downloads/GHO2021_EN.pdf. [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

their relative freedom of movement within Somalia and neighboring countries, particularly Kenya, to gather supplies, recruit fighters, and plan operations.

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) tackled security challenges through its Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS), partnering with the international community, including military and law enforcement agencies, at federal, state (FMS), and local levels.

In 2018, both ISIS-Somalia and Al-Shabaab used asymmetric tactics against AMISOM and Somali security forces, targeting members of parliament, government officials, and softer targets such as hotels, restaurants, and cafes that had fewer security measures[174].

Al-Shabaab frequently employed suicide bombers, ambush tactics, targeted assassinations, and mortar attacks throughout the country. The group regularly executed large-scale assaults to overrun AMISOM or Somali National Army (SNA) bases, enabling them to seize weapons, ammunition, uniforms, and other equipment to replenish their supplies.

Meanwhile, the Islamic State in Somalia (ISIS-Somalia) conducted a series of roadside improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, small arms attacks, suicide bombings, and targeted assassinations. These operations were notably prevalent in Bosasso, a town in Puntland, and the Bakara Market area of Mogadishu, as well as in smaller towns.

The following are some other notable incidents:

On November 25, 2021, Al-Shabaab launched attacks on Somali and AMISOM forces in Lower and Middle Shabelle[175]. In Balaad village, they ambushed an AMISOM convoy, killing at least seven Burundian soldiers, damaging several vehicles, and seizing logistics equipment and weapons. Concurrently, a car bomb

---

[174] African Union Peace and Security Council. 30 NOVEMBER 2022, 'Communiqué of the 29th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/1123.comm-en.pdf [Accessed date: 06.03.2023].

[175] V.A. Africa. Somali Governor Says AU Soldiers Killed Civilians After Al-Shabaab Ambush. 2021. https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_somali-governor-says-au-soldiers-killed-civilians-after-al-shabab-ambush/6209636.html [Accessed date 11.08.2022].

targeted a Somali National Army (SNA) base in Afgooye district, killing one soldier and wounding several others, showcasing Al-Shabaab's capability to execute multiple, coordinated operations[176].

On October 1, Al-Shabaab attacked a European Union Training Mission convoy near the SNA Headquarters in Mogadishu with a suicide bombing[177]. Later, on October 13, they executed twin suicide bombings in Baidoa, killing 22 people and injuring 40, marking the first major attack in the area since 2016[178]. The bombings targeted the Badar restaurant and the Bilan hotel, popular among politicians and government employees, potentially aiming to assassinate Mukhtar Robow, a former Al-Shabaab leader turned political candidate[179].

On November 7, Al-Shabaab kidnapped three NGO workers during a healthcare campaign in the Gedo region. Two days later, they orchestrated a complex assault on a Mogadishu hotel using three vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and five armed attackers. Although they breached the hotel's wall, security forces neutralized the attackers, resulting in 52 deaths and 106 injuries[180].

In early November, 11 employees of Somalia's leading telecommunications company, Hormuud, were reportedly assassinated by ISIS affiliates over a two-week span. According to a Hormuud manager, the victims were targeted because the company refused to pay extortion demands.

Regarding legislative measures, law enforcement, and border security,

---

[176] V.A. Africa. Somali Governor Says AU Soldiers Killed Civilians After Al-Shabaab Ambush. 2021. https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_somali-governor-says-au-soldiers-killed-civilians-after-al-shabab-ambush/6209636.html [Accessed date 21.06.2022].

[177] V.A. Africa. Suicide Bomber Targeting Security Convoy Kills 8 in Mogadishu. 2021. https://www.voanews.com/a/suicide-bomber-targeting-security-convoy-kills-8-in-mogadishu/6327669.html [Accessed date 11.06.2022].

[178] United Nations. Violence will not deter Somali people in their pursuit of peace, says UN chief, in wake of lethal attacks. 2018. https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/10/1023152 [Accessed 21.06.2023].

[179] Nbc News. Former al-Shabab spokesman, Mukhtar Robow, is running for office in Somalia. 2018. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/former-al-shabab-spokesman-mukhtar-robow-running-office-somalia-n939266 [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[180] EASO. Somalia Security situation 2021. https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Somalia_Security_situation_new_AC.pdf [Accessed date: 04.03.2021].

Somalia's counter-terrorism legal framework and law enforcement protocols remained unchanged throughout 2018[181]. Somalia's porous borders exacerbated regional insecurity, enabling groups like Al-Shabaab to operate largely undetected in the region. Somalia faces challenges with travel document verification, and regional partners struggle to adequately screen Somali travelers due to the lack of international recognition of Somali identity cards.

Somalia has implemented a national immigration screening watch list and utilizes the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Migration Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS) at 16 entry points. MIDAS includes biographic and biometric screening capabilities, although its effectiveness is hindered by procedural and network connectivity issues.

Counter-Terrorism Financing. In 2018, Somalia became a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF)[182], a regional group inspired by the Financial Action Task Force. The Somali government enhanced its efforts against money laundering and terrorist financing by inaugurating the Financial Reporting Center, the nation's inaugural financial intelligence unit, in November.

Countering Violent Extremism. The Prime Minister's Office took a leading role in preventing and countering violent extremism. Following the 2017 presidential election, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) offered amnesty to Al-Shabaab members who were willing to renounce terrorism and support the government. Donor-supported reintegration programs helped former Al-Shabaab fighters re-enter society, with facilities set up in Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Baidoa.

International and Regional Cooperation. In 2018, there were no significant advancements in international and regional cooperation. AMISOM, comprising forces from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, continued its

---

[181] UNIDOC. Counter-Terrorism in the International Law Context. 2021. https://www.unodc.org/pdf/terrorism/CTLTC_CT_in_the_Intl_Law_Context_1_Advance_copy. pdf. [Accessed date: 25.01.2023]

[182] FATF. Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/menafatf.html. [Accessed date: 24.01.2023].

collaboration with the Somali National Army (SNA) [183]. Additionally, the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, China, and Qatar provided substantial bilateral support, according to media reports.

Kenya. In 2018[184], Al-Shabaab continued to carry out terrorist attacks in Kenya's border regions with Somalia, primarily using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and ambush tactics against Kenyan police and military forces. Despite these ongoing attacks, Kenya reported a decrease in Al-Shabaab-related fatalities in 2018, largely due to fewer indiscriminate attacks on civilians[185]. Al-Shabaab shifted its focus towards targeting security personnel and infrastructure, although civilians remained at risk.

Kenya has maintained a significant role in regional counter-terrorism efforts and is a key partner of the United States in areas such as counter-terrorism investigations, prosecutions, and incident responses. In 2018, Kenya joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) have continued to support AMISOM with border security and counter-IED operations within Kenya. Several terrorist activities were investigated, leading to disruptions in Al-Shabaab and ISIS operations, including attack planning, recruitment, and travel activities.

Border Security, Law Enforcement, and Legislation. Kenya continues to investigate and prosecute terrorism cases under the updated Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2014[186]. However, many defendants end up being acquitted. In January 2018, the High Court overturned five convictions for attempted terrorist travel to Somalia

---

[183] African Union Peace and Security Council. 'Communiqué of the 29th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/1123.comm-en.pdf [Accessed date: 13.04.2023].

[184]. African Union. Guideline on the Role of the African Standby Force (ASF). https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/01-asf-in-hands-guidelines.pdf. [Accessed date: 21.06.2023].

[185] EAC, 'Regional Strategy for Peace and Security (adopted by the 13th EAC Council of Ministers meeting, Arusha, Tanzania). http://eacj.eac.int[Accessed date: 08.06.2021].

[186] United Nations (UN) General Assembly, 18. December 2015. 'Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism'. UN doc. A/RES/70/120.https://documents-dds ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/429/12/PDF/N1542912.pdf?OpenElement [Accessed date: 11.05.2022].

because legal procedures were not properly followed when Somalia was designated a restricted destination[187].

The Kenyan government has yet to establish a public defender service, which is essential for the National Legal Aid Action Plan's success. Terrorism suspects often have limited access to defense lawyers, and trials in these cases frequently progress slowly. By the end of 2018[188], trials were still ongoing for four Kenyans accused of aiding the 2013[189] Westgate Mall attack and for four Kenyans and one Tanzanian linked to the 2015 Garissa University attack. Additionally, British terrorism suspect Jermaine Grant, who received a nine-year sentence in 2015, was awaiting a verdict.

Kenya's counter-terrorism efforts involve multiple agencies, including the Kenya Police Service, Directorate of Criminal Investigations, and Administration Police, as well as the National Intelligence Service and elements of the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF). However, these efforts are often hampered by inconsistent coordination, limited resources, inadequate training, corruption, and unclear command structures.

The National Counter-terrorism Center (NCTC) in Kenya has increased its collaboration with private security firms and critical sectors to address attacks on soft targets. Executive Order No. 1 of June 2018 enhanced the NCTC's role in coordinating inter-agency counterterrorism efforts.

Kenya's security forces focus on protecting soft target areas like universities, malls, hotels, and tourist spots in major towns. Terrorists exploit Kenya's sparsely populated border regions and largely unmonitored borders for their operations and movement.

---

[187] EAC, 'Regional Strategy for Peace and Security (adopted by the 13th EAC Council of Ministers meeting, Arusha, Tanzania). http://eacj.eac.int [Accessed date: 21.09.2022].

[188] African Union. EU Support to G5 Sahel Joint Force. May 2019. factsheet_eu_g5_sahel_0.pdf - Yandex.Documents. [Accessed date: 11.03.2021].

[189] African Union. (2015b).28. December. 2015. Communique of the 565th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU). URL:https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-565-comm-burundi-17-12-2015.pdf [Accessed date: 13.09.2021].

Personnel from rural Border Police Units received training and equipment in tactical ground sensor operations and border security operations through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program funded by the Department of State.

As of 2018, Kenyan officials were developing a comprehensive border control strategy involving multiple agencies. This effort aimed to implement the Automated Targeting System-Global (ATS-G) software from the United States under a June 2018 agreement[190].

The integration of the Public Infrastructure Security Cyber Education System (PISCES) with ATS-G will enhance their combined capabilities to detect potential threats and disrupt terrorist movements across Kenya.

To improve aviation safety and security at Nairobi's Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, Kenya set up inter-agency Joint Operations Centers at various entry points and border crossings. Immigration officials used government watch-lists, although smaller ports of entry often lacked adequate screening tools and equipment.

The Kenyan government closely monitored individuals planning to join Al-Shabaab or ISIS, as well as those returning from abroad. Kenyan security forces have successfully thwarted terrorist plots and responded to numerous terrorism-related incidents.

In February, police apprehended five armed Al-Shabaab fighters who were planning an attack on Nairobi, located five hours north of the capital, with guns, grenades, and a car bomb. Allegations have been made against Kenyan government entities or their agents for arbitrary and unlawful executions, particularly of known or suspected criminals, including terrorists.

The Kenyan government worked with the US Embassy in Nairobi to exchange threat information and enhance security, particularly through a dedicated counter-terrorism response unit within the General Service Unit, funded by US assistance.

---

[190] African Union Peace and Security Council. 30 NOVEMBER 2022, 'Communiqué of the 29th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/1123.comm-en.pdf [Accessed date: 13.02.2021].

Additionally, Kenya is a participant in the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a regional body modeled after the Financial Action Task Force.

Kenya's National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism remained active, primarily through localized action plans at the county level. In Isiolo, Garissa, and Wajir counties, the National Counter-terrorism Center (NCTC) worked alongside county governments, security entities, and civil society to develop action plans that supported coordinated efforts and allocation of resources for CVE initiatives.

Efforts within the prison system have led to improved treatment of terrorists, while judicial authorities have adopted plea bargaining and other strategies to enhance management of remand detainees. Initiatives aimed at rehabilitating and reintegrating former terrorists, facilitators, and supporters continued on a small scale, although they lacked robust legal frameworks and sufficient public support.

Cooperation at global and regional levels is evident in Kenya, where Nairobi hosts the African headquarters of the United Nations, serving as a hub for regional coordination against cross-border challenges. AMISOM, comprising troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, and now including the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), continues its operations.

Kenya joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in August. Despite not being a member, Kenya actively participates in GCTF regional meetings and hosted a GCTF workshop in February on the connection between transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Since 2018, Uganda has played a significant role in counterterrorism efforts in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. It remains a key player in AMISOM's efforts against Al-Shabaab as the largest troop contributor[191]. Uganda recently hosted the Ninth High-Level Meeting of the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework, which focused on combating terrorist organizations in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

---

[191] *Debisa N.G.* Security diplomacy as a response to Horn of Africa's security complex: Ethio-US partnership against al-Shabaab //Cogent Social Sciences. 2021. Vol. 7. №. 1. P. 1–19.

Various East African terrorist groups are believed to exploit Uganda's established smuggling routes as transit points. The Ugandan government has shown strong political will to apprehend suspected terrorists and combat terrorism domestically. However, its failure to prosecute six terrorism suspects and implement recent terrorism finance legislation highlights challenges in holding terrorists accountable for their actions.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security. In 2018, Uganda's counter-terrorism laws remained unchanged[192]. Security forces detained eight individuals accused of affiliations with Al-Qaida and Al-Shabaab in 2015, alleging they were planning bombings in Kampala. They faced charges of aiding terrorism and conspiracy. However, six suspects were acquitted in November 2018 due to insufficient evidence, only to be promptly re-arrested upon release. Two others remain in police custody.

The Uganda Police Force's Directorate of Counterterrorism plays a pivotal role in investigating and responding to terrorist incidents. However, its effectiveness has been hindered by limited resources, inadequate training, and corruption issues.

Coordination between Uganda's security and intelligence agencies remains a significant challenge. The U.S. Department of State's Anti-terrorism Assistance program supports the Uganda Police Force in enhancing their capabilities against terrorism threats.

Uganda's primary concern has been border security, particularly due to its porous borders with conflict-ridden countries like South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. To address this, Uganda has implemented the PISCES system provided by the United States for screening travelers at major entry points.

Uganda is increasingly worried about security threats along its western border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), particularly from the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an armed group based in eastern DRC. The Ugandan government accuses the ADF of killing civilians and planning attacks against

---

[192] *Walsh B.* Revisiting Regional Security Complex Theory in Africa: Museveni's Uganda and Regional Security in East Africa // African Security. 2020. Vol. 13. № 4. P. 300–324.

Ugandan interests. In November, Ugandan security officials met with their DRC counterparts to coordinate efforts against the ADF. As a result, Uganda deployed troops into eastern DRC to pursue ADF fighters responsible for atrocities in Uganda.

Uganda is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a regional body aligned with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Despite making progress in 2017 towards legislation to combat illicit terrorism financing[193], these measures were reportedly not used to prosecute suspects in 2018. Uganda underwent a mutual evaluation in 2016 and was removed from the FATF's "Grey list" in 2018, yet issues identified in their 2007 report persisted[194].

Private sector sources indicate that many Ugandan banks lack the technology or capability to comply with Uganda's financial regulations, with a significant portion of mobile money transactions operating outside the country's financial oversight[195].

In terms of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), officials from the Uganda Police Force (UPF) noted that the government drafted a National Action Plan for CVE in 2018. However, the document has not been shared with security partners, and no timeline for its dissemination has been established.

Uganda participates in various international organizations such as the United Nations, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Community (EAC), PREACT, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), all of which collaborate on counterterrorism efforts. Despite not being a member, Uganda attends regional workshops and events organized by the Global Counterterrorism Forum

---

[193] *Klemarvol. K., Marelja M.* Institutional Support for Terrorist Financing Prevention // Athens JL. 2018. Vol. 4. P. 27.

[194] *De Coning C.* Peace enforcement in Africa: doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations //Contemporary Security Policy. 2017. Vol. 38. №. 1. P. 145-160.

[195] African Union Peace and Security Council. 29 SEPTEMBER 2022, 'Communiqué Adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 1108th meeting held on 29 September 2022, considering the political and security situation in the Abyei region: of the 29th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council'. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/comm.1108-en.pdf [Accessed date: 13.07.2022].

(GCTF).

In October, the Ugandan government hosted the Ministerial and High-Level Meetings of the Regional Oversight Mechanism for the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region. The conference prominently addressed the threat posed by the ADF and other armed groups in eastern DRC. Senior leaders from the region agreed to convene again to delve deeper into these concerns.

The regional security coordination strategy, initiated during the 13th Council of Ministers meeting in 2006[196] to guide the Peace and Security Sector, remains a foundational framework. It is flexible to accommodate adjustments needed to address emerging security challenges, including terrorism activities in Somalia[197].

Article 124 of the East African Community Treaty underscores the importance of peace and security among its Partner States[198]. It outlines comprehensive approaches for implementation to foster a stable and secure regional environment that promotes development and harmonious coexistence among East African peoples. This article served as the basis for joint anti-terrorism efforts in Somalia under the auspices of IGAD and subsequently AMISOM[199].

The policy also facilitates collaboration on cross-border crimes such as auto theft, drug trafficking, terrorism, and money laundering. This collaborative approach fosters a conducive climate for peace and ensures the security of individuals and property, thereby facilitating progress.

Additionally, the East African Community established an Inter-Sectoral Security Council aimed at enhancing interstate collaboration to oversee the

---

[196] African Union Peace and Security Council, January 19, 2007, Communiqué of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX), paragraph 9. URL:https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqueeng-69th.pdf [Accessed date: 11.06.2021]

[197] *Мезенцев С.В.* Внутренние и международно-политические аспекты кризиса в Мали и французская операция «Сервал» // Вестник Московского университета. Серия 25: Международные отношения и мировая политика. 2014. № 1. С. 3–28.

[198] Ibid.

[199] *Трунов Ф.О.* Участие ФРГ в борьбе с международным терроризмом на территории Сомали // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2017. Т. 17. № 4. С. 710–726.

achievement of its primary goal of regional security provision.

East Africa's Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Terrorism remains a major challenge in East Africa, hindering the region's ability to reach its full potential. While security issues such as terrorism are global concerns affecting numerous countries, East African nations have experienced substantial losses due to these threats.

To address these issues, seven members of the East African Community drafted a Treaty establishing the EAC Secretariat in Arusha, Tanzania.

Policy framework to combat terrorism. East African countries have adopted multilateral approaches to tackle terrorism, including initiatives like the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). They have also formed partnerships with neighboring nations to strengthen their fight against terrorism. These collaborative efforts have enhanced intelligence sharing, especially for law enforcement purposes.

The anti-terrorism framework in East Africa is structured around national legislation and policies specifically designed to combat terrorism. Each country has formulated its own approach to address the threat. For example, Uganda has shown its dedication to fighting international terrorism by contributing 6,000 troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)[200]. In 2010, Uganda created a counter-terrorism unit that includes police, military, and National Intelligence Service members[201].

As part of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counter-Terrorism, Uganda has received funding for military and law enforcement training in counter-terrorism. The country has also worked with neighboring security agencies to share information about suspected terrorists.

Kenya, also a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counter-

---

[200] *Amble J.C., Meleagrou-H. A.* Jihadist radicalization in East Africa: Two case studies // Studies in Conflict &Terrorism. 2014. Vol. 37. P. 523–540.

[201] African Union Peace and Security Council, January 19, 2007, Communiqué of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX), paragraph 9. URL:https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqueeng-69th.pdf [Accessed date: 08.02.2022].

Terrorism, enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 2012[202] and the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act in 2011[203]. As one of the countries most affected by Al-Shabaab bombings, Kenya has taken significant measures to reduce the threat of terrorism by implementing stricter regulations. The anti-terrorism legal framework has been effective in establishing and enforcing a legal basis for identifying and freezing terrorist assets. Kenya's major contribution to enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities in other countries includes its substantial troop deployment to AMISOM.

Tanzania's counter-terrorism law, enacted in 2002, criminalizes terrorism. The police and the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) are responsible for investigating and responding to allegations of terrorist activities. The regulations also formalized the procedures for freezing assets, designating individuals as suspected terrorists, and sharing information between government agencies. Tanzania is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counter-Terrorism and participates in initiatives focused on the Horn of Africa at the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum.

Conclusively. From the above-mentioned study of the functions performed by several regional organizations in Somalia that each one makes a unique contribution to the larger goals of peacekeeping and counterterrorism in the area. With its mission, AMISOM, the African Union (AU) has played a significant role in the fight against terrorism in Somalia by giving Somali security forces vital military support and training. However, a number of obstacles have made AMISOM less successful, including a lack of resources, problems with coordination, and shifting dynamics inside Somalia's complicated political system.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been instrumental in promoting communication and negotiation amongst Somali parties within the context of peacebuilding. IGAD's involvement has been crucial in promoting consensus-building and regional collaboration, especially when it comes

---

[202] *Gelot L., Sandor A.* African security and global militarism //Conflict, Security & Development. 2019. Vol. 19. №. 6. P. 521–542.
[203] Ibid.

to state-building and efforts at reconciliation. IGAD has facilitated the development of intraregional peace and security as well as the progressive stability of Somalia by offering a forum for diplomatic engagement and mediation.

In addition, the member nations of the East African Community (EAC) have actively engaged in the battle against al-Shabaab by sending troops to AMISOM and giving bilateral support to Somalia's security sector. Particularly interested are Kenya and Uganda, who have used their military might and regional clout to counter the threat posed by al-Shabaab. Nonetheless, issues like the spread of tiny and light weaponry and cross-border insecurity highlight the necessity for improved coordination and cooperation among EAC member states.

In conclusion, there is an obvious need for synergy and complementarity among the work of the various regional organizations, even while each one brings special capabilities and strategies to bear on the problems of terrorism and instability in Somalia. The AU, IGAD, and EAC can improve the efficacy of their operations and support long-term peace, stability, and development in Somalia and the larger East African region by making the most of their respective mandates and resources.

CHAPTER III. INTERNATIONAL ORGARNIZATIONS & ACTORS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST AL-SHABAAB

3.1. The United Nations Fight Against Al-Shabaab

Background of United Nations Peace Keeping Operations. By the early 1990s, international aid organizations like UNICEF and the International Red Cross were significantly involved in assisting the Somali population. In exchange, the UN committed to deploying 50 observers and 500 peacekeepers to support the relief operations in Somalia. The United States contributed to these efforts with a humanitarian airlift starting in August 1992. However, the cease-fire soon collapsed, leading to widespread violence and looting, which hindered relief efforts. Interference by one of Mogadishu's most powerful warlords, General Muhammed Aideed, caused relief operations to come to a near halt by November. The US Agency for International Development estimated that up to 80 percent of the relief supplies meant for the starving population were being stolen by thieves and bandits[204].

On November 21, 1992, the National Security Council's Deputies Committee met and recommended military intervention in Somalia. Shortly after, President Bush offered to deploy American troops to Somalia to ensure the security of humanitarian relief efforts. The UN Security Council approved this offer on December 3 by passing Resolution 794, which paved the way for a US-led coalition to intervene in Somalia. This resolution was notable for several reasons. By invoking Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, it explicitly authorized the use of force to achieve the mission. It also granted the United States, in coordination with the UN Secretary-General, the authority to arrange unified command and control of the involved forces. Lastly, it called for a limited US effort "to establish as soon as possible a

---

[204] United Nations office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA. Global Humanitarian overview report, 10 December 2020.file:///C:/Users/mentor/Downloads/GHO2021_EN.pdf. [Accessed date: 11.09.2021].

secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." Based on this mandate, the United States launched Operation Restore Hope[205].

Use of military force. The military intervention in Somalia unfolded in two distinct stages. The first stage was Operation Restore Hope. Although it was sanctioned by a UN mandate, the operation was managed and executed by the United States. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) adapted an existing plan and established a Combined Task Force. The coalition quickly expanded to include the US Army's 10th Mountain Division and troops from 23 other nations. Upon the United Nations' request, the task force was renamed the United Task Force (UNITAF)[206].

CENTCOM, interpreting UN Resolution 794, confined the mission to the short-term stabilization of Somalia's security situation to allow humanitarian efforts to resume. UNITAF was envisioned as a temporary measure to provide immediate relief and allow the UN time to organize a coalition for Somalia's long-term rehabilitation. The operation was carried out in four phases[207]:

Phase I: Marines were deployed to Mogadishu to establish security and reopen the port and airfield.

Phase II: Starting on December 13, the 10th Mountain Division arrived to secure lines of communication and relief centers in Somalia's interior.

Phase III: Operations expanded to distribute relief supplies to a broader area in southern Somalia. By March, UNITAF was prepared to transfer control to the United Nations.

Phase IV: Completed on May 4, 1993, US forces handed over control of operations in Somalia to UN forces.

On March 26, 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 814, establishing UNOSOM II. This resolution went beyond Restore Hope, showing a

---

[205] *Verhoeven H.* The Gulf and the Horn: Changing geographies of security interdependence and competing visions of regional order //Civil Wars. 2018. Vol. 20. №. 3. P. 333-357.
[206] *Cocodia J.K.* External intervention and stability in somalia // FRESKA. 2022. Vol. 1. № 1.
[207] *Gerhart G., Makinda S.M.* Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia // Foreign Affairs. 1994. Vol. 73. № 2. P. 172.

preference for using military force to create a broader security environment conducive to long-term stability in Somalia. It specifically called for the disarmament of clans, deemed essential for the rehabilitation of Somali political institutions and the economy. It expanded the UN forces in Somalia, placed them directly under UN command, and authorized them under Chapter 7 to use force as necessary to achieve this mission[208].

General Aideed, who historically distrusted the United Nations, opposed UNOSOM II from the outset. As violence against coalition forces escalated in the summer of 1993, UNOSOM II increased its use of force in response. Following a June 5 ambush that killed 23 Pakistani peacekeepers, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 837, calling for the "arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment" of those responsible. This led to efforts to compel General Aideed into compliance and a full-scale manhunt to capture him. The UN held him responsible for the ambush, and on June 17, Admiral Jonathan Howe, the UN special representative to Somalia, specifically called for Aideed's arrest. However, General Aideed successfully evaded capture and won a five-month battle of attrition against UN forces[209].

After a US Army Rangers raid on October 3 resulted in the deaths of 18 Americans, President Bill Clinton announced that the United States would withdraw from Somalia by March 1994. He also stated that US troops would no longer attempt to disarm Somali clans but would focus on protecting UNOSOM II forces and ensuring the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. This marked a significant shift in the UN mission, as UN troops adopted a less aggressive stance. Not only did UNOSOM II fail to capture Aideed, but it also worsened the security situation in Somalia. By November 1993, Somali clans were once again embroiled in a power struggle. Ultimately, the United States withdrew all its military forces from Somalia in March 1994 and returned in March 1995 to oversee the withdrawal of the remaining UN

---

[208] *Tubbs J.O.* Beyond Gunboat Diplomacy., 1997.

[209] *Farer T., Rothenberg D.* The UN in Somalia: Understanding the point of departure // Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 1994. Vol. 8. № 1. P. 55–62.

forces. UNOSOM II failed to achieve its objectives, marking it as a military failure.

Limits and Challenges of UN Involvement in Somali Conflict. The UN was hesitant about the military turnover, but a determined guerrilla campaign highlighted the significant limitations of the type of multinational force deployed in Somalia. In situations of general lawlessness, the need to integrate various contingents is not particularly pressing. However, when troops must collaborate closely in mutual defense against organized opposition, issues of interoperability, insufficient armament, and varying levels of training become starkly evident. This challenge is compounded by the difficulty of forming an effective integrated force from small units of 20 to 30 different nations that have not previously worked together. The increased risk and policy controversies tend to reinforce national micromanagement of forces contributed to the UN[210].

For military force to be effective, unity of command and policy is essential, especially when the danger is greatest. A multinational force cannot succeed if one unit makes separate deals with an adversary, as this endangers other contingents. The UN faces disadvantages as a volunteer organization: troop contributors rotate units frequently and may withdraw them with little notice, nations want to dictate the deployment and duties of their contingents, and the UN lacks the authority to hold nations to fixed contracts. This leads to significant delays due to constant reassignment and readjustment of forces in Somalia.

UN resolutions are made in the Security Council, but the UN needs sufficient troop contributors to execute Council mandates[211]. While all nations share the financial burden, those that send troops put their citizens at risk. Casualties often determine a nation's willingness to stay. The need for Chapter VII authority in Somalia indicated potential danger, but some nations only concluded that the mission was unsustainable after suffering casualties[212].

---

[210] Fereydoun, H. The problem of international terrorism at the United Nations, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 1977. Vol. 1. № 1. P. 71–83.

[211] United Nations. Peacekeeping Fact. 2016 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml. [Accessed date: 12.03.2022].

[212] UN. Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship between the United Nations and

Troop-contributing countries must decide from the outset if the objectives of a UN operation justify the risks and potential costs to their citizens. Peace enforcement operations are inherently risky. Lack of resolve is understandable when the primary motivation is humanitarian. A Chapter VII situation may define the limits of national willingness to place military units under international command for a humanitarian cause[213]. Nonetheless, peace enforcement is sometimes necessary to address societal breakdowns leading to genocide or starvation. In such cases, strongmen may obstruct peacekeeping forces, as happened with the initial Pakistani contingent in Somalia under Chapter VI rules, leading to atrocities that require UN intervention[214].

Neglecting to respond to deliberate attacks, such as those experienced by the Pakistani forces in Somalia on June 5, can have enduring repercussions. While avoiding confrontations with their potential for casualties is preferable, evading inevitable conflicts linked to a UN mandate will quickly render a Chapter VII force ineffective. If a UN force is perceived as incapable of handling casualties, it will embolden obstructionists and undermine UN credibility globally. In certain scenarios, ad hoc coalitions and regional organizations might suffice.

However, if the UN is to act as the representative of the international community, contributing nations must fully support its policies. They should convene frequently to stay aligned with evolving policies and commit to entering and exiting missions collectively. Above all, they should pledge to maintain a unified and politically cohesive stance. For challenging situations like Somalia, it might be necessary to have a dominant force in the coalition, similar to the role the United States played with UNITAF, or at least larger units from fewer nations.

Designating specific standby units could help mitigate interoperability issues

---

Regional Organizations, in particular the African Union, in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n08/261/94/pdf/ n0826194.pdf?token= 553ZHgGlkAjg4zL6KM&fe=true [Accessed date: 16.07.2022].

[213] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), https://www.unocha.org/global-humanitarian-overview-2019. [Accessed date: 06.03.2023].

[214] Ibid.

and prevent delayed arrivals. A more controversial alternative, proposed over the years, is the creation of a well-trained UN volunteer cadre, modeled after the French Foreign Legion, which could form a rapidly deployable headquarters and core force for tough assignments. While this concept has drawbacks, the main advantage of a volunteer force would be reducing direct national interference and strengthening political will to maintain commitments. Such a force would need to be developed gradually, through trial and error. As it evolves, its effectiveness could be evaluated at various stages, allowing for appropriate adjustments.

A gradual approach might also alleviate the understandable concerns of UN member states. While developing an effective military force under UN auspices conflicts with national sovereignty, streamlining the civilian side would be less controversial. Civilian reform is equally crucial for the UN in New York and its field missions to reach their full potential. For instance, an experienced team of civilian personnel should be readily available to provide expertise in political, humanitarian, judicial, disarmament, public affairs, and administrative programs at field headquarters and in the various zones of a troubled country.

The inability to adequately staff UNOSOM II resulted in missed opportunities[215]. Solutions can be found to address this shortfall. When U.S. logistics forces left Somalia, the UN civilian administrative division took on the additional responsibility of providing support through contractors to the military. This fragile arrangement was necessary because no nation volunteered logistical troops to replace the U.S. contribution. Some doubted whether civilian contractors would fulfill their obligations if hostilities resumed, and others were uncertain if a civilian field staff, constrained by outdated UN contracting procedures, could respond promptly to urgent military needs.

An interim solution was established, consisting of an integrated civilian-military cell, supplemented by some U.S. military logisticians. This setup offers a valuable model for addressing similar challenges in the future. Another issue that

---

[215] *Marika S.* 'Diplomatic platitudes': The Atlantic charter, The United Nations and colonial independence, Immigrants & Minorities. 1996. Vol. 15. № 2. P. 135–150.

needs addressing is the lack of budget flexibility and resources. The recruitment and maintenance of forces in Somalia were partly hindered by the UN's inability to pay countries for services rendered in previous peacekeeping missions.

A more critical limitation in Somalia was the rigid requirement to seek voluntary donations for the police, penal, and justice systems. Likewise, UNOSOM had to rely on individual contributions from nations to support essential humanitarian efforts by NGOs and UN agencies, with many countries failing to fulfill their pledges[216]. UNOSOM also urgently needed small amounts of humanitarian funding that could be flexibly directed toward projects with an immediate impact on local conditions, helping Somalis return to work.

This flexibility would have reduced the delays caused by the conventional processing of project proposals through a complicated bureaucratic system.

Many might conclude that the UN is inherently dysfunctional when it comes to peace enforcement operations in a failed state. However, this judgment should be reserved until a major overhaul of the peacekeeping support mechanism is attempted. Improvements should focus on forces, personnel, and resources for the field, as well as the support structure in New York.

The United States and the UN: Perhaps the most significant difference between the UNITAF and UNOSOM periods was the strength of the U.S. military contribution during each. U.S. troop strength in UNITAF peaked at over 20 000[217], supported by full air, naval, and logistical resources. As in the Persian Gulf War, the United States provided the dominant force, minimizing political and practical interoperability problems. Challenges could be met by U.S. forces alone if necessary. Conversely, when the United States later participated in UNOSOM, it did so with a capable but intentionally limited contribution.

On May 4, 1993, command transitioned from a cohesive coalition led by a superpower to a loose international organization with far fewer resources.

[216] *Sven B. & Suzanne E.G.* (Counter-) terrorism in Africa: Reflections for a new decade, South African Journal of International Affairs. 2021. Vol. 28. № 2. P. 127–143.
[217] UN. UNISOM 1 BACKGROUND. https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unosom1backgr2.html [Accessed date: 22.04.2023].

Comparing UNITAF and UNOSOM, it appears that time horizons influenced decision-making. UNITAF aimed for a timely withdrawal, while UNOSOM planned for a two-year deployment. The U.S.-led coalition was limited to a relatively narrow and less controversial short-term mission[218].

The UN, on the other hand, undertook the monumental and potentially never-ending mission of trying to revive the nation. The goal was to re-establish self-governance and decrease reliance on international presence, except for long-term development assistance. While UNITAF limited its operations to roughly 40 percent of Somalia, UNOSOM's mandate was to provide assistance and bolster stability across the entire country. As the responsibility transitioned to UNOSOM II[219], the United States found itself caught between conflicting objectives. Washington wanted the UN to succeed in its broader, long-term mission and was willing to support it to some extent. Simultaneously, the U.S. aimed to reduce the UN's dependence on remaining American forces and to free itself from the burden of supporting a prolonged UN peacekeeping effort.

Consequently, when the UN requested military support following the June 5 attack on Pakistani peacekeepers, the U.S. response was ambivalent, and the additional forces it deployed had limited engagements. Highly trained troops requested immediately after the attack were not approved for several crucial months. To implement Resolution 837, passed by the Security Council on June 6, the UN needed a small, skilled force like the U.S. Rangers ready for immediate action in case of an opportunity to arrest Aidid or if international personnel were taken hostage by Aidid's Somali National Alliance (SNA)[220]. Even before the June 5 incident, there had been publicized threats to kill Americans.

Additionally, the likelihood of successfully detaining SNA operatives

[218] *Caleb S.* Underselling Islamist extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa, Defense & Security Analysis. 2015. Vol. 31. № 2. P.123–136.
[219]Brian, J. International terrorism: A balance sheet, Survival. 1975. Vol. 17. № 4. P. 158–164.
[220] The UN security council. Resolution 837. S/RES/837 (1993) 6 June 1993. Adopted by the Security Council at its 3229th meeting, on 6 June 1993. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/837. [Accessed date: 16.07.2023].

responsible for the attacks on the UN was highest in the weeks immediately following the incident. Moreover, if a military strategy does not yield visible results quickly, enthusiasm and support inevitably wane. Thus, these strategies need to be front-loaded for success. Despite media reports suggesting otherwise, the UN strategy was never solely focused on arresting General Aidid. This would have been a convenient shortcut. Even with perfect intelligence and the best possible means to apprehend Aidid, success was uncertain. UNOSOM aimed to avoid allowing aid to the majority of Somalis to be jeopardized by the uncertain timing of Aidid's arrest or some other resolution of his accountability for alleged crimes against the UN.

In reality, the UN strategy was far more comprehensive. To succeed, this multifaceted campaign required significant support in both military and civilian sectors. UNOSOM's approach was to persist in fulfilling its full Security Council mandate, working towards recovery across the nation. For instance, significant progress was made in establishing more than 50 district and 8 regional councils and training their new members. These councils represented the fragile beginnings of local self-governance under the transitional agreement of the Addis Accords of March 1993 and needed consistent and substantial support to endure[221].

Implementing programs to support agriculture, health, education, refugees, and police was expected to also help maintain widespread support among the Somali population. The strategy was to isolate Aidid and those directly responsible for the June 5 massacres, while launching a comprehensive political, humanitarian, and security initiative across the country. As a signatory of the Addis Accords, Aidid's SNA faction was intended to be fully involved in the recovery process and share in its benefits.

UNOSOM was committed to fair implementation of the agreement. By reducing the threat of armaments and disrupting planned attacks, UNOSOM aimed to better protect its operations from further violence. With the success of programs nationwide, including in South Mogadishu, it was hoped that Aidid's hardline

---

[221] *Bachmann J. & Hönke J.* "Peace and Security" as Counterterrorism? the Political Effects of Liberal Interventions in Kenya'. African Affairs. 2010. Vol. 109. № 434. P. 97–114.

supporters would either choose new leadership or persuade him to comply peacefully with the provisions of resolution 837[222]. However, Aidid used intimidation and threats to discourage moderate clan elders from pursuing reconciliation that might weaken his control over the SNA.

Throughout this strategic approach, ongoing U.S. support for all UN programs was crucial. On the military front, the UN operation relied heavily on U.S. equipment and transport support for other UN forces. For instance, in response to the Security Council's June 6 resolution, the U.S. provided additional armored personnel carriers. The U.S. also temporarily stationed a Marine amphibious force off the Somali coast and AC-130 gunships in neighboring countries, whose precise firepower deterred local aggressors. Moreover, the U.S. maintained its army presence in Somalia longer than initially planned and used it more extensively. Despite its small size and limited mandate, this capable force became the backbone of the UN operation during periods of organized hostility. Nevertheless, Washington aimed to avoid taking on the primary military burden again.

UN counter terrorism Approaches. Recent years have seen increasing discussion of whether UN peacekeeping operations should be given counter-terrorism tasks, and what these might include. Here I propose, as a heuristic device, a new category of UN counter-terrorism operations, and then detail some measures for these operations. This should provide a better grounding for analyzing the implications of mandating UN peacekeeping operations with counter-terrorism tasks[223].

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted by the General Assembly in 2006, reconfirmed in the fifth biannual review of the strategy in 2016. The strategy has four pillars:

(1) Tackling conditions conducive to terrorism;

---

[222] UNSC. Resolution 837. Adopted by the Security Council at its 3229th meeting 6th June 1993. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%20RES%20837.pdf [Accessed date: 16.07.2023].
[223] *Baker R.T.* Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States // Political Science Quarterly. 2018. Vol. 133. № 4. P. 775–777.

(2) Preventing and combating terrorism;

(3) Building country's capacity to combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard;

(4) Ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law while countering terrorism.

Depending on their scope, UN counter-terrorism operations, would either be narrowly defined to fit into the second pillar of this action plan, or be more similar to existing multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations with multiple tasks across the four pillars. Here, anchored in the discursive development from counterterrorism to violent extremism presented above and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, I choose the wider option, more akin to current multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations, and use the four categories of the UN strategy to develop an indicative overview of activities and tasks that UN counter-terrorism operations would carry out in the field. Tackling conditions conducive to terrorism Under this pillar, UN counter-terrorism operations would be expected to support various tasks conventionally seen as part of the peace building–development spectrum.

In current UN peacekeeping operations these are often labeled 'early peace building activities and are undertaken in close collaboration with other peace building and development actors within and outside the UN system. In the Plan of Action, the Secretary-General lamented the 'strong emphasis on the implementation of measures under pillar II on of the Global Strategy, while pillars I and IV have often been overlooked.

The Plan of Action distinguishes between root causes or 'push' factors (e.g. poor governance, marginalization, inequality, lack of opportunities) and factors that may 'pull' individuals towards radicalization (e.g. collective grievances, victimization, distortion of religious beliefs, political ideologies, social networks). UN counter-terrorism operations would represent only marginal support for addressing these push/pull factors, but could, as with current UN peacekeeping operations, support capacity development and institution-building in areas such as strengthening the rule of law, human rights, and state–society relations. This would

contribute to a comprehensive and potentially trans formative peace building agenda but might conflict with or be subsumed under other pillars of the strategy[224].

Preventing and combating terrorism Here we find the tasks currently most closely associated with counter-terrorism operations today.

In conclusion, the UNITAF and UNISOM missions in Somalia have shown the difficulties and complications that come with trying to maintain peace and rebuild nations in areas that are rife with war. When the Somali state collapsed, UNITAF's initial deployment sought to stabilize the nation and deliver humanitarian relief. Notwithstanding its initial achievements in alleviating the humanitarian crisis and reinstating some semblance of order, UNITAF's mission was ultimately beset by serious constraints because of the lack of a well-defined political plan and consistent international backing**.**

Afterwards, the goal of UNISOM II was to advance UNITAF's work by shifting to long-term nation-building and state-building projects. UNISOM encountered many challenges in spite of its broadened mandate, including as internal factionalism, insufficient funding, and the intricacies of Somali clan politics. As UNISOM struggled to properly negotiate these issues, the limitations of UN participation in Somalia became apparent, resulting in a progressive decline of the organization's efficacy and influence.

Moreover, the United Nations' counterterrorism approaches in Somalia have been multifaceted, involving a combination of political, humanitarian, and security-focused initiatives. However, the UN's ability to address the root causes of terrorism and extremism in Somalia has been constrained by various factors, including the volatile security situation, limited state capacity, and divergent interests among key stakeholders. Despite efforts to enhance coordination and collaboration among UN agencies and international partners, the persistent threat posed by terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab underscores the inherent limitations of counterterrorism efforts in Somalia.

---

[224] *Mohammed I.S.* Provocation and Attrition Strategies in Transnational Terrorism: The Case of Al-Shabaab, Terrorism and Political Violence. 2021.

In summary, the experiences of UNITAF and UNISOM underscore the inherent problems and limitations of multinational operations in complex war contexts, even though they were instrumental in alleviating the immediate humanitarian crisis and restoring peace in Somalia. To effectively tackle the underlying causes of violence and terrorism in Somalia, it will be necessary to maintain political involvement, allocate resources towards state-building and governance reforms, and enhance collaboration and coordination between international entities and local stakeholders. The United Nations can only hope to make significant headway toward long-lasting peace and security in Somalia by taking a comprehensive and integrated approach.

3.2. European Union Security Strategy for the Horn of Africa

In the European Union's strategic framework for the Horn of Africa, outlined in November 2011, the EU's interests in the region are underscored by its geo-strategic significance, historical engagement with the countries, a commitment to improving the welfare of the people and helping them achieve self-sustaining economic growth, and the necessity to protect EU citizens from threats originating from the region[225].

The engagement of the EU in Somalia has been based on the concept of ownership: the process for bringing about peace and stability should be driven by Somali themselves. However, the envisaged ownership has rarely been implemented, because no scope was provided for genuine Somali solutions to Somali problems, particularly with regard to the set-up of the new state structures[226].

Following the traditional Western approach, the aim has always been to follow

---

[225] Council of the European Union. Strategic Frame work for the Horn of Africa November 2011. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-africa/ [Date of Access: 15.07.2023].
[226] Hogan J. J. Competing Architects: Applying Social Contextualist Analysis to Negotiations on the African Peace and Security Architecture //African Security. 2020. Vol. 13. №. 1. P. 3–27.

the Westphalian state model with a centralized system of government. Although Somali stakeholders have been involved in the negotiations on their country's future, other forms of statehood have never seriously entered the equation. As the current international system needs a particular standard-setting procedure to function smoothly, it is not able to integrate new features of state governance. It therefore exerts an ideational power on its own[227].

The opportunity for experimenting with alternative forms of governance is thus quite restricted. Given the EU and its major allies like the USA can influence regional developments due to their financial, economic, and military strength, efforts to establish Somali statehood are largely shaped by these powers.

The dynamics of Somalia have been profoundly impacted by the European Union's engagement, which has been primarily motivated by security and geopolitical objectives rather than a primary concern for the welfare of the Somali people. The EU and its allies are among the external actors who give top priority to reducing the dangers posed by Somalia, including terrorism, piracy, instability in the region, and refugee crises. Because of this, governance practices and strategies frequently ignore more comprehensive socio-political concerns in favor of security-centric agendas[228].

An example of this security-focused strategy is the EU's refusal to negotiate with organizations such as Al-Shabaab and its preference for armed approaches. Security forces are trained, but their efficacy is compromised by insufficient judicial and executive monitoring. Additionally, the EU's backing of military incursions by nearby nations, despite concerns regarding.

There are many reasons why the EU is not taking the latter path: firstly, its interest in showing its ability to launch a naval mission; secondly, in order to react to strong pressure from economic actors; and thirdly to choose the seemingly easier way by training and deploying forces rather than developing concepts based on local

---

[227] *Hogan J.J.* Competing Architects: Applying Social Contextualist Analysis to Negotiations on the African Peace and Security Architecture //African Security. 2020. Vol. 13. №. 1. P. 3–27.
[228] *Luckham R.* The military, militarization, and democratization in Africa: A survey of literature and issues //African Studies Review. 1994. Vol. 37. №. 2. P. 13–75.

approaches.

Since its launch in April 2010, the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) has been extended from two to four consecutive 6-month training periods. Because of the unstable security conditions in Somalia, the operation is carried out at the Bihanga camp in Uganda. Under the supervision of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) has previously trained the security forces in Somalia. The first two cycles of EUTM supplemented UPDF's basic training program for recruits by offering specialized training modules in areas like medical evacuation, communications, urban combat techniques, counter-improvised explosive device tactics, and the humanitarian aspects of conflict management[229].

Somalia's lack of order and law has made it notorious for maritime piracy. With 20 percent of the world's trade passing through the Gulf of Aden, Somali armed factions have frequently hijacked merchant ships and demanded hefty ransoms. In response, several international fleets, including EUNAVFOR Somalia, the EU's first maritime operation, were deployed to counter pirate activities. To further assist the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in establishing basic security measures for its citizens and combating piracy and other criminal activities, the EU also initiated the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM)[230].

One essential part of the EU's much-discussed 'comprehensive approach' to Somalia is the training mission. The European Union was the main donor to Somalia, providing a sizeable budget of E215.4 million for its Special Support Programme from 2008 to 2013 and EUR 1.6 billion from 2014 to 2021[231]. This indicates that Somalia like many developing countries is heavily reliant on donor support for

---

[229] *Pirozzi N.* Towards an effective Africa–EU partnership on peace and security: Rhetoric or facts? //The International Spectator. 2010. Vol. 45. № 2. P. 85–101.

[230] *Papastavridis E.* EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta Off Somalia: The EU In Unchartered Legal Waters? // International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 2015. Vol. 64. № 3. P. 533–568.

[231] European Union. The European Union and The Federal Republic of Somalia. URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/somalia/european-union-and-federal-republic-somalia_en?s=153#:~:text=The%20EU%20has%20supported%20humanitarian%20aid%20operations%20in,the%20country%2C%20helping%20more%20than%20two%20million%20people. [Date of Access: 15.07.2023].

instance in 2019 the World Bank, United Kingdom, European Union and Germany were the largest providers of development aid to Somalia.

Donors give the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) financial support in addition to humanitarian help. The peacekeepers in AMISOM are covered by the European Union (EU) and its member states for a range of costs, including housing, gasoline, communication equipment, salary, and medical expenses. In addition, the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) is presented as an attempt by the EU to relieve AMISOM of its training duties and direct funds toward its counterinsurgency activities. Reintegrating soldiers trained under EUTM into the National Somali Force is ultimately the duty of AMISOM. Recruits receive two to three months of cohesion training in the Jazira facility in Mogadishu from AMISOM after completing their training at Bihanga[232].

The aid offered is also to support several initiatives, including gender equality, environmental conservation, education, food security, conflict prevention, good governance, and HIV/AIDS mitigation. On the other hand, the United States' support is quite little, totaling USD 16.7 million in 2010. Over time, the amount has varied, reaching a high of USD 51 million in 2008 and a low of USD 9 million in 2009. Together with financial institutions, other major contributors are the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Japan, Belgium, Canada, Finland, and Ireland[233].

The efficiency of international assistance coordination is called into doubt by the discrepancy between the contributions of the EU and other big donors, such the US. Despite its considerable resources and global influence, the United States' limited support for Somalia's development points to a lack of agreement amongst the major players in the country's development about objectives and strategies[234].

---

[232] *Sepos A.* Imperial power Europe? The EU's relations with the ACP countries //Journal of Political Power. 2013. Vol. 6. №. 2. P. 261–287.

[233] *Oksamytna K.* The European Union Training Mission in Somalia and the Limits of Liberal Peacebuilding: Can EUTM Contribute to Sustainable and Inclusive Peace? // The International Spectator. 2011. Vol. 46. № 4. P. 97–113.

[234] *Sepos A.* Imperial power Europe? The EU's relations with the ACP countries //Journal of Political Power. 2013. Vol. 6. № 2. P. 261-287.

The fluctuating nature of aid disbursements, as evidenced by the varying amounts from year to year, highlights the volatility and unpredictability of external assistance. This inconsistency can impede long-term planning and hinder the effectiveness of development initiatives, particularly those that require sustained investment and commitment over time.

Objectives and activities of the European Union Comprehensive Plan. After Somali state structures collapsed in the early 1990s, the EU initially limited its involvement to humanitarian aid, avoiding political and security matters[235].

The increasing securitization of internationally active terrorists in the aftermath of Al Qaeda's bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 as well as the attacks of 9/11 however boosted considerably the awareness within the EU for political developments in so-called fragile states[236].

The Horn of Africa with Somalia as one of the world's most persistent failed state took more and more attention. It resulted in the EU and its partners getting also involved in rebuilding Somalia's central state structures ever since. Main EU instruments thereby have been development cooperation and political dialog, especially in the areas of governance and security, education, economic development, and food security[237].

Instead of initiating peace efforts, the EU supported neighboring countries like Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya, as well as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). When the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI)—including the Federal Transitional Charter, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and the Transitional Parliament—were established in 2004, the EU and its partners

---

[235] *Schmidt P., Zyla B.* European security policy: Strategic culture in operation? //Contemporary security policy. 2011. Vol. 32. № 3. P. 484–493.

[236] *Виноградова Н.В.* Эковас. Проблемы Региональной Интеграции. Сборник Статей. Отв. Ред. А.Й.? Элез. М.: Институт Африки ран, 2016. 282 С., "Восток. Афро-Азиатские общества: история и современность" // Восток. Афро-Азиатские общества: история и современность. 2017. № 5. С. 212–216.

[237] European Union. The European Union and The Federal Republic of Somalia. URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/somalia/european-union-and-federal-republic-somalia_en?s=153 [Accessed date: 15.07.2023].

recognized them as the legitimate representatives of Somalia[238].

However, the TFI failed to meet international expectations: they couldn't gain control over the country, faced allegations of widespread fraud and corruption, and struggled with regions declaring independence (Somaliland) or seeking autonomy within Somalia. Despite these issues, the EU continued to support the TFI, recognizing Somalia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The EU did not harshly confront the TFI's failures nor engage politically with other Somali regions and authorities.

From 2004 onward, Somalia's future statehood was further negotiated in international conferences aimed at ending the transitional period[239].

This milestone was reached in August 2012 when a new constitution was drafted and approved by a National Constituent Assembly, following the EU- and UN-sponsored Roadmap for the End of Transition in Somalia laid out in September 2011[240]. Subsequently, a new parliament was appointed by a council of traditional Somali Elders, advised by a Technical Selection Committee, which then elected a speaker and a president. The new Somali Government, in collaboration with its international partners, is now focused on ending violent conflicts, especially in south-central Somalia, establishing permanent democratic structures, resolving the status of various regions, and adopting the provisional constitution through a national referendum[241]. Throughout this process, the EU has continuously developed strategies to ensure the effectiveness of its comprehensive cross-sectoral approach.

The first development strategy stated that its long-term objective was 'to contribute to the alleviation of poverty and to the promotion of a more peaceful, equitable and democratic society. In its follow-up 'Joint Somalia Strategy Paper for

---

[238] *Bachmann J., Hönke J.* 'Peace and security 'as counterterrorism? The political effects of liberal interventions in Kenya //African affairs. 2010. Vol. 109. № 434. P. 97–114.
[239] *Blumenau B., Müller J.A.* International Organisations and Terrorism. Multilateral Antiterrorism Efforts, 1960–1990 //Terrorism and Political Violence. 2021. P. 1–19.
[240] *Negasa G.D.* Security diplomacy as a response to Horn of Africa's security complex: Ethio-US partnership against al-Shabaab, Cogent Social Sciences. 2021. Vol. 7. № 1. P. 3–19
[241] *Amare T.* International relations in the Horn of Africa (1991–96). Review of African Political Economy. 1996. Vol. 23. № 70. P. 499–509.

the period 2008–2013, it added three overarching strategic objectives: to encourage reconciliation, democracy, and the development of governance structures; to contribute to the reconstruction of the country; and to restore the rule of law[242].

The Commission's efforts have been complemented by the Council's involvement, which integrated the Somalia issue into a broader regional strategy. The Council adopted strategic guidance to shape EU actions in response to challenges in the Horn of Africa and a Strategic Framework for the region, identifying five key areas of engagement[243]: building democratic and accountable state structures, contributing to peace, security, and conflict prevention and resolution, mitigating the effects of regional insecurity, reducing poverty, promoting economic growth, and fostering regional cooperation. The appointment of a Special Representative for the Horn of Africa supports this engagement. The framework prioritizes Somalia and the issue of piracy as significant obstacles to regional peace and security, making them key focuses for the Special Representative.

The rising of the Somali insurgent group Al-Shabaab in 2006 and its support for Al Qaida's international jihad as well as the escalating attacks on international shipping within the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean resulted in an enhanced securitization of EU policies toward Somalia since 2007: Rebuilding the Somali security sector onshore to become capable of fighting terroristic behavior as well as countering pirate's activities off-shore became the two focal points of EU's engagement ever since[244].

Regarding the first component, significant support has been allocated to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM's main objective is to assist the Somali Government in diminishing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups. This includes temporarily receiving defectors, in

---

[242] *Botha S., Graham S.E.* (Counter-) terrorism in Africa: Reflections for a new decade //South African Journal of International Affairs. 2021. Vol. 28. № 2. P. 127–143.

[243] European Union. The Horn of Africa: a geo-strategic priority for the EU.// https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/horn-africa-geo-strategic-priority-eu_en [Accessed date: 06.17.2023]

[244] *Bueger C., Stockbruegger J., Werthes S.* Pirates, fishermen and peacebuilding: Options for counter-piracy strategy in Somalia//Contemporary Security Policy.2011. Vol. 32. № 2. P. 356–381.

coordination with the United Nations, to create conditions for effective and legitimate governance throughout Somalia[245].

Additionally, AMISOM aims to establish secure conditions for humanitarian aid delivery, protect those involved in the country's peace and reconciliation processes, and ensure the Somali Government can perform its functions. Part of their mandate includes aiding in the development of the Federal Government of Somalia's Security Forces and helping to extend state authority in areas reclaimed from Al-Shabaab[246].

Apart from being the primary financier for AMISOM, the EU has also focused on enhancing security in Somalia through the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) for Somalia, established in 2010 in Uganda[247].

This mission, coordinated closely with the UN, AMISOM, Uganda, and the USA, aims to contribute to the reform of Somalia's security sector by building and strengthening the Somali National Security Force (SNSF).

From January 2013, EUTM was also tasked with training of commanders, specialists in the areas of military police, civilian-military cooperation, intelligence as well as combat engineering to prepare the SNSF especially for the fight against Al-Shabaab. It furthermore is supposed to support other actors in the implementation of their respective mandates in the security and defense area in Somalia[248].

The offshore component was established in 2008 in response to the escalating problem of piracy off the Somali coast, which had become a significant concern for the EU. In response, the Council decided to launch its first military naval operation, EU Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta. This mission was initiated following a direct request from the Transitional Federal Government for international

---

[245] *Amare T.* International relations in the Horn of Africa. Review of African Political Economy, 1996. Vol. 23. № 70. P. 499–509.

[246] *Kagwanja P.* Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers, old strategies. African Security Review. 2003. Vol. 15. № . 3. P. 72–86.

[247] *Burbach D.T., Fettweis C.J.* The coming stability? The decline of warfare in Africa and implications for international security //Contemporary Security Policy. 2014. Vol. 35. № 3. P. 421–445.

[248] *Bayeh E.* Human security in the horn of Africa: Trends and Challenges //International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development. 2014. Vol. 1. № 7. P. 341–346.

assistance in addressing the piracy issue[249].

Operation Atalanta aimed to achieve four key objectives: protecting vessels from the World Food Program (WFP) that were delivering aid to Somalia, safeguarding AMISOM shipping, deterring, preventing, and responding to acts of piracy and armed robbery, providing protection to vulnerable ships navigating off the Somali coast on a case-by-case basis, and contributing to monitoring fishing activities in the region. The overarching political goal of the operation was to enhance maritime security in the area, while its politico-military aim was to deter piracy and secure major maritime routes[250].

Additionally, through the Instrument for Stability, the EU worked on improving regional responses to piracy with its Critical Maritime Routes Programme. In 2012, the EU launched the mission 'Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean,' a civilian operation focused on training and strengthening the maritime capabilities of selected countries in the region[251].

Challenges of the EU Comprehensive Plan in the Horn of Africa. Applying a comprehensive approach toward a conflict-ridden country like Somalia is a huge challenge. It requires a smooth alignment of all EU actors and institutions, a close coordination of its own approach with those of its major partners, and the engagement with local stakeholders. And last but not least, it needs to combine a multidimensional set of sectors such as humanitarian and development affairs as well as political dialog and security provision. While an improvement of the general situation undoubtedly has taken place throughout the last years, the Somali crisis is a showcase for how difficult it is to implement a comprehensive approach

---

[249] *Bueger C., Stockbruegger J., Werthes S.* Pirates, fishermen and peacebuilding: Options for counter-piracy strategy in Somalia //Contemporary Security Policy.2011.Vol. 32. № 2. P. 356–381.
[250] *Burgess S.* A lost cause recouped: Peace enforcement and state-building in Somalia // Contemporary Security Policy. 2013. № 34. P. 302–323.
[251]*Dersso S.A.* The Somalia Conflict implications for peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts //Institute for Security Studies Papers. 2009. Vol. 2009. № 198. P. 24.

effectively, internally as well as externally[252].

This concerns all different sectors of engagement under review: Despite the fact that the EU not only has been one of the biggest donor of humanitarian aid for decades but that this sector has been the original base of its engagement in Somalia, the famine of 2011 once again demonstrated that it still isn't able to deal with such a challenge in cooperation with its major partners, be it the Somali institutions, the UN, the AU, or the USA[253].

While the room for maneuver was limited due to the ongoing civil war and the rejection of emergency and humanitarian aid by Al-Shabaab in the southern parts of the country, action was taken much too slow, uncoordinated, and late: the first calls for a humanitarian disaster came up one year ahead, but only when the crisis reached its fullest extent mid 2011 funds were raised and emergency deliveries packed.

In terms of development aid, the situation has been quite similar. Specifically, managing projects remotely from Nairobi has not achieved the expected outcomes, both in aligning priorities with local needs and in effective oversight. This underscores the necessity for improved collaboration with local entities that are both willing and capable of performing basic governance functions[254].

Through the EUTM, the EU put some effort into improving the Somali Government's effectiveness in providing security onshore. At first sight, the EUTM can be regarded as a success. Since the beginning of the mission, about 3000 soldiers were trained by EUTM, representing about 25 per cent of the Somali Forces[255]. In close collaboration with AMISOM and in conjunction with a military intervention by Kenya, they were able to regain control over parts of the country including the

---

[252] *Harry V.* The Gulf and the Horn: Changing Geographies of Security Interdependence and Competing Visions of Regional Order, Civil Wars. 2018. Vol. 20. № 3. P. 333–357.

[253] *Valentin A.R.* The United Nations and the problem of combatting international terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence. 1990. Vol. 2. № 3. P. 289–304.

[254] *Burbach D.T., Fettweis C.J.* The coming stability? The decline of warfare in Africa and implications for international security //Contemporary Security Policy. 2014. Vol. 35. №. 3. P. 421–445.

[255] *Colin D.R. & Jahara M.* Military advising and assistance in Somalia: fragmented interveners, fragmented Somali military forces, Defence Studies. 2021. Vol.21. №.2. P. 181-203.

capital Mogadishu and the strategically important southern seaport Kismayo since 2011.

Under the umbrella of the comprehensive approach and respecting the need for collaborative security governance, another aim of the EU was to integrate the efforts of a diverse set of actors to train the Somali security forces within EUTM. The EU has tried fulfilling this task, by offering training to Somali soldiers at the EUTM camp in Uganda, coordinating activities of the Ugandan Government, the UN, the USA, and the AU. The EUTM's collaboration with key partners has received widespread praise. However, the mission faces several significant challenges[256]:

Somalia requires a complete overhaul of its security infrastructure, making the training of soldiers a secondary concern.

Another issue is that the security forces have been chosen by and trained specifically for the Somali Government, fostering the belief that they are primarily there to support the political leadership in Mogadishu rather than serve the broader population[257].

A third challenge involves the oversight of the mission. Effective assessment of the trained soldiers' performance and their integration into the emerging Somali National Security Forces (SNSFs) can only be achieved if the EUTM operates directly within Somalia. The results of the EU's anti-piracy efforts have also been mixed[258].

Conclusively the question of EUTM legitimacy has arisen given its mandate as an external player in the Somali conflict. Below, is therefore an analysis of different aspects of legitimacy in as far as European Union involvement is concerned.

Legitimacy based on external engagement. It is undisputed that without

---

[256] *Burchard S., & Burgess S.* "US Training of African Forces and Military Assistance, 1997–2017: Security versus Human Rights in Principal Agent Relations." African Security. 2018. Vol. 11. № 4. P. 339–369.

[257] *Clark J.F.* Realism, neo-realism and Africa's international relations in the post-cold war era //Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory. 2001. P. 85–102.

[258] *Debisa N.G.* Security diplomacy as a response to Horn of Africa's security complex: Ethio-US partnership against al-Shabaab // Cogent Social Sciences. 2021. Vol. 7. № 1. P. 1–19.

legitimacy, security governance is bound to fail. However, external security governance in Somalia is facing various legitimacy problems. This applies to both overall aims of the EU within its comprehensive approach: to provide security and to rebuild the state. From a formal point of view, the activities of the EU within Somalia as well as off its coast are covered by several mandates of the UN Security Council that provide sufficient legitimacy[259].

The EU is part of a greater international community that has been engaged with the Somali challenge, including counter piracy, throughout the last decade.

In addition, regional and sub-regional institutions such as the AU and IGAD were in favor of European involvement[260]. More importantly, the TFG invited the EU and the international community to become engaged in the diverse areas and has continuously demanded even greater commitment. Yet, the legitimacy of external engagement faces the problem that it might be undermined by de facto hegemonic interests which are disguised by the official goals of enhancing security and state-building[261].

The legitimacy of the whole approach of post liberal state-building in Somalia is questionable, because it follows the security-first logic. The main driving force seems not to be the interests of ordinary Somalis, but rather the security of the sea lane of communication and the fight against terrorism. Another problem lies in the fact that the complexity of the constellation of actors inevitably leads to informal arrangements for security governance. These arrangements may be effective and useful in the short term but lack transparency and might therefore open the door to misuse. As a consequence, legitimacy could be undermined in the long run[262].

---

[259] UN General Assembly. Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, Observations of states submitted in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 3034 (XXVII). [Accessed date: 20.07.2023].

[260] United Nations (UN), 2013. '"Arc of Instability" across Africa. UNSC Presidential Statement'. Security Council 6965th Meeting. UN Doc. SC/11004. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-2013. [Accessed date: 20.07.2023].

[261] European Commission. (2005). EU strategy for Africa: towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development. https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vikqh371yoye. [Accessed date: 20.07.2023].

[262] *Dersso S.A.* The Somalia Conflict implications for peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts

The bulk of the European Union (EU) investment went into the military containment of piracy and the support for AMISOM in its struggle against Al - Shabaab. Due to security considerations, the EU started with an indirect approach by remote control from Nairobi with no delegation present in Mogadishu, thus compromising its ability to possess accurate contextual knowledge.

Furthermore, even if the EU and its partners were more effective, the Somali stakeholders affected could still perceive these activities as detrimental to their own concepts of order and way of living. Hence, external interventions in Somalia 'face a fairly high risk of producing unintended consequences, including the inadvertent triggering of armed conflict'[263].

Moreover, the huge international coalition makes it difficult to find out who bears the ultimate responsibility for this or that outcome. Officially, it is Somalia itself that is supposed to be the owner of the process. Yet, the ownership principle is often disregarded, be it deliberately or by sheer ignorance[264].

Legitimacy from a Somali perspective. The legitimacy of EU engagement in Somalia can be regarded as highly debatable from a Somali perspective. Although formal requirements are fulfilled according to international standards, the legitimacy of the various parts of the EU's comprehensive approach can be questioned[265]. Neither efforts to rebuild the state nor efforts to counter piracy have been democratic and inclusive in the sense that the addressees have been involved from scratch. Peace negotiations as well as steps to rebuild state structures have been taken without even attempting to achieve broad-based support from the Somali people via a bottom-up approach.

Those Somali who have been involved have mostly either been proponents of

---

//Institute for Security Studies Papers. 2009. Vol. 2009. № 198. P. 24.

[263] *Haastrup T., Dijkstra H.* New directions for African security // Contemporary Security Policy. 2017. Vol. 38. № 1. P. 102–108.

[264] *Gelot L.* Civilian protection in Africa: How the protection of civilians is being militarized by African policymakers and diplomats //Contemporary Security Policy.2017.Vol. 38.№. 1.P. 161–173.

[265] *Sjursen H.* The EU as a 'normative' power: How can this Be? Civilian or Military Power? European Foreign Policy in Perspective. London: Routledge. 2007. P. 67–84.

the violent conflict devastating the country or representatives of the diaspora that was able to establish a sound financial base and a close-knit support network internationally. Moreover, there were attempts to rebuild the state on the drawing board, while ignoring local forms of governance that have been established successfully in various parts of Somalia since the official state structures collapsed[266].

Conclusion. In conclusion, a comprehensive assessment was conducted to ascertain the efficacy of the European Union's multifaceted approach towards Somalia. This analysis encompassed an evaluation of its effectiveness, legitimacy, and its positioning within the broader European security hierarchy, thereby subjecting three key aspects of security governance to critical scrutiny. Regarding effectiveness, the findings present a nuanced picture. Significant progress has been observed particularly in the realm of countering piracy, where tangible outcomes suggest a successful containment of the threat. Instances of attacks and successful piracy attempts have notably decreased, leading to a reduction in the number of hostages held by pirates. This apparent success could be interpreted as a testament to the efficacy of the EU's strategy within this specific domain.

However, it is imperative to recognize the transient nature of such achievements, as success in countering piracy may prove ephemeral. Factors such as the withdrawal of naval forces, decreased vigilance among ship-owners, or adaptations by pirates to circumvent existing measures could potentially undermine current gains. Moreover, while progress has been made in certain areas, the underlying root causes of instability and insecurity in Somalia remain largely unresolved.

Thus, while the EU's efforts have yielded notable outcomes in countering piracy, the broader challenges facing Somalia which is currently Al-Shabaab terror activities remains a significant security challenge not only for the Somali government but regional and global peace as well given the transboundary terror

---

[266] *Abdinor D. & Ali Y.S.* Federalism in post-conflict Somalia: A critical review of its reception and governance challenges, Regional & Federal Studies. 2021.

activities of Al-Shabaab. Ultimately, the effectiveness of the EU's comprehensive approach in Somalia hinges on its ability to navigate these complexities and enact lasting solutions in counter terrorism that contribute to the country's stability and development.

3.3. Non- State actors in countering Al-Shabaab Activities

When we hear the term "non-state actor" today, we often associate it with "terrorist organization." However, technically, non-state actors encompass any entity operating on the international stage that is not a sovereign state. Sovereign states are typically identifiable by their membership in the United Nations. Thus, non-state actors are those entities in international relations that are not UN members. These include inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals, both natural and legal entities. Our focus here is on international non-state actors composed of human groups rather than sovereign states.

Law-abiding non-state actors like Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Doctors Without Borders, CARE, and Human Rights Watch are typically categorized as "NGOs." On the other side of the legal spectrum are organized crime and terrorist groups such as the Mafia, the Colombian drug cartel, the Irish Republican Army, Hamas, Abu Sayyef, and Al-Qaeda.

NGOs traditionally have the legal status of individuals, and like most individuals, they generally operate under national law—the law of the place where they are established and where they conduct activities. There is little case law defining this status. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Barcelona Traction ruled that corporations have the nationality of their place of incorporation[267]. By analogy, non-state actors formed under a particular state's law, typically as non-profit or charitable organizations, share this trait. Members of any non-state actor group

---

[267] Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 42-43 (Feb. 5).

enjoy basic human rights globally. NGOs as entities may claim minimal international standard treatment from foreign governments, including protection against uncompensated nationalization of their property.

NGOs must comply with both the laws of their home state and the states where they operate. Throughout the 1990s, NGOs gained greater rights and duties directly from international law, often advocating for increased access to state territories and participation in law-making forums. This advocacy achieved some success, though it was sometimes perceived as diminishing the nation-state's status on the international stage.

Since 1990, however, there have been notable counter-trends concerning the prominence of non-state actors and their challenge to state authority. This is particularly evident in the evolving role of premier NGOs, especially international humanitarian assistance organizations. These NGOs have arguably made the most significant progress toward enhanced status due to their international legal rights enshrined in treaties and their willingness to accept the accompanying international legal duties. We will review some of these rights and duties, along with cases that indicate a slowed progression towards greater international recognition for NGOs.

Conversely, at the opposite end of the non-state actor spectrum, international criminal organizations that use violence to achieve their goals have seen a shift in how they are treated legally. The United States has reversed its long-held position that terrorists and other criminal organizations should not receive any legal recognition as international actors.

Among all non-state actors, humanitarian aid NGOs have arguably made the most significant strides toward enhanced international status. Various treaties accord special status to certain NGOs. For instance, the Geneva Conventions refer to "impartial humanitarian organizations," which are allowed to supply foodstuffs, medical supplies, and clothing. States cannot object to the presence of these groups if the civilian population in a zone of occupation is in need. This provision suggests that organizations meeting the criteria of "impartial" and "humanitarian" have specific rights granted directly under international law. Denying NGO access in such

circumstances constitutes a breach of the Geneva Conventions.

The theoretical significance of the developments involving NGOs lies in their demonstration of how non-state actors can gain international recognition and rights. By complying with international legal standards and fulfilling duties that come with those rights, NGOs have carved out a niche for themselves on the international stage. This has not only allowed them to operate more effectively in conflict zones but has also paved the way for a more structured and legally recognized role in international relations.

On the other hand, the case of international criminal organizations reveals the complexities and contradictions in the treatment of non-state actors. While humanitarian NGOs have gained rights and recognition, violent non-state actors like terrorists and organized crime groups have prompted a different response. The United States' reversal on the legal recognition of such groups underscores the ongoing debate about the legitimacy and status of different types of non-state actors in international law.

In summary, the progress of humanitarian aid NGOs toward enhanced international status, supported by treaties and international law, highlights the evolving role of non-state actors. At the same time, the legal treatment of violent non-state actors reflects a more contentious and less uniform approach. This duality underscores the importance of understanding the varied landscape of non-state actors and their impact on international relations and law.

Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 8 June 1977 mandates that states must permit the free access of all relief consignments, equipment, and personnel, even if this aid is intended for the civilian population of the opposing party. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) reinforced this provision in the 1986 Nicaragua case, asserting that "there can be no doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law."

NGOs have advocated for the right to access all populations in need, not just

those involved in international armed conflicts. The increasing distribution of aid by NGOs, rather than by governments, bolsters the argument that these organizations should be granted certain rights, including the right to access sovereign territory, irrespective of the state's consent. The notion is that "sovereign rights should no longer be an excuse to refuse humanitarian assistance or authorized humanitarian intervention."

NGOs have been lobbying for the right to enter state territories without needing explicit permission. In September 1999, the UN Security Council highlighted in Resolution 1265 "the importance of safe and unhindered access of humanitarian personnel to civilians in armed conflict, including refugees and internally displaced persons, and the protection of assistance to them…". It emphasized "the need for combatants to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, as well as personnel of international humanitarian organizations"[268].

This evolving legal framework suggests that rights and duties for NGOs are developing directly under international law. This development implies that NGOs might soon possess the right of access and the ability to make claims in international or national courts when their rights are violated by states. Conversely, NGOs would also be held accountable for fulfilling their duties, which include obligations to do no harm, maintain impartiality in conflicts, remain neutral, and accept accountability.

The theoretical significance of this development lies in recognizing the growing role and influence of NGOs in international humanitarian efforts. As NGOs take on more responsibilities traditionally managed by states, their need for recognized rights and duties becomes more pressing. This shift underscores a broader transformation in international relations where non-state actors play increasingly pivotal roles. The practical implications of this shift are profound, suggesting that NGOs could wield greater influence in shaping humanitarian policy

---

[268] Rohan J. Hardcastle & Adrian T. Chua, Humanitarian Assistance: Towards a Right of Access to Victims, 325 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 589. 1989. P. 12.

and practice while also being subject to stricter standards and accountability mechanisms. This dual dynamic of empowerment and accountability could enhance the effectiveness and reliability of humanitarian aid, ensuring it reaches those most in need while maintaining ethical and legal standards.

Co-ordination practices involve strategic efforts by brokers that aim to co-ordinate activities and actors in a way that empowers and enhances the social status of the broker vis-a-vis all parties involved. Elders, religious leaders (sheikhs) and civil society groups have become increasingly integrated into Somalia's burgeoning countering/preventing violent extremism (CVE/PVE) through a political sociological approach to militarization.

Elders, for example, have served as an informal early warning mechanism in Mogadishu, channeling vulnerable youths into newly initiated countering violent extremism programs. In Baidoa, elders and traditional leaders have served a similar purpose. In the words of one Elder: "Presently, there is a system in which we are working in Baidoa to maintain the rehabilitation of the youth, backed up with elders; we have agreed that every elder should go back to his clan to mobilize the youth groups in government-held and remote areas in order to work with the existing system." Elders and sheikhs, as representatives of civil community life, were here drawn into the countering violent extremism sector by government officials, with the end goal of defeating Al-Shabaab.

The Somali Ministry of Justice has populated a list of religious leaders it deems suitable for countering violent extremism (CVE) work. Formalizing the CVE roles of particular sheikhs, however, involves delicate political maneuvering such as;

• First, since sheikhs might come from a combination of religious backgrounds – Sufi, Shafi and Quietist/non-political Wahhabism – their different theological leanings and associated social positions make their selection by Government officials very political, as the choice of sheikhs for CVE activities may upset a tenuous balance that exists between these groups.

• Secondly, drawing on religious leaders can imply that religion/ideology

plays a significant role for radicalization, something which is not uniformly accepted by CVE practitioners. As militarization involves an intensification of the labor and resources allocated to military purposes, including the shaping of other institutions in synchrony with military goals, elders and sheikhs have undoubtedly been drawn into militarization's ambit. The introduction of traditional leaders into official CVE activities, however, is not necessarily all that novel. Known by other terms, traditional leaders have arguably engaged in informal, community-oriented CVE-related work since Al-Shabaab initial expansion.

Their previous work, such as in traditional dispute resolution, did not have a notable transnational aspect or strong influence from global militaristic trends. Elders and sheikhs began to engage in new, formal Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts partly because traditional dispute resolution fell within their roles, and the most severe conflicts had adopted a transnational jihadist dimension. They also became involved because state structures and institutions still held limited power and legitimacy in many areas of Somalia.

Thus, the words 'DE radicalization' and 'CVE' are relatively new in this context, while some of the roles that they refer to are not. These terms were brought to Somalia as a part of the wider war on terror and the gradual militarization of the traditional societal structures.

As funds from the UN and other donors increased for the business of CVE from 2012 and on-wards, more local actors entered this sector. Because of the purported preventive and developmental roles that facilitate the objectives of effective CVE work, Somali civil society actors have become visible for their community activities, thereby drawing these organizations into the transnational politics of CVE. Unlike the sheiks, civil society actors had not previously conducted deradicalization[269].

Rather, the focus of civil society was on human rights work and youth or women's empowerment. After 2013, non-state CVE actors grew significantly in

---

[269] Gelot L., Hansen S. J. They are from within us: CVE brokerage in South-central Somalia // Conflict, Security & Development. 2019. Vol. 19. № 6. P. 563–582

numbers. In addition to their traditional human rights work, the Elman Human Rights Centre, for example, became involved in reintegrating children who had been victims of Al-Shabaab activities. The same is the case with the 'Horn of Africa Voluntary Youth Committee' founded in 1992. Today it operates both in Hargeisa and Mogadishu, as well as in Ethiopia, and has become a CVE-related project implementer, even though the nature of its work is essentially the same as it has been in the past (providing development, education and job training)[270].

The countering violent extremism agenda has thus drawn a variety of actors into wider attempts to deal with and ultimately defeat Al-Shabaab. While it is important to note that not all CVE initiatives will involve all types of interlocutors, their growing inclusion in CVE-related activities indicates a drawing in of societal actors into global militarized politics. As a result, several Somali institutions like the Elman Human Rights and Serendi centers are adjusting their activities to synchronize with military goals. Such a widened scope has the potential to enhance the deradicalization, and therefore counter-insurgency process, but also introduces new challenges.

The newly found countering violent extremism brokers often attribute the label countering violent extremism (CVE) to already existing activities to prevent recruitment to local militias, to access alternative livelihoods or to reintegrate former combatants or radical Islamists. Because there has been no system in place in Somalia to ensure a uniform countering violent extremism approach, diverse actors have ample space to appropriate, alter and transform CVE brokerage according to their beliefs, interests and immediate context. The countering violent extremism agenda, therefore, empowers some actors more than others, notably the religious leaders on the 'approved' list, the clan elders most regularly consulted, certain government ministries and the civil society actors that receive grants.

Drawing together these activities with the aim of stopping Al-Shabaab attributes military values to development-oriented youth empowerment schemes. In

---

[270] Ibid.

Somalia, this uneasy transversal function of CVE is made necessary by a situation where counter-terrorism operations are sharing the scene with a government amnesty program for defected (moderate) Al-Shabaab leaders/fighters, and other leniency measures directed at some high-risk or strategically important defectors.

Countering violent extremism brokerage and semi-territoriality in South-central Somalia, the Somali National Army, special/regional police forces, AMISOM and the Ethiopian Army have insufficiently secured the local population. They remain concentrated around their base areas except for limited patrols and well-planned offensive operations. Local communities, therefore, know that their primary and regular interactions will continue to be with Al-Shabaab militants. As a result, this ensures that local communities maintain a form of loyalty to the insurgent group due to their fear of reprisals.

The Al-Shabaab presence and ability to collect taxes, zakat, is permanent enough to secure stable incomes for recruits meeting their potential opportunism, desires for income and the need for security. As such, Al-Shabaab is able to operate relatively freely in the Somali countryside. Moreover, Somali National Army levels of corruption are high (implementing illegal checkpoints and protection rackets), and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) are perceived by the many as a conflict actor (and sometimes as an imperialist presence) in the Bay/Bakool region, making loyalty to Al-Shabaab more likely[271].

Under such a regime of fear, Countering Violent Extremism brokerage is both unavoidable and dangerous. Rural social institutions, rural women's groups, elders and religious leaders' risk being sanctioned by Al-Shabaab for their roles as brokers. one Countering Violent Extremism actor concluded that even if, "Al-Shabaab's ideology is waning, the fear among ordinary people and the collusion of business circles and politicians with Al-Shabaab remain daunting." Insecurity also hinders defections from Al-Shabaab and severs loyalty towards government institutions.

A former Al-Shabaab member, for example, explained how he hesitated to

---

[271]*Andrew S.* International terrorism and the challenge to diplomacy, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 1987. Vol. 10. № 2. P. 103–112.

defect for a long period because he feared that he would be tortured or shot depending on who, at what point in time, got a hold of him. In research carried out another respondent explained, "one day a special police officer, and the next an Al-Shabaab operative, then back to being a beneficiary of a vocational program. But when facing unemployment, he carries out a small job for Al-Shabaab."[272] In this sense, the original militarist agenda outlined by the international community and Somali government actors is significantly altered by brokers.

Countering Violent Extremism has instead become a tool to gain power, options and funding rather than a counter-terrorism strategy. Translation practices the inclusion of local elders and local religious leaders in CVE activities has provided donors and UN agencies with bridges between them and government actors, as well as to rural areas where government authority has limited influence. For their part, brokers act as translators, or bridges, which means that through their actions they produce relations and realities that are irreducible to the interests of the bridged parts.

Importantly as elders and religious leaders begin to engage in CVE brokerage, this has gradually transformed related Somali societal structures. Traditionally, religious leaders were supposed to act as neutral arbiters in conflict. Similarly, Somali clan leaders have traditionally held mediator roles more so than outright warlord roles. In one sense, their role has become hybridized, and merged with modern roles they traditionally never had.

Some have noticed a risk that elders and sheikhs become 'just like other politicians', meaning corrupt and politicized elites in the country. Certain elders and sheikhs play roles in labeling individuals as 'extremists' and 'radicals. Their involvement in programs to rehabilitate defectors means that they partially serve the interests of external CVE actors which is more like serving global militarist agendas.

These external interests do not always align with community welfare. Militarization leads to a partial alteration of their traditional roles and can undermine

---

[272] *Gelot L., Hansen S.J.* They are from within us: CVE brokerage in South-central Somalia // Conflict, Security & Development. 2019. Vol. 19. № 6. P. 563–582.

their legitimacy. Conversely, such a hybrid position may also yield the possibility for using their newly attained legitimacy in ways that can reduce violent action, and increase an acclaim from local communities. Thus, the involvement of traditional leaders in CVE work illustrates tensions and contradictions when their roles become entangled with local militarized politics: in some cases, this militarization can present new problems, but can also solve some older problems, which as a result transcends the simple view of the militarization phenomena being associated with either 'good' or 'bad'[273].

The fact remains that in the semi-territorial areas of Somalia, where the government and other structures are simply too weak to provide consistent protection to local communities, the involvement of elders and sheiks remains crucial since they can assess and mitigate community risks coming from individual defections and decipher possible sanctions from Al-Shabaab that might result. Brokerage by Somali local actors have also enabled international actors to support CVE in remote spaces far from Mogadishu, despite their own inability of having staff present.

While local actors have channeled new resources and terms to conduct many of the same functions as before, CVE efforts nevertheless require them to also place themselves in relation to a counter-terrorism-inspired language that brands their interlocutors and program beneficiaries as extremists, radicalized and defectors. Thus, as Somali NGOs have gained a newfound status, and can access a well-funded transnational CVE agenda, they nevertheless partake in extending CVE's importance at the local level. By so doing, local brokers become imbricated in global forms of militarism associated with the fight against violent extremism.

In the process, they also transform its content and operations. CVE brokers inadvertently lessen the coercive aspects of the counter-insurgency approach to Somali people, values, and territory, yet their non-military means still retain linkages with an excessive, and inherently exclusionist security focus. Alignment practices

---

[273] *Gelot L., Hansen S.J.* They are from within us: CVE brokerage in South-central Somalia // Conflict, Security & Development. 2019. Vol. 19. № 6. P. 563–582.

CVE brokers often become social mobilisers or quasi social workers. They mediate between conflicting interests and aim to bring the actors connected in and through brokerage 'in line'.

The nature of community recruitment by Al-Shabaab has created additional layers of division and social challenges with Somali society, such as broken families (single-headed households). The sentiment is equally shared by former Al-Shabaab members. For example, a former Al-Shabaab fighter stated, 'if family accepts me, maybe others can'[274].

Therefore, the locally known cases of loopholes in screening processes (for instance, cases brought to the Baidoa Centre of young people who are not actual defectors) are viewed pragmatically. For them, this sort of opportunism is easier to understand when you consider the insecurity in the region and the history of clan politics, including the marginalization of some groups. Of course, Al-Shabaab is not the only factor creating insecurity in Somalia.

Clan conflicts, and manifold grievances from the era preceding Al-Shabaab's ascendancy, where human rights violations occurred in battles between Somali warlords, often following sub-clan cleavages, have contributed to a variety of other conflicts. Somalia's historical context leads many CVE brokers to explain the reservations they have with terms like 'De radicalization', 'extremist', 'defector', all of which tend to stigmatize and attribute blame onto large segments of the community.

Others articulate that the communities do not need specific interventions to 'De radicalize', since most people do not benefit from such categories. They would explain that due to the absence of functioning state institutions, non-state actors perform governance, development, social or humanitarian roles. In South-central Somalia, involvement or support for Al-Shabaab covers a wide range of activities, including routine and non-radical acts such as paying or collecting zakat, collecting supplies, living as an infiltrator in the community to gather intelligence on

---

[274] *Gelot L., Hansen S.J.* They are from within us: CVE brokerage in South-central Somalia // Conflict, Security & Development. 2019. Vol. 19. № 6. P. 563–582.

competing groups, or accepting services provided by Al-Shabaab such as justice provision or financial aid to run a market stand that doubles as tax collection point.

In this context, such minor supporting acts are carried out because people fear for their lives and property, which ultimately informs how community members are considered; in ways that do not center on 'radical' or 'extreme' beliefs or actions. This suggests that brokers have reservations and hold ambiguous attitudes regarding their own position and involvement in the transnational politics of CVE. It is worth recalling that their brokerage link is itself a result of the war on terror's introduction to Somalia, and the military agenda to defeat Al-Shabaab, which ushered in CVE activities to the region.

Global militarism can 'do work' through brokers, underlining its fleeting and succumbs to local forces that adapt its dominant practices to suit local context. CVE brokers saw it as their role to plan activities that better recognize the many causes of engagement with Al-Shabaab in Somalia, including economic reasons, the need for security, and the need to appease or collaborate with Al-Shabaab for mobility, security or business operations. Somali brokers' simultaneous adaptation of global militarism is preferable to many community members over the available alternatives, for example continued Al-Shabaab dominance and the militants' ability to attract former recruits back to their ranks.

Countering Violent Extremism brokers has a significant level of influence and independence to carry out CVE work in South-central Somalia. The development of CVE brokerage may lead to short-term empowerment of some actors but could also produce longer-term changes in Somali societal structures. For example, in the recent past, sub-clans have attempted to manipulate Al-Shabaab, and other powerful militias to gain advantages in local clan-based conflicts. Sub-clans are known to have infiltrated Al-Shabaab to gain its support. Local conflicts stir up the need for Al-Shabaab connections in order to gain the advantage of powerful allies. Of course, Al-Shabaab does not always master this game. But they can nevertheless benefit from inter and intra clan insecurity.

Al-Shabaab has often taken advantage of or has manipulated inter-clan

conflicts to their benefit. When the presence of fewer CVE brokers among marginalized groups, for instance, intensifies clan politics over the resources that are introduced to the CVE scene, this could easily sow the seeds of future patterns of armed conflict, and further anchor informal militarized fighting strategies between communities.

Insurgents and armed groups such as Al-Shabaab are frequently viewed as inherently hostile towards aid workers, often resorting to violence, extortion, and obstruction of humanitarian efforts within the territories they control. Despite this, scholarly attention to the dynamics of armed groups has been limited within the literature on humanitarian principles and aid worker security, resulting in a lack of essential information for aid agencies to effectively engage with these actors and access vulnerable populations.

Ashley Jackson's policy brief on humanitarian negotiations with armed non-state actors, focusing particularly on Afghanistan, Sudan, and Somalia, highlights the importance of understanding and analyzing groups like Al-Shabaab comprehensively. Negotiations between aid workers and these armed groups are commonplace and often vital for the survival of civilians under their control. These groups have developed intricate structures and policies for regulating aid agencies, underscoring the necessity for nuanced engagement strategies.

The willingness of such groups to permit aid operations is largely motivated by self-interest, emphasizing the significance of comprehending their motivations and objectives. Al-Shabaab, for instance, may coerce aid agencies to surrender relief items to bolster their own reputation. Conversely, armed groups may perceive it as advantageous to attack or expel aid workers rather than allow them to operate safely.

Effective engagement necessitates a well-defined strategy and dedicated resources, yet approaches to engaging armed groups are frequently ad hoc. Many agencies opt for indirect engagement through community acceptance mechanisms due to reluctance to engage directly with armed groups, especially in volatile environments like Somalia. However, such ad hoc approaches often lead to the delegation of responsibility to field staff and community members.

Engagement must occur at multiple levels, involving dialogue with both leadership and rank-and-file members of armed groups. High-level engagement is crucial for addressing policy issues, while dialogue with lower-level members ensures compliance with agreements reached with leadership.

Maintaining neutrality, independence, and impartiality is paramount for gaining acceptance for humanitarian activities. Aid agencies' perception is heavily influenced by geopolitical and historical contexts, leading to practices such as paying registration fees to armed groups like Al-Shabaab in areas under their control.

Coordinated action and advocacy are essential to address broader challenges to engagement with armed groups. While many agencies prefer bilateral engagement, greater coordination and information-sharing can enhance effectiveness. Models such as those implemented by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the International NGO Safety Office (INSO) offer valuable insights for replication and improvement. Collaborative funding mechanisms and donor support also play a crucial role in facilitating these efforts.

Conclusion. Above is an analysis of the interplay of global militarized politics and local brokerage by showing that Countering Violent Extremism brokers leverage and transform expanding views of what counts as CVE. Somali NGOs have gained a newfound social status by their access to transnational networks of funding and influence. Such access provides benefits such as vocational training, grants and contracts and networks with global organizations.

However, their participation in a form of counter-insurgency against their communities is transforming and potentially delegitimizing the sources of their social power. Brokers partake in extending CVE's importance at the local level and by so doing become imbricated in global forms of militarism. In the process, they also transform its content and operations. In some cases, CVE becomes a pretext for doing what NGOs did before, for example programs with focus on vocational training, youth integration etc.

The CVE and De radicalization scene in Somalia is a telling example of what

occurs when CVE activities draw together bundles of military, developmental, political and humanitarian actors. CVE networks assign new rules of the game for global-local CVE cooperation, set standards of expertise for this work, and label a diverse set of actors as 'extremist' or 'radicalized' groups and as CVE actors, respectively. They blur distinctions between pacifist and military forms of interventions to counter support for terrorism and the often-undefined category of extremist groups.

Observably because of local brokerage, global militarism is widened and altered in south-central Somalia. The politics of CVE in Somalia remains associated with the broader effort to defeat Al-Qaida's local affiliate, al-Shabaab. Yet, the social and political focus of CVE makes the term more palatable to development and humanitarian actors than counter-terrorism. CVE co-ordination and information-sharing is a form of interaction that nurtures and constructs assumptions about (de)radicalization processes. This process reinforces connections between poverty and insecurity and redraws the lines between civilian oversight and military force.

CONCLUSION

The Somali crisis has its roots in a complex mix of historical, socio-political, and economic issues, culminating in state collapse, widespread instability, and the rise of terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab. The crisis began with the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, which led to the breakdown of central authority and the start of a civil war. This period of statelessness was marked by clan conflicts, warlordism, and a lack of effective governance.

The historical background of the crisis in Somalia is deeply connected with the country's colonial past, when the European powers, seeking to assert their influence in Africa, artificially divided the territory and subordinated it to their interests. Ignoring the cultural and ethnic unity of the Somali people, the colonial authorities divided the Somali lands between Britain, Italy, France and Ethiopia, which became the basis for subsequent conflicts. The infringement of the rights and traditions of the local population, as well as a powerful anti-colonial movement led by leaders such as Said Mohamed Abdullah Hassan, created the prerequisites for the growth of national consciousness and the desire for independence. However, achieving political independence did not solve the problems inherent in the period of colonialism, including territorial disputes and inter-clan tensions, which eventually became the causes of civil clashes and destabilization of the State.

The collapse of the Somali State and the development of the threat of terrorism were the result of a complex interaction of internal and external factors, including the weakening of State institutions, inter-clan tensions and political marginalization. After the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, a period of anarchy began in the country, where power passed to clan leaders and military leaders, which deepened inter-clan conflicts and aggravated the crisis. The lack of effective central government and economic difficulties contributed to the radicalization of the population, which was actively exploited by terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab. Today, the threat of terrorism remains a key factor hindering the restoration of

stability in Somalia, as terrorists use the weakness of State structures to spread extremist ideologies and deepen socio-political divisions.

The creation of the Al-Shabaab group was the result of the radicalization of the youth wing of the Union of Islamic Courts and the strengthening of the influence of the international jihadist movement against the background of political instability in Somalia. By maintaining close ties with Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab gained access to the tactics and resources of global terrorism, which allowed it to expand its activities beyond Somalia and become a transnational threat. Based on nationalist and religious motives, as well as using cultural and clan ties, Al-Shabaab effectively recruits new fighters, including the Somali diaspora and extremists from other countries. Over time, the group has intensified cross-border attacks, such as terrorist attacks in Kenya and Uganda, which confirms its intention not only to fight for power in Somalia, but also to spread its ideology outside the country, threatening the security of the entire region.

The African Union plays a central role in maintaining security in Somalia and countering terrorist threats, especially from Al-Shabaab. The founding of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was an important step demonstrating the commitment of regional States to the principles of pan-Africanism and an independent solution to African problems. Under the leadership of the African Union Peace and Security Council, AMISOM secured key facilities, assisted in the training of the Somali national forces and participated in active combat operations against militants. The participation of countries in the region such as Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Burundi and Djibouti, as well as coordination with the United Nations, helped to stabilize the situation, despite the ongoing threat of terrorism and the need for increased funding and logistical support.

IGAD plays an important role in peace-building in the Horn of Africa, seeking to stabilize the region through support for diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts. The Organization was actively involved in conflict management processes, which allowed the creation of interim governance structures in Somalia and Southern Sudan. However, IGAD's success is limited due to weak institutional capacities and

the lack of mechanisms to control the military and political actions of participating countries, which, in turn, undermines its legitimacy and effectiveness. Despite institutional constraints, IGAD makes a significant contribution to regional peace-building and remains an important player in conflict management and preventing the spread of extremism.

The struggle of the member States of the East African Community against the threat of Al-Shabaab requires a comprehensive approach, including joint efforts in the field of security, legislation and combating the financing of terrorism. Despite certain achievements, such as the creation of specialized anti-terrorist units and international cooperation, problems remain urgent due to lack of resources, corruption and the difficulty of coordinating actions. The countries of the region must continue to work together to strengthen their positions, share intelligence information and implement effective counter-terrorism strategies to ensure the security and stability necessary for the social and economic development of East Africa.

The experience of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in Somalia, such as UNITAF and UNOSOM II, has demonstrated the complex challenges the international community faces in combating extremist groups and terrorists, including groups such as Al-Shabaab. The history of UN missions in Somalia has shown that successful operations require unity of command, sufficient funding and resource support, as well as political will on the part of participating countries. The UN faces difficulties in maintaining stability in unstable countries due to lack of resources, disagreements between participating countries and difficulties in integrating multinational forces. The lack of unity and coordination in missions such as UNOSOM II often leads to failures on the ground and a decrease in the authority of the UN in the international arena. In addition, humanitarian efforts under the threat of terrorist attacks require a timely and prompt response. In this context, the initiative to create a volunteer force resembling the French Foreign Legion could strengthen the UN's ability to counter threats posed by groups like Al-Shabaab. Based on this experience, the fight against Al-Shabaab requires a systematic approach, including

training specialized contingents and improving the operational structure in order to respond promptly to terrorist threats and ensure the protection of civilians and humanitarian missions.

A safe and stable environment in Northeast Africa is of high priority for the European Union because of its strategic location, affecting trade routes and global security. The EU is focusing efforts on maintaining security and rebuilding State institutions in Somalia, but its strategy, based on the Westphalian State model with centralized authority, limits the introduction of flexible, locally-oriented approaches to governance. Experience has shown that such a model does not always meet the specifics of the region, where traditional structures may be more acceptable in the absence of order. The EU strategy focuses on combating piracy and terrorism, for which training programs for Somali security forces and military operations such as the EU NAVFOR Somalia mission (Operation Atalanta) have been launched. The EU also continues to fund the African Union by supporting Operation AMISOM, which helps the Somali government counter extremist groups. However, due to the limited possibilities of judicial and executive control, the effectiveness of such initiatives remains questionable. As a result, the EU's actions have an important impact on the stability of the region, but mainly because of its security priorities rather than the interests of the Somali population. As part of its strategy, the EU faces challenges: disagreements in the approaches of international partners, the difficulty of coordinating humanitarian and military assistance, and a lack of flexibility for alternative forms of governance.

The study of the role of non-State actors in countering the activities of Al-Shabaab demonstrates the complex and multi-layered nature of interaction between various actors in the context of the fight against terrorism in Somalia. Traditional leaders and local communities, including elders and religious leaders, have become important intermediaries in initiatives to prevent violent extremism (CVE). Their involvement in processes aimed at rehabilitating and supporting young people has the potential to reduce the influence of Al-Shabaab, but it also creates risks of politicizing their role and undermining their traditional authority. The complex

nature of these relations underlines that, despite the desire to integrate local structures into global counter-terrorism programs, it is necessary to take into account their historical and cultural context. Against the background of weak State institutions, the effectiveness of counterterrorism initiatives largely depends on the ability of local communities to adapt to changing conditions and interact with external players.

SOURCES AND LITERETURE

Legal Normative Documents

1. Constitution of 2012, The Federal Republic of Somalia Provisional Constitution Adopted August 1, 2012, Mogadishu, Somalia.Somalia-Constitution2012.pdf (umn.edu).

2. East African Region (2014), Agreement on the Establishment of the East African Standby Force (EASF). https://www.easfcom.org [

3. European Commission. (2000). ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. Cotonou, 23 June 2000. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/consolidated-text-cotonou-agreement_en.

4. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html. [Accessed date; 21.06.2023].

5. UNSC, 'Resolution 1744 (2007)', Article 4, 2. Adopted by the Security Council at its 5633rd meeting, on 20 February 2007. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1744

6. United Nations Security Council Resolution,6 December 2006 S/RES/1725.Adopted by the Security Council at its 5579th meeting.https://documents ddsny.un.org/doc/UDOC/GEN/N06/646/11/PDF/N0664611.pdf?OpenElement

Official Documents

7. African Union. 27.Feb. (2013). Report of the African Union Commission on the strategic review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.report-356.somalia.27.feb.pdf

8. African Union. (2003). Policy framework for the establishment of the African Stand by Force and the Military Staff Committee. Addis Ababa. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-pso-doctrine-chapter-3-edited.pdf

9. A.U. Constitutive Act art 3, obj F. https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf.

10. African Union. (2015b).28. December. 2015. Communique of the 565th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU). https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-565-comm-burundi-17-12-2015.pdf

11. African Union. (2016a). August 2016. Securing predictable and sustainable financing for peace and security in Africa.https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auhr-progress-report-final-020916-with-annexes.pdf.

12. African Union. (2016b). Assembly Decision: Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII) para 5b,17 – 18 July 2016. https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/31274-assembly_au_dec_605-620_xxvii_e.pdf

13. African Union. (2017). January 27, 2017.Main successes of the AU in Peace and Security, challenges, and mitigation measures in place. https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20170127/main-successes-au-peace-and-security-challenges-and-mitigation-measures-place.

14. African Union. 22nd Meeting, 5th, January 2005. Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Support of the African Union to the Transitional Institutions in Somalia. AUC PSC/PR/2 (XXII). https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/2420/2005_22_PR_R1E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

15. African Union,28 June – 2 July, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Conflict Situations in Africa, AUC Executive Council EX.CL/191 (VII). https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ex-cl-191-vii-e.pdf

16. African Union Peace and Security Council. 29 SEPTEMBER 2022, 'Communiqué Adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 1108th meeting held on 29 September 2022, considering the political and security situation in the Abyei region: of the 29th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council'. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/comm.1108-en.pdf

17. African Union, 22nd Meeting 5 January 2005, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Support of the African Union to the Transitional

Institutions in Somalia. AUC PSC/PR/2 (XXII). https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/reportsomalia-22nd.pdf

18. African Union Peace and Security Council. 19 JANUARY 2007 'Communiqué of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council'. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqueeng-69th.pdf

19. African Union Peace and Security Council. 30 NOVEMBER 2022, 'Communiqué of the 29th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/1123.comm-en.pdf

20. AU Peace Support Operations Division, African Union Policy On Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse for Peace Support Operations. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/english-final-sea-policy-for-au-psos.pdf

21. AU and UN,10 OCTOBER 2013. Report of the Joint African Union–United Nations Mission on the Benchmarks for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-rpt-399-amisom-09-10-2013.pdf

22. African Union. 13 APRIL 2017. Communiqué of the 679th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/679th-com-g5sahel-13-04-2017.pdf.

23. African Union.09-10 February 2020. Decisions and Declarations of the Assembly of the AU Third Ordinary Session." Article 13. https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/38180-assembly_au_dec_749-795_xxxiii_e.pdf

24. African Union. EU Support to G5 Sahel Joint Force. May 2019. factsheet_eu_g5_sahel_0.pdf - Yandex.Documents

25. African Union. Guideline on the Role of the African Standby Force (ASF).https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/01-asf-in-hands-guidelines.pdf

26. African Union.18 APRIL 2017 Multinational Joint Task Force. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/press-statement-of-the-680th-psc-meeting-on-mnjtf-18-april-2017eng.pdf

27. African Union. 9 July 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. Addis Ababa: African Union Commission. Articles 3 (a, b, f), 6(a). https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf

28. African Union. 28 February 2004. Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security. Article 13. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-en.pdf

29. African Union. 12 to 14 July 1999; Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Council (Durban: AU, 2002), Art. 7-8. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf

30. African Union Peace and Security Council, January 19, 2007, Communiqué of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX), paragraph 9. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqueeng-69th.pdf

31. Africa Progress Report. (2013). Equity in extractives: Stewarding Africa's natural resources for all. Geneva: Africa Progress Panel.

32. African Union. (2003). Policy framework for the establishment of the African Stand by Force and the Military Staff Committee. Addis Ababa.

33. African Union. The African union counter-terrorism framework. 2015. https://peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-counter-terrorism-framework

34. African Union. (2014). Silencing the guns, owning the future: Realizing a conflict-free Africa. Addis Ababa: African Union & ACCORD.

35. Constitutive act of the African Union. 11. July 2000. https://au.int/en/constitutive-act.

36. Council of the European Union. The European Union counter-terrorism strategy. 2005. https://www.refworld.org/policy/legalguidance/council/2005/en/61243

37. Declaration of independence. 11. Feb. 1961. SOMALIA Declaration of acceptance of the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations. somalia.pdf (un.org).

38. EAC, 'Regional Strategy for Peace and Security (adopted by the 13th EAC Council of Ministers meeting, Arusha, Tanzania). http://eacj.eac.int

39. European Commission. (2005). EU strategy for Africa: towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development. https://www.iemed.org/publication/the-new-eu-strategy-for-africa/

40. European Commission. (2005). EU strategy for Africa: towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/eu-strategy-for-africa.html

41. IGAD REGIONAL STRATEGY VOLUME 2: January 2016. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 2016 – 2020.file:///C:/Users/mentor/Downloads/-%20IGAD%20RS_implementationplan_final_v6%20(1).pdf

42. IGAD. January 2016. Regional Strategy Volume 1: THE FRAMEWORK Intergovernmental Authority on Development- IGAD. https://igad.int/download/igad-regional-strategy-volume-1-the-framework-en-fr/

43. IGAD. 30 JANUARY 2011 'Communiqué of the 17th Extra-Ordinary Summit of IGAD Heads of State and Government on Somalia'. https://igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/283_Communique-of-the-17TH-Summit.pdf.

44. Intergovernmental Authority on Development, September 29, 2008. Communique of the Extra-Ordinary Meeting of the IGAD Council of Ministers. https://igad.int/communique-of-the-extra-ordinary-meeting-of-the-igad-council-of-ministers/

45. OAU. 14 July 1999. Organization of African Unity, Sirte Declaration (Sirte: OAU, 1999). https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/oau-convention-on-the-prevention-and-combating-of-terrorism.pdf

46. Status of mission agreement between the transitional federal government of the somali federal republic and the African union mission in Somalia. 6. March. 2007. Status-of-Mission-Agreement-on-AMISOM.pdf (amisom-au.org)

47. United Nations office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA. Global Humanitarian overview report, 10 December 2020.file:///C:/Users/mentor/Downloads/GHO2021_EN.pdf.

48. UN. 7 April 2008. Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in particular the African

Union, in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, Doc. S/2008/186. file:///C:/Users/mentor/Downloads/S_2008_186-EN.pdf

49. UNSC, 2 October 2009. Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1872. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%202009%20503.pdf

50. United Nations, 24th August – 21st September 1953. Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 1953. See doc. A/AC/66/L.2. file:///C:/Users/%D0%A2%D0%92% 2638-EN.pdf

51. UN General Assembly. 22 June 1973. A/AC.160/2, Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, Observations of states submitted in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 3034 (XXVII).

52. UNSC. (2008). Letter dated 10 December 2008 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/604/73/PDF/N0860473.pdf?OpenElement

53. UN General Assembly Resolution. http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGA/1999/171.pdf

54. UNSC. (2022). Letter dated 10 October 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/638/44/PDF/N2263844.pdf?OpenElement

55. UNSC. (2015). 09. 0ctober 2015. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2015/801.

56. UNSC. (2016). Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2016/919.   https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/ Somalia:Eritrea%20(S:2016:919).pdf.

57. UNSC. (2018). 09.Novermber.2018. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2018/1002. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%

7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_1002.pdf.

58. United Nations (UN) General Assembly, 18. December 2015. 'Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism'. UN doc. A/RES/70/120. https://documentsddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/429/12/PDF/N1542912.pdf?OpenElement

59. United Nations (UN). General Assembly, 2015. 'Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism'. Report of the Secretary-General. UN Doc. A/70/674. https://www.un.org/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/plan_action.pdf

60. United Nations (UN), 13th May 2013. '"Arc of Instability" across Africa. UNSC Presidential Statement'. Security Council 6965th Meeting. UN Doc. SC/11004. https://press.un.org/en/2013/sc11004.doc.htm

61. United Nations (UN) General Assembly, 18. December 2015. 'Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism'. UN doc. A/RES/70/120. https://documents-dds ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/429/12/PDF/N1542912.pdf?OpenElement

62. UNODC. Introduction to International Terrorism. URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/e4j/18-04932_CT_Mod_01_ebook_FINALpdf.pdf

63. United Nations. The United Nations Global Counter-terrorism strategy. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n05/504/88/pdf/n0550488.pdf?token=fGHMq141pQNfGF9Gp1&fe=true 2006.

64. U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism. 2022. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2022/

65. United Nations. Russia's report to the United Nations on the elimination of terrorism. 2019. https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/75/int_terrorism/russia_e.pdf

66. United Nations. //Amid devastating drought, ongoing rights violations, Somalia pushes forward in fight against Al-Shabaab terror group, Security Council hears | meetings coverage and press releases. URL: https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15208.doc.htm

Clerical Documents

67. United Nations. The United Nations Global Counter-terrorism strategy. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n05/504/88/pdf/n0550488.pdf?token=fGH Mq141pQNfGF9Gp1&fe=true 2006.

68. African Union. The African union counter-terrorism framework. 2015. https://peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-counter-terrorism-framework

69. Council of the European Union. The European Union counter-terrorism strategy. 2005. https://www.refworld.org/policy/legalguidance/council/2005/en/61243

70. U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism. 2022. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2022/

71. United Nations. Russia's report to the United Nations on the elimination of terrorism. 2019. https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/75/int_terrorism/russia_e.pdf

Statistical Documents

72. he Military Balance 2022. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003294566 .

73. Global Terrorism index 2022. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GTI-2022-web-04112022.pdf

74. Global Terrorism Index 2023 - Institute for Economics & Peace. URL: https://www.economicsandpeace.org/report/global-terrorism-index-2023/

75. UNHCR - Refugee Statistics. Somali Profile. https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/som

76. Uppsala Conflict Database. https://ucdp.uu.se/country/520

Literature In Russian

1. Африка: региональные аспекты глобальных проблем / Н.И. Аникина, И.В. Дмитриева М.М. Голанский и др. / Отв. ред. С.А. Бессонов; Институт Африки (Москва). М. 1994. С. 152 – 153.

2. Алиасхабов А. С. Международное сотрудничество в борьбе с терроризмом: правовой аспект //Вестник молодого ученого Кузбасского института. 2021. С. 76–79.

3. Балезин А. С. Черная Африка: прошлое и настоящее / [А. С. Балезин и др.]; под ред. А. С. Балезина., С. В. Мазова., И. И. Филатовой. М.: Университет Дмитрия Пожарского, 2016.

4. Васильев А.М., Жерлицына Н.А. Эволюция Аль-Каиды: между региональными конфликтами и глобалистской перспективой //Восток. Афро-азиатские общества: история и современность. 2022. № 1. С. 141-151.

5. Воеводский А.В., Иванова Л.В., Мазов С.В.СССР и кризисы холодной войны в черной Африке //Электронный научно-образовательный журнал "История". 2023. Т. 14. № S23.

6. Дегтерев Д.А. Африканский континент как полюс притяжения: вопросы солидарности и соперничества //Проблемы национальной стратегии. 2023. № 3 (78). С. 256-273.

7. Дегтерев Д.А., Петровская О.В. Миротворчество в меняющемся мире //Проблемы национальной стратегии. 2022. № 2 (71). С. 10-13.

8. Дегтерев Д.А., Амара Д., Эгамов Б.Х.У. "Общие интересы" в миротворческих операциях ООН в Африке: прикладной анализ кадрового состава //Проблемы национальной стратегии. 2022. № 2 (71). С. 76-101.

9. Денисова Т.С., Костелянец С.В. Бассейн озера Чад: территория нестабильности //Азия и Африка сегодня. 2024. № 1. С. 33-41.

10. Денисова Т.С., Костелянец С.В. Мозамбик: радикализация ислама как фактор политической нестабильности //Азия и Африка сегодня. 2024. № 5. С. 46-55.

11. Денисова Т.С., Костелянец С.В. Демократическая Республика Конго: распространение исламского радикализма //Восток. Афро-азиатские общества: история и современность. 2023. № 3. С. 149-161.

12. Дейч Т. Как погасить опасный огонь в "горячих точках" // Африки. Азия и Африка сегодня. 2005. №12. С. 20–26.

13. Дейч Т., Кулькова О.С. Проблемы мира и безопасности в сотрудничестве Китая со странами Африки //Пути к миру и безопасности. 2023. № 2 (65). С. 123-147.

14. Дунаев А.Л. Сомали: гуманитарная катастрофа на фоне гражданской войны // Вестник Московского университета. Серия 25: Международные отношения и мировая политика.2011. № 4. С. 126-146.

15. Жерлицына Н.А Буркина-Фасо и террористический кризис в Сахеле //Неприкосновенный запас. Дебаты о политике и культуре. 2022. № 5 (145). С. 165-177.

16. Забелла А.А., Кассае Ныгусие В.М. Военно-техническое взаимодействие Китая и Африканских стран в начале XXI века // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2019. № 2. С. 77-86.

17. Иванова Л.В. «Аш-Шабаб» в Сомали: надежда на мир или угроза миру? // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2013. № 12. С. 23-26.

18. Кассае Ныгусие В. Африканский Рог: прошлое и настоящее // История – 2022. Том 13. Выпуск 3. С. 113.

19. Кассае Ныгусие В.М., Ивкина Н.В. Особенности политического развития Африки в постколониальный период // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2020. Т. 20. № 1. С. 22-38.

20. Каримов Р.Р., Каримова Г.Ю. Трансформация Международного Терроризма В Современном Мире // Право: ретроспектива и перспектива. 2022. Т. 11. №. 3. С. 14–18.

21. Калинина Н.И, Козюлин В.Б. Договор о торговле оружием: заставить пушки замолчать // Индекс безопасности. 2010. Т. 3. №.16. С. 81-98

22. Калинина Н. Пути международного ограничения мировой торговли оружием // Мировая экономика и международные отношения. 2013. №1. С. 29-47.

23. Коновалов И. Исламисты Сомали // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2008.

№ 4. С. 47-52.

24. Коновалов И.П., Шубин Г.В. Современная Африка: войны и оружие / И.П. Коновалов, Г.В. Шубин. М.: «Социально-политическая мысль». 2012. 475 с.

25. Костелянец С.В., Денисова Т.С. Неоколониализм как драйвер радикализации ислама в странах Тропической Африки //Электронный научно-образовательный журнал "История". 2023. Т. 14. № S23.

26. Кудров Е.А. Конфликт в Дарфуре: основные причины и тенденции. М.: Ин-т Ближнего Востока. 2008. С. 80.

27. Кулькова О.С. Африканская политика Евросоюза: новые сюжеты и повороты. В сб.: Африка - восходящий центр формирующегося многополярного мира. Сб. статей. М., 2024. С. 143-153.

28. Лошкарёв И.Д., Копытцев И.С. Рынок безопасности в Африке: место России и новые возможности //Полис. Политические исследования. 2024. № 4. С. 23-37.

29. Лошкарёв И.Д. Конфликт в Тиграе: от современности к средневековью? //Статья в открытом архиве № 16062021 16.06.2021.

30. Лошкарёв И.Д., Копытцев И.С. "Революция Оромо" и проблемы межэтнического баланса в Эфиопии на современном этапе (1991-2020 гг.) //Вестник Брянского государственного университета. 2020. № 3 (45). С. 89-98.

31. Львова Э.С. К истории колониального раздела Африки // Под небом Африки моей. История, культура, языки народов Африки. 2015. С. 18-23.

32. Мазов С. Холодная война в «сердце Африки». СССР и конголезский кризис, 1960–1964. Litres. 2022. 524 с.

33. Магомедов Д.С. Партнерство США и стран Африки в борьбе против терроризма при администрациях Дж.У. Буша и Б. Обамы // Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право. 2018. Т. 11. № 5. С. 164–181.

34. Маценко И.Б. Восток. Афро-Азиатские общества: История и современность. 2015. № 3. С.206-209.

35. Мезенцев С.В. Внутренние и международно-политические аспекты кризиса в Мали и французская операция «Сервал» //Вестник Московского университета. Серия 25: Международные отношения и мировая политика. 2014. № 1. С. 3-28.

36. Осминина М.А., Смирнова О.А. Анализ нестабильной ситуации на Африканском континенте: сравнительный анализ, характеристики //Система ценностей современного общества. 2010. № 14. С. 142-147.

37. Панцерев К.А. Существующие практики и риски злонамеренного использования искусственного интеллекта в странах Африки к югу от Сахары //Азия и Африка сегодня. 2021. № 10. С. 31-37.

38. 2.Панцерев К.А. Информационный империализм: препятствие на пути стран Тропической Африки к независимому развитию

39. Панцерев К.А Страны Африки южнее Сахары на пути к созданию искусственного разума: миф или реальность?//Азия и Африка сегодня. 2020. № 10. С. 29-33.

40. Пархоменко В.К. США - Сомали: эскалация американского участия в войне против "Аш-Шабааб" // США и Канада: экономика, политика, культура. 2020. №.12. С. 100–113.

41. Пономарев И.В. Борьба с террором в условиях информационной войны: опыт Кении //Азия и Африка сегодня. 2017. № 6. С. 25-31.

42. Пономарев И.В. Танзания. Межконфессиональная конфронтация и террористическая активность: причины и последствия Азия и Африка сегодня. 2016. № 7. С. 36-42.

43. Пономарев И.В. Исламские радикальные движения на политической карте современного мира. Зона Сахары-Сахеля и Африканский Рог. Коллективная монография. Том IV, ИАфр РАН. 2020. С.220.

44. Попова О.П., Трунов Ф.О. Межведомственное взаимодействие в рамках оказания помощи «нестабильным государствам»: опыт ФРГ // Вестник Московского университета. Серия 25: Международные отношения и мировая политика. 2016. № 1. С. 107-139.

45. Рагунштейн А.Г., Рагунштейн О.В. Террористическая деятельность группировки «Аль-Шабааб» как угроза безопасности в странах Африканского Рога // Ученые записки. 2020. Т. 56. №. 4. С. 170–181.

46. Сакоева Р.Д. Миротворческая миссия Африканского Союза в Сомали." Социально-политические и историко-культурные аспекты современной геополитической ситуации: материалы III международной научно-практической конференции и круглого стола, Сочи, 09 –11 апреля 2019 года, том 3, Издательство "Перо". 2019. С. 189–194.

47. Сидорова Г.М., Жерлицына Н.А. Миграционные процессы в Африке и проблема безопасности ко второму саммиту "Россия–Африка" //Вестник Российской академии наук. 2023. Т. 93. № 2. С. 141-149.

48. Следзевский И.В. Самоорганизация кризисного социума: религиозная мобилизация масс в постколониальной Африке (Кризис африканского развития и его последствия) //Африка: поиск идентичности и диалог с миром: Ежегодник – 2018 / [Л.В. Пономаренко и др.] под ред. Н.С. Кирабаева. М.: РУДН. 2018. С. 8-34.

49. Трунов Ф.О. Участие ФРГ в борьбе с международным терроризмом на территории Сомали // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2017. Т. 17. № 4. С.710-726.

50. Усов В.А. Африканская политика Нью-Дели в сфере безопасности: вызовы и перспективы. В сборнике: Африка - восходящий центр формирующегося многополярного мира. Сборник статей. М., 2024. С. 180-189.

51. Фитуни Л.Л., Абрамова И.О. Агрессивные негосударственные участники геостратегического соперничества в «исламской Африке» //Азия и Африка сегодня. 2014. Т. 689. № 12. С. 8–15.

52. Шагалов В. А. Миротворческая операция ООН в Сомали в 1992–1995 годах // Ученые записки Казанского университета. Серия Гуманитарные науки. 2005. Т. 147. №.1. С. 157–177.

53. Шагалов В.А. Гражданская война в Сомали и миротворческая операция Африканского союза //Ученые записки Казанского университета.

Серия: Гуманитарные науки. 2011. № 1. С. 207-216.

Literature In English

54. Abrahamsen R. Return of the generals? Global militarism in Africa from the Cold War to the present //Security Dialogue. 2018. Vol. 49. №. 1-2. P. 19-31.

55. Adamson F.B. International Terrorism, Non-State Actors and Transnational Political Mobilization: A Perspective from International Relations. New York: Routledge. 2006.

56. Albrecht U. Technology and militarization of third world countries in theoretical perspective //Bulletin of Peace Proposals. 1977. Vol. 8. №. 2. P. 124-126.

57. Alden C., International African Institute, Royal African Society. China in Africa (African Arguments). Zed Books, 2007. P. 169.

58. Amble J. C., Meleagrou-Hitchens A. Jihadist radicalization in East Africa: Two case studies // Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 2014. Vol. 37. №. 6. P. 523-540.

59. Agbiboa D. Ties that bind: The evolution and links of Al-Shabab. Journal of the Round Table. 2014. Vol. 103. No. 6. P. 581-597.

60. Afriyie F.A. Terrorism and its Negative Effects on Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Al-Shabaab // European Scientific Journal ESJ. 2019. Vol. 15. № 11.

61. Ansorg N. Security sector reform in Africa: Donor approaches versus local needs // Contemporary Security Policy. 2017. Vol. 38. №. 1. P. 129-144.

62. Amble J.C., Meleagrou-Hitchens A. Jihadist radicalization in East Africa: Two case studies // Studies in Conflict &Terrorism. 2014. Vol. 37, P. 523-540.

63. Anderson D.M., McKnight J. Understanding AL-Shabaab: clan, Islam and insurgency in Kenya // Journal of Eastern African Studies. 2015. Vol. 9. № 3. P. 536-557.

64. Bachmann J., Hönke J. 'Peace and security'as counterterrorism? The political effects of liberal interventions in Kenya // African affairs. 2010. Vol. 109. №. 434. P. 97-114.

65. Baldwin D.A. The concept of security //Review of international studies.

1997. Vol. 23. №. 1. P. 5-26.

66. Bala B., Tar U. A. Regional Cooperation in West Africa: Counterterrorism and Counter-Insurgency // African Security. 2021. Vol. 14. №. 2. P. 186-207.

67. Balthasar D. State Making in Somalia under Siyad Barre: Scrutinizing Historical Amnesia and Normative Bias // The International Journal of African Historical Studies. 2018. Vol. 51. №. 1. P. 141-162

68. BalzacqVOL. The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience, and context // European journal of international relations. 2005. Vol. 11. №. 2. P. 171-201.

69. Brosig M. Rentier peacekeeping in neo-patrimonial systems: The examples of Burundi and Kenya //Contemporary Security Policy. 2017. Vol. 38. №. 1. P. 109-128.

70. Blumenau B., Müller J. A. International Organisations and Terrorism. Multilateral Antiterrorism Efforts, 1960–1990 // Terrorism and Political Violence. 2021. P. 1-19.

71. Botha S., Graham S.E. (Counter-) terrorism in Africa: Reflections for a new decade // South African Journal of International Affairs. 2021. Vol. 28. №. 2. P.127-143.

72. Bueger C., Stockbruegger J., Werthes S. Pirates, fishermen and peacebuilding: Options for counter-piracy strategy in Somalia // Contemporary Security Policy. 2011. Vol. 32. №. 2. P. 356-381.

73. Burbach D. T., Fettweis C. J. The coming stability? The decline of warfare in Africa and implications for international security // Contemporary Security Policy. 2014. Vol. 35. №. 3. P. 421-445.

74. Burchard S., Burgess S. US training of African forces and military assistance, 1997–2017: Security versus human rights in principal–agent relations // African Security. 2018. Vol. 11. №. 4. P. 339-369.

75. Bayeh E. Human security in the horn of Africa: Trends and Challenges //International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development. 2014. Vol. 1. №. 7. P. 341-346.

76. Buzan B. People, states & fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era. ECPR press, 2008. P. 318.

77. Burgess S. A lost cause recouped: Peace enforcement and state-building in Somalia// Contemporary Security Policy. 2013. №. 34. P. 302–323.

78. Cedric B. & Hassan H. The rise and fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts // Journal of Eastern African Studies. 2007. Vol.1. №. 2. P. 151-160.

79. Clark J. F. Realism, neo-realism and Africa's international relations in the post-cold war era // Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory. 2001. P. 85-102.

80. Cohen H. J. US Policy Toward Africa: Eight Decades of Realpoiltik. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2019. P. 280.

81. Coleman K. P., Williams P. D. Logistics Partnerships in Peace Operations. New York: International Peace Institute, 2017. P. 36.

82. Conteh-Morgan E., Weeks P. Is China Playing a Contradictory Role in Africa? Security Implications of its Arms Sales and Peacekeeping // Global Security and Intelligence Studies. 2016. Vol. 2. №. 1. P. 81.

83. Cunningham P. Review of Books. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science. 2003. Vol. 31. №.1. P. 90-90.

84. Dahir A., Sheikh Ali A. Y. Federalism in post-conflict Somalia: A critical review of its reception and governance challenges // Regional & Federal Studies. 2021. P. 1-20.

85. Davis D. E. Non-state armed actors, new imagined communities, and shifting patterns of sovereignty and insecurity in the modern world //Contemporary Security Policy. 2009. Vol. 30. №. 2. P. 221-245.

86. Debisa N. G. Security diplomacy as a response to Horn of Africa's security complex: Ethio-US partnership against al-Shabaab // Cogent Social Sciences. 2021. Vol. 7. №. 1. P. 1-19.

87. De Coning C. Peace enforcement in Africa: doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations // Contemporary Security Policy. 2017. Vol. 38. №. 1. P. 145-160.

88. Degterev D. Quantitative Methods in International Studies in Russia and abroad // International Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy. 2015. Vol. 13. № 2.

89. Dersso S. A. The Somalia Conflict implications for peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts // Institute for Security Studies Papers. 2009. Vol. 2009. №. 198. P. 24.

90. Diehl P. F. Geography and war: A review and assessment of the empirical literature //International Interactions. 1991. Vol. 17. №. 1. P. 11-27.

91. Elfversson E., Lindberg Bromley S., Williams P. D. Urban peacekeeping under siege: attacks on African Union peacekeepers in Mogadishu, 2007–2009 // Third World Quarterly. 2019. Vol. 4. №. 2-3. P. 158-178.

92. Erickson R. J. What international law approach should be taken toward international terrorism? //Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 1988. Vol. 11. №. 2. P. 113-137.

93. Ekanem E. A. Al Shabaab and its Violent Extremism in Kenya // Saudi J. Humanities Soc Sci. 2022. Vol. №. 5. P. 188-204.

94. Ehrhart H.-G., Petretto K. Stabilizing Somalia: can the EU's comprehensive approach work? // European Security. 2013. Vol. 23. № 2. P. 179–194.

95. Fennell C. Racism, Law, and the Social Sciences // Transforming Anthropology. 2009. Vol. 17. №. 2. P. 159-160.

96. Gelot L. Civilian protection in Africa: How the protection of civilians is being militarized by African policymakers and diplomats // Contemporary Security Policy. 2017. Vol. 38. №. 1. P. 161-173.

97. Gelot L., Sandor A. African security and global militarism //Conflict, Security & Development. 2019. Vol. 19. №. 6. P. 521-542.

98. Gerhart G. M., Woodward P. The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations // Foreign Affairs. 2003. Vol. 82. № 6. P. 174

99. Germond B., Smith M. E. Re-thinking European security interests and the ESDP: explaining the EU's anti-piracy operation // Contemporary security policy. 2009. Vol. 30. №. 3. P. 573-593.

100. Haastrup T., Dijkstra H. New directions for African security //Contemporary Security Policy. 2017. Vol. 38. №. 1. P. 102-108.

101. Hamilton D.R. International terorism // Taylor & Francis. 1988. P. 335-337.

102. Hared Hassan. Dynamism of terrorist threats in Kenya university of Nairobi institute of diplomacy and international studies. A dissertation research project submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree of master of arts in international conflict management to the institute of diplomacy and international studies University of Nairobi. November. 2015.

103. Hoffman B., Hoffman D.K. The RAND-St Andrews chronology of international terrorism. 1995. Vol. 7. №. 4. P. 178-229.

104. Hogan J. J. Competing Architects: Applying Social Contextualist Analysis to Negotiations on the African Peace and Security Architecture // African Security. 2020. Vol. 13. №. 1. P. 3-27.

105. Hodder W.R. Colonialism: political aspects. In: N. Smelser and P. Baltes, eds. international encyclopedia of the social & behavioural sciences. Oxford: Elsevier. 2001. P. 2237– 2240.

106. Horton M. Al-Shabaab: Why Somalia's al-Qaeda Affiliate Wants Puntland // Terrorism Monitor. 2017. Vol. 15. №. 5. P. 8-12.

107. Hong Z. China-US oil rivalry in Africa //Copenhagen Discussion Papers. 2007. Vol. 2. №. 26. P. 97-119.

108. Hoveyda F. The problem of international terrorism at the United Nations // Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 1977. Vol. 1. №. 1. P. 71-83.

109. Ingiriis M. H. From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: how the Ethiopian intervention and the 'War on Terror'exacerbated the conflict in Somalia //Third World Quarterly. 2018. Vol. 39. №. 11. P. 2033-2052.

110. Ingiriis M. H. The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement's recruitment project // Small Wars & Insurgencies. 2020. Vol. 31. № 2. P. 359–380.

111. Issa salwe A. Somalia and the Islamist War: Assessing the Probability of

Al-Shabab Winning or Losing the War with Somalia // Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal. 2022. Vol. 9. № 6. P. 281–290.

112. INSIDE the minds of Somalia's ascendant insurgents: an identity, mind, emotions and perceptions analysis of Al-Shabaab. Program on Extremism at George Washington University. 2006. 113 p.

113. Jenkins B. International terrorism: A balance sheet //Survival. 1975. Vol. 17. №. 4. P. 158-164.

114. Karlin M. E. Building militaries in fragile states: Challenges for the United States. – University of Pennsylvania Press. 2018. P. 296.

115. Kagwanja P. Counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers, old strategies // African Security Review. 2006. Vol. 15. №. 3. P. 72-86.

116. Kasaija, P. A. Somalia after the United Nations-led Djibouti peace process, African Security Review. 2011. Vol. 20. №. 3. P. 45-53.

117. Keenan J. US militarization in Africa: What anthropologists should know about AFRICOM // Anthropology Today. 2008. Vol. 24. №. 5. P. 16-20.

118. KlemarVOL. K., Marelja M. Institutional Support for Terrorist Financing Prevention // Athens JL. 2018. Vol. 4. P. 27.

119. Kinsella D. The black market in small arms: examining a social network //Contemporary Security Policy. 2006. Vol. 27. №. 1. P. 100-117.

120. Krause K., Milliken J. Introduction: The challenge of non-state armed groups //Contemporary Security Policy. 2009. Vol. 30. №. 2. P. 202-220.

121. Knowles E., Matisek J. Western security force assistance in weak states: Time for a peace building approach // The RUSI Journal. 2019. Vol. 164. №. 3. P. 10-21.

122. Kollman K. W. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science // Political Science Quarterly. 1999. Vol. 114. № 1. P. 177–178.

123. Lizardo O. A., Bergesen A. J. Types of terrorism by world system location //Humboldt Journal of Social Relations. 2003. P. 162-192.

124. Luckham R. The military, militarization, and democratization in Africa: A survey of literature and issues // African Studies Review. 1994. Vol. 37. №. 2. P.

13-75.

125. Mansur A., Bokeriya S. Mandates in the success of a peacekeeping missions: a case study of Liberia // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2018. № 7. P. 47–52.

126. Makanda J. Fighting Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: The Role of Ordinary Kenyans in Kenya's Military Intervention in Somalia and the Fight against al-Shabaab //Journal of African Union Studies. 2019. Vol. 8. № 1. P. 33-49.

127. Michael W. S. Jihadi governance and traditional authority structures: al-Shabaab and Clan Elders in Southern Somalia, 2008-2012, Small Wars & Insurgencies. 2020. Vol. 31. № 6. P. 1174-1195.

128. Nsia-Pepra K. Militarization of US Foreign Policy in Africa: Strategic Gain or Backlash? //Military Review. 2014. Vol. 94. № 1. P. 50-58.

129. Olsen, R.G. (2009). The EU and military conflict management in Africa: for the good of Africa or Europe? International Peacekeeping. 2009. Vol.16. № 2. P. 245–260.

130. Pierre A. J. Coping with international terrorism //Survival. 1976. Vol. 18. №. 2. P. 60-67.

131. Pirozzi N. Towards an effective Africa–EU partnership on peace and security: Rhetoric or facts? // The International Spectator. 2010. Vol. 45. № 2. P. 85-101.

132. Reno W. The politics of security assistance in the horn of Africa //Defence Studies. 2018. Vol. 18. № 4. P. 498-513.

133. Robinson C. D., Matisek J. Military advising and assistance in Somalia: fragmented interveners, fragmented Somali military forces //Defence Studies. 2021. Vol. 21. № 2. P. 181-203

134. Romanov V.A. The United Nations and the problem of combatting international terrorism // Terrorism and Political Violence. 1990. Vol. 2. № 3. P. 289-304.

135. Rubin A. P. Current legal approaches to international terrorism // Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 1990. Vol. 13. №. 4-5. P. 277-297.

136. Sautman B., Hairong Y. Friends, and interests: China's distinctive links

with Africa //African Studies Review. 2007. Vol. 50. №. 3. P. 75-114.

137. Selth A. International terrorism and the challenge to diplomacy // Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 1987. Vol. 10. №. 2. P. 103-112.

138. Sepos A. Imperial power Europe? The EU's relations with the ACP countries //Journal of Political Power. 2013. Vol. 6. №. 2. P. 261-287.

139. Schmidt P., Zyla B. European security policy: Strategic culture in operation? //Contemporary security policy. 2011. Vol. 32. №. 3. P. 484-493.

140. Sherwood M. 'Diplomatic Platitudes': The Atlantic Charter, the United Nations, and Colonial Independence //Immigrants & Minorities. 1996. Vol. 15. № 2. P. 135-150.

141. Shinn D. Fighting terrorism in East Africa and the Horn // Foreign Service Journal. 2004. Vol. 81. № 9. P. 40.

142. Shinn D. H., Eisenman J. China, and Africa: A century of engagement. University of Pennsylvania press. 2012. P. 544.

143. Shire M. I. Dialoguing and negotiating with Al-Shabaab: the role of clan elders as insider-partial mediators // Journal of Eastern African Studies. 2020. Vol. 15. № 1. P. 1–22.

144. Sjursen H. (ed.). Civilian or military power? European foreign policy in perspective. Routledge. 2013. P. 176.

145. Slayton C. Underselling Islamist extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa //Defense& Security Analysis. 2015. Vol. 31. № 2. P. 123-136.

146. Sundberg J.W.F. Comments on the fourth interim report of the committee on international terrorism. 1984. № 7:2. P. 185-192.

147. Tekle A. International relations in the Horn of Africa (1991–96) //Review of African Political Economy. 1996. Vol. 23. № 70. P. 499-509.

148. Verhoeven H. The Gulf and the Horn: Changing geographies of security interdependence and competing visions of regional order // Civil Wars. 2018. Vol. 20. № 3. P. 333-357.

149. Walsh B. Revisiting Regional Security Complex Theory in Africa: Museveni's Uganda and Regional Security in East Africa //African Security. 2020.

Vol. 13. № 4. P. 300-324.

150. Wendt A., Barnett M. Dependent state formation and Third World militarization //Review of International Studies. 1993. Vol. 19. № 4. P. 321-347.

151. Weimann G., Brosius H. B. The predictability of international terrorism: A time-series analysis //Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 1988. Vol. 11. № 6. P. 491-502.

152. Wæver O. Securitization and Desecuritization. I Ronnie D. Lipschutz (red.) On Security. New York: Colombia University Press. 1995.

153. Williams M. C. Words, images, enemies: Securitization and international politics //International studies quarterly. 2003. Vol. 47. № 4. P. 511-531.

154. Williams P.D. Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017. Oxford University Press. 2018. P. 366.

155. Williams P.D. War and Conflict in Africa. Journal of International Peacekeeping in Africa. 2012. Vol. 19. № 2. P. 251-252.

156. Wondemagegnehu D. Y., Kebede D. G. AMISOM: charting a new course for African Union peace missions //African Security Review. 2017. Vol. 26. № 2. P. 199-219.

157. Yoder A. The effectiveness of UN action against international terrorism: Conclusions and comments. 1983. № 6:4. P. 587-592.

158. Zenn, J. Al-Shabaab Versus the Islamic State in Somalia Province: Why Only Al-Qaeda's Affiliate Remains Unrivalled. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses. 2023. Vol. 15. № 2. P. 7–11.

Internet Sources

159. Agnon S.Y. Thabit Jamaldin Yahya, terrorist attacker of Bella Vista Hotel Mombasa, receives death penalty. http://intelligencebriefs.com/ [Accessed date: 18.06.2023].

160. Agutu N. Five al Shabaab abductees on police radar after escaping from Somalia // The Star. [Accessed date: 20.05.2023].

161. Al-Shabaab attacker given life sentence for Kenya grenade blasts // The Guardian (UK). 28 October 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/ [Accessed date: 20.05.2023]

162. At al Shabaab's mercy: Woman narrates gang rapes, drug abuse at camps // The Star. 23 November 2017. [Accessed date 20.05.2023].

163. Abdi, R. "Somalia's Southwest State: A New President Installed, A Crisis Inflamed." *International Crisis Group*, December 24. 2018. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/somalias-south-west-state-new-president-installed-crisis-inflamed. [Accessed date 20.05.2023]

164. Anzalone, C., & Hansen, S. J. (2019). "The Saga of Mukhtar Robow and Somalia's Fractious Politics." *War on the Rocks*, January 30. https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/the-saga-ofmukhtar-robow-and-somalias-fractious-politics/ [Assessed date 20.05.2023]

165. Barasa L. Inside Al-Shabab network in Kenya // Daily Nation (далее - DN). 29 October 2011 - http://www.nation.co.ke/ [Accessed date: 20.05.2023]

166. Bertelsmann. S. BTI 2022 Country Report Somalia. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2022. https://btiproject.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2022_SOM.pdf. [Accessed date: 08.02.2024]

167. Bwana J., Oketch W. Extremist to hang for killing moderate Mombasa Sheikh // Standard Digital. 16 April 2016 - http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ [Accessed date: 20.05.2023]

168. De Waal, A. (2015). The real politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, war and the business of power. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley. [Accessed date: 20.05.2023]

169. Faleti, S. A. Termination of Protracted Social Conflicts in Africa. In I. O. Albert (Ed.), Perspectives on Peace and Conflict in Africa. 2006.

170. Gaffey, C. (2017). "Who Is Somalia's New President Farmajo?" *Newsweek*, February 9. https://www.newsweek.com/farmajo-somalia-president-554683 [Accessed date 20.05.2023]

171. Gaanderse, M. (2010). Security for all: West Africa's good practices on

gender in the security sector. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. https://www.eisf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/0115-Gaanderse-2010-Security-for-all-West-AfricaE280%99s-good-practices-on-gender-in-the-security-sector.pdf [Accessed date. 23.05.2023]

172. Global Terrorism index 2022. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GTI-2022-web-04112022.pdf [Accessed date: 21.06.2023]

173. Hummel K. The 2022 Somali offensive against Al-Shabaab: Making enduring gains will require learning from previous failures. URL: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2022-somali-offensive-against-al-shabaab-making-enduring-gains-will-require-learning-from-previous-failures/ [Accessed date:15.01.2024].

174. Hussein, A. (2011). The Future Constitutional Structure of the Somali Republic: Federal or Decentralized Unitary State? https://www.hiiraan.com/op2/2011/apr/the_future_constitutional_structure_of_the_somali_republic_federal_or_decentralized_unitary_state.aspx. [Accessed date: 20.05.2023]

175. Klobucista C., Masters J., Sergie M.A. Al-Shabaab. URL: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabaab [Accessed date: 15.01.2024].

176. Lotze, W. (2013). Strengthening African peace support operations. Berlin: German Peace Operations Center (ZIF). http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Walter_Lotze_Dec_2013.pdf . [Accessed date. 23.05.2023]

177. Olojo A. How viable is dialogue with al-Shabaab and Boko Haram? Institute for Security Studies (ISS). 2019. P. 12. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335882148_How_viable_is_dialogue_with_al-Shabaab_and_Boko_Haram [Accessed date: 20.07.2022]

178. Roland M. The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujaheddin in Somalia. 2011. https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03641269 [Accessed date: 15.01.2024].

179. Rotich H.K. Al-Shabaab militia, a threat to security in the Horn of Africa:

A case study of kenya. URL: http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/154532. 2019. [Accessed date: 15.01.2024].

180. Ṣóyẹmí. Ẹ. À. Blood and Treasure: United States Budgetary Costs and Human Costs of 20 Years of War in Iraq and Syria, 2003-2023 // Brown// URL:https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2023/Soyemi_Costs%20of%20War_CTSomalia.pdf [Accessed date: 08.02.2024].

181. Stanford. Centre for International Security and Cooperation. // Al Shabaab. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-shabaab [Accessed date: 15.01.2024].

182. The Military Balance 2022. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003294566 . [Accessed date: 21.06.2023]

183. Uppsala Conflict Database. https://ucdp.uu.se/country/520 [Accessed date: 21.06.2023]

184. Zimmerman K.L. Al-Shabaab and the challenges of providing humanitarian assistance in Somalia //Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights. 2011. https://www.academia.edu/48888932/Al_Shabaab_and_the_Challenges_of_Providing_Humanitarian_Assistance_in_Somalia [Accessed date: 20.07.2022]

ABBREVIATIONS

ACSRT - African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism

ADF - Allied Democratic Forces

AFRICOM - US Africa Command

AIAI - Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (The Islamic Union)

AMIS - AU Mission in Sudan

AMISEC - AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros

AMISOM - African Union Mission in Somalia

APC - Armored Personnel Carrier

APF - African Peace Facility (EU)

APSA - African Peace and Security Architecture

ARPCT - Alliance for Peace Restoration and Combat Against Terror

ARS - Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia

ASWJ - Ahlu Sunna wa'al Jama

ATMIS - African Union Transition Mission in Somalia

AU - African Union

BNDF - Burundi National Defence Force

BOI - Board of Inquiry

CAR - Central African Republic

CAS – Comprehensive Approach to Security

CCTARC - Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell

CERWAN – Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States

CIA – United States Central Intelligence Agency

CIMIC - Civil-Military Coordination

CONOPS - Concept of Operations

CVE – Countering Violent Extremism.

DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DFS - UN Department of Field Support

DPA - UN Department of Political Affairs

DPKO - UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DRC - Democratic Republic of the Congo

EARF - East African Response Force (US)

EACTI – East Africa Counter Terrorism Initiative

EDD - Explosive Detecting Dog

ENDF - Ethiopia National Defense Force

ESAAMLG – East & South African Anti Money Laundering Group.

EU - European Union

EUTM - European Union Training Mission Somalia

FAD - Force Armée de Djibouti

FATF – Financial Action Task Force

FGS - Federal Government of Somalia

FOB - Forward Operating Base

FPU - Formed Police Unit

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

GCTF – Global Coalition to Defeat Islamic State

ICT – Information and Communications Technology

ICU - Islamic Courts Union

IDP - Internally Displaced Person

IED - Improvised Explosive Device

IGAD - Inter-governmental Authority on Development

IGASOM - IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia

IHL - International humanitarian law

IMATT - International Military Advisory and Training Team

IOM - International Organization for Migration

IPO - Individual Police Officer

IRA - Interim Regional Administration

ISIS – Islamic State in Somalia

ISF - International Stabilization Force

IST - Information Support Team

ISTAR - Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance

KDF - Kenyan Defence Force

LRA – Lord's Resistance Army

MENAFATF - Middle East-North Africa Financial Action Task Force

MIA - Mogadishu International Airport

MIDAS – Migration Information Data Analysis System.

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCTC – National Counter- Terrorism Centre

NGO - Non-Governmental Organization

NSSP - National Security and Stabilization Plan (Somalia)

OAU - Organisation of African Unity

OCHA - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)

PISCES – Public Infrastructure Security Cyber Education System

PIU - Public Information Unit

POC - Protection of Civilians

PSC - Peace and Security Council of the African Union

PSOD - Peace Support Operations Division (AU)

QIP - Quick Impact Project

QRF - Quick Reaction Force

ROE - Rules of Engagement

RSLAF - Royal Sierra Leone Armed Forces

SCIC - Supreme Council of Islamic Courts

SEA - Sexual exploitation and abuse

SNA - Somali National Army

SNF – Somali National Front

SNL – Somali National League

SNM - Somali National Movement

SNP - Somali National Party

SNP - Somali National Police

SNSF - Somali National Security Forces

SPLM/A – Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army

SPF - Somali Police Force

SRC – Supreme Revolutionary Council

SRCC - Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU

Commission

SSDF - Somali Salvation Democratic Front

SWS – Southwestern State

TCC - Troop-Contributing Country

TFG - Transitional Federal Government

TFP - Transitional Federal Parliament

TNG - Transitional National Government

UPDF - Uganda People's Defence Force

UPF – Uganda Police Force

UN - United Nations

UNICEF - United Nations International Children's Emergency Funds

UNMEE - UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

UNPOS - UN Political Office for Somalia

UNSOA - UN Support Office for AMISOM

UNSOM - UN Assistance Mission in Somalia

UNSOS - UN Support Office in Somalia

USC – United Somali Congress