

Peoples' Friendship University of Russia named after Patrice Lumumba  
(RUDN University)

*As a manuscript*

**SINGUWA Chimuka**

**SPECIFIC FEATURES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN  
AFRICA (1992-2023)**

Specialty 5.6.7. History of International Relations and Foreign Policy

THESIS  
for a PhD Degree in History

Scientific supervisor  
Assoc., candidate of law  
**BOKERIYA Svetlana Aleksandrovna**

Moscow –2024

Федеральное государственное автономное образовательное учреждение  
высшего образования  
«Российский университет дружбы народов имени  
Патриса Лумумбы»

*На правах рукописи*

**СИНГУВА Чимука**

**ОСОБЕННОСТИ РЕГИОНАЛЬНОЙ ИНТЕГРАЦИИ НА ЮГЕ  
АФРИКИ (1992–2023 гг.)**

Специальность 5.6.7. История международных отношений и внешней  
политики

**ДИССЕРТАЦИЯ**  
на соискание ученой степени  
кандидата исторических наук

Научный руководитель:  
кандидат юридических наук,  
доцент  
**Бокерия Светлана Александровна**

Москва – 2024

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| <b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....   | 4   |
| <b>CHAPTER 1. THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION FOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN INTEGRATION PROCESSES</b> .....                              | 4   |
| 1.1 The Political and Economic Incentives for Integration in the region .....   | 32  |
| 1.2 Influence of External Factors on Regional Integration in Southern Africa ...  | 42  |
| 1.3 Historical and Legal Foundations of Integration Tendencies in Southern Africa .....                                   | 51  |
| <b>CHAPTER 2. THE COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: SACU, COMESA &amp; AfCFTA</b>        | 61  |
| 2.1 The Formation and Organizational structure of the Southern African Customs Union .....                                | 62  |
| 2.2 The Economic Harmonization within the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) .....                    | 76  |
| 2.3 The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and its influence on the integration efforts in Southern Africa..... | 96  |
| <b>CHAPTER 3. THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION</b> .....                 | 108 |
| 3.1 The Historical Background of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) .....                   | 109 |
| 3.2 The Transition from SADCC to SADC: the Political Landscape Of Economic Integration .....                              | 122 |
| 3.3 The Challenges and Responses to Maintaining Security and Peace in the Region.....                                     | 147 |
| <b>CONCLUSION</b> .....   | 172 |
| <b>LIST OF SOURCES AND LITERATURE</b> .....   | 179 |
| <b>ABBREVIATIONS</b> .....  | 207 |

## INTRODUCTION

**The relevance of the study** is primarily determined by the fact that the period under study encompasses significant political, economic, and social changes that have occurred in the region, such as the overthrow of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the emergence of democratic administrations in many countries, and the advancement of efforts toward regional integration. Understanding the specifics of these processes provides valuable insights into how these transformations have influenced the development outcomes and processes of the countries and the region as a whole.

Another reason lies in the fact that regional integration in Southern Africa is crucial for addressing common challenges and leveraging collective opportunities. Issues such as trade facilitation, infrastructure development, as well as peace and security, require coordinated efforts from neighboring countries. Thus, analyzing the specific characteristics of regional integration can help identify areas where cooperation is most needed and where existing mechanisms may require strengthening or reform.

Moreover, the period from 1992 to 2023 includes important milestones on the path to regional integration and encompasses the transformation and establishment of regional organizations such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Examining the specific features of these initiatives and how they affect regional cooperation can provide valuable lessons for future integration efforts.

The relevance of this research goes beyond the expert-academic community and also has practical significance for policymakers and opinion leaders in the Southern African region. The findings of the research can influence strategic priorities, the development of policies and programs that promote regional integration goals, and the improvement of the population's well-being by offering fact-based analysis and recommendations. Such practical significance ensures that the research will have a

tangible impact on promoting sustainable development and prosperity in Southern Africa.

These reasons underscore the relevance of the research topic and, consequently, the need to study regional integration processes in Southern Africa, reflecting broader dynamics of integration on the African continent.

Finally, the relevance of the research is also due to the fact that these processes are underrepresented in contemporary academic literature.

**Literature review.** Over the past few decades, scholars have shown great interest in the regional integration of Southern Africa, exploring its driving forces, challenges, and outcomes. This literature review examines significant works on regional integration in the region from the 1960s to the present, focusing on perspectives from Russian, Western, and African authors. The study includes scholarly literature published in both English and Russian.

**The historiography in Russian** can be divided into several groups depending on the thematic focus of the research. *The first category* includes works dedicated to the historical development of Southern African countries. This group primarily consists of the works of Soviet researchers, who made significant contributions to the study of Africa during the existence of the USSR. Among these are the scholarly works of V.F. Titov<sup>1</sup>, A.Z. Zusmanovich<sup>2</sup>, A.B. Davidson<sup>3</sup>, O.Ya. Ivanova<sup>4</sup>, T.M. Turukina<sup>5</sup>, Yu.N.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Титов В.Ф.* Ангола: формирование марксистской мысли. М.: Издательство Московского университета, 1985. 125 с.

<sup>2</sup> *Зусманович А.З.* Империалистический раздел бассейна Конго (1876–1894 гг.). М.: Издательство восточной литературы, 1962. 356 с.

<sup>3</sup> *Давидсон А.Б.* Южная Африка: становление сил протеста (1870–1924 гг.). М.: Главная редакция восточной литературы, 1972. 614 с. *Он же.* ЮАР. В кн.: История Тропической и Южной Африки. 1918–1988. М., Наука, 1989. 412 с. *Он же.* Матабеле и машона в борьбе против английской колонизации 1888–1897 / Акад. наук СССР. Ин-т востоковедения. М.: Изд-во вост. лит., 1958. 184 с.

<sup>4</sup> *Иванова О.Я.* Коморские Острова: Справочник / Отв. ред. Ю. Н. Винокуров; Институт Африки РАН. М.: Восточная литература, 2003. 73 с. *Иванова О. Я.* Сейшельские острова: Справочник / О.Я. Иванова; Рос. акад. наук. Ин-т Африки. М.: Вост. лит., 2000. 46 с.

<sup>5</sup> *Турукина Т.М.* Проблемы политического и социально-экономического развития Федеральной Исламской Республики Коморские Острова (1975–1990). М.: Ин-т Африки АН, 1991. 78 с.

Vinokurov<sup>6</sup>, A.L.Emelyanov<sup>7</sup>, A.P. Pozdnyakova<sup>8</sup>, S.M. Shlenskaya<sup>9</sup>, Z.I. Tokareva<sup>10</sup>, M. A.Chuvaeva<sup>11</sup>, L.A. Demkina<sup>12</sup>, and others.

The problems of political and economic processes unfolding in Southern Africa have become a field of scholarly research for a number of prominent Russian historians. To address the objectives set forth in the work, the author drew upon the works of A.M. Khazanov<sup>13</sup>, L.N. Rytov<sup>14</sup> and others.

The study by S.A. Slipchenko examines in detail the most important participation of the "frontline states" in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. The scientist emphasizes that the voices of regional countries were heard all over the world, strengthening calls for justice and condemning colonialism in the international arena<sup>15</sup>.

The work of A.A. Gromyko holds an important place in historiographical discourse. It discusses an era of conflicts in the region, where the enduring legacy of racism and colonialism intersects with the natural trajectory of African countries

---

<sup>6</sup> *Винокуров Ю.Н., Орлова А.С., Субботин В.А.* История Заира в новое и новейшее время. М.: Наука, 1982. 215 с.

<sup>7</sup> *Емельянов А.Л.* Мадагаскар / История Тропической и Южной Африки, 1918-1988. М.: Наука, 1989. 364 с.

<sup>8</sup> *Позднякова А.П.* Республика Малави: справочник / Позднякова, Ариадна Петровна; АН СССР, ин-т Африки. М.: Наука, 1989. 187 с.

<sup>9</sup> *Шлэнская С.М.* Объединенная Республика Танзания. Справочник. М.: Институт Африки РАН, 2014. 261 с.

<sup>10</sup> *Токарева З.И.* Маврикий: Справочник / З.И. Токарева; Рос. акад. наук, Ин-т Африки. М.: Наука, 1992. 165 с.

<sup>11</sup> *Чуваева М.А. Ксенофонтова Н.А.* Республика Замбия: Справочник. 2-е изд., доп. и перераб. М.: Восточная литература, 1996. 272 с.

<sup>12</sup> *Демкина Л.А.* Рабочий класс и рабочее движение в Северной Родезии. Народы Азии и Африки. М., 1961. С. 41–52. *Она же.* Первые нерасовые выборы в ЮАР // Африка: суждения и факты. М., Институт Африки РАН. 1994. С. 4–11.

<sup>13</sup> *Хазанов А.М.* История Анголы в новое и новейшее время. М.: Институт Востоковедения РАН, 1999. 390 с. *Хазанов А.М.* История Мозамбика в Новое и Новейшее время. М.: ЮНИТИ-ДАНА, Закон и право, 2006. 175 с.

<sup>14</sup> *Рытов Л.Н.* Борьба народов Лесото и Ботсваны за независимость (1945–1966 гг.): дис. канд. ист. наук: 07.00.03. М., 1999. С. 22.

<sup>15</sup> *Слипченко С.А.* Роль "прифронтовых" государств в освободительном процессе на Юге Африки (уроки Зимбабве, проблема Намибии) / С.А. Слипченко; Академия наук СССР, Институт Африки. М., 1984. 223 с.

striving for political self-determination<sup>16</sup>. V.G. Shubin<sup>17</sup> examines the liberation movements in Southern Africa in the 1960s and 1990s.

*The second category* of works dedicated to Southern Africa includes publications by Russian Africanists and scholars who studied the international relations of Southern African states before and after gaining independence. These researchers examined diplomatic interactions, geopolitical dynamics, and the foreign policy orientation of the countries in the region. Notably, This segment of the literature mainly contains the works of D.A. Zelenova<sup>18</sup>, L.Ya. Prokopenko<sup>19</sup>, L.L. Fituni<sup>20</sup>, G.M. Sidorova<sup>21</sup>,

---

<sup>16</sup> Громько Ан.А. Конфликт на Юге Африки. М.: Мысль, 1979. 296 с.

<sup>17</sup> Шубин В.Г. Горячая «холодная война»: Юг Африки (1960–1990 гг.). М.: Издательский дом «ЯСК», 2013. 368 с.

<sup>18</sup> Зеленова Д.А. «Советские военные специалисты при АНК в Анголе: военная культура и быт в лагере Какулама» в сборнике «Солидарность в борьбе с апартеидом: Историческая память в России и Южной Африке» Под ред. ВГ Шубина. Институт Африки РАН, 2023. С.6-12. Зеленова Д. А., Воронина Н. А. ЮАР Сегодня. Институт Африки РАН, 2020. С.36-66. Зеленова Д.А., Андреева Т.А., Баринов А. К., Воронина Н.А. Второй саммит, экономический и гуманитарный форум Россия – Африка: новая глобальная архитектура// Азия и Африка Сегодня, 2023. № 9. С. 5-18. Zelenova D.A. From Egypt to South Africa: the rise and fall of assistance from Moscow in Africa's decolonisation, Journal of Southern African Studies, 2022.Vol. 48 №5. P.1-3.

<sup>19</sup> Прокопенко Л.Я. Новые политические элиты в государствах Юга Африки. М.: Институт Африки РАН, 2011.С. 51–62.

<sup>20</sup> Фитуни Л.Л. Развитие экономики независимой Анголы. М.: Наука, 1981.174 с.

<sup>21</sup> Сидорова Г.М. Интеграция Демократической Республики Конго в систему международных отношений // Экономические отношения, 2017. Т.7. №4. С. 375-386. Сидорова Г.М. Ботсвана через призму времен и событий // Международная жизнь. 2021. № 8. С. 134-136. Сидорова Г.М. Современные вооруженные конфликты в Африке как объект политического анализа // В монографии: Военные науки versus. Наука о войне в Австрии и в России. Под ред. В.К. Белозёрова. М.: ФГБОУ ВО МГЛУ, 2021. С.134-139. Сидорова Г.М. Совет Безопасности ООН как эффективная организация по обеспечению мира и стабильности в Африке // Дипломатическая служба. 2021. № 1. С. 36-43. Сидорова Г.М. Африка в геополитической структуре XXI века // Вестник Дипломатической академии МИД России. Россия и мир, 2020. № 1(23). С. 30-42.

A.C. Balezin<sup>22</sup>, V.I. Berezin<sup>23</sup>, A.A.Khilova<sup>24</sup>, Y.S. Skubko<sup>25</sup>, L.Y. Prokopenko<sup>26</sup>, L.M. Kapitsa<sup>27</sup>, Ya.B. Liokumovich<sup>28</sup>, and others.

E.A. Bragin's research focuses on the analysis of the features of the economic development of four countries in Southern Africa: Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa. E.A. Bragin emphasizes the growing importance and role of foreign trade relations in strengthening national economies<sup>29</sup>.

In a collection of articles compiled by A.P. Pozdnyakova, L.Ya. Prokopenko, V.A. Sidorov, and others<sup>30</sup>, particular attention is paid to elections held in Southern Africa and Madagascar, especially in the years following the "wave of democratization" that swept across Africa in the early 1990s.

*The third category* is represented by the works of Russian researchers studying regional cooperation in Southern African region in various areas. This section focuses on the growing significance of Southern African nations in global politics and the

---

<sup>22</sup> Балезин А.С., Притворов А.В., Слипченко С.А. История Намибии в новое и новейшее время. М.: Восточная литература, 1993. С.182-183.

<sup>23</sup> Бerezин В.И. Замбия. Пути завоевания экономической независимости. М., Наука. 1972.120 с.

<sup>24</sup> Хилова А.А. Борьба с апартеидом в ЮАР: анализ конфликта // International scientific review of the problems of law, sociology, and political science. Boston, 2019. С. 83–94.

<sup>25</sup> Скубко Ю.С., Шубин Г.В. Социально-экономическое и политическое развитие ЮАР в 2005–2009 гг. М.: Институт Африки, РАН, 2009.

<sup>26</sup> Прокопенко Л.Я. Первые леди стран Юга Африки: политика и жизнь // Женщина в российском обществе, 2014. №. 4. С. 51–62.

<sup>27</sup> Капица Л.М. Юг: путь к экономической независимости // Экономика: вчера, сегодня, завтра, 2018. Т. 8. №. 10. 442 с.

<sup>28</sup> Лиокумович Я.Б., Коротаев А.В. Революционные и квазиреволюционные события в Южной Африке: Лесото-ЮАР-Ботсвана. Системный мониторинг глобальных и региональных рисков: ежегодник, 2022. С. 75–95.

<sup>29</sup> Брагина Е.А. Малые страны Южной Африки: трудное продвижение // Азия и Африка сегодня, 2020. № 12. С. 64–70.

<sup>30</sup> Выборы в странах Юга Африки. Сборник статей. М.: Институт Африки РАН, 2020. 336 с.



economy. The works of experts such as A.A. Arkhangel'skaya<sup>31</sup>, A.S. Zdanevich<sup>32</sup>, A.E. Koneva<sup>33</sup>, I.V. Cherkasova<sup>34</sup>, A.S. Pokrovsky<sup>35</sup>, I.V. Medvedev<sup>36</sup>, P.I. Polytsikov<sup>37</sup>, M.V. Ledeneva<sup>38</sup>, G. M. Vildanova<sup>39</sup>, and others are included in this category.

African studies have traditionally been a prominent focus at RUDN University. Regarding issues of integration in Southern Africa and the region's integration process in peace and security, notable contributions have been made by several scholars. S. Bokeria focuses on how regional organizations contribute to the settlement of international disputes in Africa<sup>40</sup>. Professor Kassae Nygusie's research is devoted to the emergence of modern African states and the formation of ruling elites<sup>41</sup>. L.

---

<sup>31</sup> *Архангельская А.А.* Особенности развития и формирования внешнеполитического курса новой Африки в 1994-2004 гг // Вестник РУДН. Серия: Международные отношения. 2008. № 1. С.110-117; *Она же.* Международные аспекты создания Южно-Африканского Союза в 1910 г // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2017. № 17(1). С.150-162

<sup>32</sup> *Здaneвич А.С.* История развития политических и социальных процессов на Юге Африки (Конец XVIII-первая треть XIX вв.): дисс. канд. ист. наук: 07.00.03. СПб. гос. ун-т, 2004. С. 157.

<sup>33</sup> *Конева А. Е., Солнцев А.М.* Интеграция государств юга Африки // Евразийский юридический журнал, 2015. №. 8. С. 43–46.

<sup>34</sup> *Черкасова И.В.* Экономическая интеграция на Юге Африки. М.: Наука, 1993. 214 с.

<sup>35</sup> *Покровский А.С.* Монополистический капитал в странах Южной Африки. М.: Наука, 1976. 180 с.

<sup>36</sup> *Медведев И.В.* Перспективы интеграции региональных объединений САДК, SACU и БРИКС в контексте развития экономики России // Финансовая аналитика: проблемы и решения, 2016. Т. 21 (303). С. 53–60.

<sup>37</sup> *Польщиков П.И., Тищенко Т.Ф.* Экономика стран Юга Африки. М.: МГИМО, 1978. 82 с.

<sup>38</sup> *Леденёва М.В., Плаксунова Т.А.* Экономический рост и перспективы экономического развития стран Африки южнее Сахары // Теоретическая и прикладная экономика, 2020. № 2. С. 129–139.

<sup>39</sup> *Вильданова Г.М.* Трехсторонняя зона свободной торговли КОМЕСА-ВАС-САДК // проблемы социально-экономического развития России, 2017. С. 171–174.

<sup>40</sup> *Бокерия С.А., Омо-Огбебор О.Д.* Боко Харам: новые вызовы и угрозы безопасности в Западной Африке // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2016. № 2. С. 274-284; *Svetlana B.* African Union in addressing regional peace and conflict in Darfur // *Asia and Africa Today.* 2021. № 1. С. 37. *Бокерия С.А., Сингува Ч.* SADC as the First Step of Regional Integration in Southern Africa // *Азия и Африка сегодня,* 2023. № 1. С. 49–56.

<sup>41</sup> *Кассae Ныгусие В.М., Ивкина Н.В.* Особенности политического развития Африки в постколониальный период // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения, 2020. Т. 20. С. 22–38.

Ponomarenko has studied the Democratic Republic of the Congo in depth<sup>42</sup>, N. Ivkina deals with the impact of colonialism on modern international relations in Africa<sup>43</sup>, Adu Yao Nikez in his works touches on the international legal aspect of the functioning of the African subsystem of international relations<sup>44</sup>, K. Amuhaya explores migration processes on the African continent<sup>45</sup>, in the works of A. Zabella the influence of China in African countries is studied<sup>46</sup>.

Researchers from MGIMO University of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs study economic integration in Africa based on the publications of G. Kostyunina<sup>47</sup>, who argues that, despite the signing of initial integration agreements during the colonial period, Southern Africa and other regions of Africa remain among the least integrated in the world.

The study conducted by M. Ogurtsov takes into account the unique features of political and economic integration in Southern Africa<sup>48</sup>. The issue of currency integration in Southern Africa is explored in the works of E.S. Romanchuk<sup>49</sup>.

---

<sup>42</sup> Пономаренко Л.В. Из истории завоевания Конго // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Всеобщая история, 1997. № 3. С. 68–75.

<sup>43</sup> Микаэль К. Н. В., Ивкина Н. В. Особенности политического развития Африки в постколониальный период // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2020. Т. 20. №. 1. С. 22-38.

<sup>44</sup> Аду Я.Н. Специфика реализации международного права в Африке // Африка и международное право. 2020. С. 20-29; Никэз А.Я., Мезяев А.Б. Конфликт между ЭКОВАС и Мали: международно-правовые и политические аспекты // Вестник международных организаций: образование, наука, новая экономика. 2023. Т. 18. №. 1. С. 170-189.

<sup>45</sup> Амухайа К. А., Очола К.О. Модель переселения мигрантов в Руанду //Международная аналитика. 2023. Т. 14. №. 3. С. 93-105.

<sup>46</sup> Забелла А.А. Инициатива “Один пояс–один путь” и африканская континентальная зона свободной торговли // Полис. Политические исследования. 2024. №. 1. С. 174-181.

<sup>47</sup> Костюнина Г.М. Интеграционные процессы в Африке: история и современный этап // Российский внешнеэкономический Вестник, 2016. № 4. С. 34–50; Она же. Интеграция в Африке / Г.М. Костюнина // Международная экономическая интеграция: учебное пособие / Под ред. Н.Н. Ливенцева. М.: Экономистъ, 2006. С. 297–320.

<sup>48</sup> Огурцов М.И. САДК как пример субрегиональной интеграции в Африке // Интеллектуальный потенциал XXI века: ступени познания, 2011. №.6. С. 141–144.

<sup>49</sup> Романчук Е.С. Региональная валютно-финансовая интеграция на Юге Африки: проблемы и перспективы введения единой региональной валюты // Финансы и кредит, 2015. №. 28 (652). С. 44–53.

Particular attention should be given to the work of the leading expert in the intellectual and cultural history of Africa and its diaspora, as well as postcolonial studies, T.M. Gavristova. Her extensive research covers the history of science and culture in Africa and the African diaspora, with a special focus on issues of identity and exclusivity<sup>50</sup>.

*The fourth category* consists of studies focused on the challenges faced by Southern African countries in their regional integration efforts. This part of the literature review includes contributions from several researchers such as G.M. Sidorova<sup>51</sup>, A.V.Zinina<sup>52</sup>, T.S. Denisova<sup>53</sup>, V.V. Anokhin<sup>54</sup>, and others.

N.A. Dobryakova and T.M. Karmov conducted a study on the emergence of permanent armed conflict in the DRC in the 1990s<sup>55</sup>. S.G. Karamaev studied the attacks of groups in the province of Cabo Delgado from 2017<sup>56</sup>.

**Foreign historiography** has extensively explored various aspects Southern African regional integration process. Within the English literature, this historiography can be categorized into different categories. *The first category* comprises studies by

---

<sup>50</sup> *Гавристова Т. М.* Африканские интеллектуалы за пределами Африки. Ярославль: ЯрГУ, 2002. 308 с.; *Гавристова Т.М.* Неизвестная Африка: история в биографиях: монография. Ярославль: Филигрань, 2014. 192 с.; *Гавристова Т.М.* Культура африканского зарубежья: учебное пособие для вузов. Ярославль: ЯрГУ. 2002. 112 с.; *Гавристова Т.М., Хохолькова Н.Е.* Постколониальная Эпистемология: Африканские «Регистры» // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения, 2022. Т. 22. №. 4. С. 688-699; *Гавристова Т.М.* Африка: время травелогов // Кунсткамера, 2019. С. 176-184.

<sup>51</sup> *Сидорова Г.М.* Вооруженные конфликты в Африке на примере Демократической Республики Конго / Г.М. Сидорова. М.: Восточная литература, 2013. 339 с.; *Она же.* Кто виноват в нестабильности Демократической Республики Конго? // Вестник МГИМО Университета, 2014. №. 6 (39). С. 29–36.

<sup>52</sup> *Зинина А.В.* Ксенофобия как социально опасный феномен //Актуальные проблемы социальной коммуникации, 2010. С. 168–170.

<sup>53</sup> *Денисова Т.С., Костелянец С.В.* Демократическая Республика Конго: политическая нестабильность и фактор Руанды // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2023. Т. 23. №. 1. С. 37–47.

<sup>54</sup> *Анохин В.В.* Ксенофобия в ЮАР // Инязовские чтения, 2022. С. 172–178.

<sup>55</sup> *Добрякова Н.А., Кармов Т.М., Лобанов В. Б., Труфанов Г.А.* Конфликт в Демократической Республике Конго и Россия: Перспективы Урегулирования // Современная научная мысль. 2020. №1. С 142–148.

<sup>56</sup> *Кармаев С.Г.* Кризис в Мозамбике и угрозы регионального и глобального характера // Азия и Африка сегодня, 2021. №. 6. С. 35–41.

Western authors that analyzed the historical aspects of the development of political and economic motives behind Southern Africa's regional cooperation, with a particular focus on the evolution of Southern African countries. Notably, the works of K.P. Vickery, J.D. Omer-Cooper<sup>57</sup>, V. Martins<sup>58</sup>, L. Cantwell<sup>59</sup>, G.M., Gerhart<sup>60</sup>, K. Wilburn<sup>61</sup>, M.O. West<sup>62</sup>, A. Pallotti<sup>63</sup>, J. Ball<sup>64</sup>, N. Rousseau<sup>65</sup>, J. van der Merwe<sup>66</sup>, J. Handmaker<sup>67</sup>, V.D Johnson<sup>68</sup> and others are prominent within this historiographic group.

Professor S. Marx had a significant influence on the study of the history of Southern Africa before and after independence<sup>69</sup>. D. Simon, referencing S. Marks' materials, discusses the importance of the SADCC/SADC and SACU in promoting regional cooperation in Southern Africa after the end of apartheid<sup>70</sup>.

---

<sup>57</sup> *Vickery K.P., Omer-Cooper J.D.* History of Southern Africa // African Economic History, 1988. № 17. P. 297.

<sup>58</sup> *Martins V.* Hegemony, Resistance and Gradations of Memory: The Politics of Remembering Angola's Liberation Struggle // History and Memory, 2021. Vol. 33. № 2. P. 106.

<sup>59</sup> *Cantwell L.* Chiefly Power in a Frontline State: Kgosi Lince II, the Bakgatla and Botswana in the South African Liberation Struggle, 1948–1994 // Journal of Southern African Studies, 2015. Vol. 41. № 2. P. 255-272.

<sup>60</sup> *Gerhart G.M., Kahn O.E.* Disengagement from Southwest Africa: Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia // Foreign Affairs, 1991. Vol. 70. № 5. P. 208.

<sup>61</sup> *Wilburn K., Gewald J.-B.* Herero Heroes: A Socio-Political History of the Herero of Namibia, 1890-1923 // African Studies Review. 2000. Vol. 43. № 2. P. 310.

<sup>62</sup> *West M.O.* The Rise Of An African Middle Class: Colonial Zimbabwe, 1898-1965. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2002. // Africa Today, 2004. Vol. 50. № 3. P. 150-152.

<sup>63</sup> *Pallotti A.* Tanzania and the 1976 Anglo-American Initiative for Rhodesia // The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2017. Vol. 45. № 5. P. 800-822.

<sup>64</sup> *Ball J., Gastrow C.* Angola: Nationalist Narratives and Alternative Histories // Kronos, 2019. № 1 (45). P. 52.

<sup>65</sup> *Rousseau N.* Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: the Soweto Intelligence Unit and Southern Itineraries // Journal of Southern African Studies, 2014. Vol. 40. № 6. P. 1343-1361.

<sup>66</sup> *Merwe J. van der.* An historical geographical analysis of South Africa's system of accumulation: 1652–1994 // Review of African Political Economy, 2016. Vol. 43. № 147. P. 332.

<sup>67</sup> *Handmaker J.* Confronting apartheid: a personal history of South Africa, Namibia and palestine // South African Journal on Human Rights, 2020. Vol. 36. № 2–3. P. 275-279.

<sup>68</sup> *Johnson V.D., Dickinson E.* International Norms and the End of Apartheid in South Africa // Safundi, 2015. Vol. 16. № 4. P. 355-377.

<sup>69</sup> *Marks S.* The Historiography of Southern Africa: Recent Developments // African Historiography: What History for Whish Africa? Beverly Hills etc.: Sage Publications, 1986. 176 p.

<sup>70</sup> *Simon D.* Odén, Bertil (ed.), "Southern Africa after Apartheid: Regional Integration and External Resources" (Book Review) // Third World Planning Review, 1994. Vol. 16. № 3. P. 33.

In G.G. Maasdorp's research, the importance of economic and political aspects in advancing regional integration during Southern Africa's struggle for independence is emphasized <sup>71</sup>.

*The second category* includes research studies that examine the achievements, challenges, and prospects of regional integration after the end of apartheid in Southern Africa. In their research, scholars provide valuable insights into ongoing efforts to promote cooperation and development in Southern Africa, highlighting both the accomplishments and the obstacles they face along the way. Among these scholars are R. Gibb<sup>72</sup>, F. Söderbaum<sup>73</sup>, M. Ramutsindela<sup>74</sup>, C. Jenkins<sup>75</sup>, R. Bush<sup>76</sup>, J.S. Whitaker<sup>77</sup>, E.A. Friedland<sup>78</sup>, J. Herbst<sup>79</sup>, C. Arndt<sup>80</sup>, A. Hammerstad<sup>81</sup>, T. Ohlson<sup>82</sup>, K. Booth<sup>83</sup>, D.

---

<sup>71</sup> *Maasdorp G.G.* Economic and Political Aspects of Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa // South African Journal of Economics, 1986. Vol. 54. № 2. P. 94-105.

<sup>72</sup> *Gibb R.* Regional integration in post-apartheid Southern Africa: the case of renegotiating the Southern African customs union // Journal of Southern African Studies, 1997. Vol. 23. № 1. P. 67-86.

<sup>73</sup> *Söderbaum F.* Rethinking regions and regionalism // Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 2013. P. 9-18.

<sup>74</sup> *Ramutsindela M.* Perspectives on regionalism in (southern) Africa // GeoJournal, 2005. Vol. 62. № 1/2. P.1007-110.

<sup>75</sup> *Jenkins C., Thomas L.* Is Southern Africa ready for regional monetary integration? // Post-Apartheid Southern Africa. Routledge, 1998. P.163-188.

<sup>76</sup> *Bush R.* Dependence and Collective Self Reliance in southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) // African Affairs, 1985. Vol. 84. № 337. P.625-626.

<sup>77</sup> *Whitaker J.S., Lee M.C.* SADCC: The Political Economy of Development in Southern Africa // Foreign Affairs, 1990. Vol. 69. № 2. P. 188.

<sup>78</sup> *Friedland E.A.* The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference and the West: co-operation or conflict? // The Journal of Modern African Studies, 1985. Vol. 23. № 2. P. 287-314.

<sup>79</sup> *Herbst J., Payne R.J.* The Third World and South Africa: Post-Apartheid Challenges // The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 1993. Vol. 26. № 2. P. 397.

<sup>80</sup> *Arndt C., Roberts S.J.* Key issues in regional growth and integration in Southern Africa // Development Southern Africa, 2018. Vol. 35. № 3. P. 297-314.

<sup>81</sup> *Hammerstad A.* Domestic threats, regional solutions? The challenge of security integration in Southern Africa // Review of International Studies, 2005. Vol. 31. № 1. P. 69-87.

<sup>82</sup> *Ohlson T., Stedman S.J.* Security in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa // Security Dialogue, 1993. Vol. 24. № 4. P.415-428.

<sup>83</sup> *Booth K., Peter V.* Security in southern Africa: after apartheid, beyond realism // International Affairs, 1995. Vol. 71. № 2. P.285-304.

G. Anglin<sup>84</sup>, and others. Their works stand out for their significant contributions to this field of study.

T.B. Young's research is dedicated to the cooperation of Southern African states. The main goal of this cooperation is to promote integration, stability, and development in the region<sup>85</sup>. K.R. Hill has demonstrated the importance of the SADCC for regional countries in terms of reducing their dependence on South Africa<sup>86</sup>.

*The third category* includes research works by Western scholars that examine the formation, institutional mechanisms, distinctive features, and goals of major regional integration organizations in Southern Africa. These include studies by R.Gibb<sup>87</sup>, G. P.Jenkins<sup>88</sup>, F. Manwa<sup>89</sup>, S. Abban<sup>90</sup>, K. R. Jefferis<sup>91</sup>, K.D. Hwang<sup>92</sup>,

---

<sup>84</sup> *Anglin D.G.* Economic liberation and regional cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and PTA // International Organization, 1983.Vol. 37. № 4. P. 681-711.

<sup>85</sup> *Young T.B.* Oden and H. Othman, Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: a post-apartheid perspective. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1989, P. 243 // Africa, 1991. Vol. 61. № 3. P.436-436.

<sup>86</sup> *Hill C.R.* Regional co-Operation in Southern Africa // African Affairs, 1983.Vol. 82. № 327. P. 215-239.

<sup>87</sup> *Gibb R., Treasure K.* SACU at centenary: theory and practice of democratising regionalism // South African Journal of International Affairs, 2011. Vol. 18. № 1. P. 1-21. *Gibb R.* The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement: Dependence with Democracy // Journal of Southern African Studies, 2006. Vol. 32. № 3. P.583-603.

<sup>88</sup> *Jenkins G. P., Safaeimanesh S.* Estimation of the potential economic welfare to be gained by the South African Customs Union from trade facilitation // South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences. 2021.Vol. 24. № 1. P. 14.

<sup>89</sup> *Manwa F., Wijeweera A., Kortt M.A.* Trade and growth in SACU countries: A panel data analysis // Economic Analysis and Policy, 2019. Vol. 63. P. 107-118.

<sup>90</sup> *Abban S.* The Prospect of the Proposed Currency Union on Intra-regional Trade: Southern African Customs Union //Journal of Applied Economic Sciences (JAES), 2020. Vol. 15. №. 70. P. 759-773.

<sup>91</sup> *Jefferis K.R.* The Process of Monetary Integration in the SADC Region\* // Journal of Southern African Studies, 2007.Vol. 33. № 1. P.83-106.

<sup>92</sup> *Hwang K.D.* The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa // International Area Review, 2007. Vol. 10. № 1. P. 55-72. *Hwang K.D.* The Concepts and the Levels of Analysis of Politico-Security Regionalism in Southern Africa: The Case of Southern African Development Community (SADC) // Korean Journal of International Relations, 2007. Vol. 47. № 2. P. 197-221.

N. Boshoff<sup>93</sup>, J. Joseph<sup>94</sup>, G. Cawthra<sup>95</sup>, Jr. Compton<sup>96</sup>, J.E. Joseph<sup>97</sup>, J. Riedel<sup>98</sup>, B. Vickers<sup>99</sup>, A. Cofelice<sup>100</sup>, L.Páez<sup>101</sup>, S.H. Albagoury<sup>102</sup>, others.

J. Stewart and K. McCarthy in their study identify two key factors influencing regional cooperation efforts in Southern Africa<sup>103</sup>. J. Muntchik's research focuses on the institutional structure of the central security body of the SADC<sup>104</sup>.

*The fourth category* consists of works by African researchers who have thoroughly examined the progress of regionalization in the spheres of politics, economics, and security in Southern Africa. These scholars have analyzed the evolving dynamics of regional cooperation, offering insights into the complexities of integrating politics, economics, and security in Southern Africa. Their research provides valuable information on the achievements made as well as the challenges and opportunities faced

---

<sup>93</sup> *Boshoff N.* South–South research collaboration of countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) // *Scientometrics*, 2009. Vol. 84. № 2. P. 481-503.

<sup>94</sup> *Joseph J.E.* SADC'S transport infrastructure: enhancing the AFCFTA's prospects through regional economic integration // *EUREKA: Social and Humanities*, 2023. № 1. P. 27-42.

<sup>95</sup> *Cawthra G.* Collaborative Regional Security and Mutual Defence: SADC in Comparative Perspective // *Politikon*, 2008. Vol. 35. № 2. P. 159-176.

<sup>96</sup> *Compton Jr, Robert W.* “Comparative Regional Integration in SADC and ASEAN: Democracy and Governance Issues in Historical and Socio-Economic Context.” *Regions & Cohesion*, 2013. Vol. 3. № 1. P. 5-31.

<sup>97</sup> *Joseph J.E.* The South African Development Community (SADC) and Covid-19: revisiting security community in SADC // *EUREKA: Social and Humanities*, 2021. № 5. P. 69-81.

<sup>98</sup> *Riedel J., Slany A.* The potential of African trade integration – Panel data evidence for the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite // *The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development*, 2019. Vol. 28. № 7. P.843-872.

<sup>99</sup> *Vickers B.* Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Small States in the EU–SADC EPA Negotiations // *The Round Table*, 2011. Vol. 100. № 413.P. 183-197.

<sup>100</sup> *Cofelice A.* African Continental Free Trade Area: Opportunities and Challenges // *The Federalist Debate*. 2018. Vol. 31. № 3. P. 32-35.

<sup>101</sup> *Páez L.* A Continental Free Trade Area: Imperatives for Realizing a Pan-African Market // *Journal of World Trade*. 2016. Vol. 50. № 3. P. 533-567.

<sup>102</sup> *Albagoury S.H.* African pathway to achieve inclusive growth: COMESA case study // *Journal of Humanities and Applied Social Sciences*, 2020. Vol. 3. № 2. P. 108-119.

<sup>103</sup> *Stewart J., McCarthy C.* An appropriate model for joint regional action in southern Africa after apartheid // *Development Southern Africa*, 1995. Vol. 12. № 3. P. 401-411.

<sup>104</sup> *Muntschick J., Arkhangelskaya A.A.* The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the European Union (EU). Regionalism and External Influence. Palgrave Macmillan, 186 p // *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations*, 2020. Vol. 20. № 2. P. 417–420.

by regionalization efforts in the region. Notably, the works of A. Biswas<sup>105</sup>, E. Msindo<sup>106</sup>, A. M.Kanduza<sup>107</sup>, L. Abegunrin<sup>108</sup>, F. M Zerihun<sup>109</sup>, D.N. Mlambo<sup>110</sup>, I.S Motelle<sup>111</sup>, T.D. Agbeyegbe<sup>112</sup>, K. Cheluget<sup>113</sup>, A. Makochekanwa<sup>114</sup>, D. Zaire<sup>115</sup>, M. Nyathi<sup>116</sup>, A. van. Nieuwkerk<sup>117</sup>, L. Nathan<sup>118</sup>, C. Singuwa & G. Honrada<sup>119</sup>, C.

---

<sup>105</sup> *Biswas A.* Approaches To Regional Integration In Southern Africa // *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, 2000. Vol. 5. № 1. P. 71–90.

<sup>106</sup> *Msindo E., Nyachega N.* Zimbabwe's Liberation War and the Everyday in Honde Valley, 1975 to 1979 // *South African Historical Journal*, 2019. Vol. 71. № 1. P. 70–93.

<sup>107</sup> *Kanduza A.M.* SADCC, Liberation Movements and Regional Development in Southern Africa // *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies*, 1986. Vol. 15. № 1–2. P. 151.

<sup>108</sup> *Abegunrin L.* Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC): Towards Regional Integration of Southern Africa for Liberation // *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs*, 1986. Vol. 17. №. 4. P. 363-384.

<sup>109</sup> *Zerihun F.M., Breitenbach M.* Why So Much Pessimism about Economic Integration in Africa? The Case of the Southern African Development Community // *African Journal of Business and Economic Research*, 2019. Vol. 14. № 3. P. 33–52.

<sup>110</sup> *Mlambo D.N.* The quest for post-colonial regional integration: examining the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Southern Africa post-1992 // *Journal of African Foreign Affairs*, 2020. Vol. 7. №. P. 23–48.

<sup>111</sup> *Motelle I.S., Biekpe N.* Financial intermediation spread and stability of the banking system in the Southern Africa Customs Union // *Managerial Finance*, 2014. Vol. 40. № 3.P. 276–299.

<sup>112</sup> *Agbeyegbe T.D.* On the feasibility of a monetary union in the Southern Africa Development Community // *International Journal of Finance & Economics*, 2007. Vol. 13. № 2. P. 150–157.

<sup>113</sup> *Cheluget K., Wright S.* COMESA and the Tripartite Free Trade Area: Towards an African Economic Community? // *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 2017. Vol. 24. № 4. P. 481–499.

<sup>114</sup> *Makochekanwa A.* Welfare Implications of COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area // *African Development Review*, 2014. Vol. 26. № 1. P. 186–202.

<sup>115</sup> *Zaire D., Warikandwa T.V.* The African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement: Aiding Intra-African trade towards deeper continental integration // *Journal of Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice*, 2021. Vol. 7. № 2. P. 16–44.

<sup>116</sup> *Nyathi M.* Oversight Institutions of SADC // *The Southern African Development Community and Law*. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. P. 67–106.

<sup>117</sup> *Nieuwkerk A. van.* Subregional collaborative security: Lessons from the OAU and SADC // *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 2001. Vol. 8. № 2.P. 81–94.

<sup>118</sup> *Nathan L.* How should the peace and security performance of SADC be evaluated? // *African Security Review*, 2013. Vol. 22. № 3. P. 201–209.

<sup>119</sup> *Singuwa C., Honrada G.* Regional Security Integration in the SADC Region // *Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serija 4. Istorija. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija*, 2023. № 4. P. 192–201.



Nangini<sup>120</sup>, S. Maereser<sup>121</sup>, V.H. Mlambo<sup>122</sup>, A. Mold<sup>123</sup>, I. Moyo<sup>124</sup>, C.C. Ajibo<sup>125</sup>, and others have made significant contributions to this field.

M. Leshoele examined the Southern African Development Community (SADC) from an Afrocentric perspective. The study partly revealed that this lack of attention was due to the fact that regional economic communities were initially conceived as a compromise during the early discussions of the 1960s, when African leaders debated the most effective approach to uniting the continent<sup>126</sup>.

V. Songwe, J.A. McLeod and S. Karingi analyze the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Their research study examines the existing political and legal structures of the African Union (AU) and assesses the current progress in the implementation of regional and political integration initiatives<sup>127</sup>.

H.S. Galadima and U.M. Ogbonnaya argue that the Southern African region has faced persistent security and development challenges since the mid-20th century, including issues such as political upheavals in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ethno-political conflicts, terrorist activities, and severe economic crises<sup>128</sup>.

---

<sup>120</sup> Nangini C. Visualizing Armed Groups: The Democratic Republic of the Congo's M23 in Focus // Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2014. Vol. 3. № 1. P. 89-94.

<sup>121</sup> Maereser S., Zengeni K.T. Recurring Armed Conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: an Insight into the SADC Intervention Problematique // Journal International Studies, 2017. Vol. 13. P. 141-160.

<sup>122</sup> Mlambo V.H., Masuku M.M. Terror at the front gate: Insurgency in Mozambique and its implications for the SADC and South Africa // Journal of Public Affairs. 2021. Vol. 22. № S1. P. 77.

<sup>123</sup> Mold A. Proving Hegel Wrong: Learning the Right Lessons from European Integration for the African Continental Free Trade Area // Journal of African Trade, 2021. Vol. 8. № 2. P. 132.

<sup>124</sup> Moyo I. The African Continental Free Trade Area and informal cross border trade: implications on socio-economic development in Africa // Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 2023. Vol. 41. № 4. P. 408-419.

<sup>125</sup> Ajibo C.C. African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement: The Euphoria, Pitfalls and Prospects // Journal of World Trade, 2019. Vol. 53. № Issue 5. P. 871-894.

<sup>126</sup> Leshoele M. The Role of SADC (or Lack Thereof) in the Political Unification of the Region and/or Continent: An Afrocentric Critique // Journal of African Union Studies, 2023. Vol. 12. № 2. P. 116.

<sup>127</sup> Songwe V., Macleod J.A., Karingi S. The African Continental Free Trade Area: A Historical Moment for Development in Africa // Journal of African Trade, 2021. Vol. 8. № 2. P. 23.

<sup>128</sup> Galadima H.S., Ogbonnaya U.M. Regional responses to security and development challenges in East and Southern Africa: lessons and way forward // African Security Review, 2018. Vol. 27. № 2. P. 158-176.

The significance of integration issues in the Southern African subregion is underscored by the establishment of specialized research institutes like the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), the African Centre for The Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), the Centre for Conflict Resolutions (CCR), and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) within the SADC region. These research centers are dedicated to examining and addressing the regional agenda. Their publications, including those authored by S. Maeresera<sup>129</sup>, S. H. Albagoury<sup>130</sup>, M. Magwape<sup>131</sup>, S.Tshivhasa Tshedza<sup>132</sup>, K. Mapako<sup>133</sup>, M. Cipollina<sup>134</sup>, and others contribute significantly to understanding and addressing integration challenges in the region.

To summarize, the analysis of Russian and foreign historiography devoted to regional integration in Southern Africa shows that the international scientific community has collected a lot of factual and theoretical material. At the same time, it can be noted that there is a lack of comprehensive work on the dynamics, peculiarities and main directions of regional integration in Southern Africa. This dissertation aims to fill that gap in this area of study.

**The object of research** is the regional integration in Southern Africa.

**The subject of research** includes the dynamics, features, main directions of the Southern African regional integration.

---

<sup>129</sup> *Maeresera S., Rugeje E.A., Zangeneh K.* The Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Recurring Conflict: Whose Conflict Transformation Responsibility? // *Journal of International Studies*, 2020. Vol. 14. P. 49.

<sup>130</sup> *Albagoury S.H.* African pathway to achieve inclusive growth: COMESA case study // *Journal of Humanities and Applied Social Sciences*, 2020. Vol. 3. № 2. P. 108–119.

<sup>131</sup> *Magwape M.* SACU and Trade Facilitation: A Post-Covid Pandemic Legal Analysis for Improved Efficiency // *Global Trade and Customs Journal*, 2023. Vol. 18. № Issue 2. P. 64–73.

<sup>132</sup> *Tshivhasa Tshedza S., Stewart Lee K.* How will AfCFTA Impact on South Africa's Socioeconomic Position? // *Journal of African Foreign Affairs*, 2023. Vol. 10. № 3. P. 103–120.

<sup>133</sup> *Mapako K.* Mozambique Armed Conflict: A Semi-Active Volcano in Southern Part of Africa // *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2021. P. 5.

<sup>134</sup> *Cipollina M.* The Trade Growth under the EU–SADC Economic Partnership Agreement: An Empirical Assessment // *Economies*, 2022. Vol. 10. № 12. P. 16.

**The purpose of this dissertation** is to identify the peculiarities of regional integration process in in Southern African Region.

To achieve the above-mentioned research study's purpose, the following tasks must be completed:

- Investigate the economic and political motivations behind Southern Africa's regional cooperation.
- Assess the external factors impacting regional integration in Southern Africa.
- Investigate the historical and legal foundations of regional integration.
- Examine the specific features and objectives of key regional integration groupings in Southern Africa, including SACU, COMESA, and the AfCFTA.
- Assess the role of SACU, COMESA, and AfCFTA in the regional integration process.
- Evaluate the role of SADC as the core of regional integration projects in Southern Africa.
- Assess regional responses to maintaining security and peace in Southern Africa.

**The chronological scope** of the study covers the period from 1992 to 2023. The lower boundary was defined in 1992, when apartheid was ended in South Africa, which led to serious political changes and increased regional cooperation. During this time, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) were established to promote economic development and regional integration.

The upper limit was determined in 2023, when a new stage of consolidation of regional integration efforts begins. In particular, important agreements and documents aimed at strengthening cooperation and economic integration were signed.

**Main Sources of Data.** In order to achieve the author's objectives and successfully tackle the research task at hand, a wide range of sources have been

carefully gathered, analyzed, and organized. These sources are grouped into several distinct categories, each providing a unique contribution to the study.

*First and foremost* are the regulatory and legislative documents sourced from various governmental bodies across Southern Africa. These include the constitutions of Angola<sup>135</sup>, Botswana<sup>136</sup>, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo<sup>137</sup>, Eswatini<sup>138</sup>, Lesotho<sup>139</sup>, Madagascar<sup>140</sup>, Malawi<sup>141</sup>, Mauritius<sup>142</sup>, Mozambique<sup>143</sup>, Namibia<sup>144</sup>, Seychelles<sup>145</sup>, South Africa<sup>146</sup>, United Republic of Tanzania<sup>147</sup>, Zambia<sup>148</sup> and

---

<sup>135</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Angola.2010. URL:[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Angola\\_2010](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Angola_2010) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>136</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Botswana.1966. URL:<https://www.parliament.gov.bw/images/constitution.pdf> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>137</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Democratic Republic of Congo 2005 (rev. 2011). URL:[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_2011](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_2011) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>138</sup> Constitution of Eswatini 2005. URL:[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Swaziland\\_2005](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Swaziland_2005) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>139</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Lesotho 1993 (rev. 2018). URL:[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lesotho\\_2018](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lesotho_2018) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>140</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Madagascar 2010. URL:[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Madagascar\\_2010](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Madagascar_2010) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>141</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Malawi.2017. URL:[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malawi\\_2017](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malawi_2017) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>142</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius 2016. URL:<https://cdn.accf-francophonie.org/2019/03/maurice-constitution2016.pdf> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>143</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique.2007. URL:[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mozambique\\_2007](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mozambique_2007) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>144</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Namibia.2010. URL:<https://www.lac.org.na/laws/annoSTAT/Namibian%20Constitution.pdf> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>145</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles.1993. URL:<https://seylii.org/akn/sc/act/1994/7/eng@2020-06-01> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>146</sup> Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.1996. URL:[https://www.concourt.org.za/images/phocadownload/the\\_text/Slimline-Constitution-Web-Version.pdf](https://www.concourt.org.za/images/phocadownload/the_text/Slimline-Constitution-Web-Version.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>147</sup> The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania.1977. URL:<https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/constitution.pdf> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>148</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Zambia.2016. URL:[https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/amendment\\_act/Constitution%20of%20Zambia%20%20\(Amendment\),%202016-Act%20No.%20\\_0.pdf](https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/amendment_act/Constitution%20of%20Zambia%20%20(Amendment),%202016-Act%20No.%20_0.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

Zimbabwe<sup>149</sup>. Within these foundational texts, the principles of equal opportunity and active participation in regional integration are firmly embedded. It is evident that the values of equitable access and enthusiastic engagement in Southern Africa are upheld within the constitutional frameworks of each member state.

South Africa stands out as the sole country in Southern Africa to have formulated a white paper detailing its foreign policy. This document underscores the nation's commitment to fostering economic diplomacy within the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and across the entire continent. The approach of the white paper to development emphasizes an integrated strategy that incorporates programs like the Spatial Development Initiatives. Moreover, it gives importance to activities such as promoting investments across the region, building industrial networks that cover the region, and enhancing the ability of member countries to compete effectively by strengthening their supply-side capabilities<sup>150</sup>.

This collection of sources also consists of various documents from different entities, including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)<sup>151</sup>, the African Union such as the Treaties establishing the African Union<sup>152</sup>, the Africa Union Economic

---

<sup>149</sup> The Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe.2013. URL:[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe\\_2013](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>150</sup> White Paper on South African Foreign Policy. URL:[https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis\\_document/201409/final-draft-white-paper-sa-foreign-policy.pdf](https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/final-draft-white-paper-sa-foreign-policy.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>151</sup> UN Security Council, Resolution 1736 (2006) The Situation Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/RES/1736 (2006), 22 December 2006. URL: <https://www.refworld.org/legal/resolution/unsc/2006/en/26241> (date of access: 12.02.2023).UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 960 (1994) [Mozambique], S/RES/960 (1994), 21 November 1994. URL: <https://www.refworld.org/legal/resolution/unsc/1994/en/87437> (date of access: 07.09.2023).UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 477 (1980) [New member: Zimbabwe], S/RES/477 (1980), 30 July 1980. URL: <https://www.refworld.org/legal/resolution/unsc/1980/en/8938> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>152</sup> Constitutive Act of the African Union .URL: <https://au.int/en/treaties> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

Community (AEC)<sup>153</sup>, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)<sup>154</sup>, as well as documents from regional organizations, such as SADC<sup>155</sup>, SACU<sup>156</sup>, and COMESA<sup>157</sup>.

*The second category* consists of documents and reports from international and regional organizations, including the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)<sup>158</sup>, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<sup>159</sup>, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)<sup>160</sup>, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)<sup>161</sup>, African Union Commission (AUC)<sup>162</sup>, as well as the African Union Development Agency (NEPAD)<sup>163</sup>.

---

<sup>153</sup> Treaty Establishing The African Economic Community. URL: [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37636-treaty-TREATY\\_ESTABLISHING\\_THE\\_AEC-compressed.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37636-treaty-TREATY_ESTABLISHING_THE_AEC-compressed.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>154</sup> African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement. URL: [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36437-treaty-consolidated\\_text\\_on\\_cfta\\_-\\_en.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36437-treaty-consolidated_text_on_cfta_-_en.pdf) (date of access: 09.10.2023).

<sup>155</sup> Declaration & Treaty of SADC 1992. URL: [https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-11/Declaration\\_\\_Treaty\\_of\\_SADC\\_0.pdf](https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-11/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC_0.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>156</sup> The SACU Agreement, 2002. URL: <https://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=566> (date of access: 23.09.2023).

<sup>157</sup> The Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), November 1993. URL: [https://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/comesa-treaty-revised-20092012\\_with-zaire\\_final.pdf](https://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/comesa-treaty-revised-20092012_with-zaire_final.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>158</sup> The UN: Partner in the Struggle against Apartheid. URL: <https://southafrica.un.org/en/about/about-the-un> (date of access: 07.09.2023). The report from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) pertaining to Southern Africa. URL: [file:///C:/Users/BPS%20B6-1/Desktop/A\\_47\\_645-EN.pdf](file:///C:/Users/BPS%20B6-1/Desktop/A_47_645-EN.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>159</sup> UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Submission on Zimbabwe: UPR 26th Session, March 2016. URL: <https://www.refworld.org/policy/upr/unhcr/2016/en/119230> (date of access: 12.02.2023).

<sup>160</sup> Socioeconomic impact of conflict in Africa. URL: <https://www.uneca.org/socioeconomic-impact-of-conflict-in-africa> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>161</sup> Country Brief South Africa: Counteracting premature deindustrialization. URL: [https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/files/2020-11/UNIDO\\_IAP\\_SDG9\\_-\\_Country\\_Brief\\_-\\_South\\_Africa\\_v2.pdf](https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/files/2020-11/UNIDO_IAP_SDG9_-_Country_Brief_-_South_Africa_v2.pdf) (date of access: 07.07.2023).

<sup>162</sup> The AUC Meets with a High-Level Donor Mission. URL: <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240401/african-union-commission-meets-high-level-donor-mission-multi-hazard-early> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>163</sup> AUDA-NEPAD 2022 Annual Report. URL: <https://www.nepad.org/publication/auda-nepad-2022-annual-report> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

*The third group* comprises media sources, which encompass a variety of documents includes speeches and statements made by heads of state within the region. Notable examples of these media sources include speeches delivered by His Majesty King Mswati III <sup>164</sup>, H.E. Mr.E. Mwencha<sup>165</sup>, H.E. B. William Mkapa<sup>166</sup>, H.E.F. Nyusi<sup>167</sup>, H.E. H. Hichilema<sup>168</sup>, H.E Dr M.E.K. Masisi<sup>169</sup> and H.E C. Ramaphosa<sup>170</sup>. These documents serve as valuable resources, offering insights into the perspectives, policies, and visions of key figures within the region regarding matters of regional integration and collaboration.

*The fourth group* comprises statistical sources, predominantly composed of National Statistical Services like Statistics South Africa (StatsSA)<sup>171</sup>, Instituto Nacional

---

<sup>164</sup> Speech By His Majesty King Mswati Iii During The Official Opening Of The 8th Summit Of SACU Heads Of State And Government Held At Mandvulo Grand Hall – Lozitha. URL:<https://www.sacu.int/docs/speeches/2023/SPEECH-OFFICIAL-OPENING-OF-THE-8th-SACU-SUMMIT-JUNE-2023.pdf> (date of access: 23.09.2023).

<sup>165</sup> Opening speech for the 2nd COMESA-SADC-EAC Tripartite Summit by H.E. Mr. Erastus Mwencha Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Johannesburg.2011. URL:[https://au.int/sites/default/files/speeches/25452-sp-dcp\\_opening\\_speech\\_-\\_2nd\\_tripartite\\_12.06.11.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/speeches/25452-sp-dcp_opening_speech_-_2nd_tripartite_12.06.11.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>166</sup> keynote address speech by former President of the United Republic of Tanzania, H.E. Benjamin William Mkapa titled: “Build bridges not walls,”. URL: <https://uongozi.or.tz/news/build-bridges-not-walls-former-president-mkapa/> (date of access 23.09.2023).

<sup>167</sup> Statement by His Excellency Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, President of the Republic of Mozambique and Chairperson of SADC, on need to speed up economic integration in SADC. URL:<https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-president-urges-sadc-to-speed-up-economic-integration-watch-195109/> (date of access: 23.09.2023).

<sup>168</sup> Communiqué of 42nd Ordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government. URL: <https://www.gov.za/speeches/communiqu%C3%A9-%C2%A0-42nd%C2%A0ordinary-summit-sadc-heads-state-and-government-17-aug-2022-0000> (date of access: 23.09.2023).

<sup>169</sup> Statement by His Excellency Dr. Mokgweetsi Eric Keabetswe Masisi, President of the Republic of Botswana and Chairperson of the SACU Summit, during the Investment Roundtable held on 12 - 13 April 2022, in Gaborone, Botswana. URL:[https://www.sacu.int/docs/speeches/2022/Statement\\_HE-President-Masisi.pdf](https://www.sacu.int/docs/speeches/2022/Statement_HE-President-Masisi.pdf) (date of access 07.09.2023).

<sup>170</sup> Statement delivered on behalf of the AU Chairperson, President Cyril Ramaphosa on the occasion of the Handover Ceremony of the AfCFTA Secretariat. URL:<https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-handover-ceremony-afcfta-secretariat-20-aug-2020> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>171</sup> Celebrating 20 years of Freedom and Democracy. URL: <http://www.statssa.gov.za> (Accessed date: 07.09.2023).

de Estatística (INE - Mozambique)<sup>172</sup>, National Bureau of Statistics (NBS - Tanzania)<sup>173</sup>, Statistics Botswana (statsbots)<sup>174</sup>, and the Namibia Statistics Agency (NSA)<sup>175</sup>. These entities are tasked with the fundamental duties of gathering, organizing, interpreting, and distributing comprehensive, pertinent, trustworthy, and up-to-date official data at a national level. These data proved particularly invaluable in examining the economic collaboration among Southern African countries.

**Methodology of research** is determined by the set goals and objectives, chronological framework, object and subject. This study was conducted within the framework of the theory of regional studies using a number of general scientific principles and methods. The author proceeded from the principles of historicism, objectivity, reliability, and systematics. The principle of historicism made it possible to evaluate historical events in their specific context in order to understand their significance and impact on the processes of regional integration in southern Africa. By tracing the historical evolution of integration initiatives and analyzing their motives, the principle of historicism has provided valuable information about the prerequisites and motives for regional integration. The use of the above principles and methods ensures the scientific validity of the provisions and conclusions formulated by the author.

**Methods of the research.** General scientific methods were used in the work: analysis, synthesis, induction and deduction. They were used to identify the main prerequisites and causes of integration processes in Southern Africa, identify common

---

<sup>172</sup> Oil and Gas investment in Mozambique. URL: <https://www.ine.gov.mz/> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>173</sup> Regional Strategy for Development of Statistics - 2013 - 2018 (SADC).URL: <https://www.nbs.go.tz/index.php/en/other-statistics/291-regional-strategy-for-development-of-statistics-2013-2018-sadc> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>174</sup> Transport and Infrastructure Stats Brief Quarter 3, 2023.URL: <https://www.statsbots.org.bw/sites/default/files/publications/Transport%20and%20Infrastructure%20%20Stats%20Brief%20Quarter%203%202023.pdf> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>175</sup> Trade Statistics Bulletin – March 2022. URL: [https://nsa.nsa.org.na/new\\_publications/trade-statistics-bulletin-march-2022/](https://nsa.nsa.org.na/new_publications/trade-statistics-bulletin-march-2022/) (date of access 07.09.2023).



and special features of economic and political regionalization, etc. Special historical methods were also used. Using the historical-genetic (retrospective) method, the economic and political prerequisites for regional cooperation in Southern Africa were determined. The historical-comparative method made it possible to compare the points of view and approaches of various researchers and experts to the problems under consideration.

The work is based on a problem-chronological approach, which involves a consistent analysis of historical events and achievements in order to identify and understand the underlying problems, causes and outcomes. In this study, this method was used to systematically study the political and economic motives of regional integration, external influences on regional integration and the role played by various regional integration associations such as SACU, COMESA, AfCFTA and SADC. After analyzing the progress in integration efforts and the related obstacles over time, the authors of the study identified the main problems and patterns, which allowed us to gain a complete understanding of the complex dynamics of regional integration in Southern Africa.

**The scientific novelty** of the dissertation lies in the comprehensive study of regional integration in Southern Africa from 1992 to 2023. It identifies priority areas, specific features of integration processes, and their impact on the region's developmental trajectory, as well as assesses the role of integration associations in ensuring economic and social progress.

The dissertation presents an original periodization of the integration process and a new conceptual approach to studying the fundamentals of integration in Southern Africa. This approach takes into account both political and economic incentives affecting regional integration efforts and the underlying motivations behind the joint efforts of Southern African countries.

The dissertation systematizes the external and internal factors influencing regional integration in Southern Africa. The research provides a detailed understanding

of how global economic trends, geopolitical dynamics, and international trade policies impact integration initiatives. Identifying the level of interaction between internal and external factors in the regional integration process has laid the foundation for further analysis of regional integration in Southern Africa.

The author offers practical recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of local governments' policies in addressing existing challenges and leveraging the opportunities of regional integration.

The scientific novelty of the research is also determined by the introduction of a broad range of original sources in English, including documents and reports from international organizations. This has enabled an in-depth exploration of the theoretical approaches and practical activities of Southern African countries aimed at improving the legal framework and bilateral relations to stimulate integration processes.

#### **The main provisions for defence.**

The following provisions are submitted for defence:

1. Southern Africa's regional integration stems from a unique historical background shaped by struggles against colonialism and apartheid. Liberation movements, particularly in countries like South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique, laid the foundation for collective action. These movements fostered a shared vision of regional solidarity, which continues to influence the political and economic unity pursued today.

2. Regional integration in Southern Africa is driven by dual motivations: economic growth and political stability. On the political side, integration fosters peace, reduces the likelihood of conflict, and promotes collective security, particularly through institutions like SADC. Economically, integration has been incentivized by trade facilitation, the development of regional infrastructure (e.g., transportation corridors), and the need for larger markets to boost economic resilience. The link between political stability and economic growth creates a reinforcing cycle that sustains integration efforts.

3. Institutions like the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) are the main drivers of integration, where SADC plays a central role in political coordination, conflict resolution, and economic harmonization. SACU, one of the oldest customs unions globally, facilitates economic collaboration through tariff-sharing agreements. COMESA works to promote regional economic integration through trade and investment, by reducing trade barriers and facilitating the free movement of goods, services, and capital across member states. It focuses on advancing customs cooperation, promoting industrial growth, and fostering a competitive regional market. AfCFTA, though continent-wide, is a critical framework for reducing trade barriers and fostering intra-African commerce, with Southern Africa as a key participant. These organizations create platforms for dialogue, trade harmonization, and coordinated political actions that foster both economic development and peace within the region.

4. Despite notable achievements, Southern Africa's regional integration is hindered by several challenges, including political instability in countries like Mozambique, where insurgency in the Cabo Delgado region poses security threats, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which faces ongoing armed conflict and political unrest that destabilize the region. Economic disparities between member states—such as between wealthier nations like South Africa and poorer neighbors—create uneven benefits from integration efforts. Additionally, overlapping memberships in multiple regional organizations, like SADC and COMESA, lead to conflicting policies, undermining effective collaboration.

5. External geopolitical factors, such as Cold War alliances, colonial legacies, Western influence, and contemporary global economic pressures, have significantly influenced regional integration in Southern Africa. International financial institutions, like the IMF and World Bank, have historically imposed structural adjustment

programs that affected national economies and regional strategies. Trade agreements with the European Union and the United States, along with sanctions and international diplomatic interventions, have further shaped the region's political and economic dynamics. In more recent years, the rise of China's involvement in Africa, particularly through infrastructure investments, has reshaped regional cooperation, creating both opportunities and challenges.

6. SADC has played a pivotal role in peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts in Southern Africa, including interventions in the DRC, Mozambique, and Lesotho. These efforts ensure that political stability is maintained, which is a precondition for regional economic integration. Additionally, the SADC Mutual Defense Pact and other security agreements emphasize collective security, which fosters a stable environment for economic cooperation.

7. A specific feature of Southern Africa's integration is its focus on infrastructure development, Trade Liberalization, Industrial Development and Human Development. Investments in regional transportation, energy grids, and communication networks are crucial for linking member states and enabling the free flow of goods and people. This focus on infrastructure plays a key role in facilitating both economic and social integration.

8. The deep socio-economic divides left by colonialism and apartheid continue to affect the region. Regional integration serves as a tool for addressing these historical injustices by promoting equitable economic development, fostering cross-border cooperation, and improving the standard of living for marginalized communities.

**Theoretical significance.** The dissertation is of substantial theoretical significance as it makes a significant contribution to the scientific discussion on regional integration within the African context. By analyzing integration efforts in Southern Africa over more than three decades, the research provides valuable insights into the dynamics, challenges, and achievements of regional cooperation in this area.

Thus, the results, theoretical conclusions, and positions of the research are crucial for understanding the evolution of integration efforts in Southern Africa.

This study contributes importantly to the accumulation of scientific knowledge on regional processes in Africa by shedding light on various aspects of regional integration processes in Southern Africa. It examines the economic, social, political, and institutional dimensions of integration, highlighting the difficulties associated with establishing closer ties between countries with varying levels of development, governance structures, and historical backgrounds. Through this comprehensive analysis, the authors have expanded existing theoretical frameworks, emphasizing the interaction of factors shaping regional integration in Southern Africa, such as colonial legacy, intra-regional conflicts, and external influences.

**The research practical relevance** presented in this dissertation provides key references and conclusions that can be used by individuals or organizations while addressing relevant issues in SADC, SACU, COMESA, AfCFTA, and other similar organizations. Moreover, these materials can be utilized to create outlines for lectures for students studying regional integration dynamics in Southern Africa. The lectures would specifically focus on SADC, SACU, COMESA, and AfCFTA regional schemes and other aspects of international relations and security problems in Southern Africa.

The research's comprehensive nature allows for a "cross-sectional" examination of achievements and obstacles, followed by the formulation of a roadmap for their own development. The research may also be of interest to Russia, which has returned to Africa after more than a decade away as one of the primary bilateral partners in appraising the prospects for development cooperation with countries in Southern Africa.

**The reliability and validity of research findings** depend on several factors. These include having a representative source and information base, following a systematic approach to analyzing the challenges under scrutiny and using various scientific research methods.

**Dissertation Approbation.** The key findings and conclusions of the dissertation are presented in four scientific publications. One article has been published in peer-reviewed scientific publications that are included in the list of the Higher Attestation Commission and the list of the PFUR. The remaining three articles have been published in publications that are included in the international citation databases such as Scopus and Web of Science.

**The structure of the dissertation.** The dissertation is composed of five sections: an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion, a list of sources and literature, and abbreviations.

## **CHAPTER 1. THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION FOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN INTEGRATION PROCESSES.**

The basis of integration processes in Southern Africa is complex and includes various dimensions such as historical, political, economic, and legal factors. The ultimate goal of regional integration in Southern Africa is to promote cooperation and collaboration among countries in the region to jointly overcome common challenges and achieve shared objectives.

Historically, integration processes in Southern Africa were deeply influenced by the region's struggle against colonialism and apartheid. Liberation movements recognized the importance of solidarity and cooperation among nations to overcome oppression and achieve self-determination. This historical legacy of unity in the face of adversity continues to shape contemporary integration efforts, serving as a driving force for regional cooperation and collective action.

Politically, integration processes in Southern Africa were driven by the recognition that by working together, member states could address common challenges more effectively. Economically, integration processes in Southern Africa were motivated by the desire to stimulate growth, attract investment, and enhance competitiveness in the global marketplace.

External factors played a significant role in shaping regional integration processes in Southern Africa. Globalization, international actors, and geopolitical considerations influenced integration initiatives within the region. Understanding these external dynamics is crucial for comprehending the broader context within which integration efforts unfolded.

Moreover, the legal foundations of integration tendencies in Southern Africa were rooted in both historical legacies and legal frameworks. Post-independence efforts to promote unity and cooperation have been enshrined in legal instruments such as the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

## 1.1 The Political and Economic Incentives for Integration in the region

The political and economic motives for regional integration in Southern Africa are deeply intertwined, reflecting the region's historical challenges, economic aspirations, and the pursuit of collective stability and prosperity. Politically, the historical context of conflicts, colonialism, and apartheid has been a driving force for cooperation<sup>176</sup>. Southern Africa witnessed protracted struggles for independence and post-independence internal conflicts, and regional integration emerged as a political imperative to foster peace, stability, and reconciliation.

An in-depth analysis of the protracted struggles for independence and post-independence internal conflicts, often intertwined with the legacies of colonialism, apartheid, and struggles for independence, had presented complex challenges to post-colonial nation-building<sup>177</sup>. For instance, South Africa's struggle against apartheid is one of the region's most visible and long-running struggles for freedom. Apartheid, a system of institutionalized racial segregation and discrimination, entrenched the dominance of the white minority over the majority black population.

South Africa, during the era of apartheid, was marked by intense internal conflicts rooted in institutionalized racial segregation and discrimination. The anti-apartheid struggle led by the African National Congress (ANC) and other liberation movements resulted in widespread protests, political activism, and government

---

<sup>176</sup> *Bondarenko D.* Nation-building in Post-colonial Sub-Saharan African states: Tanzania, Zambia, and Uganda compared // *Asia and Africa Today*, 2022. № 1. P. 18.

<sup>177</sup> *Зданевич А.С.* История развития политических и социальных процессов на Юге Африки (Конец XVIII-первая треть XIX вв.): дисс. канд. ист. наук: 07.00.03. С.-Петербург. гос. ун-т, 2004. С. 157–220.



crackdowns<sup>178</sup>. Internal conflicts escalated, leading to events such as the Soweto Uprising in 1976<sup>179</sup>.

Led by figures such as Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC), the resistance against apartheid gained momentum over decades, culminating in the eventual dismantling of the oppressive system in the early 1990s<sup>180</sup>. Mandela's triumphant release from prison in 1990 and the consequential democratic elections in 1994 represent a historic turning point in South African history. These events marked the end of apartheid and ushered in a new era of hope, unity, and progress for the country.

Namibia, formerly known as Southwest Africa, endured decades of colonial rule under South Africa. The Namibian War of Independence, fought by the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)<sup>181</sup>, sought to liberate the country from South African control<sup>182</sup>. The struggle was marked by armed resistance, international diplomatic efforts, and the eventual withdrawal of South African forces<sup>183</sup>. Namibia gained independence in 1990, with SWAPO's leader, Sam Nujoma, becoming the country's first president<sup>184</sup>.

Mozambique and Angola experienced liberation struggles against Portuguese colonial rule. In Mozambique, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)<sup>185</sup> fought

---

<sup>178</sup> Шубин В.Г. Горячая «холодная война»: Юг Африки (1960–1990 гг.). М.: Издательский дом «ЯСК», 2013. С. 352.

<sup>179</sup> Там же.

<sup>180</sup> ANC Constitution 1991. URL: <https://www.anc1912.org.za/anc-constitution-1991> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>181</sup> Constitution of SWAPO PARTY. URL: [https://www.politicalpartydb.org/wp-content/uploads/Statutes/Namibia/Namibia\\_Swapo\\_1998.pdf](https://www.politicalpartydb.org/wp-content/uploads/Statutes/Namibia/Namibia_Swapo_1998.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>182</sup> Камати Н.Ч. Намибия: СВАПО в борьбе за независимость // Азия и Африка сегодня, 2014. № 5. С. 43-36.

<sup>183</sup> Балезин А.С., Притворов А.В., Слипченко С.А. История Намибии в новое и новейшее время. С. 182.

<sup>184</sup> Горбунов Ю.И., Притворов А.В. Намибия проблемы достижения независимости. М., 1983. С. 58.

<sup>185</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique. URL: <https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/1990/en/21027> (date of access: 09.09.2023).

a guerrilla war against Portuguese forces, leading to the country's independence in 1975<sup>186</sup>. However, the country experienced a protracted internal conflict following its independence. The Mozambican Civil War, which lasted until 1992, was characterized by clashes between the ruling party, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), and the anti-government rebel group, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO)<sup>187</sup>. The conflict had devastating consequences, including widespread displacement, economic disruption, and human rights abuses. The war, fueled by external factors and ideological differences, strained Mozambique's capacity for reconstruction and development in the post-independence period.

Similarly, in Angola, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (UNITA) waged a protracted war against Portuguese colonialism<sup>188</sup>. Angola achieved independence in 1975, but internal conflicts persisted, leading to a civil war. The conflict involved multiple factions, with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) vying for control. The external involvement of Cold War superpowers exacerbated the conflict, turning Angola into a proxy battleground<sup>189</sup>. The civil war persisted for nearly three decades, causing immense human suffering and hindering the country's social and economic development<sup>190</sup>.

---

<sup>186</sup> *Хазанов А.М.* История Мозамбика в Новое и Новейшее время. М.: ЮНИТИ-ДАНА, Закон и право, 2006. С. 151.

<sup>187</sup> *Горячев Ю.А.* Идеино-политическая эволюция ФРЕЛИМО в процессе антиколониальной борьбы за независимость. Автореферат канд. дисс. М., Институт Африки АН СССР, 1979. С. 26.

<sup>188</sup> *Мартышин О.В.* Африканская революционная демократия идейно-политическая платформа -МПЛА Партия Труда, ФРЕЛИМО, ПАИК. М., 1981. С. 89.

<sup>189</sup> *Gerhart G.M., Kahn O.E.* Disengagement from Southwest Africa: Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia // *Foreign Affairs*, 1991. Vol. 70. № 5. P. 208.

<sup>190</sup> *Martins V.* Hegemony, Resistance and Gradations of Memory: The Politics of Remembering Angola's Liberation Struggle // *History and Memory*, 2021. Vol. 33. № 2. P. 80.

Zimbabwe's struggle for independence was characterized by a protracted guerrilla war against British colonial rule and white minority rule<sup>191</sup>. Led by figures like Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, the liberation movements, such as the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), played a crucial role in the fight for self-rule<sup>192</sup>. Abolition of white minority rule was made possible by the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, which cleared the way for Zimbabwe's independence in 1980<sup>193</sup>.

Nevertheless, the country experienced internal conflicts related to issues of land reform and political power<sup>194</sup>. In the early 2000s, the government, led by President Robert Mugabe, implemented controversial land reforms that often involved the seizure of commercial farms owned by white farmers. The land redistribution efforts, combined with political tensions, economic challenges, and allegations of human rights abuses, contributed to internal strife. While not a full-scale civil war, these internal conflicts had profound implications for Zimbabwe's social fabric, economic stability, and international relations.

Southern Africa's conflicts often spilled across borders, requiring regional interventions and diplomatic efforts to restore stability. South Africa's destabilizing actions in neighboring countries, including its involvement in conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, further complicated regional dynamics. Regional conflicts, such as those in Angola and Mozambique, had the potential to destabilize the entire region. Recognizing the need to prevent the spread of conflicts, regional integration became imperative. An informal grouping called the Frontline States, a group of nations that

---

<sup>191</sup> Демкина Л.А. Рабочий класс и рабочее движение в Северной Родезии. Народы Азии и Африки. М., 1961. С. 41.

<sup>192</sup> West M.O. The Rise Of An African Middle Class: Colonial Zimbabwe, 1898-1965. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2002. // Africa Today, 2004. Vol. 50. № 3. P. 150.

<sup>193</sup> Lancaster House Agreement, 21 December 1979. URL:[https://sasspace.sas.ac.uk/5847/5/1979\\_Lancaster\\_House\\_Agreement.pdf](https://sasspace.sas.ac.uk/5847/5/1979_Lancaster_House_Agreement.pdf) (date of access: 05.07.2023).

<sup>194</sup> Msindo E., Nyachega N. Zimbabwe's Liberation War and the Everyday in Honde Valley, 1975 to 1979 // South African Historical Journal, 2019. Vol. 71. № 1. P. 78.

included included countries such as Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia), played a crucial role in supporting the anti-apartheid movements and providing safe havens for liberation movements<sup>195</sup>. The collaboration of Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, Botswana's Seretse Khama and Tanzania's Julius Nyerere was a pivotal moment in the history of Africa. Their joint efforts to create a stronger security regime to support the sub-region's national liberation movements, gain political freedom from colonial rule, and overthrow white minority rule proved to be a turning point in the struggle for African independence<sup>196</sup>.

The Lusaka Declaration of 1969 marked a significant milestone in the struggle against colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa<sup>197</sup>. The declaration was issued by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) during its summit in Lusaka, Zambia. The declaration reiterated African states' resolve to support liberation movements fighting against colonial authority and racial discrimination in Southern Africa, particularly in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa<sup>198</sup>. The Lusaka Declaration condemned the apartheid government in South Africa and called for collective efforts to end colonial rule in the region. It provided a framework for coordinated action among African states to support the liberation movements militarily, diplomatically, and economically<sup>199</sup>.

The Mogadishu Declaration of 1971 was another important development in the struggle for liberation in Southern Africa. The declaration was presented at the

---

<sup>195</sup> *Березин В.И.* Замбия. Пути завоевания экономической независимости. М., Наука. 1972. С. 114.

<sup>196</sup> *Marks S.* The Historiography of Southern Africa: Recent Developments // *African Historiography: What History for Whish Africa?* Beverly Hills etc.: Sage Publications, 1986. P. 170.

<sup>197</sup> The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, Lusaka 14th - 16th April 1969. URL:<https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/Lusaka%20Manifesto.pdf> or [https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA00020117\\_32](https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA00020117_32) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>198</sup> *Шубин В.Г.* Социал-демократия и борьба против колониализма и апартеида. М.: Наука, ГРВЛ.1985. С. 191.

<sup>199</sup> *Pallotti A.* Tanzania and the 1976 Anglo-American Initiative for Rhodesia // *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 2017. Vol. 45. № 5. P. 815.

exceptional OAU conference that took place in Mogadishu, Somalia<sup>200</sup>. The declaration reiterated the principles outlined in the Lusaka Declaration and called for the intensification of support for the liberation movements in Southern Africa. The Mogadishu Declaration emphasized the need for African states to provide material and moral support to the liberation movements, including military aid, training, and diplomatic assistance. It also condemned the apartheid government rule in South Africa and called for the imposition of economic sanctions and other measures to isolate the apartheid regime internationally.

The Frontline States strategy for liberation in Southern Africa refers to the coordinated efforts of the frontline states - countries in Southern Africa that shared borders with South Africa and Rhodesia - to support the liberation movements in their struggle against colonialism and apartheid. These countries played a crucial role in providing sanctuary, logistical support, and military training to the liberation movements, such as the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in Rhodesia and African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

The frontline states strategy involved hosting training camps, refugee camps, and diplomatic offices for the liberation movements<sup>201</sup>. They also allowed freedom fighters to transit through their territories, provided financial assistance, and facilitated international solidarity campaigns against apartheid and colonialism<sup>202</sup>. The collective efforts of the frontline states contributed significantly to the eventual collapse of minority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia and the attainment of independence for countries in the region. The Lusaka and Mogadishu Declarations provided the

---

<sup>200</sup> The Mogadishu Conference and Declaration, October 1971. URL: [https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9599-21com\\_1981b.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9599-21com_1981b.pdf) (date of access: 07.03.2023).

<sup>201</sup> *Rousseau N.* Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: the Soweto Intelligence Unit and Southern Itineraries // *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 2014. Vol. 40. № 6. P. 1351.

<sup>202</sup> *Macmillan H.* The African National Congress of South Africa in Zambia: The Culture of Exile and the Changing Relationship with Home, 1964–1990 // *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 2009. Vol. 35. № 2. P. 318.

ideological and diplomatic framework for these efforts, reaffirming the solidarity of African states in the struggle against colonialism and apartheid.

During the apartheid era, South Africa pursued a strategy known as CONSAS (Consolidated Associations of South Africa). CONSAS was a network of states that South Africa sought to cultivate as allies or satellite states in Southern Africa, with the primary goal of extending its influence and maintaining its dominance. This strategy was driven by various factors, including securing South Africa's economic interests, countering the spread of communism, and asserting its regional hegemony.

One of the key objectives of CONSAS was to safeguard Apartheid South Africa's economic interests in the region<sup>203</sup>. By forming alliances with neighboring countries such as Lesotho, Swaziland, and parts of Namibia, South Africa aimed to ensure access to resources, markets, and labor. These countries were often dependent on South Africa's economy, and by maintaining close ties, South Africa could exert significant influence over their economic policies and development agendas.

Additionally, CONSAS also helped South Africa prevent the growth of communism in Southern Africa. In the Cold War era, South Africa perceived communism as a threat to its apartheid regime and sought to prevent its spread into neighboring countries. By forming alliances with governments sympathetic to its anti-communist stance, South Africa aimed to create a buffer zone against communist influence and maintain stability in the region.

Furthermore, CONSAS was instrumental in South Africa's efforts to assert its regional hegemony and consolidate its power. By cultivating alliances with neighboring states and exerting political and economic influence, South Africa aimed to establish itself as the dominant power in the region. This enabled South Africa to pursue its own goals and objectives while marginalizing resistance and dissent in other nations in Southern Africa.

---

<sup>203</sup> *Merwe J. van der.* An historical geographical analysis of South Africa's system of accumulation: 1652–1994 // *Review of African Political Economy*, 2016. Vol. 43. № 147.

The Frontline States of Southern Africa took a bold stance against the apartheid regime's sub-imperial constellation of Southern African states (CONSAS). Through diplomatic, political, and military channels, they actively challenged the oppressive regime and its allies<sup>204</sup>. The Frontline States, including countries like Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, and others, perceived CONSAS as a threat to regional stability, independence, and the struggle against apartheid<sup>205</sup>.

Diplomatically, the Frontline States sought to isolate CONSAS and South Africa by garnering international support for their opposition. They lobbied for the imposition of economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and arms embargoes against the apartheid regime<sup>206</sup>. By engaging in diplomatic efforts, the Frontline States aimed to weaken the support network that South Africa sought to build through CONSAS and isolate it politically on the global stage.

Politically, the Frontline States worked to counter CONSAS by supporting liberation movements within the region. By backing these movements, the Frontline States aimed to challenge the internal stability of CONSAS member states and disrupt South Africa's attempts to extend its influence. This political support not only weakened the cohesion of CONSAS but also contributed to the main objective of dismantling apartheid.

Military efforts were also part of the Frontline States' strategy against CONSAS. They provided military support to liberation movements, particularly those fighting against South Africa's influence in neighboring countries. Military intervention and support for armed resistance were seen as essential tools to counteract the sub-imperial ambitions of CONSAS and undermine the military and strategic alliances that South Africa sought to establish. Moreover, this solidarity created a shared sense of purpose

---

<sup>204</sup> *Handmaker J.* Confronting apartheid: a personal history of South Africa, Namibia and palestine // South African Journal on Human Rights, 2020. Vol. 36. № 2–3. P. 276.

<sup>205</sup> Mark C., Steve N. The challenges of regional integration in Southern Africa // African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 2009. Vol. 3. №. 10. P. 399.

<sup>206</sup> *Johnson V.D., Dickinson E.* International Norms and the End of Apartheid in South Africa // Safundi, 2015. Vol. 16. № 4. P. 363.

and common political goals among the Frontline States. By supporting each other in their struggles for political independence and against oppressive regimes, these nations fostered a sense of unity and mutual assistance, forming the foundation for broader regional integration efforts.

The political incentives for regional integration created by the Frontline States in the region were deeply rooted in their collective opposition to apartheid<sup>207</sup>. Through diplomatic unity, support for liberation movements, and joint international efforts, these states aimed to reshape the political landscape of the region, laying the foundation for a more integrated and cooperative Southern Africa<sup>208</sup>.

The Frontline States in Southern Africa played an instrumental role in creating economic motives for regional integration during a critical time of the struggle against apartheid. Their economic contribution paved the way for a more collaborative approach to tackle socio-economic challenges and fostered a sense of unity among the nations in the region. The Frontline States' efforts are a testament to the power of cooperation and the positive outcomes that can be achieved through collective action. These states, including Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, and others, recognized the economic benefits that could be derived from collaborative efforts and sought to address common challenges through regional cooperation<sup>209</sup>.

The Frontline States implemented measures to resist South Africa's economic dominance in the region. This included efforts to diversify their economies, seek alternative trading partners, and reduce dependence on South African-controlled economic systems. By doing so, they aimed to undermine the economic foundation of CONSAS and reduce South Africa's ability to exert control over the region.

---

<sup>207</sup> Чуваева М.А., Ксенофонтова Н.А. Республика Замбия: Справочник. 2-е изд., доп. и перераб. М., 1996. С. 272.

<sup>208</sup> Mole S. Negotiating with Apartheid: The Mission of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group 1986 // *The Round Table*, 2012. Vol. 101. № 3. P. 255.

<sup>209</sup> Костюнина Г.М. Интеграция в Африке / Г.М. Костюнина // *Международная экономическая интеграция: учебное пособие* / Под ред. Н.Н. Ливенцева. М.: Экономистъ, 2006. С. 299.



One key strategy employed by the Frontline States to create economic incentives for regional integration was the promotion of trade and economic diversification. By fostering intra-regional trade agreements and reducing trade barriers among themselves, these states aimed to create a more interconnected and interdependent regional economy. This not only helped in reducing economic dependence on South Africa, but also promoted economic resilience and stability within the Frontline States.

The Frontline States recognized the potential for joint infrastructure development projects to spur economic growth and enhance regional connectivity. Initiatives such as the development of communication systems and transportation networks, and energy grids, were implemented to promote the movement of people and goods across borders, fostering economic collaboration and integration<sup>210</sup>. Along with making the region's infrastructure more developed, this also produced economic motives for more investment and trade.

Additionally, the Frontline States aimed to combine their resources and expertise to tackle common issues related to economic growth, including agricultural development, industrialization, and technological advancement. By engaging in joint efforts and initiatives, these states could leverage their collective capabilities to overcome individual limitations and foster economic growth. This collaborative approach aimed to create a more balanced and diversified regional economy, reducing dependence on external influences and promoting self-sufficiency.

The Frontline States also worked towards the establishment of regional financial mechanisms and institutions to facilitate economic cooperation. Initiatives such as regional development banks and monetary unions were explored to streamline financial transactions, enhance economic stability, and foster greater confidence in regional economic integration. This not only provided a framework for economic cooperation but also signaled a commitment to shared economic objectives.

---

<sup>210</sup> *Simon D. Odén, Bertil (ed.), "Southern Africa after Apartheid: Regional Integration and External Resources" (Book Review) // Third World Planning Review, 1994. Vol. 16. № 3. P. 8.*

Institutions like the Southern African Development Community (SADC)<sup>211</sup>, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)<sup>212</sup> and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)<sup>213</sup> have played an important role in facilitating diplomatic collaboration, conflict resolution, and the establishment of common political and economic principles<sup>214</sup>. The shared commitment to political stability serves as a foundational incentive for regional integration, aiming to create a united front against historical animosities and external pressures.

In conclusion, the political and economic incentives are intricately linked, providing a comprehensive framework for addressing historical challenges, fostering political stability, and promoting sustainable economic development. Through initiatives that prioritize peace, economic cooperation, and collective decision-making, Southern Africa aims to create a region that is politically united, economically vibrant, and better equipped to face the complexities of the globalized world.

## 1.2 Influence of External Factors on Regional Integration in Southern Africa

Following independence, Southern African nations encountered numerous external influences that impacted their endeavors towards regional integration. These influences spanned geopolitical, economic, and social realms, profoundly molding the direction of integration endeavors throughout<sup>215</sup>.

---

<sup>211</sup> SADC Treaty. URL: [https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-11/Declaration\\_\\_Treaty\\_of\\_SADC\\_0.pdf](https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-11/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC_0.pdf) (date of access: 09.05.2023).

<sup>212</sup> 2002 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement. <https://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=566>

<sup>213</sup> COMESA Treaty. URL: [https://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/comesa-treaty-revised-20092012\\_with-zaire\\_final.pdf](https://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/comesa-treaty-revised-20092012_with-zaire_final.pdf) (date of access: 07.05.2023).

<sup>214</sup> *Gibb R.* The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement: Dependence with Democracy // *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 2006. Vol. 32. № 3. P. 589.

<sup>215</sup> *Hartwick E.R., Oden B.* Southern Africa after Apartheid: Regional Integration and External Resources // *Economic Geography*, 1994. Vol. 70. № 4. P. 422.

The global geopolitical landscape was a crucial external factor that impacted Southern Africa's post-independence regional integration. The Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union exerted a significant influence on the region's integration efforts. During the Cold War era, both superpowers sought to expand their influence globally, including in Southern Africa, which was strategically important due to its natural resources and geopolitical location. The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union led to their involvement in supporting different factions and governments in Southern African countries, often exacerbating internal conflicts and complicating efforts at regional cooperation.

The involvement of external powers in Southern Africa's internal affairs had profound implications for regional integration<sup>216</sup>. The support provided by the Soviet Union and United States and to various factions and governments often fueled existing tensions and conflicts within the region<sup>217</sup>. For example, the proxy wars fought between different factions in Angola and Mozambique, with backing from external powers, prolonged conflicts and hindered efforts to achieve peace and stability<sup>218</sup>. Moreover, the Cold War rivalry contributed to the polarization of Southern African countries along ideological lines, making it challenging to forge consensus and cooperation among neighboring states<sup>219</sup>.

Geopolitical tensions between neighboring countries and external actors further complicated the region's integration efforts. The alignment of countries with different geopolitical blocs during the Cold War era created divisions and mistrust among Southern African nations<sup>220</sup>. Competing interests and alliances sometimes clashed with

---

<sup>216</sup> *Vink N., Ratcliffe A.E.* The Wits economic initiative, or, the Cold War is over, and Africa lost // *Development Southern Africa*, 1991. Vol. 8. № 2. P. 275.

<sup>217</sup> *Onslow S.* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. XXVIII: Southern Africa // *Cold War History*, 2013. Vol. 13. № 1. P. 137.

<sup>218</sup> *Shubin V.* Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991 // *Cold War History*, 2015. Vol. 15. № 3. P. 421.

<sup>219</sup> *Popescu M.* Reading through a Cold War Lens: Apartheid-Era Literature and the Global Conflict // *Current Writing*, 2012. Vol. 24. № 1. P. 37.

<sup>220</sup> *Graham M.* Cold War in Southern Africa // *Africa Spectrum*, 2010. Vol. 45. № 1. P. 131.

the goals of regional unity and cooperation. For instance, rivalries between Apartheid South Africa and its neighboring countries, were exacerbated by external interference, impeding efforts to establish meaningful regional integration mechanisms<sup>221</sup>.

Moreover, regional dynamics in Southern Africa were influenced by external interference during and after the Cold War era. Lingering mistrust and unresolved conflicts stemming from past external interventions posed persistent challenges to regional integration initiatives. While the dissolution of Cold War brought opportunities for renewed cooperation and dialogue in Southern Africa, the scars of past conflicts and external interference continued to shape the region's political landscape and hindered efforts to achieve comprehensive regional integration.

Economically, Southern African countries were deeply entwined within the structure of the global economy, which was significantly influenced by neoliberal policies and the process of globalization<sup>222</sup>. This global economic system played a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of post-independence integration initiatives in the region. Southern African nations recognized the importance of integrating into the global economy as a means to spur economic growth, attract foreign investment, and enhance competitiveness on the international stage<sup>223</sup>.

To achieve these objectives, Southern African countries embarked on various measures aimed at liberalizing trade, fostering investment, and participating in regional economic blocs. Trade liberalization policies were implemented to reduce barriers to trade and promote the flow of services and goods between the countries. Additionally, efforts were made to draw in foreign direct investment (FDI) by creating conducive investment climates, offering incentives to investors, and pursuing privatization initiatives in key sectors of the economy.

---

<sup>221</sup> *Ngwe L., Shubin V.* The Hot «Cold War»: The USSR in Southern Africa // *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 2017. № 226. P. 473.

<sup>222</sup> *Naudé W., Krugell W.* Global integration of Africa versus regional integration in Africa // *South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences*, 2001. Vol. 4. № 3. P. 493.

<sup>223</sup> *Mwase N.* Regional Economic Integration and Inter-Regional Trade in Post-Apartheid Eastern and Southern Africa – The South African Dimension // *World Competition*, 1998. Vol. 21. № 4. P. 73.

Participation in regional economic groupings like the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) offered Southern African nations opportunities to deepen economic collaboration, streamline trade policies, and advance regional unity. By joining forces and collaborating with their neighboring countries, Southern African nations have taken a significant step towards boosting their economic prospects and improving the living standards of their populations. Within this context, the concept of regionalism as an economic doctrine gains significance in understanding Southern Africa's integration efforts, underscoring nations' strategic responses to global economic dynamics. In the Southern African context, regional integration is perceived as a strategy to enhance competitiveness within the global economic landscape.

Despite concerted integration efforts, Southern African countries remained vulnerable to external economic factors that could affect their economic stability and growth trajectories<sup>224</sup>. The economies of Southern Africa were intricately linked to the global economic landscape, and any changes in commodity prices, trade regulations, and financial market conditions had a significant impact on the region.

Fluctuations in commodity prices, in particular, posed a significant challenge for Southern African countries. The region is endowed with abundant natural resources, including minerals, agricultural products, and precious metals, which form the backbone of many national economies. However, the prices of these commodities are subject to volatility in the global market, driven by factors such as shifts in demand, changes in production levels, and geopolitical tensions. As a result, Southern African countries often experienced fluctuations in export revenues and government income, impacting their fiscal sustainability and economic resilience.

---

<sup>224</sup> *Keck A., Piermartini R.* The Impact of Economic Partnership Agreements in Countries of the Southern African Development Community // *Journal of African Economies*, 2007. Vol. 17. № 1. P. 85.

For instance, a sudden decline in the price of key exports could lead to a significant reduction in government revenues, affecting budgetary allocations for essential services such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure development<sup>225</sup>. Moreover, reliance on commodity exports for foreign exchange earnings made Southern African economies susceptible to external shocks, exposing them to risks associated with commodity price volatility.

Furthermore, changes in global trade regulations and financial market conditions could also have far-reaching consequences for Southern African economies. Shifts in trade policies, such as tariff increases or trade barriers imposed by major trading partners, could disrupt regional trade flows and hinder export-led growth strategies<sup>226</sup>. In addition, changes in financial markets, such as exchange rate fluctuations or interest rate changes, can influence economic activity and growth prospects by affecting borrowing costs, investment inflows, and capital flows in the region <sup>227</sup>.

International organizations and donor agencies played a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of regional integration in post-independence Southern Africa by providing crucial financial assistance, technical expertise, and policy guidance to member states. Institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and various United Nations (UN) agencies were actively involved in supporting development initiatives and fostering cooperation among Southern African countries. Their assistance was particularly valuable in addressing pressing development challenges, such as infrastructure deficiencies, poverty alleviation, and capacity-building needs.

---

<sup>225</sup> *Fraser G.C.G.* An economic analysis of factors influencing rural-urban migration in southern Africa // *Development Southern Africa*, 1993. Vol. 10. № 3. P. 437.

<sup>226</sup> *Nkosinathi Mlambo D.* The quest for post-colonial regional integration: examining the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Southern Africa post-1992 // *Journal of African Foreign Affairs*, 2020. Vol. 7. № 1. P. 23.

<sup>227</sup> *Arndt C., Roberts S.J.* Key issues in regional growth and integration in Southern Africa // *Development Southern Africa*, 2018. Vol. 35. № 3. P. 297.

Financial assistance provided by international organizations and donor agencies often served as a lifeline for Southern African countries, offering critical support to finance essential infrastructure projects, social programs, and economic reforms. These funds played a pivotal role in addressing pressing development needs and catalyzing sustainable growth across the region.

Infrastructure development projects, such as roads, railways, ports, and energy facilities, were essential for enhancing connectivity, facilitating trade, and promoting economic development in Southern Africa. However, the high costs associated with such projects often exceeded the financial capacity of individual countries. Financial assistance from international organizations filled this gap, providing the necessary funding to undertake large-scale infrastructure initiatives that would otherwise have been unattainable. By improving transportation networks, energy access, and communication systems, these projects laid the foundation for economic expansion, job creation, and improved living standards in the region.

Financial assistance enabled Southern African countries to implement crucial social programs aimed at addressing poverty, inequality, and social exclusion. Funding was allocated towards initiatives in areas such as education, healthcare, housing, and social protection, in an effort to increase access to basic services and enhancing the well-being of vulnerable populations. By investing in human capital development and social infrastructure, financial assistance helped to empower individuals, reduce social disparities, and foster social cohesion within Southern African societies.

In addition to infrastructure and social programs, financial assistance supported economic reforms intended to enhance fiscal sustainability, macroeconomic stability and private sector development in Southern Africa. Assistance was provided to implement policy reforms, strengthen institutions, and build capacity in areas such as public finance management, regulatory frameworks, and business environment improvement. These reforms were essential for fostering investment, entrepreneurship,

and economic expansion, which in turn fueled regional economic expansion and the creation of jobs in Southern Africa.

The impactful guidance of international experts played a vital role in empowering Southern African governments to design and execute effective strategies. These strategies helped bolster governance, stimulate economic growth, and elevate public service delivery to new heights. This technical assistance was instrumental in building institutional capacity and fostering good governance practices, which are essential for sustainable development and regional integration.

However, the support provided by international organizations and donor agencies was not without its complexities. Often, financial assistance came with conditions and requirements attached, which could influence the direction and priorities of integration efforts in Southern Africa<sup>228</sup>. These conditions usually focused on economic policy reforms, fiscal discipline, and governance improvements to promote macroeconomic stability, transparency, and a favorable investment and growth environment.

The alignment of donor priorities with the needs and aspirations of Southern African countries was crucial for ensuring effective integration outcomes. In some cases, there may have been tensions between the policy prescriptions of international donors and the domestic development agendas of Southern African governments. Balancing the demands of donors with the imperatives of national sovereignty and development priorities required careful negotiation and strategic decision-making on the part of policymakers in the region.

Dependency theory highlights the role of external forces in perpetuating economic imbalances. In regards to Southern Africa, the historical economic disparities were not only shaped by internal factors but were also influenced by external actors

---

<sup>228</sup> *Архангельская А.А., Muntschick J.* The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the European Union (EU). Regionalism and External Influence. Palgrave Macmillan, 186 p. // Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 2020. T. 20. №. 2. C. 419.



during the era of colonialism. The integration process, therefore, involves renegotiating the region's position within the global economic system. By addressing historical economic disparities, Southern Africa seeks to assert greater autonomy and control over its economic destiny, reducing vulnerability to external pressures. Additionally, through the lens of dependency theory, collaborative initiatives, such as resource pooling and joint development projects, aim to mitigate dependency on external forces, promoting self-sufficiency and equitable economic growth among member states.

Furthermore, dependency theory underscores the interconnectedness of economic, social, and political dimensions. Addressing historical economic disparities is not merely an economic necessity but also a social and political imperative. However, by reducing these disparities through the integration process, can foster a more cohesive society that is inclusive and participatory in its governance. These aspects are crucial for building a resilient regional community that can collectively navigate global challenges.

In addition to the vital role played by international assistance in addressing immediate development challenges, it's worth noting that Southern African countries understood the significance of fostering self-reliance and ownership of development processes. By taking charge of their own development, these countries could create sustainable and long-lasting solutions to the challenges they face. Efforts were made to strengthen regional institutions, enhance coordination among member states, and mobilize domestic resources to support integration initiatives. By working collaboratively with international partners while asserting their own agency and priorities, Southern African countries sought to ensure that integration efforts in the region were driven by the needs and aspirations of the region's people, ultimately leading to more sustainable and inclusive outcomes.

Security threats and conflicts emanating from neighboring regions posed formidable challenges to the pursuit of post-independence integration in the region. The presence of political instability, armed conflict, and terrorism in adjacent countries

posed a severe risk to the stability of Southern Africa, which in turn impeded regional integration efforts. The region was often forced to cope with the aftermath of neighboring state conflicts. These conflicts could worsen existing tensions within the region and disrupt the efforts of collaboration and cooperation.

In response to these security challenges, regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) assumed a critical role in addressing security threats and promoting peace and stability in Southern Africa. These institutions facilitated diplomatic efforts, peacekeeping missions, and conflict resolution initiatives aimed at mitigating the impact of security crises on the region. By fostering dialogue and cooperation among member states, SADC and the AU sought to create a conducive environment for regional integration to flourish<sup>229</sup>.

It is important to note that despite the efforts of regional organizations, security issues frequently pushed Southern African countries to adopt defensive measures that could hinder integration efforts. Increased border controls, security checkpoints, and military interventions were sometimes deemed necessary to safeguard national security interests in the face of external threats. While such measures might enhance security in the short term, they could also hinder the free movement of people, services and goods, a fundamental principle of regional integration by erecting barriers to trade, investment, and mobility across borders.

Furthermore, security considerations could influence the allocation of resources and priorities within Southern African countries, diverting attention and resources away from integration initiatives towards security-related expenditures. The importance of ensuring security and stability in Southern Africa cannot be overstated. However, these efforts often clashed with other developmental goals, resulting in a slower pace of

---

<sup>229</sup> *Nkosinathi Mlambo D.* The quest for post-colonial regional integration: examining the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Southern Africa post-1992 // *Journal of African Foreign Affairs*, 2020. Vol. 7. № 1. P. 23.

integration and a diversion of resources from initiatives aimed at promoting economic growth and social development.

In conclusion, external factors exerted a profound influence on regional integration process in the Southern African region after independence. Geopolitical dynamics, economic trends, international support, and security challenges all shaped the region's integration efforts, presenting both opportunities and obstacles for Southern African countries. By understanding and navigating these external dynamics, policymakers and stakeholders can effectively advance integration initiatives that promote economic development, political stability, and social cohesion across the region.

### **1.3 Historical and Legal Foundations of Integration Tendencies in Southern Africa**

The legal basis for cooperation in Southern Africa has been greatly shaped by key agreements and declarations. These foundational documents have laid the groundwork for cooperation, political stability and economic unity in the region. They've created a framework that promotes collaboration among Southern African nations, drives economic development, and fosters peaceful relationships. This Subchapter will explore the ways in which these agreements and declarations have significantly contributed to establishment and strengthening regional integration.

During the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) founding summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1963, a crucial document known as the Charter was adopted. Although its scope extended beyond Southern Africa, the documents' significance resonated deeply within the region. It underscored fundamental principles of unity,

solidarity, and cooperation among all African states, serving as a guiding beacon for regional integration efforts<sup>230</sup>.

This this legal document provided a crucial framework for Southern African countries to rally together against common challenges, particularly colonialism and apartheid. By emphasizing the importance of collective action, the Charter laid a solid foundation for collaborative efforts aimed at dismantling systems of oppression and advancing the cause of liberation across the continent<sup>231</sup>. In Southern Africa, where the struggle against colonial rule and apartheid was particularly acute, the principles espoused in the Charter of the OAU resonated strongly, galvanizing regional solidarity in the fight for freedom and equality.

The Charter's call for unity and cooperation fostered a sense of shared purpose among Southern African nations, encouraging them to work together towards common goals<sup>232</sup>. It provided a moral and ideological framework for regional integration efforts, emphasizing the necessity of collaborative action to overcome historical injustices and promote socio-economic development<sup>233</sup>.

Moreover, the principles articulated in the Charter served as a catalyst for diplomatic and political initiatives aimed at addressing the specific challenges facing Southern Africa. By promoting dialogue, negotiation, and peaceful resolution of conflicts, the Charter laid the groundwork for regional cooperation mechanisms that would later emerge to tackle issues such as apartheid in South Africa, colonialism in Namibia, and regional conflicts in countries like Zimbabwe and Mozambique. While the Charter's significance extended across the African continent, its impact on Southern

---

<sup>230</sup> OAU Charter, Addis Ababa, 25 May 1963 URL: [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau\\_charter\\_1963.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf) (date of access: 10.02.2024).

<sup>231</sup> *Barber J.* The Organization of African Unity and its Charter // *International Affairs*, 1970. Vol. 46. № 2. P. 384.

<sup>232</sup> *Hestermeyer H.* African Union replaces Organization of African Unity // *German Law Journal*, 2002. Vol. 3. № 8. P. 34.

<sup>233</sup> *Cervenka Z.* The Organization of African Unity and its Charter // *Verfassung in Recht und Übersee*, 1970. Vol. 3. № 3. P. 416.

Africa was profound. By promoting unity, solidarity, and cooperation, it provided the moral and ideological underpinnings for integration efforts in the region, laying the groundwork for collaborative endeavors aimed at achieving peace, freedom, and prosperity for all nations in the region<sup>234</sup>.

The Windsor Declaration, forged during a pivotal moment in Southern Africa's history, stands as a testament to international solidarity and support for the region's struggle against apartheid and colonial oppression. Convened in Windsor, England, in 1980, this landmark agreement brought together representatives from Great Britain and the "Frontline States" of Southern Africa, comprising Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Angola, and Zimbabwe<sup>235</sup>.

At its core, the Windsor Declaration symbolized a shared commitment to the principles of independence and self-determination for Southern African countries. By affirming this commitment, both the UK and the Frontline States underscored their dedication to supporting the aspirations of the region's peoples to govern themselves free from external interference and domination.

The Declaration was a forceful call for the withdrawal of apartheid South Africa from Namibia, which was then known as South-West Africa. The declaration marked a crucial diplomatic stance against the apartheid regime's expansionist policies and unwarranted occupation of Namibia. The Windsor Declaration lent crucial international backing to the ongoing struggle for Namibian independence, reinforcing the legitimacy of the Namibian people's quest for self-rule.

Additionally, the Windsor Declaration threw its weight behind the broader fight against apartheid in South Africa. By voicing unequivocal support for the anti-apartheid movement, the declaration bolstered the morale of activists within South Africa and

---

<sup>234</sup> *Adeyeye J. A. A Comparative Analysis of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) // Groningen Journal of International Law, 2019. Vol. 6. № 2. P. 215.*

<sup>235</sup> Windsor Political Declaration by the European Commission and the Government of the United Kingdom. URL: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63fccf07e90e0740d3cd6ed6/The\\_Windsor\\_Framework\\_a\\_new\\_way\\_forward.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63fccf07e90e0740d3cd6ed6/The_Windsor_Framework_a_new_way_forward.pdf) (date of access: 11.02.2024).

garnered international attention and condemnation of the apartheid regime's discriminatory policies.

Importantly, the Windsor Declaration's endorsement of regional integration efforts signaled the recognition of Southern Africa's collective aspirations for unity, peace, and prosperity. By acknowledging the interconnectedness of the region's struggles and objectives, the declaration underscored the importance of collaborative action in addressing common challenges and advancing shared goals.

The Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 represents a turning point in the history of Southern Africa, marking the culmination of negotiations that brought an end to the protracted Rhodesian Bush War and paved the way for Zimbabwe's independence<sup>236</sup>. Signed in London, UK, this historic agreement provided the legal framework for a peaceful transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe, addressing key issues such as holding free and fair elections and safeguarding human rights<sup>237</sup>.

At its core, the Lancaster House Agreement embodied the principles of inclusivity and democracy, seeking to balance the interests of all parties engaged in the disagreement. By establishing a comprehensive framework for negotiations, the agreement provided a platform for constructive dialogue and compromise, facilitating the resolution of longstanding grievances and paving the way for a more equitable and representative political system in Zimbabwe.

The Lancaster House Agreement ensured that the transition to majority rule would be conducted in a transparent and democratic manner, with provisions for the holding of free and fair elections under international supervision. This commitment to democratic principles helped to instill confidence among the Zimbabwean people and

---

<sup>236</sup> Whitaker J. S., Davidow J. A Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference in Rhodesia, 1979 // *Foreign Affairs*, 1985. Vol. 63. № 5. P. 1134.

<sup>237</sup> Lancaster House Agreement, 21 December 1979. URL: [https://sasspace.sas.ac.uk/5847/5/1979\\_Lancaster\\_House\\_Agreement.pdf](https://sasspace.sas.ac.uk/5847/5/1979_Lancaster_House_Agreement.pdf) (date of access: 13.02.2024).

international observers, laying the groundwork for a peaceful and legitimate transfer of power<sup>238</sup>.

The Lancaster House Agreement's successful execution established a standard for amicable political transitions throughout the region. By demonstrating that negotiated settlements could effectively resolve even the most entrenched conflicts, the agreement inspired hope and optimism for the future of Southern Africa. It served as a beacon of stability and cooperation in a region marred by political turmoil and armed conflict, highlighting the potential for peaceful coexistence and shared prosperity.

In addition to its immediate impact on Zimbabwe, the Lancaster House Agreement had far-reaching implications for the broader Southern African region. By resolving the conflict in Zimbabwe and establishing a framework for democratic governance, the agreement contributed to cooperation and stability in the region, fostering a climate conducive to regional integration and economic development<sup>239</sup>.

The Harare declaration, convened during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1989, stands as a seminal document in the global fight against apartheid and the advancement of development, human rights and democracy in Southern Africa. With its condemnation of apartheid and its firm commitment to supporting the struggle for liberation in South Africa, the declaration represented a significant moral and political stance by Commonwealth member states<sup>240</sup>.

The Harare declaration symbolized a collective rejection of apartheid's discriminatory policies and its corrosive impact on the region's socio-political landscape. By voicing unequivocal condemnation, the declaration sent a powerful

---

<sup>238</sup> *Brown R.* From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. Behind and Beyond Lancaster House // *African Affairs*, 1981. Vol. 80. № 319. 302 p.

<sup>239</sup> *Onslow S.* Zimbabwe: Land and the Lancaster House Settlement // *British Scholar*. 2009. Vol. 2. № 1. P. 40.

<sup>240</sup> The Harare Declaration was adopted on 21 August 1989, by the OAU sub-committee on Southern Africa in its summit in Harare, Zimbabwe. URL: [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ZA\\_HarareDeclaration-21Aug\\_1989.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ZA_HarareDeclaration-21Aug_1989.pdf) (date of access: 15.02.2024).

message of solidarity with the oppressed peoples of South Africa and underscored the Commonwealth's commitment to upholding fundamental principles of human dignity, equality, and justice<sup>241</sup>.

The declaration served as a rallying cry for international action against apartheid, providing a legal and moral basis for diplomatic, economic, and cultural sanctions aimed at isolating the apartheid regime and pressuring it to dismantle its system of racial segregation. Through its endorsement of targeted measures, the declaration bolstered the anti-apartheid movement and galvanized global support for the struggle for freedom and democracy in South Africa.

Importantly, the declaration's emphasis on promoting development, democracy, and human rights in Southern Africa reflected a broader commitment to fostering inclusive and sustainable development across the region. By advocating for democratic governance, observance of human rights, and socio-economic empowerment, the declaration aimed to deal with the underlying sources of instability and inequality in Southern Africa, laying the groundwork for a more just and prosperous future for all its inhabitants<sup>242</sup>.

Through the mobilization of diplomatic pressure and moral authority, the declaration proved to be a pivotal force in creating a favorable environment for negotiations and dialogue between the apartheid government and the liberation movements. As a result of this historic agreement, apartheid was peacefully dismantled, making way for the emergence of a democratic South Africa<sup>243</sup>.

The Harare Declaration was no ordinary diplomatic rhetoric. It was a bold and significant affirmation of the Commonwealth's unwavering commitment to justice,

---

<sup>241</sup> Kirby M.D. Harare Declaration on Human Rights // Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 1989. Vol. 15. № 3. 999 p.

<sup>242</sup> Chege M. Southern Africa Political Economy Monthly: December 1996, Harare, Zimbabwe // Foreign Policy, 1997. № 107. 151 p.

<sup>243</sup> The Harare Declaration was adopted on 21 August 1989, by the OAU sub-committee on Southern Africa in its summit in Harare, Zimbabwe. URL: [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ZA\\_HarareDeclaration-21Aug\\_1989.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ZA_HarareDeclaration-21Aug_1989.pdf) (date of access: 07.02.2024).



equality, and freedom in Southern Africa. Its impact transcended borders and resonated with the people, sending a clear message that the Commonwealth stands for what is right and just. In addition, through its condemnation of apartheid and its advocacy for democracy and development, the declaration left an indelible mark on the region's history, contributing significantly to the promotion of human rights and democracy in South Africa and beyond<sup>244</sup>.

Apart from agreements and declarations, the legal foundation of in the Southern African region is firmly established within the constitutions of individual countries within the region. Constitutions serve as foundational documents that define the fundamental principles, rights, and structures of governance within a nation-state. In the context of Southern Africa, these constitutions play a crucial role in shaping the legal framework for cooperation and collaboration among countries, thereby facilitating regional integration efforts<sup>245</sup>.

Firstly, Southern African constitutions affirm the autonomy and independence of each member state, while also recognizing the importance of mutual respect and avoiding interference in another country's domestic affairs. By upholding the sovereignty of each nation, the constitutions provide a legal foundation that supports cooperative relations and regional integration initiatives while safeguarding the national interests of each country.

Besides, many constitutions in the region enshrine the safeguarding of fundamental liberty and human rights. These rights include the right to equality, freedom of expression, and political participation. By safeguarding these rights, constitutions promote inclusivity, democracy, and good governance, which are essential components of successful regional integration. Ensuring that citizens are able to exercise their rights freely strengthens the legitimacy of regional integration efforts

---

<sup>244</sup> *Patel H.* Southern Africa and democracy, in the light of the Harare declaration // *The Round Table*, 2000. Vol. 89. № 357. 585 p.

<sup>245</sup> *Weeks J.* Regional cooperation and Southern African development // *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1996. Vol. 22. № 1. P. 99.

and fosters a conducive environment for cooperation on a regional and national levels<sup>246</sup>.

Additionally, Southern African constitutions often contain provisions aimed at promoting economic development and social justice. These provisions may include commitments to land reform, equitable distribution of resources, and the promotion of social welfare. By addressing socio-economic inequalities and promoting development, constitutions contribute to regional stability and cooperation<sup>247</sup>. Economic integration efforts, such as trade agreements and infrastructure development projects, are supported by these constitutional principles aimed at fostering inclusive development throughout the region<sup>248</sup>.

The incorporation of international law and treaties into the domestic legal system of Southern African countries is crucial for upholding regional integration commitments. Constitutions in this region recognize this importance and extend it to regional integration agreements and treaties. This integration provides a solid foundation for compliance with regional integration commitments and fosters cooperation among member states<sup>249</sup>. This ensures that regional integration efforts are grounded in legal frameworks that are respected and upheld at the national level.

Additionally, several constitutions expressly call for the creation of regional integration mechanisms or institutions. For example, the constitutions of countries belonging to SADC may recognize the organization and its objectives as being in the

---

<sup>246</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Botswana.1966. URL:<https://www.parliament.gov.bw/images/constitution.pdf> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>247</sup> The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania.1977. URL: <https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/constitution.pdf> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>248</sup> The Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe.2013. URL:[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe\\_2013](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>249</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Namibia.2010. URL:<https://www.lac.org.na/laws/annoSTAT/Namibian%20Constitution.pdf> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

national interest<sup>250</sup>. This recognition strengthens the legal basis for participation in regional integration initiatives and facilitates cooperation among member states. It underscores the significance of regional integration efforts in advancing the collective interests and development goals of the region as a whole<sup>251</sup>.

In conclusion, the significance of these agreements, declarations, and constitutions in laying the legal groundwork for integration in the region cannot be overstated. By promoting unity and cooperation among member states, they have provided a robust framework upon which regional integration efforts have thrived. These agreements and declarations have served as powerful instruments for addressing historical injustices in the region. Through their condemnation of colonialism, apartheid, and other forms of oppression, they have helped to shine a light on the injustices of the past and pave the way for reconciliation and healing. By acknowledging and confronting these injustices head-on, they have created a foundation for building a more equitable and inclusive society in Southern Africa.

These agreements and declarations have been essential in resolving conflicts within the region. By providing mechanisms for dialogue, negotiation, and peaceful dispute resolution, they have helped to defuse tensions and build trust among member states. Whether through diplomatic initiatives or international mediation efforts, they have facilitated the resolution of long-standing conflicts and contributed to the region's stability and peace.

In addition, various agreements and declarations have played a significant role in creating institutions and mechanisms for collaboration in Southern Africa. These agreements have established the legal framework for cooperation in different areas such

---

<sup>250</sup> Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.1996.  
URL:[https://www.concourt.org.za/images/phocadownload/the\\_text/Slimline-Constitution-Web-Version.pdf](https://www.concourt.org.za/images/phocadownload/the_text/Slimline-Constitution-Web-Version.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

<sup>251</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Zambia.2016.  
URL:[https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/amendment\\_act/Constitution%20of%20Zambia%20%20\(Amendment\),%202016-Act%20No.%202\\_0.pdf](https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/amendment_act/Constitution%20of%20Zambia%20%20(Amendment),%202016-Act%20No.%202_0.pdf) ( date of access: 07.09.2023).

as trade, investment, infrastructure development, and security cooperation. Regional organizations such as SADC, SACU, and COMESA, as well as bilateral treaties and protocols, have been instrumental in facilitating this cooperation. By formalizing these arrangements and providing clear guidelines for cooperation, they have helped to foster a culture of collaboration and partnership among member states.

## **CHAPTER 2. THE COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: SACU, COMESA & AFCFTA**

Regional integration groupings play a pivotal role in shaping the economic landscape and fostering cooperation among countries in Southern Africa. This chapter introduces and examines SACU, COMESA and AFCFTA which are key regional integration groups in the region. Notably, while acknowledging the significance of the SADC as the principle regional organization, this chapter refrains from in-depth analysis of SADC, as its multifaceted role in security and other areas of regional integration warrants a separate, dedicated exploration in subsequent chapters.

Through an analysis of their objectives, structures, and functions, this chapter sets the stage for a deeper exploration of their impact on cooperation in the region. The SACU is currently the oldest customs union in the world, comprising Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa. Established in 1910, SACU operates on the principle of a common external tariff, facilitating trade and economic integration among its member states. SACU's objectives include promoting industrial development, enhancing competitiveness, and fostering economic growth through removing obstacles to trade and the harmonization of trade policies.

Another significant regional integration grouping in Southern Africa is the COMESA, which is a powerful force for economic integration, trade facilitation, and sustainable development in the region. Established in 1994, it now boasts 21 member states, all dedicated to achieving shared goals. These goals include the establishment of a customs union, the promotion of industrial development, and the facilitation of cross-border trade and investment. By implementing initiatives such as the harmonization of trade policies and the elimination of non-tariff barriers, the organization seeks to enhance regional competitiveness and attract investment.

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) represents a landmark agreement aimed at promoting intra-African trade and economic integration. Signed in 2018 and officially launched in 2021, AfCFTA seeks to create a single market for goods and services, facilitate the movement of people and capital, and promote industrial development and economic diversification across the continent.

The AfCFTA is a game-changing agreement that promises to revolutionize trade and economic integration in Africa. The continental agreement aims to establish a unified market for goods and services, facilitate the seamless flow of people and capital, and promote industrial growth and economic diversification across the continent. With 54 member states, including several in Southern Africa, AfCFTA has the potential to significantly boost regional trade and economic growth, foster industrialization, and enhance the competitiveness of African economies on the global stage.

By fostering collaboration, harmonizing trade policies, and eliminating trade barriers, these groupings contribute to the realization of a more integrated, prosperous, and interconnected Southern Africa. These regional integration groupings will be explored in detail below.

### **2.1 The Formation and Organizational structure of the Southern African Customs Union**

The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) celebrated its 113th anniversary in 2023, making it the oldest customs union agreement still in operation. The roots of the custom union can be traced back to the 1889 agreement between the British Colony of Cape of Good Hope and the Orange Free State Boer Republic. A new agreement was signed in 1910, which included the Union of South Africa and the British High Commission Territories, namely Basutoland (Modern Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Modern Botswana), and Swaziland (Modern Eswatini). Before becoming a de jure member, Southwest Africa (Modern Namibia) was a de facto member since it was administered as part of Apartheid South Africa. SACU officially welcomed Namibia in

1990<sup>252</sup>. Every nation, with the exception of Botswana, is a participant in the Shared Currency Zone. A unified external tariff is utilized under the SACU agreement. It is significant to note that during the SACU's 113 years of operation, three agreements were reached in 1910, 1969, and 2002. These agreements were all discussed and reached in specific political environments.

The 1910 Agreement, for instance, played a significant role in shaping South Africa's economic landscape. While it wasn't the first customs agreement in the region, it replaced the customs union between the Cape of Good Hope and the Orange Free State after the Anglo-Boer War in 1903. Moreover, it attracted the participation of the High Commission Territories (HCTs) of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Swaziland, thus, consolidating the region's economic integration <sup>253</sup>.

The Agreement marked a significant milestone in the history of international trade between the Union of South Africa and the HCTs. Despite having only six provisions, the agreement established a trade deal that qualifies as a Customs Union (CU) under modern terminology. To comply with the WTO law, a CU must ensure the liberalization of almost all trade among participants and the application of similar duties and trade regulations by participants to the trade of nations outside the arrangement. Moreover, the agreement must establish a free trade area (FTA), including application procedures.

Hudson argued that the 1910 Agreement's Article II, which stated that "there shall be free interchange of the products and manufactures of the Union and the Territories with the exception of spirits and beer etc.," satisfied the first requirement<sup>254</sup>. However, Hudson noted that for these products, the customs and excise duties to be imposed in the HCTs would be the same as those in effect in the Union. The second

---

<sup>252</sup> *Chettle J.H.* The Cambridge History of the British Empire. VIII. South Africa, Rhodesia, and the High Commission Territories // *Canadian Historical Review*, 1964. Vol. 45. № 2. 161 p.

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>254</sup> *Hudson D.J.* "Brief Chronology of Customs Agreements in Southern Africa, 1855 – 1979". Botswana Notes and Records, 1979. №11. 89 p.

condition was partially met by Article I, which stated that "the Customs Union Tariff, as it at present exists, shall be maintained between the contracting parties until altered by legislation enacted by the Union or the (HCTs)".<sup>255</sup> This made sure that the Union of South Africa's standard 15 percent ad valorem tariff on imports from other countries would be implemented in the HCTs. The HCTs also had to "shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, conform to the laws and regulations for the time being in force within the Union in respect [of] refunds, rebates, abatements, suspensions, methylation, prohibitions, removals in bonds or otherwise, and interpretations of the tariff," according to Article IV.

Article III of the 1910 Agreement included the following clauses as complementary measures mandating the application of South African tariffs, rules, and regulations to imports from other nations:

"...all duties of customs levied on dutiable items imported into and consumed in the Territories shall be paid into the Treasury of the Union, and there shall be paid out of the Treasury annually towards the cost of administration of each Territory a sum in respect of such duties which shall bear to the total customs revenue of the Union in respect of each financial year the same proportion as the average amount of the customs revenue of such Territories"<sup>256</sup>.

Taking into account this clause, the following initial revenue pool shares were established: The following percentages are for Basutoland: 0.88575%; Bechuanaland Protectorate: 0.27622%; Swaziland: 0.14900%; and South Africa: 98.68903%<sup>257</sup>.

The 1910 Agreement was intended to be in effect from July 1, 1910, through June 30, 1911, and then for rolling 12-month periods if a party did not "retire" from the

---

<sup>255</sup> *Hudson D.J.* "Brief Chronology of Customs Agreements in Southern Africa, 1855 – 1979". Botswana Notes and Records, 1979. №11. 89 p.

<sup>256</sup> 1910 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement. URL: <https://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=564> (date of access: 12.09.2023).

<sup>257</sup> *Hudson D.J.* "Brief Chronology of Customs Agreements in Southern Africa. Botswana Notes and Records, 1979. 89 p.



arrangement<sup>258</sup>. In order to withdraw from the agreement, a party must give at least three months' notice of their plan to do so before the 30th of June of any given year. Additionally, the HCTs had the option to terminate the agreement immediately if the Union's legislature changed the customs tariff or took any other actions that were against to the Agreement's spirit and intent. Likewise, the Union was free to immediately withdraw from the Agreement if any of the HCTs changed the customs tariff or did anything else that went against the letter and spirit of the Agreement. The Agreement was signed on June 29, 1910, as mentioned in the paragraph above. Unexpectedly, Lord Gladstone signed it four times: once as the Union's Governor-General and three times as the HCTs' High Commissioner. The 1910 Agreement appears to have been a colonial imposition on the HCTs, driven not by theories or arguments about trade integration but rather by the desire to transfer the financial burden of administering the HCTs from the colonial treasury in London to the Union Treasury. This is evident from the way it was carried out and from some of the language used in the provision on sharing of revenue from the customs pool (Article III)<sup>259</sup>.

Additionally, according to the 1910 Agreement, South Africa was principally in charge of collecting customs duties on imports entering the Common Customs Area (CCA) that were going to the HCTs and distributing each HCT annually its proportionate share of the taxes collected and pooled. According to Article 13 of the 1969 Agreement, each member was obligated to collect excise, sales, and extra duties in addition to customs charges, and to submit the money they had collected to the Consolidated Revenue Fund of South Africa on a quarterly basis.

The 1910 Agreement's continued existence in essentially the same form till the end of colonial control for the HCTs was another amazing peculiarity of SACU. Even though the apartheid Union Government's legislative activities could have triggered the

---

<sup>258</sup> 1910 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement.URL: <https://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=564> (date of access: 12.09.2023).

<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

HCTs' right to "retire" from the arrangement under Article VI, the British Colonial Office did not feel the need to review the arrangement<sup>260</sup>.

The second agreement, known as the 1969 SACU Agreement, was a renegotiation and reworking of the 1910 Agreement that took place after the HCTs gained independence from the United Kingdom as the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Republic of Botswana, and the Kingdom of Swaziland.

About twenty-two (22) articles made up the original agreement, many of which were explained and translated in what was referred to as a "secret memorandum of understanding" (MOU). As a result of the 1990 addition of the 23rd provision, which deals with the admission of new members, Namibia was able to become a full member that same year after gaining independence. The original 22 articles maintained the following as the fundamental components of the SACU: the free exchange of goods grown or produced within the Union; the application of South Africa's taxes, laws, and regulations as the SACU Common External Tariffs (CET); the collection of taxes levied throughout the entire SACU area in a common pool, to be managed by South Africa's Treasury; and the periodic calculation and distribution from the pool of shares for the former HCTs. To bolster the previous HCTs' economic expansion and make up for some of the disadvantages of being in a CU with South Africa, the 1969 Agreement made an effort to qualify and adjust these qualities<sup>261</sup>.

It is crucial to note that the 1910 Customs Union Agreement did not provide for or anticipate the necessity for institutions to manage or administer the SACU. In the conditions of the time, the Colonial Office in London undoubtedly preferred that the Union Government run the system as it saw suitable, as long as the funding for the HCTs governance were secured on a regular basis. Surprisingly, the 1969 Agreement suggested very rudimentary mechanisms for CU management.

---

<sup>260</sup> *Kumar U.* Southern African Customs Union and BLS – Countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland). *Journal of World Trade*, 1990. Vol. 24. № 3. 31 p.

<sup>261</sup> Article 14 of the 1969 Agreement. URL: <https://www.sacu.int/docs/agreements/1969/1969-agreement.html> (date of access: 15.09.2023).

However, Article 20 of the 1969 Agreement stipulated the creation of a CU Commission, made up of representatives of all contracting parties, as the single or primary forum for "discussing any matter arising out of this Agreement".<sup>262</sup> It was planned for the Commission to convene at least once a year, ideally before the end of October, in each of the contracting parties. It might also convene whenever a contractual party requested it, in which case that party would be in charge of planning the meeting. Therefore, each nation that was in charge of planning and hosting the Commission's meetings provided service in turn. No SACU or Commission Secretariat existed. Agendas, notes, and records of discussions were to be created, distributed, and maintained by the organizing and hosting nation. The Commission eventually granted itself the authority to create auxiliary institutions to aid in its work, although these did not include a Secretariat.

It's worth mentioning that the agreement should have provided for an intergovernmental organization to administer and oversee SACU affairs, since it was, by law, a treaty between four sovereign states, officially signed by four plenipotentiaries, and later ratified by a fifth sovereign state. The first step in making SACU a 21st Century CU that is in line with contemporary developments in international commercial relations was to address this deficiency.

The 2002 SACU agreement was a considerable enlargement of the 1969 accord. It initially consisted of 51 articles divided into 9 segments and 1 Annex<sup>263</sup>. At the time, members were debating amendments to make the Summit of Government and Heads of State a SACU organ. The number of Annexes has also been raised, from one to five. The Annexes now elaborate on the Revenue Sharing Formula (Annex A); the Tariff Board (Annex B); National Bodies (Annex C); SACU Single Origin and related regulations and procedures (Annex D); and Mutual Administrative Assistance (Annex

---

<sup>262</sup> Article 20 of the 1969 Agreement.URL: <https://www.sacu.int/docs/agreements/1969/1969-agreement.html> (date of access: 09.09.2023).

<sup>263</sup> The 2002 Southern African Customs Union Agreement.URL: <https://www.sacu.int/docs/agreements/2017/SACU-Agreement.pdf>(date of access: 18.09.2023).

E)<sup>264</sup>. Despite the expansion of the agreement, its contents largely focused on established themes and issues within SACU. However, this is not to say that these topics are any less important. In fact, they continue to be crucial to SACU's success, including free movement of domestic products, SACU's Common External Tariff, economic development of the BLNS countries, and various provisions and annexes related to the creation of SACU as an international organization, common SACU institutions, and common policies<sup>265</sup>.

With the implementation of the Agreement, SACU's status was elevated beyond a mere treaty arrangement among member states<sup>266</sup>. This move has strengthened SACU's position as a powerful international player, with a more influential voice in global trade and commerce. One of the notable outcomes of this agreement was the establishment of SACU's headquarters in Windhoek, Namibia, which served as a symbolic recognition of the union's institutionalization and its commitment to regional integration and cooperation.

By granting SACU a separate legal identity and competence from its member states, the 2002 Agreement conferred upon the union a distinct legal personality in international law. This distinction meant that SACU could enter into agreements, contracts, and other legal arrangements in its own capacity, independent of the individual member states. This legal framework provided SACU with greater flexibility and autonomy in its operations and decision-making processes, enabling it to effectively pursue its mandate of facilitating trade and economic cooperation within the region.

Furthermore, establishing SACU as an international organization underscored the member nations' dedication to advancing regional cooperation and promote economic development in Southern Africa. By elevating SACU to the status of an

---

<sup>264</sup> The 2002 Southern African Customs Union Agreement.URL: <https://www.sacu.int/docs/agreements/2017/SACU-Agreement.pdf>(date of access: 18.09.2023).

<sup>265</sup> Ibid.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid.

international organization, member states demonstrated their willingness to pool sovereignty and resources to achieve common objectives, such as promoting trade facilitation, industrial development, and economic diversification.

The creation of SACU as an international organization also enhanced its credibility and visibility on the global stage, enabling it to engage more effectively with international partners, organizations, and stakeholders. This increased recognition and legitimacy strengthened SACU's ability to negotiate trade agreements, access international funding and technical assistance, and advocate for the member`s interests at the international forums.

The goals of SACU are described in Article 2 of the SACU Agreement from 2002. This might be seen as indicating the desire for such an agreement among countries participating in the Customs Union. The agreement sought to achieve several key goals to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of SACU's operations<sup>267</sup>.

The new agreement aimed to drive economic growth and integration across member states by promoting the free movement of goods and services within the customs union<sup>268</sup>. This objective is in line with the broader goal of reducing trade obstacles and strengthening regional economic cooperation among SACU countries. By eliminating tariffs and other trade barriers, the agreement aims to create a more conducive environment for intra-regional trade, investment, and overall economic development.

The SACU agreement of 2002 sought to enhance the competitiveness of member states' economies by harmonizing trade policies and customs procedures. Standardizing customs procedures and administrative practices helps to streamline trade processes, lower transaction expenses, and enhance SACU's business environment. This objective

---

<sup>267</sup> Article 2 of the SACU Agreement.URL: <https://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/SACU.pdf>(date of access: 18.09.2023).

<sup>268</sup> Ibid.

demonstrates the understanding of the significance of effective border management and trade facilitation measures in promoting economic efficiency and competitiveness.

Another goal of the SACU agreement was to fortify the institutional and governance structures of the customs union. The agreement aimed to enhance decision-making processes, transparency, and accountability within SACU institutions, thereby ensuring effective implementation and enforcement of trade rules and regulations. Strengthening institutional capacity and governance mechanisms is crucial for the smooth functioning of SACU and the achievement of its objectives.

Furthermore, the SACU agreement of 2002 emphasized the need for cooperation and coordination on trade-related issues with external partners, including other regional economic communities and international organizations. By fostering partnerships and collaboration with external stakeholders, SACU aimed to leverage resources, expertise, and market opportunities to support its development objectives and enhance the welfare of its member states.

It is clear that the SACU agreement of 2002 outlined ambitious goals to modernize and strengthen the customs union, promote economic development and integration, enhance competitiveness, strengthen institutional capacity, and foster cooperation with external partners. These goals reflect SACU's commitment to advancing the economic interests and welfare of its member states through effective regional cooperation and integration initiatives.

Five key themes are highlighted in the current SACU program: policy development, institution building, global economy integration, trade facilitation, and revenue management. Additional programs that SACU is exploring include a number of supplementary ones.

The following were initially designated as the institutions of SACU under Article 7 in Part Three: (a) Council of Ministers; (b) Customs Union Commission; (c) Secretariat; (d) Tariff Board; (e) Technical Liaison Committees; and (f) Ad hoc

Tribunal<sup>269</sup>. The SACU Summit, as well as National Bodies to be constituted or designated in each Member State, are also relevant to SACU operations. Following the historic decision by the SACU Heads of State and Government on 22 April 2010 to institutionalize their meetings, the Amendments to the SACU Agreement, 2002, to institutionalize the SACU Summit were agreed by the Council on 10 April 2013. On April 12, 2013, a landmark decision was made by the Governments of all Member States, as they signed the Amendments to the 2002 SACU agreement<sup>270</sup>. These Amendments were set to bring about positive changes in the region, but their effectiveness depended on the adoption by all Member States.

Richard Gibb highlights that by establishing common institutions and policies, the 2002 Agreement sought to turn SACU into a 21st Century Custom Union that was in line with current trends in global trade relations. The SACU Common External Tariffs (CET) or the free exchange of products inside SACU were not proposed to be revisited, except for the need that it now be a SACU CET rather than a South African CET<sup>271</sup>. The revenue sharing model, as with every time the SACU Agreement was renegotiated, was significantly changed, presumably to encourage equal revenue sharing.

According to reports, SACU officials are still thinking about methods to strengthen their alliance and make it better. Industrial growth, agriculture, competition, and what are referred to as "unfair trade practices" are all included as potential areas for the establishment of shared policies in the SACU Agreement<sup>272</sup>. These are priority sectors for the creation of common policies, the Agreement tacitly proposes in this

---

<sup>269</sup> Article 7 of the 2002 SACU Agreement URL: <https://www.sacu.int/docs/agreements/2017/SACU-Agreement.pdf> (date of access: 18.09.2023).

<sup>270</sup> Development of SACU Institutions. URL: <https://www.sacu.int/category.php?cat=Development%20of%20SACU%20institutions> (date of access: 18.09.2023).

<sup>271</sup> *Gibb R.* 'The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement: Dependence with democracy', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 2006. Vol 32. №3. 583 p.

<sup>272</sup> *Медведев И.В.* Перспективы интеграции региональных объединений САДК, SACU и БРИКС в контексте развития экономики России // *Финансовая аналитика: проблемы и решения*, 2016. vol. 21 (303). С. 55.

regard. It's unclear what drove the identification or ranking of these sectors, but it couldn't have been the need to upgrade SACU to a 21st-century arrangement.

SACU is an organization for trading goods. The scope of such agreements now covers intellectual property rights and trade in services under contemporary international trade law. Furthermore, SACU should transition from a CU to a common market and then, finally, into an economic union according to the typology of these agreements. A common market necessitates the harmonization or unification of business-related laws, rules, and policies. Among the topics covered elsewhere in the 2002 Agreement are standards and technical regulations and the marketing of agricultural products. What led to the selection or prioritizing of just four policy action areas in Part 8 of the Agreement is merely a minor issue. The more significant criticism levelled at this section of the Agreement is that the work that needs to be done in the four areas is not identical, and that for some of the areas, the Agreement does not obligate Member States to create uniform policies. A shared industrial development policy must be developed, as stated in Article 38, by SACU Member States. Clearly stated in Article 41 is the need for "policies and instruments to address unfair trade practices between Member States." The SACU will require its own legal framework to manage concerns like dumping and subsidies.

This is hardly expected to happen soon, given the difficulties in establishing the Tariff Board and National Bodies. On the other hand, Articles 39 and 40 are reluctant to demand the creation of unified regulations for agriculture and competition. Member States just "agree to cooperate on agricultural policies to guarantee coordinated development of the agricultural sector" within SACU, according to Article 39(2). The member states acknowledge in Article 40 that "there shall be competition policies in each Member State" and that they "shall cooperate with each other with respect to the enforcement of competition laws and regulations." As a result, the Agreement does not mandate the development of a SACU competition policy or legislation—rather, it merely considers goodwill amongst national competition authorities.



In spite of the aforementioned difficulties, SACU is a focused and effective Customs Union. A unified external tariff and comparatively unrestricted trade in products are supported by a revenue-sharing mechanism. The SACU economies exhibit a high degree of macroeconomic convergence that is highlighted by sound fiscal policy, modest inflation, and moderate debt. The nations' economies have a lengthy history and have successfully negotiated a number of trade agreements as a group. Particularly in the fields of finance, banking, and retail, this has made them more interdependent and more integrated.

Consolidating the customs union has been prioritized as a major medium-term goal by the Member States of SACU to improve this integration. This will guarantee that all notable institutions are founded and that SACU policies are created. Additionally, SACU's promotion of Member States' integration into the world economy is one of its main goals. Trade agreements with third countries have historically been the main strategy utilized to accomplish this. In order to speed up talks with third parties, SACU is creating a Common Negotiating Mechanism that will, among other things, specify how to obtain consensus on the negotiation's structure and position. The creation of a Common Negotiating Mechanism within SACU is a strategic move aimed at streamlining and strengthening the negotiation process with third parties. As SACU seeks to extend its trade agreements beyond its member states to include other SADC countries, the establishment of this mechanism is crucial for ensuring a cohesive and unified approach to negotiations.

The Common Negotiating Mechanism serves as a crucial tool in achieving a shared objective among SACU member states - to ensure a unified approach towards the negotiation's structure and position. By facilitating consensus-building, it enables all parties involved to work towards a common goal with greater efficiency and effectiveness. This involves coordinating the interests and priorities of individual member states to develop a collective bargaining strategy that best represents the interests of the entire SACU bloc. By establishing clear procedures and mechanisms

for decision-making, the mechanism helps to avoid potential conflicts or disagreements during the negotiation process. Furthermore, the Common Negotiating Mechanism serves to enhance SACU's effectiveness and efficiency in negotiating trade agreements with third parties. By centralizing the negotiation process and pooling resources, expertise, and bargaining power, SACU can present a stronger and more coherent offer to potential trading partners. This increases the likelihood of achieving favorable outcomes and securing beneficial trade terms for SACU member states and the broader SADC region.

It's worth noting that the mechanism's establishment demonstrates SACU's dedication to advancing economic cooperation within the SADC. By engaging in collective negotiations and harmonizing trade policies and positions, SACU contributes to the main objective of deepening economic integration and enhancing intra-regional trade within Southern Africa. This aligns with the SADC's Free Trade Area primary objectives and other regional integration initiatives aimed at fostering sustainable economic development and prosperity.

Since the 2002 Agreement came into effect, SACU has concluded an FTA with the EFTA nations, a preferential trade agreement with MERCOSUR, and a Trade, Investment, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TIDCA) with the USA.

However, the SACU and SADC institutions, despite having identical goals, have been struggling to coexist in the Southern African region. This has caused significant obstacles for the SADC regional integration project, as member states are divided between these two institutions. Moreover, the fact that SACU members are not permitted to enter into new trade agreements with third parties has repeatedly been violated, which poses a threat to the overall stability of the regional integration project.

In addition, SACU and SADC have always been closely intertwined. However, the EU has taken advantage of this close relationship by negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with SACU member states individually, causing a rift within the SADC. Unfortunately, SACU's decision to negotiate independently without

using SADC as a principle economic organization in the region has not only contributed to the division of the SADC area but also weakened its economic bloc<sup>273</sup>.

It has been suggested by Professor Jephias Mapuva that the European Union (EU) is behind a move to divide the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)<sup>274</sup>. This view is supported by Brendan Vickers, who argues that the smaller countries in the region have limited bargaining power to influence the negotiation process and the outcome. The negotiations have resulted in the splitting of SADC into four separate trade regimes with the EU. This is due to the significant power imbalances between the EU and African nations<sup>275</sup>.

This situation has had an adverse effect on the SADC regional integration agenda. The divisions among SACU members have resulted in each member having a different external tariff, which has weakened the prospects of deeper regional integration<sup>276</sup>. The creation of a common market, a monetary union, or a stronger customs union seems like a distant dream. The SACU officials have proposed that the SACU should be given the responsibility for handling matters related to regional economic integration, but there has been a debate about whether the SADC or the SACU should lead the efforts<sup>277</sup>. The ongoing struggle for dominance between SACU and SADC has further thwarted the region's integration efforts. It's alarming to note that the two organizations can't agree on important policy issues like managing economic issues or leading regional integration<sup>278</sup>. It's crucial that SACU and SADC work

---

<sup>273</sup> *Mapuva J.* "Unpacking Regional Economic Integration Challenges Bedevilling the SADC Regional Grouping: A Synopsis" *Developing Country Studies*, 2013. Vol 3, No 13. P. 95-102.

<sup>274</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>275</sup> *Vickers B.* 'Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Small States in the EU-SADC EPA Negotiations' *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 2011. Vol. 100. № 413.187 p.

<sup>276</sup> *Mapuva J.* "Unpacking Regional Economic Integration Challenges Bedevilling the SADC Regional Grouping: A Synopsis" *Developing Country Studies*, 2013. Vol 3, No 13. P. 95-102.

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid.*

together to overcome their differences and work towards a common goal of deeper regional integration.

In conclusion SACU is an indispensable cornerstone of economic development in the region. Its customs union arrangement and institutional framework promote trade facilitation, industrialization, and economic development among its member states. SACU continues to play a pivotal role in fostering regional integration and advancing the collective interests of its member countries. As a result, it has emerged as a crucial driver of economic growth and prosperity in the region.

## **2.2 The Economic Harmonization within the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)**

The establishment of COMESA is a testament to the strong sense of optimism and solidarity among newly independent African nations in the mid-1960s. These countries shared a common vision of pan-African unity and collective self-reliance, driven by their aspirations for development and prosperity<sup>279</sup>. As a result, the idea of regional economic cooperation gained momentum, with the ultimate goal of harnessing the region's vast resources and potential for mutual benefit.

In 1965, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) organized a crucial meeting in Lusaka, Zambia. The meeting brought together newly independent states from Eastern and Southern Africa to explore ways of promoting sub-regional economic integration and cooperation<sup>280</sup>. The participants recognized the immense potential benefits of closer economic ties and cooperation, and as a result, they

---

<sup>279</sup> *Gondwe M.* From PTA To COMESA: the Quest For Sub-Regional Economic Integration in Eastern and Southern Africa // *African Yearbook of International Law Online / Annuaire Africain de droit international Online*. Brill, 1998. Vol. 6. № 1. P. 3.

<sup>280</sup> The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa: Achievements, Problems and Prospects. *Africa Spectrum*, 1989. Vol. 24., № 2. P. 157. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40174356>. Accessed 11 Apr. 2024.

enthusiastically endorsed the establishment of an Economic Community of Eastern and Central African states (ECCAS)<sup>281</sup>.

The establishment of ECCAS was a momentous decision, driven by the collective commitment of member states to foster regional integration and enhance economic cooperation. By pooling their resources and harmonizing policies, ECCAS aimed to unlock the region's vast economic potential and accelerate development efforts<sup>282</sup>. The proposed community was envisioned as a powerful platform for promoting sustainable growth, reducing economic disparities, and improving the livelihoods of citizens across the region.

The ministerial meeting in Lusaka was a critical milestone towards achieving regional economic integration in Eastern and Southern Africa. Although ECCAS did not come to fruition as initially planned, the discussions and recommendations laid the groundwork for future initiatives aimed at closer economic ties and collaboration within the region<sup>283</sup>. Ultimately, the post-independence period's spirit of pan-African solidarity and collective self-reliance continues to inspire efforts towards regional integration and cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa, as demonstrated by the establishment of COMESA and other regional organizations<sup>284</sup>.

The establishment of an Interim Council of Ministers following the ministerial meeting in Lusaka in 1965 marked a significant milestone towards the creation of a regional economic community. Comprised of representatives from participating countries, the council was entrusted with the crucial responsibility of coordinating efforts to negotiate a treaty that would provide the framework for economic cooperation

---

<sup>281</sup> The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa: Achievements, Problems and Prospects. *Africa Spectrum*, 1989. Vol. 24., № 2. P. 157. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40174356>. Accessed 11 Apr. 2024.

<sup>282</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>284</sup> *Hall S.* The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern African states: strategy, progress, and problems. Working paper no. 453, Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, 1987. <http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/1312>.

and integration in the region. This momentous step paved the way for a prosperous future of shared prosperity and growth, and it is a tribute to the foresight and dedication of the participating nations.

In addition to the Interim Council of Ministers, an Interim Economic Committee comprising officials from member states was appointed to support the negotiation process. This committee played a vital role in providing technical expertise and guidance on economic matters, assisting the council in formulating policies and strategies for regional economic cooperation. Together, the Interim Council of Ministers and the Interim Economic Committee worked collaboratively to advance the objectives of the proposed economic community and lay the groundwork for its establishment<sup>285</sup>.

The establishment of these interim bodies underscored the commitment of participating countries to expedite the process of regional integration and cooperation. Recognizing the importance of swift action in harnessing the region's economic potential, the interim council and committee were tasked with initiating programs and initiatives aimed at promoting economic cooperation and development pending the completion of negotiations on the treaty.

These interim arrangements also provided a platform for member states to engage in dialogue, exchange ideas, and build consensus on key issues related to regional economic integration. By facilitating communication and collaboration among stakeholders, the interim council and committee played a crucial role in fostering trust and cooperation among participating countries, laying the foundation for future cooperation within the region<sup>286</sup>.

---

<sup>285</sup> *Hall S.* The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern African states: strategy, progress, and problems. Working paper no. 453, Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, 1987. <http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/1312>.

<sup>286</sup> *Nkapnwo F.C.* "Politics and Pan-Africanism: Diplomacy, Regional Economies and Peace-Building in Contemporary Africa." *African Studies Quarterly*, 2021.vol. 20. №. 3. P. 1.

In 1978, during a gathering of Ministers of Trade, Finance, and Planning in Lusaka, a pivotal recommendation was made to establish a sub-regional economic community in Eastern and Southern Africa. This proposal was initiated with the creation of a sub-regional preferential trade area, intended to gradually evolve into a common market over a ten-year period, culminating in the establishment of the envisioned community. To formalize this commitment, the meeting adopted the "Lusaka Declaration of Intent and Commitment to the Establishment of a Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa" (PTA)<sup>287</sup>.

The adoption of the Lusaka Declaration signaled a significant step towards regional economic integration, as it outlined the framework and objectives for the establishment of the PTA<sup>288</sup>. The declaration affirmed the participating countries' commitment to fostering closer economic cooperation and liberalizing trade within the region, recognizing the potential benefits of enhanced regional integration for economic growth and development.

In addition to adopting the Lusaka Declaration, the meeting in Lusaka also established an Inter-governmental Negotiating Team tasked with drafting the treaty for the establishment of the PTA. This team was composed of representatives from member states and was entrusted with the responsibility of negotiating the terms and provisions of the treaty, including trade preferences, tariff reductions, and other measures aimed at promoting intra-regional trade and economic cooperation.

Furthermore, the meeting agreed on an indicative timetable for the work of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Team, outlining key milestones and deadlines for the negotiation process. This timetable provided a clear roadmap for the negotiations, ensuring that progress would be made in a timely manner and that the objectives outlined in the Lusaka Declaration would be achieved within the stipulated timeframe.

---

<sup>287</sup> *Nkapnwo F.C.* "Politics and Pan-Africanism: Diplomacy, Regional Economies and Peace-Building in Contemporary Africa." *African Studies Quarterly*, 2021.vol. 20. №. 3. P. 1.

<sup>288</sup> *Eastern and Southern African States: Treaty for the Establishment of a Preferential Trade Area* // International Legal Materials. Cambridge University Press (CUP), 1982. Vol. 21, № 3. P. 479–541.

After the completion of preparatory work, a pivotal meeting of Heads of State and Government was convened in Lusaka on 21st December 1981. During this historic gathering, the Treaty establishing the PTA was signed, marking a significant milestone in the region's journey towards economic integration<sup>289</sup>. The signing of the treaty represented the culmination of years of negotiations and collaborative efforts aimed at promoting closer economic cooperation and trade liberalization within Eastern and Southern Africa.

The Treaty establishing the PTA outlined the legal framework and provisions for the establishment and operation of the regional preferential trade area<sup>290</sup>. It delineated the rights and obligations of member states, including provisions related to trade preferences, tariff reductions, and mechanisms for resolving disputes. Additionally, the treaty articulated the objectives and principles guiding the PTA, emphasizing the promotion of regional trade, economic development, and integration<sup>291</sup>.

Following the signing of the Treaty, the ratification process commenced, as outlined in Article 50 of the Treaty. According to this provision, the Treaty would come into force once it had been ratified by more than seven signatory states. This ratification process involved formal approval by the respective national legislative bodies or executive authorities of participating countries, affirming their commitment to the objectives and provisions of the PTA<sup>292</sup>.

On 30th September 1982, the Treaty establishing the PTA officially came into force after meeting the ratification threshold stipulated in Article 50<sup>293</sup>. With the ratification of the Treaty by more than seven signatory states, the legal framework for the operation of the regional preferential trade area was formally established, paving

---

<sup>289</sup> *Shacinda S.* COMESA - Africa's first free trade area // Review of African Political Economy. Review of African Political Economy, 2001. Vol. 28. № 87. P. 121.

<sup>290</sup> Eastern and Southern African States: Treaty for the Establishment of a Preferential Trade Area // International Legal Materials. Cambridge University Press (CUP), 1982. Vol. 21, № 3. P. 479–541

<sup>291</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>292</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>293</sup> *Ibid.*



the way for the implementation of trade liberalization measures and cooperation initiatives outlined in the Treaty.

The entry into force of the PTA Treaty marked the beginning of a new chapter in regional economic integration in Eastern and Southern Africa. It provided a solid foundation for advancing the objectives of the PTA and fostering deeper economic cooperation and integration among member states. Through the implementation of trade facilitation measures and collaborative initiatives, the PTA aimed to promote sustainable economic growth, enhance intra-regional trade, and improve the livelihoods of the region's citizens<sup>294</sup>.

Since its establishment, the PTA has made significant strides in trade harmonization within Eastern and Southern Africa. One of the key achievements of the PTA has been the reduction of tariffs and trade barriers among member states. Through negotiated agreements and trade preferences outlined in the PTA Treaty, participating countries have gradually lowered tariffs on goods traded within the region. This tariff reduction has facilitated increased intra-regional trade by making products more affordable and competitive, thus promoting economic growth and development<sup>295</sup>.

Furthermore, the PTA has played a pivotal role in promoting trade facilitation measures and harmonizing customs procedures among member states. By streamlining customs processes and reducing bureaucratic hurdles, the PTA has facilitated smoother and more efficient cross-border trade within the region. This has led to reduced trade transaction costs, faster clearance times, and improved predictability for businesses, thereby enhancing the overall competitiveness of regional trade<sup>296</sup>.

---

<sup>294</sup> *Hall S.* The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern African states: strategy, progress, and problems. Working paper, 1987. №. 453, Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi URL:<http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/1312> (date of access: 30.09.2023).

<sup>295</sup> *Gondwe M.* "From PTA to COMESA: The quest for sub-regional economic integration in eastern and southern Africa." *African Yearbook of International Law*, 1999. vol. 6. P. 10.

<sup>296</sup> *Ibid.*

The PTA had also been instrumental in promoting the alignment of trade policies and regulations among member states. Through the adoption of common standards and regulations, as well as the harmonization of trade policies, the PTA has created a more predictable and transparent trading environment within the region. This alignment of policies has reduced trade barriers arising from divergent regulatory frameworks and facilitated greater market access for businesses operating across borders.

Moreover, the PTA had fostered closer economic cooperation and integration among member states through the establishment of regional institutions and mechanisms for trade facilitation. Institutions such as the PTA Secretariat have played a vital role in coordinating efforts to promote trade harmonization and resolve trade-related disputes. Additionally, the PTA has facilitated the exchange of information and best practices among member states, fostering learning and capacity building in areas such as trade policy formulation and implementation<sup>297</sup>.

However, the PTA encountered numerous challenges in its early years, particularly stemming from economic policies prevalent in member states up until the late 1980s and early 1990s. During this period, many PTA countries adhered to state-centric economic systems characterized by extensive government intervention in production, distribution, and marketing activities. This approach emphasized import substitution and subsidized consumption, effectively sidelining the private sector and impeding its potential to drive economic growth.

The consequences of these policies were profound and far-reaching, contributing significantly to the economic decline observed within the PTA region. By the mid-1990s, a series of alarming indicators highlighted the severity of the situation. Gross domestic investment had dwindled consistently for two decades, falling below the minimum threshold necessary to cover depreciation and repair costs. Foreign direct

---

<sup>297</sup> Nagar D.I. The politics and economics of regional integration in Africa: a comparative study of COMESA and SADC, 1980-2015. University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2016. P. 117-118. Available at: <https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/f3e193ee-9718-4880-8136-a1d91e0b1e4a/content> (date of access: 30.09.2023).

investment (FDI) in Africa remained negligible, representing a mere fraction of GDP and global FDI flows. Moreover, the region's share of exports in world trade had plummeted, exacerbating its economic vulnerability<sup>298</sup>.

The PTA region also grappled with a mounting external debt burden, which had ballooned twenty-fold since 1970<sup>299</sup>. Debt service ratios soared, consuming a significant portion of export earnings and rendering the region heavily indebted. These economic challenges were compounded by structural rigidities, inadequate access to advanced technologies, and deficient institutional and physical infrastructure. Despite modest growth in industrial output during the 1960s and 1970s, the region experienced a sharp decline due to these entrenched issues.

The cumulative effect of these challenges was evident in the economic growth trajectory of the PTA region. Despite averaging a 3.2% annual growth rate from 1960 to the mid-1990s, this growth was largely stagnant, barely exceeding the rate of population growth<sup>300</sup>. By 1993, the region, home to approximately 280 million people (excluding Egypt), had a total GDP of around US\$90 billion<sup>301</sup>. Alarming, fifteen of the twenty-three states within PTA were classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) by the United Nations, underscoring the extent of economic hardship and developmental challenges faced by the region<sup>302</sup>.

The transition from the PTA to the COMESA in 1993 marked a significant turning point in the trade sector of Eastern and Southern Africa. The PTA had served as a foundational framework for promoting trade liberalization and economic cooperation among member states. However, as regional dynamics evolved and

---

<sup>298</sup> *Nagar D.I.* The politics and economics of regional integration in Africa: a comparative study of COMESA and SADC, 1980-2015. University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2016. P. 117-118. Available at: <https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/f3e193ee-9718-4880-8136-a1d91e0b1e4a/content> (date of access: 30.09.2023).

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>300</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>301</sup> COMESA.URL: <http://www.comesa.int>. (date of access: 30.09.2023).

<sup>302</sup> *Ibid.*

member states sought deeper integration, it became apparent that a more comprehensive and ambitious framework was needed to address the evolving needs and aspirations of the region.

The PTA Treaty, signed in 1981, had initially envisioned its transformation into a common market, reflecting the long-term vision of member states for closer economic integration. In line with this vision, the Treaty establishing COMESA was signed on 5th November 1993 in Kampala, Uganda. This landmark agreement laid the groundwork for the establishment of a more advanced regional economic community that would go beyond preferential trade arrangements to encompass broader objectives such as the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor.

The decision to replace the PTA with COMESA was driven by several factors. Firstly, the PTA subsequent transformation into the COMESA were consistent with the broader objectives outlined in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL) of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, later transformed into the African Union)<sup>303</sup>. Both the LPA and the FAL articulated a vision for the economic integration of the African continent, recognizing the importance of regional economic communities as building blocks towards the creation of an African Economic Community (AEC)<sup>304</sup>.

The Lagos Plan of Action, adopted by the OAU in 1980, outlined a comprehensive strategy for the economic development of Africa. Central to the LPA was the recognition of regional economic integration as a key driver of economic growth and development. The plan emphasized the need for African countries to establish regional economic communities to promote intra-regional trade, industrialization, and economic diversification. These regional communities were

---

<sup>303</sup> Sonu T. "African Unity: The Move Forward." *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, vol. 13, no. 1, 2009, pp. 12–30. *JSTOR*, URL:<https://www.jstor.org/stable/48505468> (date of access: 30.09.2023).

<sup>304</sup> Ibid.

envisaged as stepping stones towards the eventual establishment of a continent-wide African Economic Community<sup>305</sup>.

Similarly, the Final Act of Lagos, adopted in 1980, reiterated the importance of regional integration as a means to accelerate economic development and achieve economic self-reliance. The FAL emphasized the need for African countries to pool their resources and coordinate their economic policies to overcome the challenges of underdevelopment and dependency<sup>306</sup>. It envisioned regional economic communities as platforms for fostering closer economic cooperation and integration among member states, with the ultimate goal of achieving continental unity and integration.

In this context, the establishment of the PTA and its evolution into COMESA can be seen as concrete manifestations of the principles and objectives outlined in the LPA and the FAL. By forming regional economic communities, Eastern and Southern African countries took proactive steps towards implementing the vision of continental economic integration advocated by the OAU<sup>307</sup>. The PTA and COMESA served as important building blocks in the gradual process of regional integration, laying the groundwork for closer economic cooperation and paving the way for the eventual realization of the African Economic Community.

While PTA's primary focus was to promote preferential trade among member states, COMESA was established with broader objectives. Apart from promoting trade, COMESA aims to facilitate investment, industrialization, infrastructure development, and economic diversification. Therefore, COMESA's establishment has proven to be a game-changer for the region, and it has opened new doors of opportunities for member states to grow and thrive.

---

<sup>305</sup> *Sonu T.* "African Unity: The Move Forward." *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, vol. 13, no. 1, 2009, pp. 12–30. *JSTOR*, URL:<https://www.jstor.org/stable/48505468> (date of access: 30.09.2023).

<sup>306</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>307</sup> *Ibid.*

The PTA lacked robust institutional mechanisms to effectively implement its objectives and resolve disputes among member states. In contrast, COMESA was designed with stronger institutions and decision-making structures to enhance cooperation, coordination, and integration efforts. This institutional strengthening was crucial for overcoming implementation challenges and guaranteeing the smooth operation of the community.

COMESA aimed to align trade facilitation measures, regulatory frameworks, and policies among member states. By harmonizing regulations, customs procedures, technical standards, and trade policies, COMESA aimed to reduce trade obstacles and enhance cross-border commerce<sup>308</sup>. The organization's emphasis on policy coherence and coordination is a critical step towards achieving economic development.

Furthermore, the slow progress towards achieving a free trade zone for COMESA and SADC member states had a significant impact on their economies. Despite the goal to enhance specialization, remove obstacles, and encourage non-discriminatory behavior, the implementation of tariffs by SADC member states in accordance with SADC FTA protocols had caused trade diversion or generation for COMESA member states<sup>309</sup>. Moreover, the ratification of the Lomé Convention and other international agreements by COMESA member states badly influenced fragile economies within the blocs<sup>310</sup>. To overcome these obstacles, it was crucial to eliminate all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade among member nations within the regional grouping.

The COMESA member states adopted a state-led market model that seemed promising. They constructed high tariff walls, fortified by state subsidies, grants, and

---

<sup>308</sup> *Gondwe M.* "From PTA to COMESA: The quest for sub-regional economic integration in eastern and southern Africa." *African Yearbook of International Law*, 1999. vol. 6. P. 10

<sup>309</sup> *Nagar D.I.* *The politics and economics of regional integration in Africa: a comparative study of COMESA and SADC, 1980-2015.* University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2016. P. 117-118. Available at: <https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/f3e193ee-9718-4880-8136-a1d91e0b1e4a/content> (date of access: 30.09.2023).

<sup>310</sup> *Ibid.*

protection from foreign competition<sup>311</sup>. Unfortunately, the industries of these countries were uncompetitive, produced low-quality commodities without any significant foreign investment and failed to achieve economies of scale<sup>312</sup>. The apartheid South African administration also played a role in the slow growth of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, and Angola. This led to increased borrowing levels, but the states did not receive enough foreign investment to support them<sup>313</sup>.

The COMESA countries achieved a significant milestone in 1993 by gradually reducing and ultimately eliminating customs charges and non-trade barriers. This was made possible through the adoption of a common list of commodities, which saw tariffs reduced by 25% every two years between 1 October 1986 and 29 September 1992<sup>314</sup>. Although not all member states accomplished this goal, the 25% reduction target was subsequently lowered to 10% in 1987, resulting in a remarkable 50% reduction in tariffs by 1996. The remaining 50% reduction was scheduled in two stages: first by 20% in 1998 and then by 30% in 2000<sup>315</sup>. This achievement showcases the dedication and commitment of the COMESA member nations towards promoting trade and fostering economic growth in the region.

In addition, the COMESA common list had been known to impose non-tariff barriers such as quantitative limits, export and import licensing, foreign exchange licensing, and import service requirements<sup>316</sup>. However, member states always had the freedom to negotiate and maintain their own system of trade restrictions against non-members, which has allowed them to maintain their own set of tariff rates<sup>317</sup>. This has

---

<sup>311</sup> *Nagar D.I.* The politics and economics of regional integration in Africa: a comparative study of COMESA and SADC, 1980-2015. University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2016. P. 117-118. Available at: <https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/f3e193ee-9718-4880-8136-a1d91e0b1e4a/content> (date of access: 30.09.2023).

<sup>312</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>314</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>315</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>316</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>317</sup> *Gondwe M.* "From PTA to COMESA: The quest for sub-regional economic integration in eastern and southern Africa." *African Yearbook of International Law*, 1999. Vol. 6. P. 10

been especially beneficial for smaller members with fledgling industries that require support. For instance, Kenya and Uganda took a step towards a common external tariff by agreeing to a rate of 0,5%, 15%, and 30%<sup>318</sup>. This move prevents COMESA from implementing its own common external tariff and is a positive step towards greater economic cooperation between member states.

Beyond trade liberalization, COMESA sought to deepen regional integration by fostering cooperation in key economic sectors such as agriculture, industry, services, and infrastructure development. The establishment of COMESA signaled a commitment to addressing broader development challenges faced by member states and promoting inclusive and sustainable economic growth across the region.

It worth noting, that the call to replace the PTA with COMESA also reflected broader global trends towards regional economic integration. In an increasingly interconnected world economy, regional economic communities have emerged as important platforms for enhancing competitiveness, facilitating trade, and attracting investment. By forming COMESA, Eastern and Southern African countries aimed to strengthen their collective bargaining power in global trade negotiations and enhance their resilience to external shocks and challenges.

In general, the replacement of the PTA with the COMESA in 1993 was a strategic move towards achieving deeper and wider regional integration. This change was brought about by the need to overcome economic challenges, profit from worldwide economic development as well as boost institutional capacity. COMESA ushered in a new era of economic cooperation, development, and prosperity in the Eastern and Southern Africa region. It was a step towards a brighter and more promising future for all the countries in the region.

---

<sup>318</sup> *Nagar D.I.* The politics and economics of regional integration in Africa: a comparative study of COMESA and SADC, 1980-2015. University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2016. P. 117-118. Available at: <https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/f3e193ee-9718-4880-8136-a1d91e0b1e4a/content> (date of access: 30.09.2023).



Over the years, from 1993 to 2023, COMESA has faced various challenges and seized opportunities in its efforts to pursue economic harmonization and promote regional development. With unwavering commitment and dedication to this goal, COMESA has made impressive strides, and the benefits of its efforts are felt across the region<sup>319</sup>.

The establishment of the COMESA FTA in 2000 was a groundbreaking moment in the economic integration efforts of Eastern and Southern Africa. By eliminating tariffs on goods traded within the region, the FTA aimed to create a more favorable environment for trade and investment among member states<sup>320</sup>. With the ambitious goal of strengthening regional cooperation, expanding market access, and promoting economic growth across COMESA countries, this initiative represented a crucial step towards a more prosperous future for the region. By joining forces and working towards a common goal, COMESA countries can unlock their full potential and achieve greater prosperity and stability for their citizens.

At its core, the COMESA FTA was a game-changer for intra-regional trade. With the removal of barriers to the movement of goods, member states were able to eliminate tariffs, making their products more competitive within the regional market<sup>321</sup>. This move had a significant impact on industries with comparative advantages in specific member states, providing them with expanded access to a larger consumer base without the burden of tariff-related costs<sup>322</sup>. The result was a boost in trade flows and the

---

<sup>319</sup> *Nagar D.I.* The politics and economics of regional integration in Africa: a comparative study of COMESA and SADC, 1980-2015. University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2016. P. 117-118. Available at: <https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/f3e193ee-9718-4880-8136-a1d91e0b1e4a/content> (date of access: 30.09.2023).

<sup>320</sup> *Elshain Yahia Y.* The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Free Trade Area (FTA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Nexus // *Journal of Asian Business Strategy*. Asian Economic and Social Society, 2019. Vol. 9, № 2. P. 261–286.

<sup>321</sup> *Gondwe G.* Regional Integration and Trade: The Case of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Free Trade Area // *Journal of African Trade*. African Export Import Bank, 2021. Vol. 8. № 1. P. 1.

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*

diversification of export opportunities. The COMESA FTA was a smart move for any member state looking to expand its reach and grow its economy.

The FTA established among the member states of the COMESA also signaled a strong commitment to achieving a more profound economic integration. The FTA exceeded the mere elimination of tariffs and aimed to harmonize trade-related policies and regulations across borders to facilitate smoother cross-border trade<sup>323</sup>. This included standardizing customs procedures, simplifying documentation requirements, and enhancing cooperation on trade facilitation measures. The initiatives were crucial in reducing the administrative burden on businesses and promoting a more seamless flow of goods within the region<sup>324</sup>. By enhancing cross-border trade, the FTA is set to boost economic growth and improve the livelihoods of the people within the region.

The COMESA FTA was a strategic move in response to the changing dynamics of global trade. As globalization picked up pace and regional trading blocs emerged, COMESA realized the importance of positioning itself competitively in the global marketplace<sup>325</sup>. The FTA aimed to bring member states closer together to enhance their collective bargaining power in international trade negotiations and promote a more unified voice on key economic issues affecting the region<sup>326</sup>. By fostering deeper economic ties among its members, COMESA aimed to strengthen its position on the world stage and ensure that the region's interests were better represented in global trade talks.

Despite concerted efforts to advance trade integration within the COMESA, persistent challenges have hampered the full realization of its objectives. Bureaucratic

---

<sup>323</sup> *Gondwe G.* Regional Integration and Trade: The Case of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Free Trade Area // *Journal of African Trade*. African Export Import Bank, 2021. Vol. 8. № 1. P. 1.

<sup>324</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>325</sup> *Nagar D.I.* The politics and economics of regional integration in Africa: a comparative study of COMESA and SADC, 1980-2015. University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2016. P. 117-118. Available at: <https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/f3e193ee-9718-4880-8136-a1d91e0b1e4a/content> (date of access: 30.09.2023).

<sup>326</sup> *Ibid.*

red tape, characterized by complex administrative procedures and regulatory requirements, has remained a significant barrier to seamless trade within the region<sup>327</sup>. Cumbersome paperwork, multiple inspections, and opaque clearance processes have increased transaction costs for businesses, eroding the efficiency gains expected from tariff reductions under the COMESA FTA<sup>328</sup>.

COMESA has made admirable efforts to promote trade integration, but it still faces persistent challenges. Bureaucratic red tape, complex administrative procedures, and regulatory requirements have continued to hinder the realization of COMESA's objectives<sup>329</sup>. Cumbersome paperwork, multiple inspections, and opaque clearance processes have increased transaction costs for businesses, eroding the efficiency gains expected from tariff reductions under the COMESA FTA<sup>330</sup>.

In addition to bureaucratic hurdles, insufficient transportation networks, congested border crossings and poor connectivity result in delays and increased costs for traders<sup>331</sup>. The lack of modern infrastructure, including roads, railways, and ports, hinders the timely movement of goods and services, constraining the competitiveness of businesses within the region<sup>332</sup>. To fully unlock the potential of the COMESA FTA and facilitate smoother trade flows, it is crucial to address infrastructure deficits and improve transportation systems.

The current divergent regulatory frameworks, varying standards, and inconsistent enforcement of rules across member states create complexity and

---

<sup>327</sup> *Balistreri E.J., Tarr D.G., Yonezawa H.* Deep Integration in Eastern and Southern Africa: What are the Stakes? // *Journal of African Economies*. Oxford University Press (OUP), 2015. Vol. 24, № 5. P. 677–706.

<sup>328</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>329</sup> *Geda A., Kebret H.* Regional Economic Integration in Africa: A Review of Problems and Prospects with a Case Study of COMESA // *Journal of African Economies*. Oxford University Press (OUP), 2007. Vol. 17, № 3. P. 358.

<sup>330</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>331</sup> *Nagar D.I.* The politics and economics of regional integration in Africa: a comparative study of COMESA and SADC, 1980-2015. University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2016. p. 117-118. Available at: <https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/f3e193ee-9718-4880-8136-a1d91e0b1e4a/content> (date of access: 30.09.2023).

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.*

uncertainty for businesses operating across borders. Harmonizing regulations, aligning standards, and enhancing regulatory cooperation are crucial steps to reduce trade barriers and establish a more favorable business environment in the region. Let's work together to simplify trade and create new opportunities for businesses and individuals in COMESA.

COMESA's efforts to promote investment and industrial development within the region have been underscored by various initiatives aimed at attracting investment and fostering industrialization<sup>333</sup>. One such initiative has been the establishment of investment promotion agencies (IPAs) across member states<sup>334</sup>. These agencies play a crucial role in promoting the region as an attractive investment destination, providing information, assistance, and incentives to prospective investors<sup>335</sup>. For example, the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) in Zambia and the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) in Ethiopia are among the IPAs that actively promote investment opportunities and facilitate investment processes within COMESA.

In addition to IPA initiatives, COMESA has also worked towards the development of industrial policies aimed at promoting sustainable industrialization and economic diversification. These policies outline strategies and measures to support the growth of key industries, enhance competitiveness, and create employment opportunities. For instance, the Industrialization Strategy and Roadmap 2015-2035 developed by COMESA outlines priority sectors for industrial development, including agro-processing, manufacturing, and renewable energy, among others.

---

<sup>333</sup> *Kitonyo P., Kathanje M., Kiriti-Ng.* Growth Impact of Foreign Direct Investment in the COMESA Region: Does Infrastructure Development Matter? // *Current Research Journal of Economic Theory*. Maxwell Scientific Publication Corp., 2019. Vol. 11. № 1. P. 1–11.

<sup>334</sup> *Meressa H.A.* Determinants of foreign direct investment inflows to COMESA member countries: an integration of institutional and socio-economic factors // *Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship*. Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2022. Vol. 11, № 1. P.68.

<sup>335</sup> *Njoroge L.* Capital Inflows and Economic Growth in Selected COMESA Member Countries // *Journal of Finance and Investment Analysis*. Scientific Press International Limited, 2021. P. 25–50.

However, despite these efforts, several challenges have hindered the realization of COMESA's investment and industrial development objectives. Limited access to finance remains a significant barrier for businesses seeking to invest and expand operations within the region<sup>336</sup>. Access to affordable credit, venture capital, and other forms of financing is crucial for stimulating investment and fostering entrepreneurship. Addressing this challenge requires concerted efforts to strengthen financial institutions, improve access to credit, and promote innovative financing mechanisms tailored to the needs of businesses in COMESA member states<sup>337</sup>.

Infrastructure development has indeed been a central pillar of COMESA's strategy for economic harmonization and regional integration<sup>338</sup>. Recognizing the pivotal role that efficient transportation networks, reliable energy infrastructure, and robust telecommunications systems play in facilitating trade and fostering economic growth, COMESA has prioritized investments in infrastructure projects aimed at improving connectivity and reducing trade costs across member states<sup>339</sup>.

One notable initiative supported by COMESA is the North-South Corridor project. This ambitious infrastructure program seeks to establish a seamless transportation network connecting the southern and eastern regions of Africa, from South Africa to Tanzania<sup>340</sup>. The corridor encompasses road, rail, and port infrastructure, with the aim of enhancing connectivity, reducing transit times, and lowering transportation costs for goods moving within and across COMESA member

---

<sup>336</sup> *Baruti R.* Investment Facilitation in Regional Economic Integration in Africa: The Cases of COMESA, EAC and SADC // *The Journal of World Investment & Trade*. Brill, 2017. Vol. 18, № 3. P. 495.

<sup>337</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>338</sup> *Gondwe G., Mbonigaba J.* Foreign Aid and Economic Infrastructure in the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) // *Journal of the Knowledge Economy*. Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2022. Vol. 14, № 3. P. 3072.

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>340</sup> COMESA IN BRIEF: Growing Together, for Prosperity. Lusaka, 2018. P. 1-44. URL:[https://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/COMESA-in-brief-FINAL-\\_web.pdf](https://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/COMESA-in-brief-FINAL-_web.pdf) (date of access: 10.10.2023).

states<sup>341</sup>. Despite facing challenges such as funding constraints, land acquisition issues, and regulatory hurdles, progress has been made in various segments of the corridor, contributing to improved regional connectivity and trade facilitation.

Furthermore, COMESA has championed the establishment of the Eastern Africa Power Pool (EAPP) as part of its efforts to address energy infrastructure challenges within the region<sup>342</sup>. The EAPP aims to promote regional cooperation in the development and management of energy resources, including electricity generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure<sup>343</sup>. By facilitating cross-border electricity trade and promoting the development of renewable energy resources, the EAPP seeks to enhance energy security, improve access to electricity, and stimulate economic development across COMESA countries. However, implementation challenges, including financing constraints, regulatory barriers, and technical constraints, have slowed progress in fully realizing the potential benefits of the EAPP<sup>344</sup>.

Despite the achievements and ongoing efforts in infrastructure development, COMESA faces various implementation challenges and hurdles. These include financing constraints, bureaucratic bottlenecks, regulatory barriers, and coordination challenges among member states<sup>345</sup>. Additionally, infrastructure projects often require significant long-term investment commitments, making them susceptible to political, economic, and institutional uncertainties<sup>346</sup>.

Addressing these challenges requires sustained commitment and collaboration among COMESA member states, regional institutions, development partners, and the

---

<sup>341</sup> COMESA IN BRIEF: Growing Together, for Prosperity. Lusaka, 2018. P. 1-44. URL:[https://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/COMESA-in-brief-FINAL-\\_web.pdf](https://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/COMESA-in-brief-FINAL-_web.pdf) (date of access: 10.10.2023).

<sup>342</sup> Ibid.

<sup>343</sup> Ibid.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid.

<sup>345</sup> *Nagar D.I.* The politics and economics of regional integration in Africa: a comparative study of COMESA and SADC, 1980-2015. University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2016. P. 117-118. Available at: <https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/f3e193ee-9718-4880-8136-a1d91e0b1e4a/content> (date of access: 30.09.2023).

<sup>346</sup> Ibid.

private sector<sup>347</sup>. Strengthening institutional capacity, enhancing regulatory frameworks, mobilizing financing, and promoting public-private partnerships are essential strategies to overcome implementation challenges and accelerate progress in infrastructure development within COMESA. By investing in strategic infrastructure projects and addressing infrastructure deficits, COMESA can unlock the full potential of regional integration, promote sustainable economic growth, and improve the livelihoods of its citizens across member states<sup>348</sup>.

Institutional strengthening has also been a critical aspect of COMESA's efforts to promote economic harmonization<sup>349</sup>. Over the years, COMESA has worked to strengthen its institutional framework and governance structures to enhance its capacity to implement and monitor regional integration initiatives effectively<sup>350</sup>. However, institutional capacity constraints and governance issues have sometimes hampered the organization's ability to achieve its objectives fully.

In conclusion, looking ahead, COMESA faces the challenge of addressing persisting barriers to economic harmonization while seizing opportunities presented by globalization and technological advancements. Continued efforts to reduce trade barriers, enhance infrastructure connectivity, and strengthen institutional capacity will be crucial for unlocking the full potential of economic integration within the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa.

---

<sup>347</sup> *Nagar D.I.* The politics and economics of regional integration in Africa: a comparative study of COMESA and SADC, 1980-2015. University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2016. P. 117-118. Available at: <https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/f3e193ee-9718-4880-8136-a1d91e0b1e4a/content> (date of access: 30.09.2023).

<sup>348</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>349</sup> *Meressa H.A.* Determinants of foreign direct investment inflows to COMESA member countries: an integration of institutional and socio-economic factors // *Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship*. Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2022. Vol. 11, № 1. P.68.

<sup>350</sup> *Ibid.*

### **2.3. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and its influence on the integration efforts in Southern Africa**

The AfCFTA agreement signed in March 2018 marked a landmark achievement for the African continent. With almost all African countries coming together to create the largest free trade area in the world, this historic agreement linked 55 nations and over 1.3 billion individuals, leading to a diverse and robust array of economies and populations across the continent<sup>351</sup>. This agreement has the potential to increase intercontinental trade, boost job creation, and enhance economic growth across Africa by providing an enabling environment for trade and investment<sup>352</sup>.

In addition, AfCFTA has the power to unleash Africa's economic potential by promoting trade and breaking down barriers. By unlocking the vast economic opportunities that exist within Africa, it can catalyze growth and development throughout the continent. The combined GDP of the economies covered by AfCFTA is estimated at a staggering US\$3.4 trillion<sup>353</sup>. This illustrates that immense economic opportunities lie ahead, and we can't afford to miss out on them.

The AfCFTA agreement brought a new dawn for Africa's economic integration, officially taking effect on May 30, 2019<sup>354</sup>. The ratification by 22 countries was a significant milestone, showcasing a resolute commitment to fostering closer economic cooperation and integration across the continent<sup>355</sup>. With the AfCFTA's potential to spur economic growth and development, there is no better time than now to pursue this path. The journey towards full implementation, however, requires concerted efforts and overcoming challenges that lie ahead. The map provided below offers a detailed

---

<sup>351</sup> World Bank. "The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects." Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. URL:<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ef1aa41f-60de-5bd2-a63e-75f2c3ff0f43/content> (date of access: 10.10.2023).

<sup>352</sup> Ibid.

<sup>353</sup> Ibid.

<sup>354</sup> Ibid.

<sup>355</sup> Ibid.



overview of the ratification status of member countries within AfCFTA as of October 29, 2019.



Source: World Bank study team. URL:  
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ef1aa41f-60de-5bd2-a63e-75f2c3ff0f43/content> (date of access: 12.10.2023)

To date, AfCFTA Agreement has been signed by 54 member states of the African Union (AU), with Eritrea being the only exception. With 47 countries having already ratified their instruments of the AfCFTA agreement, it is clear that the African continent

is ready to take its place on the world stage<sup>356</sup>. Although seven countries have signed but are yet to ratify the agreement, it is only a matter of time before they join in on this historic deal.

The AfCFTA is a game-changing initiative that seeks to address the long-standing issue of economic fragmentation within Africa. The continent is home to a diverse range of economies and resources, yet intra-continental trade has historically been hindered by high trade barriers, logistical challenges, and regulatory complexities<sup>357</sup>. AfCFTA is set to change this by promoting trade liberalization, harmonizing trade policies and regulations, and facilitating the movement of goods and services across borders. By doing so, AfCFTA is paving the way for a more prosperous and integrated Africa, where businesses can thrive, economies can grow, and people can prosper.

The AfCFTA is not just about enabling the transportation of goods and services. It has a much broader and more ambitious agenda. The AfCFTA aims to:

- promote industrialization and economic diversification across Africa by fostering the development of regional value chains and promoting the integration of African economies. This goal seeks to boost productivity, create jobs, and enhance the continent's global competitiveness.
- enhance the competitiveness of African businesses by creating a larger and more integrated market. By providing greater market access and reducing transaction costs, the AfCFTA seeks to stimulate investment, encourage innovation, and improve the overall business environment in Africa.

---

<sup>356</sup> World Bank. "The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects." Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. URL:<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ef1aa41f-60de-5bd2-a63e-75f2c3ff0f43/content> (date of access: 10.10.2023).

<sup>357</sup> Ibid.

- promote economic growth while preserving the environment and addressing social inequalities. By fostering inclusive and sustainable development, the AfCFTA aims to improve living standards and enhance the quality of life for all Africans.

- promote economic diversification by encouraging the development of new industries and sectors within African economies. By expanding market access and creating opportunities for trade in goods and services, the AfCFTA aims to reduce reliance on traditional exports and promote the growth of emerging sectors.

- support Small and Medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by providing access to finance, markets, and technical assistance. By empowering SMEs, the AfCFTA aims to promote inclusive growth and reduce poverty.

- facilitate cross-border investment by creating a conducive environment for investment and promoting investment flows within Africa. By harmonizing investment policies and regulations, the AfCFTA seeks to attract investment, promote infrastructure development, and spur economic growth .

- promote women's participation in trade and entrepreneurship, address gender disparities, and ensure that women benefit equitably from the opportunities created by the AfCFTA.

- provide institutional support to member states to implement the agreement effectively. This includes technical assistance, training programs, and capacity-building initiatives aimed at strengthening trade-related institutions and enhancing regulatory frameworks<sup>358</sup>.

The AfCFTA's goals can be observed as a comprehensive and ambitious agenda aimed at promoting economic integration, fostering sustainable development, and improving the livelihoods of people throughout Africa. Through these goals, the

---

<sup>358</sup> African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement.URL: [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36437-treaty-consolidated\\_text\\_on\\_cfta\\_-\\_en.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36437-treaty-consolidated_text_on_cfta_-_en.pdf) (date of access: 10.10.2023).

AfCFTA seeks to unlock the continent's vast potential and create a brighter future for all Africans.

According to Mbakiso Magwape, «AfCFTA was created to bolster intra-African trade, which has notoriously been the lowest in the world compared to other continents. The AfCFTA was established to attain increased intra-African trade by developing a continental market for goods and services, laying the foundation for a continental customs union, and resolving the spaghetti-bowl challenge within the continent....In adopting Agenda 2063, Member States undertook to fast-track the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area by 2017, and set out to establish a programme to double intra-Africa trade by 2022»<sup>359</sup>.

The AfCFTA aims to establish the ultimate African Integration Agenda, which is based on the foundation of Regional Economic Communities (RECs). By forming Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) on a large scale, RECs play a crucial role in deep integration. These agreements can serve as testing grounds for deep integration, generating numerous policies that are widely accepted. Even the initial agreements on non-tariff measures under the World Trade Organization (WTO) were the result of agreements reached by fewer nations at the Tokyo Round of negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)<sup>360</sup>. It's difficult to imagine how these and other parts of trade regulation would have evolved without these early initiatives. In this view, the coexisting existence of FTAs among smaller groups of nations can assist the AfCFTA flourish, especially when it expands to new regulatory horizons to meet the demands of a constantly changing global economy.

Furthermore, not all trade-related concerns lend themselves to pan-African collaboration. International cooperation is sometimes best effective on a bilateral or

---

<sup>359</sup> *Magwape M.* The AfCFTA and Trade Facilitation: Re-Arranging Continental Economic Integration // *Legal Issues of Economic Integration*, 2018. Vol. 45, № Issue 4. P. 355–374.  
URL:<https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Legal+Issues+of+Economic+Integration/45.4/LEIE2018021>(date of access: 10.10.2023).

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*

sub-regional basis. Countries in southern Africa, for example, may gain little benefit from discussing transport facilitation measures with those in the continent's north. Such difficulties are better addressed through sub-regional agreements rather than through the AfCFTA.

It's worth noting that this is not the only reason why regional and bilateral agreements will supplement AfCFTA's continental arrangements. This is partly due to increased political collaboration among African states on subjects ranging from human rights and disarmament to protection of natural resources.

Individual nations who are a part of the AfCFTA will be permitted to keep enforcing current free-trade agreements, but RECs that have made substantial progress in integrating will continue to follow the regulations they have established. Briefly stated, the agreement offers an African-based framework in place of the conventional WTO framework. Now that the AfCFTA is in place, nations that now trade with one another in accordance with WTO regulations will switch to doing so<sup>361</sup>.

Mbakiso Magwape notes that, « the AfCFTA uses international instruments, in particular the WTO TFA, as the target measure of trade facilitation on key issues such as release and clearance of goods, border cooperation, and publication of information. It incorporates key trade facilitation provisions from the WTO TFA with similar wording, and even allows for notification under WTO TFA without going through the AfCFTA structures. This is also an acknowledgment of the cognition of obligations of African States under international law (.....) African states have shown political will and unity in signing and implementing both the WTO TFA and the AfCFTA. The AfCFTA together with its Protocols, upon successful implementation by Member States, will have a significant impact on barriers; markets are readily accessible, thereby significantly increasing trade flows between countries. The potential of a unified, truly

---

<sup>361</sup> *Shour M.* Book Notes: The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the Gatt and the WTO, by John H. Barton, Judith L. Goldstein, Timothy E. Josling and Richard H. Steinberg // *Osgoode Hall Law Journal*, 2007. Vol. 45. № 1. P. 236.

economically integrated Africa may be a practical objective, and not just a dream. The AfCFTA has the ability to unlock intra-African trade by 52.3% »<sup>362</sup>.

This comprehensive agreement goes beyond investments, intellectual property rights, and competition legislation to create deep and comprehensive trade agreements. AfCFTA offers tremendous potential by reducing tariffs between member states and including regulatory measures like sanitary standards and technical trade barriers, as well as policy areas like trade facilitation and services<sup>363</sup>. The impact of AfCFTA will be transformative, generating growth and prosperity throughout the region. With increased output in sectors like services, manufacturing, and natural resources, AfCFTA is set to revolutionize markets and economies throughout the continent<sup>364</sup>.

Southern Africa has a rich history of participating in regional integration initiatives. From SACU to SADC and the COMESA, the region has laid the foundation for cooperation and collaboration among its member states.

The AfCFTA presents both opportunities and challenges for the region's integration efforts. With its potential to foster economic integration and development in various sectors such as trade, infrastructure, and finance, the AfCFTA is a golden opportunity that Southern Africa must seize. The region's involvement in integration initiatives has resulted in economic growth and prosperity, and the AfCFTA is the next step in this journey.

Mbakiso Magwape highlights, « The Continental FTA sparks new hope for continental integration by being the first instrument and body responsible for ‘top-down’ continental integration. This is a complete re-arrangement from the previous

---

<sup>362</sup> *Shour M.* Book Notes: The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the Gatt and the WTO, by John H. Barton, Judith L. Goldstein, Timothy E. Josling and Richard H. Steinberg // *Osgoode Hall Law Journal*, 2007. Vol. 45. № 1. P. 236.

<sup>363</sup> World Bank. "The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects." Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. URL:<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ef1aa41f-60de-5bd2-a63e-75f2c3ff0f43/content> (date of access: 10.10.2023).

<sup>364</sup> *Ibid.*

‘bottom-up’ approach. The AfCFTA requires all Member States to conform to its standards, as opposed to the previous dispensation under the AEC where RECs operated as regional bodies »<sup>365</sup>.

The AfCFTA holds immense promise for deepening economic ties within Southern Africa, particularly among member states of the SADC. AfCFTA aims to create a unified market for goods and services across Africa by reducing trade barriers, including tariffs and non-tariff barriers<sup>366</sup>. This move towards trade harmonization can significantly enhance the integration process among SADC member states, promoting intra-regional trade and investment.

As trade rules become more standardized under AfCFTA, businesses in Southern Africa can benefit from simplified customs procedures, reduced administrative burdens, and increased transparency in trade regulations<sup>367</sup>. This can lead to improved efficiency in cross-border trade, lower transaction costs, and enhanced competitiveness for Southern African industries<sup>368</sup>. A more integrated Southern African economy can attract greater investment from both within and outside the region, stimulating economic growth and job creation, while contributing to poverty reduction and overall development in Southern Africa.

Furthermore, AfCFTA can serve as a catalyst for infrastructure development and regional connectivity in Southern Africa. Improved infrastructure, such as transportation networks and logistics facilities, can further facilitate trade integration and enhance the region's competitiveness in the global market. With these benefits, AfCFTA can transform the economic landscape of Southern Africa, creating a larger

---

<sup>365</sup> *Magwape M.* The AfCFTA and Trade Facilitation: Re-Arranging Continental Economic Integration // *Legal Issues of Economic Integration*, 2018. Vol. 45, № Issue 4. P. 355–374. URL:<https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Legal+Issues+of+Economic+Integration/45.4/LEIE2018021>(date of access: 10.10.2023).

<sup>366</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>367</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>368</sup> *Tsowou K., Davis J.* Reaping the AfCFTA Potential Through Well-Functioning Rules of Origin // *Journal of African Trade*. African Export Import Bank, 2021. Vol. 8, № 2 (Special Issue). P. 88.

market of over 350 million people (SADC's population) and fostering a more prosperous and interconnected region.

Moreover, AfCFTA presents a significant opportunity for Southern African countries to diversify their export markets and reduce their dependence on a limited number of trading partners. By accessing a larger continental market, comprising over 1.3 billion people, Southern African nations can explore new avenues for growth and expand their export horizons.

Diversifying export markets is crucial for Southern African economies to enhance their resilience to external shocks and mitigate risks associated with over-reliance on a few key trading partners. By tapping into the vast consumer base provided by AfCFTA, Southern African industries can take advantage of varied preferences and demands of consumers across different regions, thereby enhancing their market penetration and revenue streams.

AfCFTA enables Southern African countries to leverage economies of scale and increase their production capacities, which leads to greater efficiencies, lower costs, and improved quality standards<sup>369</sup>. This, in turn, makes Southern African industries more competitive in international markets. By diversifying export destinations, Southern African economies can capitalize on the untapped potential of the vast continental market and expand their export horizons<sup>370</sup>.

The diversification of export markets facilitated by AfCFTA fosters innovation and technological advancement within Southern African industries. As companies adapt to meet the needs of diverse consumer markets, they are incentivized to invest in research and development, product differentiation, and value-added services. This not only drives economic growth but also positions Southern African countries as hubs for innovation and entrepreneurship in the global marketplace.

---

<sup>369</sup> *Aziegbe-Esho E., Verhoef G. Reaping the Benefits of African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) // Africa Review. Brill, 2022. Vol. 15, № 1. P. 1–23.*

<sup>370</sup> *Ibid.*



Therefore, AfCFTA is a game-changer for Southern African economies, as it not only enhances their competitiveness on the global stage but also fosters innovation and technological advancement. By diversifying their export markets, Southern African industries can take advantage of the vast continental market and reduce their dependence on traditional trading partners, thereby enhancing their resilience to external shocks and mitigating associated risks.

The implementation AfCFTA undoubtedly brings challenges, particularly regarding increased competition among domestic industries within the region. As trade barriers are lowered and market access is expanded under AfCFTA, Southern African countries may find themselves confronted with competition from more efficient producers elsewhere in Africa<sup>371</sup>.

One of the main concerns is that sectors that have traditionally been protected from competition due to tariffs and other trade barriers may suffer<sup>372</sup>. With the removal or reduction of these barriers, industries in Southern Africa may face intensified competition from counterparts in other African countries that can produce similar goods at lower costs or with higher efficiency<sup>373</sup>. This could lead to a loss of market share, reduced profitability, and even the displacement of local businesses<sup>374</sup>.

Increased competition may require structural adjustments within Southern African industries to remain competitive in the new trading environment. This could mean upgrading technology, improving productivity, and enhancing product quality to

---

<sup>371</sup> *Magwape M.* The AfCFTA and Trade Facilitation: Re-Arranging Continental Economic Integration // *Legal Issues of Economic Integration*, 2018. Vol. 45, № Issue 4. P. 355–374. URL:<https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Legal+Issues+of+Economic+Integration/45.4/LEIE2018021>(date of access: 10.10.2023).

<sup>372</sup> World Bank. "The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects." Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. URL:<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ef1aa41f-60de-5bd2-a63e-75f2c3ff0f43/content> (date of access: 10.10.2023).

<sup>373</sup> Ibid

<sup>374</sup> *Mustapha A.H., Adetoye D.* Nigeria and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement Area (AFCFTA): Issues, Challenges and Prospect. // *Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal*. Scholar Publishing, 2020. Vol. 7. № 2. P. 237–250.

meet the standards demanded by consumers in the broader African market<sup>375</sup>. However, such adjustments may be challenging for industries that are already facing constraints such as limited access to finance and inadequate infrastructure.

In addition, the uneven development levels among African countries may exacerbate the challenges posed by increased competition. Some countries may have more advanced industries or benefit from lower production costs due to factors such as cheaper labor or more favorable regulatory environments<sup>376</sup>. This disparity could further intensify competition for Southern African industries, particularly those operating in sectors where production costs play a significant role in competitiveness<sup>377</sup>.

Furthermore, infrastructure challenges in Southern Africa are limiting the region's connectivity with the rest of the continent and impeding trade facilitation. These challenges include inadequate transport networks, border delays, and logistical bottlenecks that severely hinder the efficient movement of goods and services within the region<sup>378</sup>. This is resulting in the undermining of efforts aimed at deepening trade integration and hampering the competitiveness of Southern African industries in the global market<sup>379</sup>.

To address these challenges, it is crucial that SADC member states prioritize infrastructure development projects. These projects should be aimed at improving transport connectivity, enhancing trade facilitation, and reducing logistical bottlenecks. Possible solutions include expanding and upgrading road and rail networks,

---

<sup>375</sup> World Bank. "The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects." Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. URL:<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ef1aa41f-60de-5bd2-a63e-75f2c3ff0f43/content> (date of access: 10.10.2023).

<sup>376</sup> Ibid.

<sup>377</sup> Ibid.

<sup>378</sup> Magwape M. The AfCFTA and Trade Facilitation: Re-Arranging Continental Economic Integration // *Legal Issues of Economic Integration*, 2018. Vol. 45, № Issue 4. P. 355–374. URL:<https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Legal+Issues+of+Economic+Integration/45.4/LEIE2018021>(date of access: 10.10.2023).

<sup>379</sup> Ibid.

modernizing port facilities, and implementing streamlined customs procedures to expedite border crossings.

In addition to domestic efforts, regional cooperation and coordination are essential to effectively address infrastructure challenges in Southern Africa. SADC member states must collaborate on cross-border infrastructure projects and harmonize regulatory frameworks to facilitate seamless movement of goods and services across borders. By working together, we can overcome these challenges and pave the way for more efficient trade and investment opportunities.

Southern Africa will also require support from regional and international partners to address its infrastructure challenges. Financial assistance, technical expertise, and knowledge sharing should be provided to support the implementation of infrastructure projects and capacity-building initiatives. International financial institutions, development agencies, and multilateral organizations can play a crucial role in mobilizing resources and facilitating collaboration among stakeholders.

In conclusion, the AfCFTA has the potential to significantly influence integration efforts in Southern Africa, offering opportunities for deeper economic cooperation and market integration. However, realizing these benefits will require concerted efforts to overcome challenges and ensure inclusive growth and development across the region. Through continued collaboration and commitment to regional integration goals, Southern African countries can harness the transformative potential of AfCFTA for the benefit of their citizens and the continent as a whole.

### **CHAPTER 3. THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION**

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a key driving force behind regional integration projects in Southern Africa. With its unique structure, comprehensive mandate, and collective approach to fostering cooperation among its 16 member states, SADC has emerged as a pivotal player in the region. Since its establishment in 1980, SADC has served as a platform for member states to come together and address their common socio-economic challenges and developmental priorities. By working together, SADC has made significant strides in advancing regional integration efforts, making it the primary driver of progress in the area.

At the heart of SADC's role in regional integration lies its commitment to promoting economic cooperation and development among member states. Through initiatives such as the SADC FTA and the SADC Trade Protocol, member states have committed to liberalizing trade, harmonizing trade policies, and facilitating the movement of commodities and services across borders<sup>380</sup>. Additionally, SADC has spearheaded efforts to develop regional infrastructure, including transportation networks and energy grids, to enhance connectivity and promote economic activities within the region. By fostering economic integration, SADC aims to unlock the region's economic potential, reduce poverty, and promote shared prosperity among member states.

Moreover, SADC is a vital organization for promoting security and peace in the region. Its member states work together through the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation to prevent conflicts and build enduring peace. In addition, SADC is committed to human rights, democratic governance, and the rule of law among

---

<sup>380</sup> *Огурцов М.И.* САДК как пример субрегиональной интеграции в Африке // Интеллектуальный потенциал XXI века: ступени познания, 2011. № 6. С. 142.

its members. This creates a conducive environment for sustainable development and regional cooperation. SADC's comprehensive approach towards addressing both economic and political challenges make it the indispensable core of integration projects in the region.

### **3.1 The Historical Background of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)**

The first chapter of the thesis highlights how the years 1979-1980 were a pivotal moment in Southern Africa's history. During this time, South Africa implemented a sub-imperial strategy known as the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) to exert its dominance over neighboring countries and maintain its grip on power. The fight against apartheid South Africa's influence in the region was crucial, and CONSAS posed a significant threat to the region's stability. Therefore, it was essential to challenge the strategy and resist South Africa's efforts to subjugate its neighbors<sup>381</sup>.

As part of the CONSAS strategy, apartheid South Africa sought to establish alliances with neighboring states, exploiting divisions and vulnerabilities within the region to bolster its own economic and political interests. This strategy posed a significant threat to the sovereignty and independence of surrounding nations, as South Africa aimed to perpetuate the status quo of apartheid and extend its influence throughout Southern Africa<sup>382</sup>.

---

<sup>381</sup> *Abegunrin L.* Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC): Towards Regional Integration of Southern Africa for Liberation // A Current Bibliography on African Affairs, 1985. Vol. 17. № 4. P. 363.

<sup>382</sup> *Bush R.* Dependence and Collective Self Reliance in southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) // African Affairs, 1985. Vol. 84. № 337. P. 625.

In response to this threat, a group of frontline states, including Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Angola, among others, coalesced to resist South Africa's sub-imperial ambitions<sup>383</sup>. These countries recognized the significance of united effort to counter South Africa's hegemonic aspirations and promote regional stability and development<sup>384</sup>.

The 1980s saw the frontline states rise up against CONSAS and lay the foundation for the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC)<sup>385</sup>. This incredible conference, created by Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Mozambique, Angola, and Lesotho, became a beacon of regional cooperation and solidarity. It provided member states with an avenue to work together on economic development initiatives and reduce the grip of apartheid South Africa<sup>386</sup>. With SADCC, these countries were able to forge ahead with newfound strength and purpose, paving the way for a brighter future.

By forming SADCC, the Southern African aimed to create a unified front against South Africa's sub-imperial agenda, promote intra-regional trade and investment, and foster socio-economic development within Southern Africa<sup>387</sup>. SADCC represented a significant shift towards regional integration and solidarity, marking the beginning of concerted efforts to counter South Africa's influence and pursue collective development goals. Ultimately, these nations sought to address common economic hurdles, such as

---

<sup>383</sup> *Siegal B., Thompson C.B.* Challenge to Imperialism: The Frontline States in the Liberation of Zimbabwe // *African Studies Review*, 1987. Vol. 30. № 1. P. 117.

<sup>384</sup> *Abegunrin L.* Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC): Towards Regional Integration of Southern Africa for Liberation // *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs*, 1985. Vol. 17. № 4. P. 363.

<sup>385</sup> *Bush R.* Dependence and Collective Self Reliance in southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) // *African Affairs*, 1985. Vol. 84. № 337. P. 625.

<sup>386</sup> *Abegunrin L.* Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC): Towards Regional Integration of Southern Africa for Liberation // *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs*, 1986. Vol. 17. №. 4. P. 363.

<sup>387</sup> *Бокерия С.А., Сингува Ч.* SADCC as the First Step of Regional Integration in Southern Africa // *Азия и Африка сегодня*, 2023. № 1. С. 51.

underdevelopment, inadequate infrastructure, and heavy reliance on primary commodity exports<sup>388</sup>.

Furthermore, the leaders of the Frontline States and the representatives of the governments of Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland signed the declaration with the goal of economic liberation in Lusaka, Zambia in 1980<sup>389</sup>. The Lusaka Declaration of 1980, often referred to as "towards economic liberation," outlined ambitious goals aimed at fostering economic independence and self-reliance among Southern African nations. At its core, the declaration sought to address the economic challenges faced by the region, particularly in the context of apartheid-era South Africa's dominance. The goals of the Lusaka Declaration can be summarized into several key objectives.

First and foremost, the declaration aimed to reduce the region's economic dependence on apartheid South Africa. Southern African countries recognized the need to break free from the economic stranglehold enforced by the apartheid government, which controlled key industries and trade routes in the region. The Lusaka Declaration articulated a vision of economic liberation, where member states would diversify their economies and reduce reliance on South Africa's markets and resources<sup>390</sup>.

Another goal of the Lusaka Declaration was to promote intra-regional cooperation and trade. Recognizing the potential benefits of collaboration among neighboring countries, the declaration stressed how crucial it was to promote economic ties within the region<sup>391</sup>. By promoting trade and investment among member states, the declaration sought to promote development and economic prosperity, while also enhancing the region's resilience to external shocks.

---

<sup>388</sup> *Bush R.* Dependence and Collective Self Reliance in southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) // *African Affairs*, 1985. Vol. 84. № 337. P. 625.

<sup>389</sup> Declaration of the Southern African Conference, Lusaka. URL: [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNAAX403.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAX403.pdf) (date of access: 04.09.2023).

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>391</sup> *Ibid.*

Additionally, the Lusaka Declaration promoted local industry and self-sufficiency in an effort to overcome the effects of colonialism and apartheid. Member states recognized the need to build domestic capacity and reduce dependency on imports from abroad. In order to promote economic growth and development, the declaration encouraged the expansion of the local manufacturing sector as well as the usage of the abundant resources of the area.

Furthermore, the Lusaka Declaration underscored the importance of mobilizing resources to support regional development initiatives. Member states committed to pooling their financial and human resources to fund projects and programs aimed at advancing economic liberation and social progress. This included investments in infrastructure, education, healthcare, and other critical sectors essential for sustainable development.

In general, the goals of the Lusaka Declaration were centered around achieving economic independence, promoting intra-regional cooperation, and addressing the structural inequalities inherited from colonialism and apartheid. By outlining a comprehensive framework for economic liberation, the declaration laid the groundwork for regional integration efforts and collective action to overcome the region's economic challenges.

The adoption of the Lusaka Declaration by member states was a significant step towards creating a regional economic community. This community would bring its members together, standardize their common policies, and lessen South Africa's economic sway over the region as a whole<sup>392</sup>. Moreover, it supported the struggle for democratic majority rule in the apartheid state of South Africa<sup>393</sup>. This shows that the

---

<sup>392</sup> *Tostensen A.* Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1982. No 62. P.174. URL:<https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:277965/FULLTEXT01.pdf>.(date of access: 16.10.2023).

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*



Southern African countries recognized that by pooling their resources and coordinating their efforts, they could more effectively address the region's economic problems.

Regarding legal aspects, SADCC operated under a founding document known as the Lusaka Declaration. While the Declaration did not create legally binding obligations, it provided a guiding framework for regional cooperation and development efforts. Additionally, member states may have entered into bilateral or multilateral agreements to further operationalize specific aspects of SADCC cooperation, although these agreements would typically be voluntary in nature and subject to the consent of the participating parties.

Regarding legal aspects, it is worth noting that the Lusaka Declaration served as the guiding SADCC. Although it did not impose any legal obligations, it provided a comprehensive framework for regional cooperation and development efforts. Furthermore, member states had the opportunity to enter into voluntary agreements to further improve specific aspects of SADCC cooperation, subject to the consent of all participating parties. SADCC's commitment to the development of the region made it a crucial player in promoting economic growth and stability in Southern Africa.

The Decision-making mechanism of SADCC was designed to facilitate cooperation and coordination among member states while respecting their sovereignty and autonomy. At its core, SADCC operated on the principles of consensus-building and voluntary participation, reflecting the diverse interests and priorities of its members.

The Assembly of Presidents of Nations and Governments also known as the Summit, which brought together leaders from member states to debate and make decisions on important regional topics and projects, was the primary decision-making authority within the SADCC. The Summit provided a forum for leaders to exchange views, articulate common goals, and provide strategic guidance for regional

cooperation. Decisions made at the Summit were binding on member states and served as the basis for the implementation of regional projects and programs<sup>394</sup>.

Beneath the Summit, SADCC had various committees, working groups, and technical bodies responsible for specific sectors or areas of cooperation. These bodies were tasked with developing policies, strategies, and action plans in their respective fields and recommending them to the Summit for approval.

The SADCC departed from the traditional methods of integration that were prevalent among newly independent developing countries during its inception. Unlike the centralized planning and executive bodies favored by some regions, SADCC opted for a decentralized approach to regional coordination<sup>395</sup>. Instead of concentrating authority in a single regional entity, SADCC emphasized the coordination of national development efforts among its member states. This approach allowed individual countries to retain a significant degree of autonomy in setting their development priorities and strategies while still benefiting from collective action and cooperation at the regional level<sup>396</sup>.

Central to SADCC's strategy was the prioritization of strengthening infrastructure and the productive base of member states. Rather than immediately pursuing the creation of a common market or liberalizing trade, SADCC focused on tackling the underlying issues impeding the region's economic growth. This included making investments in telecommunications, electricity systems, railroads, and roadways, as well as initiatives to enhance agricultural productivity, industrial capacity, and human capital development. By laying the groundwork for sustainable economic

---

<sup>394</sup> *Tostensen A.* Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1982. № 62. P.174. URL:<https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:277965/FULLTEXT01.pdf> (date of access: 16.10.2023).

<sup>395</sup> *Костюнина Г.М.* Интеграционные группировки в Африке // *Международная экономическая интеграция*, 2006. №. 2006. С. 297.

<sup>396</sup> *Mehrotra S.* Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC): Evaluating Recent Trends in Regional Cooperation // *International Studies*, 1991. Vol. 28. № 4. P. 389.

growth and development, SADCC aimed to create a solid foundation upon which future integration efforts could be built.

The decentralized structure of SADCC and its focus on infrastructure development were practical responses to the particular difficulties that the region was confronting when it was founded<sup>397</sup>. The region was characterized by vast disparities in levels of development, resource endowments, and historical legacies of colonialism and apartheid. By focusing on strengthening the productive capacities of member states and promoting equitable development across the region, SADCC sought to address these underlying structural constraints and foster inclusive economic growth<sup>398</sup>. While this approach may have diverged from the conventional paths of regional integration, it represented a pragmatic response to the specific needs and circumstances of Southern Africa during the late 20th century.

To meet the objectives SADCC, member states identified specific sectors of cooperation that would be coordinated by each country<sup>399</sup>. This approach aimed to leverage the comparative advantages and capabilities of individual member states while fostering collaboration and specialization at the regional level. Essentially, each SADCC member state was tasked with taking the lead in coordinating a particular industry or sector within their respective national boundaries<sup>400</sup>.

By assigning responsibility for sectoral coordination to individual member states, SADCC demonstrated a deep understanding of the diverse economic structures, resources, and capacities across the region. This decentralized approach allowed member states to take ownership of their development agendas and tailor policies to

---

<sup>397</sup> *Tostensen A.* Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1982. № 62. P.174. URL:<https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:277965/FULLTEXT01.pdf> (date of access: 16.10.2023).

<sup>398</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>399</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>400</sup> *Ibid.*

suit their particular needs and circumstances<sup>401</sup>. By empowering individual countries to take the lead in coordinating sectors where they had a competitive edge or significant growth potential, SADCC aimed to harness the full spectrum of the region's capabilities and resources.

As a result of this approach, SADCC recognized that each member state possessed unique comparative advantages and potential for economic development. Rather than imposing one-size-fits-all solutions, SADCC encouraged countries to develop their own strategies based on local realities, enabling them to better address the unique challenges and opportunities they faced<sup>402</sup>. This bottom-up approach fostered greater accountability and participation, as countries were responsible for their own development outcomes. It also facilitated cooperation and collaboration among member states, as they worked together to support each other's priorities and address common challenges.

By embracing a decentralized approach to sectoral coordination, SADCC promoted a sense of ownership and commitment among member states. This approach allowed individual countries to tailor strategies and initiatives to the specific circumstances of each country, and to take advantage of their unique comparative advantages. By prioritizing local realities and empowering member states to take the lead in coordinating sectors where they had a competitive edge or significant growth potential, SADCC aimed to create an inclusive and sustainable economic development across the region.

For instance, a nation endowed with copious agricultural resources can spearhead regional efforts to improve agricultural output and safeguard food supplies<sup>403</sup>.

---

<sup>401</sup> *Tostensen A.* Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1982. № 62. P.174. URL:<https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:277965/FULLTEXT01.pdf> (date of access: 16.10.2023).

<sup>402</sup> *Thompson C.B.* Regional economic policy under crisis conditions: the case of agriculture within SADCC // *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1986. Vol. 13. № 1. P. 82.

<sup>403</sup> *Ibid.*

Meanwhile, another member state with a strong industrial base might spearhead initiatives to promote industrialization and manufacturing capabilities. By dividing responsibilities in this manner, SADCC aimed to maximize the effectiveness of regional cooperation while respecting the autonomy and sovereignty of individual participating countries.

The sectoral coordination approach adopted by SADCC reflected a pragmatic and flexible approach to regional development. It recognized the importance of harnessing the diverse strengths and resources of member states while fostering collaboration and mutual support to achieve common development goals in Southern Africa<sup>404</sup>. The member countries demonstrated their commitment to regional cooperation by undertaking joint projects and programs aimed at enhancing intra-regional trade, fostering industrial development, and developing infrastructure throughout the region. Recognizing the potential benefits of closer economic integration, member states pooled their resources and expertise to address common challenges and pursue shared objectives<sup>405</sup>.

One of the primary areas of focus for joint projects was intra-regional trade facilitation. SADCC member states recognized the importance of reducing barriers to trade and facilitating the free movement of commodities within the region. To achieve this goal, they implemented initiatives to harmonize trade policies, simplify customs procedures, and improve transportation infrastructure along key trade routes. By streamlining trade processes and enhancing connectivity, SADCC aimed to stimulate economic activity and promote the efficient allocation of resources across national borders.

In addition to trade facilitation, SADCC member states collaborated on initiatives to promote industrial development within the region. Recognizing the

---

<sup>404</sup> *Bush R.* Dependence and Collective Self Reliance in southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) // *African Affairs*. Oxford University Press (OUP), 1985. Vol. 84, № 337. P. 625–626.

<sup>405</sup> *Ibid.*

importance of diversifying their economies and building domestic industrial capabilities, member states launched joint programs to support the growth of key industries and foster entrepreneurship and innovation<sup>406</sup>. These initiatives included investment promotion schemes, technology transfer programs, and capacity-building initiatives aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of local industries and attracting investment from both domestic and foreign sources.

Furthermore, SADCC member states prioritized infrastructure development as a critical facilitator of economic progress.<sup>407</sup> Recognizing the need to address infrastructure gaps and improve connectivity across the region, member states embarked on joint projects to develop transportation networks, energy infrastructure, and telecommunications systems. The objective of these infrastructure projects was to improve connectivity, lower cost of transportation, and increase energy accessibility, which would facilitate commerce and promote economic growth across Southern Africa<sup>408</sup>.

The commitment of SADCC member states to implementing joint projects and programs underscored their shared vision for collaboration and integration of the region. By working together to address common challenges and pursue common objectives, member states laid the groundwork for sustainable economic growth and development in Southern Africa<sup>409</sup>.

In addition, to facilitate cooperation and streamline efforts towards achieving its objectives, SADCC established specialized committees and technical working groups. These committees were tasked with identifying priority areas for regional development

---

<sup>406</sup> *Demissie F., Lee M.C.* SADCC: The Political Economy of Development in Southern Africa // The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 1991. Vol. 24. № 3. P. 628.

<sup>407</sup> *Tostensen A.* Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1982. № 62. P.174. URL:<https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:277965/FULLTEXT01.pdf> (date of access: 16.10.2023).

<sup>408</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>409</sup> *Anglin D.G.* SADCC: Prospects for Disengagement and Development in Southern Africa // African Affairs, 1989. Vol. 88. № 350. P. 114.

and devising strategies for their implementation. By dividing responsibilities and expertise into specialized groups, SADCC sought to provide a more concentrated and organized approach to tackling the region's numerous problems.

One of the key areas of focus for these specialized committees was food security. Given the importance of agriculture and the prevalence of food insecurity in many parts of Southern Africa, SADCC recognized the need for coordinated efforts to enhance agricultural productivity, guarantee that enough nourishing food is available, and address issues related to food distribution and storage. Through dedicated committees, member states collaborated on agricultural policies, technology transfer, and investment in rural infrastructure to improve food security across the region.

In addition to food security, SADCC committees also addressed critical issues such as energy development and transportation infrastructure<sup>410</sup>. Energy access and reliability are essential for economic growth and social development, and SADCC recognized the need to expand energy infrastructure and promote sustainable energy sources. Similarly, efficient transportation networks are crucial for facilitating trade, investment, and mobility within the region. By establishing committees focused on these areas, SADCC sought to coordinate investment, planning, and policy initiatives to address infrastructure gaps and promote regional integration. Additionally, SADCC served as a platform for member states to exchange knowledge, share experiences, and coordinate policies to advance regional development objectives. Through various forums, including ministerial meetings, technical workshops, and policy dialogues, member states engaged in constructive dialogue and collaboration on a wide range of issues relevant to regional development.

One key aspect of SADCC's knowledge-sharing function was its emphasis on peer learning and best practice exchange. Member states recognized the value of learning from each other's experiences and successes, particularly in areas such as

---

<sup>410</sup> *Thompson C.B.* Regional economic policy under crisis conditions: the case of agriculture within SADCC // *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1986. Vol. 13. № 1. P. 84.

economic policy formulation, resource management, and infrastructure development. By sharing lessons learned and best practices, member states were able to identify innovative solutions to common challenges and improve their own development strategies<sup>411</sup>.

SADCC provided a platform for member states to coordinate their policies and initiatives to maximize their collective impact. Through regular consultations and coordination mechanisms, member states worked together to align their national development plans and priorities with the broader regional agenda. This coordination helped to ensure coherence and consistency in the implementation of regional projects and programs, enhancing their effectiveness and impact.

On top of that, SADCC facilitated technical cooperation and capacity-building initiatives among member states. By pooling their expertise and resources, member states were able to address capacity constraints and build institutional capabilities in key areas such as infrastructure planning, project management, and policy analysis. Technical assistance programs and training workshops organized by SADCC assisted member nations improve their ability to effectively implement regional development projects and programs.

Even though the SADCC was established to lessen its member nations reliance on South Africa economically, many of them had instead increased their reliance<sup>412</sup>. Nevertheless, no masterplan for market management existed in the organization, and the SADCC adopted a project rather than policy-oriented approach on the basis that because it was simpler to act immediately on projects, easier to monitor their success, and easier to define projects that did not require excessive finance or national concessions from member states. Politically, such an approach had benefits because it underscored the basic principle of equality amongst the member states regardless of

---

<sup>411</sup> *Stoneman C.* Report: SADCC raises its political profile // *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1986. Vol. 13. № 1. P. 157.

<sup>412</sup> *Whitaker J. S., Lee M.C.* SADCC: The Political Economy of Development in Southern Africa // *Foreign Affairs*, 1990. Vol. 69. № 2. P. 188.



size and relative power, fostering a sense of equal worth. This quality might put the smaller member states in good stead in the future when they had to negotiate benefits and other important policies regarding the allocation of opportunities, resources, and capacity for themselves at the regional level<sup>413</sup>. The sectoral responsibility approach also developed a sense of common identity and responsibility with every member state, regardless of size, having a role to play.

On the contrary, the countries which were part of SADCC were expected to provide funds for their coordinating activities on behalf of the organization. However, due to the general poverty levels in these countries and limited financial resources, part of the sectors should have been addressed, particularly the crucially important human resources development sector under the responsibility of Swaziland. SADCC became deeply dependent on donors because of the member states' different development levels and the need for more resources and financial capacity; as a result, the member states had to procure funds from donors for the projects under their responsibility<sup>414</sup>. The dependency on donors allowed the donors to influence specific sectors resulting in the dominance of SADCC activities. Furthermore, because of the decentralized structure and the SADCC sectoral approach, the donors often withheld from providing the financial assistance they pledged because the relevant sectors could not utilize the provided aid.

Rolf Langhammer provides three additional reasons that contributed to the ineffectiveness of SADCC. Firstly, the member states, in general, were concerned about the distribution of short-run benefits. This was evident in the misunderstanding of the mechanisms of the economic arrangements, which were intended to enhance long-term benefits. Secondly, the inefficient transportation costs contributed to the absence of coordination and specialization among the participating member states. Third but not

---

<sup>413</sup> *Demissie F., Lee M.C.* SADCC: The Political Economy of Development in Southern Africa // The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 1991. Vol. 24. № 3. P. 631.

<sup>414</sup> *Friedland E.A.* The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference and the West: co-operation or conflict? //The Journal of Modern African Studies, 1985. Vol. 23. № 2. P. 287.

most minor, the competing import substitution policies and the small amounts of the intro-industrial trade resulted from the low-income levels. Finally, under these challenges, the SADCC member states were required to reconsider the issues of decentralization versus centralization of the organization. In this context, SADCC needed to reform to be credited<sup>415</sup>.

In conclusion, SADCC was created with an ambitious goal to empower its member states while prioritizing their sovereignty. SADCC assigned each member state with specific sectoral responsibilities, making equality a top priority. However, national interests sometimes overshadowed regional ones, posing challenges to political and economic collaboration amongst the countries. The lack of a regional identity was another hurdle, with national development projects taking precedence over regional ones. Moreover, SADCC's administrative structure was intentionally kept weak to preserve the authority of individual member states. To overcome these challenges, SADCC had to reassess its decentralization versus centralization approach. Following significant reforms, SADCC transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and took on a more autonomous role, enhancing its credibility.

### **3.2 The Transition from SADCC to SADC: the Political Landscape Of Economic Integration**

The transition from SADCC to SADC was a major turning point in the history of Southern Africa. This transition marked a crucial moment in the region's integration efforts, driven by a combination of political, economic, and social factors that defined the era of the late 1980s and early 1990s<sup>416</sup>.

---

<sup>415</sup> *Swatuk L.A.* Economic Dependence and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa. SADCC and South Africa in Confrontation by Olayiwola Abegunrin Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter, Edwin Mellen Press, 1990. 349 p. // *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1991. Vol. 29. № 2. P. 345.

<sup>416</sup> *Chan S.* Book Review: Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside (eds.), *Towards a Post-Apartheid Future in Southern Africa*, London: Macmillan, 1992. P.226 // *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1994. Vol. 23. № 2. P. 472.

Politically, this change was essential to end the apartheid regime in South Africa and establish a universally accepted majority-rule system. The movement for a democratic and liberated South Africa gained momentum, paving the way for this transformation. Today, we can look back at this historic moment with pride and appreciation for the hard work and dedication of those who brought about this change.

South Africa's alignment with the FLS was distinguished by the sophistication of its danger assessment and its reasons for doing so, even though the alliance was later changed. Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique are the four FLS nations that border South Africa. It is possible to comprehend FLS diplomatic support for South African liberation on both the national and global scales. The FLS collaborated with various regional and international organizations that worked with the UN to marginalize South Africa internationally. On a national level, the FLS backed the ANC's armed organization, supported its activity, and served as a voice for South African movements for change.

Protests against the apartheid regime's incremental changes turned violent, including conflicts with the military and police across a large portion of the nation<sup>417</sup>. As president of apartheid-era South Africa, Pieter Willem Botha exercised his constitutional authority to declare a state of emergency. More than 30,000 Africans were detained, censorship was increased, and the trade union called COSATU and other opposition organizations were outlawed. Significantly more authority was granted to the President-chaired National Security Council. The most powerful ministries, the head of the national intelligence agency, the leader of the armed forces, and the chief of police were all present<sup>418</sup>.

However, the unrest was more organized and widespread. Administrative institutions were attacked in almost every South African neighborhood: municipalities

---

<sup>417</sup> *Хилова А.А.* Борьба с апартеидом в ЮАР: анализ конфликта // International scientific review of the problems of law, sociology, and political science. Boston, 2019. С. 88.

<sup>418</sup> *Шубин Г.В.* ЮАР: создание нерасового государства. Ученые записки. Вып. 2. М.: Институт Африки РАН, 1998. С. 128.

were seized, police stations and government buildings were vandalized. By 1986, the authorities had successfully suppressed the most important pockets of rebellion, but outbreaks of violence continued. The country was seized by a strike movement between 1986 and 1987. African discontent with the reforms served as fuel for these events, which further polarized South African society. White voters' sentiments shifted to the right. The Nationalist Party (NP) received 52.45% of the vote and the Conservative Party (CP) received 26.37% in the May 1987 legislative elections, for a total of over 80% of the vote. The Progressive Federal Party (PFP), in particular, saw a decline in representation of liberal parties. The broad consensus among observers was that the need for "law and order" was the reason behind South Africa's turn towards conservatism.

P. Botha, the country's and the Nationalist Party's (NP) leader suffered a stroke in early 1989, and on February 2, he resigned as NP leader but kept the presidency. At the NP conference, Frederik Willem de Klerk was elected as the party's new head, defeating his opponent Barend Jacobus du Plessis by only eight votes. De Klerk avoided the NP's internal political battles. He was constantly "in the background," aspiring to be a "team player"<sup>419</sup>.

P. Botha and De Klerk's relationship remained tight until August 1989 as the President made every effort to hold onto power, which exacerbated the nation's dilemma. The liberal and conservative wings of the NP came together to back de Klerk's suggestion for a gentler, more democratic form of leadership. On August 14, 1989, P. Botha resigned from his position as party president after a bitter battle with the opposition within his own government. The next day, F. de Klerk took over as interim president. After the NP emerged victorious in the elections and took control of Parliament on September 6, F. de Klerk was formally proclaimed as the nation's president.

---

<sup>419</sup> *Whitaker J.S., Bryant C. Poverty, Policy, and Food Security in Southern Africa // Foreign Affairs, 1988. Vol. 67. № 1. P. 201.*

Already in October 1989, the new president signed a series of orders that were unusual for South Africa in the second part of the twentieth century, signaling an end to the former administration. Death sentences were commuted, and cases of political prisoners were reviewed, political immigrants were allowed to return home, and eight important opposition activists and regime opponents were released from prison. The new president declared that the government was ready to initiate talks with all South African opposition parties. De Klerk declared the removal of the ban on the African National Congress and several other organizations at the start of the parliamentary session on February 2, 1990. The president declared that students from other racial groups would be admitted to white schools. Private schools were allowed to establish their own admissions policies but lost governmental funding. Children from any racial group had to be admitted to schools that remained public. However, the law required that the majority of students (at least 51% in a school designated as a white school) be white.

African resistance leader Nelson Mandela quickly proclaimed after being released from prison on February 11, 1990, that the armed struggle would not end despite potential negotiations since the conditions that gave rise to it remained in South Africa. Notwithstanding, N. Mandela started holding talks with the government, and in April, leaders of a communist party called SACP and African National Congress (ANC), Alfred Nzo A and Joe Slovo, arrived from abroad according to Shubin<sup>420</sup>. The negotiations got underway at the government house in Cape Town on May 2. The passage of a proclamation asking for a stop to violence was the principal result. The Separate Public Places Act was repealed in June 1990. In order to remove South Africa's worldwide isolation and ease sanctions, F. de Klerk traveled throughout Western Europe. The new South African president, who had already personified the doctrine of change, was warmly welcomed in Europe and offered the biggest assurances. London

---

<sup>420</sup> *Whitaker J.S., Bryant C. Poverty, Policy, and Food Security in Southern Africa // Foreign Affairs, 1988. Vol. 67. № 1. P. 201.*

newspapers said that the new president did not think twice to ask for permission, in contrast to his predecessor who increased South Africa's isolation in response to any outside pressure<sup>421</sup>.

However, there were issues at home that F. de Klerk was unable to resolve as swiftly and on his own. The abolition of land and registration restrictions, as well as the removal of segregation in school, were challenging concerns. There was also a delay in the negotiations with ANC leaders on elections and a new constitution, which would have decided South Africa's fate. During the parliamentary session in early 1991, De Klerk announced that a number of discriminatory legislations will be repealed this year<sup>422</sup>. However, he strongly opposed the African National Congress's demands for a constituent assembly and a transitional government. In February, the parties reassembled and approved a third protocol, wherein the ANC pledged to stop preparing Umkhonto fighters both domestically and abroad<sup>423</sup>.

The administration kept its promises. The Population Registration Act and the Resettlement Act were dissolved in 1991, public areas were totally desegregated, black citizens were allowed to own land throughout the country, and the most restrictive elements of the Internal Security Act were eliminated. In the spring, there was again another crisis—the biggest since 1990. It was discovered that an unprecedented surge in violence by Inkatha members against ANC supporters in the country's center had been covertly orchestrated and supported by the police. Defence Minister M. Malan and Law and Order (Police) Minister A. Flock were subsequently dismissed at the ANC's demand, and a commission of inquiry into allegations regarding police behavior was established<sup>424</sup>.

---

<sup>421</sup> *Whitaker J.S., Bryant C.* Poverty, Policy, and Food Security in Southern Africa // *Foreign Affairs*, 1988. Vol. 67. № 1. P. 201.

<sup>422</sup> *Хилова А.А.* Борьба с апартеидом в ЮАР: анализ конфликта // *International scientific review of the problems of law, sociology, and political science*. Boston, 2019. С. 88.

<sup>423</sup> *Демкина Л.* "Реформирование" апартеида? // *Азия и Африка сегодня* (М.), 1980. № 12. С. 30.

<sup>424</sup> *Pisani A. du.* Post-Settlement South Africa and the Future of Southern Africa // *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, 1993. Vol. 21. № 1/2. P. 60.

In the meantime, the black majority's forces were growing stronger and more unified. N. Mandela was sworn in as the ANC Congress's formal president during its July meeting. Inkatha became a signatory to the National Peace Agreement that the government and the ANC had signed in September. The trade unions participated in a two-day walkout in favor of the ANC's demands for an interim government of national unity<sup>425</sup>.

Thus, by late 1991, the ANC had taken the lead by applying pressure on the government and combining concessions. In order to resist ANC influence, the de Klerk government saw the folly of forming an alliance with moderate Afrikaner forces. Formal but preliminary discussions were concluding, and real action was almost imminent<sup>426</sup>.

The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), a multiparty forum, opened in Johannesburg on December 16, 1991. The majority of political parties and organizations were represented by 19 delegations who attended. Two delegates from each delegation formed a steering committee, and a declaration of intent was approved. It outlined the democratic precepts that guided the course of the negotiations. CODESA was discontinued in its original form following protracted deliberations and disputes. The Planning Conference reopened with 26 parties and organizations on March 5, 1993. The first-ever non-racial elections in South African history were scheduled for April 27, 1994, on June 3.

Right-wing groups, who were opposed to the country's developments, had very little time to try to reverse the situation. The Boers founded two political organizations: the Afrikaner Popular Front, led by former South African Defence Force (SADF) commander K. Filiun, and the Afrikaner Resistance Movement, led by Y. Terblanche. Filiun and Y. Terblanche's Afrikaner Resistance Movement. These organizations

---

<sup>425</sup> Шубин Г.В. ЮАР: создание нерасового государства. Ученые записки. Вып. 2. М.: Институт Африки РАН, 1998. С. 128.

<sup>426</sup> Ibid.

advocated for Boer self-determination and even the secession of a portion of South Africa's territory in order to establish an independent Boer state.

In late June-July, the situation in the country heated up to the limit. On 25 June, white supporters of the far-right committed a pogrom in the building where multi-party negotiations were held. The participants were evacuated in time, and the incident was without casualties. On 25 July, militants stormed the white St. James Church in Cape Town. Twelve people were killed and 47 injured, including Russian and Ukrainian sailors invited to the service. Clashes between ANC and Inkatha supporters with more casualties became a daily reality. In the autumn, the Boputatswana and Siskei delegations withdrew from the negotiation process. Together with Inkatha and the Afrikaner People's Front, they formed a new bloc called the Freedom Alliance.

On 18 November, a multi-party forum approved the 1993 Constitution of South Africa. It was a transitional Constitution, limited to two years. During this period, the new parliament, elected by popular vote, had to approve the permanent Republic of South Africa's Basic Law. According to the Basic Law, South Africa was henceforth a sovereign and democratic state in which equality between people of all races was respected. Any party that won 5 per cent of the electoral vote, which equalled 20 seats in parliament, was entitled to participate in the national unity government. On 3 March 1994, amendments to the constitution were adopted to expand the powers of the provinces<sup>427</sup>.

During the first democratic elections, three parties received nearly 100% of the vote: the ANC with 62.65%, the NP with 20.34 %, and Inkatha with 10.54 %. The ANC won seven of the new constitution's nine provinces, while the NP won the Western Cape and Inkatha won KwaZulu-Natal. The inaugural session of the National Assembly

---

<sup>427</sup> Демкина Л.А. Первые нерасовые выборы в ЮАР // Африка: суждения и факты. М., Институт Африки РАН.1994. С. 4.



was conducted on May 9, and N. Mandela was chosen president. Vice-Presidents T. Mbeki and F. de Klerk were chosen<sup>428</sup>.

Therefore, it is worth noting that the transformation of Southern Africa was primarily catalyzed by the conclusion of apartheid in South Africa and the subsequent transition to a democratic system<sup>429</sup>. Under the visionary leadership of Nelson Mandela, the country embarked on a path of political reform and reconciliation, aiming to reintegrate into the global community and foster positive relationships with neighboring countries<sup>430</sup>.

Through its involvement in organizations like the FLS, SADC, and SACU, South Africa emerged as a pivotal player in the region's socio-economic progress<sup>431</sup>. This transformation offered a unique opportunity for SADC member states to reimagine their collaborative framework and pursue a more inclusive approach to regional integration, ultimately promoting enduring peace and prosperity across Southern Africa<sup>432</sup>.

It's a remarkable story of how the region transformed itself by uniting and working towards a common goal. The transition to democracy in South Africa was the catalyst that ushered in a new era of hope, progress, and prosperity. The visionary leadership of Nelson Mandela and his team paved the way for a brighter future for the entire region, and the collaborative framework established by SADC member states has been instrumental in driving the socio-economic progress of Southern Africa. Their efforts had not only transformed the region but also inspired the world<sup>433</sup>.

---

<sup>428</sup> Ibid

<sup>429</sup> *Hwang K.D.* The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa // *International Area Review*, 2007. Vol. 10. № 1. P. 55.

<sup>430</sup> Ibid

<sup>431</sup> *Arkhangelskaya A.A., Muntschick J.* The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the European Union (EU). Regionalism and External Influence. Palgrave Macmillan, 186 p // *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations*, 2020. Vol. 20. № 2. P. 417.

<sup>432</sup> *Muntschick J.* Regional Economic Integration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Analysing the Dynamics and Performance // *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations*, 2020. Vol. 20. № 2. P. 333.

<sup>433</sup> Ibid

In the economical sense, economic considerations also played a crucial role in driving the transformation of the SADCC to SADC. The transformation was driven by a growing recognition among member states of the need for a more comprehensive and integrated approach to regional cooperation. SADCC, established in 1980, initially focused on promoting economic development and reducing dependency on external assistance through decentralized regional coordination of national development efforts<sup>434</sup>. However, as the Southern African region evolved politically and economically, it became apparent that a more cohesive and coordinated strategy was necessary to fully capitalize on the region's economic potential and address common development challenges effectively.

One of the primary reasons for the transformation was the realization that fragmented and isolated national efforts were insufficient to unlock the region's full potential or address complex cross-border issues<sup>435</sup>. Member states increasingly understood that a more integrated approach would allow them to harness synergies, pool resources, and leverage collective strengths more effectively. By transitioning from SADCC to SADC, the region sought to deepen and broaden its cooperation framework, encompassing not only economic development but also political cooperation, peace, and security<sup>436</sup>.

Furthermore, the evolving geopolitical landscape in Southern Africa, marked by significant historical events such as the demise of the apartheid government in South Africa, played a crucial role in driving the transformation<sup>437</sup>. The dismantling of apartheid not only signaled a new era of political transformation but also opened up

---

<sup>434</sup> *Gibb R.* Towards a new southern Africa: The challenge of regional economic co-operation and integration // *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 1996. Vol. 4. № 1. P. 10.

<sup>435</sup> *Biswas A.* Approaches To Regional Integration In Southern Africa // *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, 2000. Vol. 5. № 1. P. 73.

<sup>436</sup> *Nyirabu M.* Appraising Regional Integration In Southern Africa // *African Security Review*, 2004. Vol. 13. № 1. P. 22.

<sup>437</sup> *Nkosinathi Mlambo D.* The quest for post-colonial regional integration: examining the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Southern Africa post-1992 // *Journal of African Foreign Affairs*, 2020. Vol. 7. № 1. P. 25.

opportunities for enhanced economic cooperation, trade liberalization, and cross-border investment. As regional dynamics shifted and new opportunities emerged, member states recognized the need for an organization like SADC to provide a more robust institutional framework for advancing regional integration objectives<sup>438</sup>.

Following the transition from SADCC to SADC, the organization has undergone significant expansions over the years, bringing about new dimensions to the integration of the southern African region<sup>439</sup>. With the addition of South Africa in 1994, following the abolition of apartheid, Mauritius in 1995, and the Democratic Republic of Congo and Seychelles in 1997, SADC now comprises 16 member nations that work together to promote sustainable economic growth and social progress.

The inclusion of these countries in the regional entity not only fostered closer ties between them but also opened up new opportunities for trade and investment. By working together, SADC member nations have been able to leverage their collective strengths to address common issues such as poverty, inequality, and climate change<sup>440</sup>.

Joining SADC has proven to be beneficial for member countries, enabling them to tap into a vast network of resources and expertise. It has also provided a platform for countries to collaborate on regional initiatives and projects, leading to greater economic integration and shared prosperity<sup>441</sup>.

Today, SADC member nations, including Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, continue to work towards creating a better future for their

---


<sup>438</sup> *Boshoff N.* South–South research collaboration of countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) // *Scientometrics*, 2009. Vol. 84. № 2. P. 490.

<sup>439</sup> *Nkosinathi Mlambo D.* The quest for post-colonial regional integration: examining the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Southern Africa post-1992 // *Journal of African Foreign Affairs*, 2020. Vol. 7. № 1. P. 23.

<sup>440</sup> *Hwang K.D.* The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa // *International Area Review*, 2007. Vol. 10. № 1. P. 55.

<sup>441</sup> *Ibid.*

citizens and the region as a whole. The SADC's current member states are depicted on the map below.



*Source:* UNODC and SADC. Making the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region Safer from Crime and Drugs Regional Programme: 2013 - 2016. Printed in Pretoria, South Africa, May 2014. URL: [https://www.unodc.org/documents/southernafrica/Stories/UNODC\\_-\\_SADC\\_-\\_Regional\\_Programme\\_-\\_online.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/southernafrica/Stories/UNODC_-_SADC_-_Regional_Programme_-_online.pdf) (date of access: 15.04.2023).

The transformation from SADCC to SADC was a significant process that involved critical negotiations, consultations, and institutional reforms aimed at expanding the scope and mandate of regional cooperation in Southern Africa. This

process culminated in the signing of the SADC Treaty in 1992, which formally established SADC as a successor organization and provided the legal framework for its operations. The treaty outlines the principles, objectives, and institutional framework for regional integration in Southern Africa, emphasizing sustainable and equitable economic growth, development, and cooperation among member states<sup>442</sup>.

The SADC Treaty marked a significant shift in the approach to regional integration. Unlike its predecessor, SADCC, which primarily focused on economic advancement, SADC recognized that achieving regional stability and prosperity required a more comprehensive approach that addressed various aspects of progress<sup>443</sup>. By prioritizing political collaboration, peace, and security alongside economic growth, SADC underscored the importance of a holistic strategy for regional development. This treaty represented a bold acknowledgement that progress cannot be achieved in isolation and that a collaborative approach is necessary to ensure long-term stability and prosperity for the region.

In addition to establishing the overarching principles and objectives of SADC, the treaty also laid out the institutional framework for the organization. It defined the structure of SADC, including its decision-making processes, organs, and mechanisms for cooperation. This institutional framework provided the foundation for SADC's operations and facilitated coordination among the countries<sup>444</sup>.

The SADC has placed a strong emphasis on both economic and political dimensions to deepen regional integration in Southern Africa<sup>445</sup>. Economically, SADC has pursued various initiatives aimed at promoting trade, investment, and economic growth the participating nations. One of the key economic initiatives is integrating two

---

<sup>442</sup> *Hwang K.D.* The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa // *International Area Review*, 2007. Vol. 10. № 1. P. 55.

<sup>443</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>444</sup> *Saurombe A.* The role of SADC institutions in implementing SADC treaty provisions dealing with regional integration // *Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal*, 2017. Vol. 15. № 2. P. 455.

<sup>445</sup> *Костюнина Г.М.* Интеграционные процессы в Африке: история и современный этап // *Российский внешнеэкономический Вестник*, 2016. № 4. С. 36.

somewhat different development approaches into one by taking a two-pronged approach to development<sup>446</sup>. This approach, which combines market liberalization and development integration, aims to achieve deeper integration. This was clearly shown when a key milestone in this journey was reached at the SADC leaders meeting in Maputo, Mozambique in 1999, a decision to create a regional strategic plan, known as RISDP<sup>447</sup>. This plan was designed to assess the effectiveness of SADC's institutions in advancing the organization's overarching objectives of social and economic advancement and poverty alleviation<sup>448</sup>.

Since its inception, the RISDP has served as the principal blueprint for the organization, offering clear guidance for SADC's policies and initiatives over the long term. Though SADC had established trade protocols prior to the creation of RISDP, the RISDP upheld the same principles as the SADC Common Agenda and provided a more comprehensive framework for driving progress across the organization<sup>449</sup>. In 1996, the organization established a trade protocol, followed by a finance and investment protocol in 2006, and a preliminary trade protocol in 2012<sup>450</sup>.

It is important to note that the RISDP reaffirmed the commitment of SADC countries to outstanding economic, political, and business governance. This commitment is based on democratic values, extensive civil society participation, transparency and adherence to the rule of law<sup>451</sup>. The RISDP is the key strategy used by SADC to achieve its objectives. Additionally, the RISDP emphasizes that sound

---

<sup>446</sup> *Moyo B.* Impact of SADC Free Trade Area on Southern Africa's Intra-Trade Performance: Implications for the African Continental Free Trade Area // *Foreign Trade Review*, 2023. Vol. 59. № 1. P. 148.

<sup>447</sup> *Isaksen J.* SADC in 2003: Restructuring and Progress in Regional Integration. Report - Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2004. P.30. URL: <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/1768-sadc-in-2003-restructuring-and-progress-in.pdf>. (date of access: 16.03.2023).

<sup>448</sup> *Saurombe A.* The role of SADC institutions in implementing SADC treaty provisions dealing with regional integration // *Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal*, 2017. Vol. 15. № 2. P. 455.

<sup>449</sup> *Isaksen J.* SADC in 2003: Restructuring and Progress in Regional Integration. Report - Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2004. P.30. URL: <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/1768-sadc-in-2003-restructuring-and-progress-in.pdf>. (date of access: 16.03.2023).

<sup>450</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>451</sup> *Ibid.*

political, economic and cooperative governance are essential requirements for sustainable socio-economic development<sup>452</sup>. It highlights that SADC's aspirations for poverty reduction and deeper integration depend on the presence of these elements.

On top of that, the RISDP aimed at enhancing regional integration and economic cooperation among member states. This plan outlines several pivotal milestones that the SADC aims to achieve from 2005 to 2020<sup>453</sup>. The SADC's goal was to establish a Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2008, which would enable the free flow of goods and services among member states<sup>454</sup>. Furthermore, by 2010, the organization aimed to establish a Customs Union with standardized external tariffs, which would streamline trade regulations and enhance economic efficiency within the region.

The RISDP also aimed at establishing a Common Market by 2015, which would facilitate the movement of capital and labor across borders, creating a more conducive environment for investment and economic growth<sup>455</sup>. Furthermore, the SADC aspired to achieve a Monetary Union by 2016, seeking to stabilize currencies across member states, thereby promoting financial stability and facilitating cross-border transactions<sup>456</sup>.

The SADC's most significant objective outlined in the RISDP was the formation of a single currency and an Economic Union by 2018<sup>457</sup>. This ambitious goal aimed to further deepen integration by unifying monetary and economic policies, promoting greater fiscal cooperation, and facilitating seamless economic activity across the region.

---

<sup>452</sup> *Isaksen J.* SADC in 2003: Restructuring and Progress in Regional Integration. Report - Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2004. P.30. URL: <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/1768-sadc-in-2003-restructuring-and-progress-in.pdf>. (date of access: 16.03.2023).

<sup>453</sup> SADC Major Achievements and Challenges: 25 Years of Regional Cooperation and Integration, 2021. P.28. URL: [https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-12/Achievements\\_booklet.pdf](https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-12/Achievements_booklet.pdf) (date of access: 16.03.2023).

<sup>454</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>455</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>456</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>457</sup> *Ibid.*

The trade protocol underwent revisions in 2010 to align with the RISDP's evolving objectives<sup>458</sup>. This, along with the Protocol on trade in services, serves as the cornerstone for guiding SADC's efforts in facilitating trade and economic cooperation within the region. They provide a framework for harmonizing trade regulations, promoting fair competition, and fostering an enabling environment for sustainable economic development across SADC member states. By achieving these milestones, the SADC aimed to create a more prosperous region, promoting economic growth and development, and providing opportunities for all member states to thrive.

The establishment of the FTA in the SADC region marked a remarkable achievement towards economic integration and cooperation in August 2008. The primary objective of the FTA was to facilitate the free movement of commodities among participating countries, which aimed to boost trade and investment opportunities<sup>459</sup>. By eliminating tariffs and trade barriers, the FTA aimed to stimulate economic activity, generate employment opportunities, and promote sustainable development across the region<sup>460</sup>.

The FTA was viewed as a concrete step towards advancing the goals of the RISDP. It was a collective commitment among countries to promote economic growth, reduce poverty, and enhance regional competitiveness through closer economic collaboration<sup>461</sup>. Moreover, the FTA structure provided a platform for enhancing regional cooperation, sharing resources and expertise, and promoting cross-border

---

<sup>458</sup> SADC Major Achievements and Challenges: 25 Years of Regional Cooperation and Integration, 2021. P.28.URL: [https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-12/Achievements\\_booklet.pdf](https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-12/Achievements_booklet.pdf) (date of access: 16.03.2023).

<sup>459</sup> *Moyo B.* Impact of SADC Free Trade Area on Southern Africa's Intra-Trade Performance: Implications for the African Continental Free Trade Area // *Foreign Trade Review*, 2023. Vol. 59. № 1. P. 149.

<sup>460</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>461</sup> *Шумов В.Н.* Африка Южнее Сахары во всеафриканской экономической интеграции // *Мировое и национальное хозяйство*, 2010. № 1 (12). С. 37.



collaboration. These efforts contributed to the socio-economic development of the Southern African region<sup>462</sup>.

The SADC FTA Laid the foundation for deeper integration initiatives, such as the SADC Customs Union and the Common Market, as envisioned in the RISDP. The launch of the SADC FTA was a significant milestone towards achieving economic integration and cooperation in the region. Therefore, it is crucial to continue implementing such initiatives to promote sustainable development, create employment opportunities, and stimulate economic growth.

The SADC Secretariat's insufficient capability has caused substantial delays in meeting the region's integration objectives. These delays have hampered the implementation deadlines for critical milestones such as the Customs Union, the Common Market, and the Monetary Union<sup>463</sup>. Furthermore, SADC confronts issues due to member states' overlapping memberships in other regional groupings, making it impossible to meet different responsibilities at once. Furthermore, SADC has faced hurdles due to complex and varied trade regulations, as well as revenue issues, which have delayed the formation of an integrated market. Addressing these problems is critical to SADC's ability to achieve its regional integration and economic growth objectives.

SADC has implemented proactive measures to tackle the hurdles in its path. The organization's Summit approved a document outlining the framework for the Customs Union, signaling a commitment to regional integration. However, the transition from the FTA to the Customs Union presents various limitations that could impede

---

<sup>462</sup> Шумов В.Н. Африка Южнее Сахары во всеафриканской экономической интеграции // Мировое и национальное хозяйство, 2010. № 1 (12). С. 37.

<sup>463</sup> SADC Major Achievements and Challenges: 25 Years of Regional Cooperation and Integration, 2021. P.28. URL: [https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-12/Achievements\\_booklet.pdf](https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-12/Achievements_booklet.pdf) (date of access: 16.03.2023).

progress<sup>464</sup>. A significant challenge is the establishment of a common external tariff, given that SADC has 11 distinct tariff policies. It is imperative to converge these policies into a single and consistent tariff regime to boost regional trade. Negotiating this intricate task will be a crucial determinant of SADC's subsequent actions on the matter.

In addition, the SADC has made it a top priority to develop its infrastructure, recognizing that it is a critical factor in promoting regional integration and economic growth. With this in mind, SADC has launched several initiatives, including the implementation of the master plan for infrastructure development in the region. This master plan is a vital strategy that will help meet the region's infrastructure needs and pave the way for enhanced connectivity, trade, and investment. SADC's commitment to infrastructure development demonstrates its unwavering dedication to the prosperity of the region, and we can be confident that these efforts will lead to a brighter future for all.

The central idea of the master plan is a comprehensive approach to improving transportation networks, energy infrastructure, and telecommunications systems across the region. Recognizing the importance of efficient transportation systems for commerce and economic growth, SADC aims to enhance road, rail, and port infrastructure to reduce transportation costs and improve connectivity between member states. This includes initiatives to develop key transport corridors, upgrade border posts, and harmonize regulations to make it easier for both individuals and merchandise to move between borders.

In addition to transportation, SADC is also prioritizing energy infrastructure development to address the region's energy challenges and unlock its economic potential. This involves investments in power generation, transmission, and distribution

---

<sup>464</sup> *Moyo B.* Impact of SADC Free Trade Area on Southern Africa's Intra-Trade Performance: Implications for the African Continental Free Trade Area // *Foreign Trade Review*, 2023. Vol. 59. № 1. P. 151.

infrastructure to improve access to reliable and affordable energy. SADC aims to encourage growth in industry, attract investment, and improve people' standard of living by increasing energy infrastructure and encouraging energy cooperation in the region.

Furthermore, SADC recognizes the importance of telecommunications infrastructure in promoting connectivity and fostering economic development in the digital age. The organization is working to improve access to affordable and reliable telecommunications services, expand broadband connectivity, and facilitate the growth of technological infrastructure and services across the region. This includes initiatives to harmonize regulatory frameworks, promote competition, and facilitate investment in telecommunications infrastructure<sup>465</sup>.

In addition, SADC in its protocol for transport communication and meteorology placed a priority on the construction of transport corridors and fosters the development of infrastructure in conjunction with development corridors<sup>466</sup>. Initially, the concept of development corridor was born in the 1980s when the SADCC constructed transport routes such as roads, railways etc from landlocked countries to ports other than South Africa as a means of competing with the apartheid-era South Africa. These corridors were established as politically motivated policies and there were cases including the Beira Corridor where powerful institutions such as the World bank and Western donors supported its development. However, after South Africa's independence, economic development began to take precedence over political concerns as the driving force behind corridor development initiatives in the region. In other words, although the initial concept of corridor development was to create transport infrastructure

---

<sup>465</sup> *Khobai H., Moyo C.* Trade openness and industry performance in SADC countries: is the manufacturing sector different? // *International Economics and Economic Policy*, 2020. Vol. 18. № 1. P. 107.

<sup>466</sup> Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology 1996. URL: <https://www.sadc.int/document/protocol-transport-communications-and-meteorology-1996> (date of access: 19.07.2023).

underlining transportation routes from landlocked countries, it gradually changed to a concept encompassing the development of surrounding areas along the corridor.

In 1997 at the transport protocol implementation workshop, at least seven transport corridors shown in the figure below were agreed to conform to the definition of the protocol. The SADC has also indicated in its Transport Corridor Monitoring and coordination report so that are promoting regional economic integration for each corridor.

**Table 1**

**Present status of the major transport and development corridors**

| <b>N<sup>o</sup></b> | <b>Corridor</b>   | <b>Present status</b>   |
|----------------------|---|---|
| <b>1</b>             | Southern Corridor<br>(South Africa -Botswana\<br>Zimbabwe -Zambia -Congo) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Goods transported to the north far exceeds those to the south. They are mostly products from South Africa, but most imports unloaded at the ports in south Africa and transported to the countries without an exit to the ocean.</li> <li>• Exported volume from Zambia and Congo is limited (Copper, cobalt etc)</li> </ul> |
| <b>2</b>             | Maputo Bay Corridor (South Africa-Mozambique)                             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Steady progress in both the transport network development and industrial development led by the private sector financing.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>3</b>             | Walvis Bay Corridor<br>(Botswana -karahari\<br>Caprivi-Walvis Bay)        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relevant as an alternative transport system for both Botswana and South Africa.</li> <li>• Very low cargo volume currently</li> </ul>  |
| <b>4</b>             | Beira Corridor (Zimbabwe-Mozambique)                                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Huge success in infrastructure rehabilitation which was made in the years 1980-1990s primary through the assistance from the Scandinavian countries.</li> <li>• In the present time, there has been an annual increase of transportation of goods.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>5</b>             | Nacala Corridor<br>(Malawi/Tanzania -<br>Mozambique)                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The transportation of goods has been low despite the progress in the railway rehabilitation works in the early 1990s.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>6</b>             | Tazara Corridor (Tanzania-Zambia)   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was established as a transportation route of copper from Zambia, however the Cargo transportation is not so large.</li> <li>• Requires rehabilitation as proposed by the government of Zambia and Tanzania<sup>467</sup>.</li> </ul>   |

<sup>467</sup> Tanzania and Zambia want to upgrade the ‘Uhuru Railway’ – but can they? URL: <https://theconversation.com/tanzania-and-zambia-want-to-upgrade-the-uhuru-railway-but-can-they-190659> (date of access: 19.07.2023).

| № | Corridor                                 | Present status  |
|---|--|---|
| 7 | Lobito Corridor<br>(Angola-Congo-Zambia) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stopped functioning due to the civil war in Angola.</li> <li>• In the process of rehabilitation and is scheduled for completion on 31 May 2024.</li> <li>• The corridor will present an alternative strategic outlet to export markets for Zambia and DRC Congo<sup>468</sup>.</li> <li>• The corridor will also offer the shortest route linking key mining regions in the two countries to the sea.</li> </ul> |

*Source:* Existing transport corridors and the ones waiting full implementation in Southern Africa. URL: [https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/11991007\\_02.pdf](https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/11991007_02.pdf) (date of access: 11.03.2023).

Transport corridors are vital to Southern Africa's economic growth and integration because they make it easier for people, products, and services to move across national boundaries. These corridors serve as vital conduits for trade, investment, and regional cooperation, providing efficient and reliable transportation routes that connect landlocked countries to ports, markets, and economic hub<sup>469</sup>s.

One key importance of transport corridors in Southern Africa is their contribution to regional trade and economic growth. By linking production centers to consumption markets, transport corridors enable the efficient flow of goods within the region and beyond. This enhances trade competitiveness, reduces transaction costs, and stimulates economic activity, ultimately driving job creation, income generation, and poverty reduction<sup>470</sup>.

Moreover, transport corridors play a strategic role in promoting regional integration and cooperation. By facilitating cross-border connectivity and cooperation among neighboring countries, transport corridors promote mutual economic benefits

<sup>468</sup> The Lobito Corridor: Washington's Answer to Belt and Road in Africa. URL: <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-lobito-corridor-washingtons-answer-to-belt-and-road-in-africa/> (date of access: 07.05.2023).

<sup>469</sup> SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan. URL: [https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-08/Regional\\_Infrastructure\\_Development\\_Master\\_Plan\\_Executive\\_Summary.pdf](https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-08/Regional_Infrastructure_Development_Master_Plan_Executive_Summary.pdf) (date of access: 07.05.2023).


<sup>470</sup> Морозенская Е.В. Роль ТАНЗАМ в восточноафриканской экономической интеграции // Ученые записки Института Африки., 2016. № 2–3 (36–37). С. 38–44.

and foster closer political ties. This cooperation extends beyond transportation infrastructure development to include harmonized customs procedures, regulatory frameworks, and trade facilitation measures, which are necessary for successful foreign investment and trade. The figure below shows the transport infrastructure in Southern Africa.

Southern Africa Transport Corridors



Southern Africa Rail Network & Ports



Source: Development of Mozambique's Port and Rail Systems, Port and Corridor Cooperation: Den Haag. <http://portandcorridor.org/> (date of access: 25.11.2023)

Furthermore, transport corridors are instrumental in promoting inclusive and sustainable development in Southern Africa. They provide improved access to markets,

social services, and employment opportunities, particularly in remote and underserved areas<sup>471</sup>. Additionally, investments in transport infrastructure along corridors can spur economic diversification, industrialization, and value chain development, leading to more resilient and inclusive growth across the region<sup>472</sup>.

In addition, transport corridors contribute to regional peace and stability by fostering economic interdependence and cooperation among countries. By enhancing connectivity and promoting shared prosperity, transport corridors reduce the risk of conflict and promote peaceful resolution of disputes, creating a conducive environment for sustainable development and cooperation<sup>473</sup>.

SADC's commitment to regional integration goes beyond just economic pursuits. The region places a high priority on political integration, which is based on shared dedication to promote peace, stability, democracy, and effective governance across the region. With the aim of fostering cooperation, resolving conflicts, and upholding fundamental human rights and democratic values, SADC has designed various principles and mechanisms for political integration<sup>474</sup>.

One of the foundational elements of political integration within SADC is the Treaty of SADC, which establishes the legal framework for the organization and outlines its objectives, principles, and institutional structure. The treaty emphasizes the crucial need for fostering political collaboration and ensuring security and peace as integral elements of integration. Participating countries pledge to uphold democratic ideals, safeguard human rights, and abide by the principles of law and order as core

---

<sup>471</sup> *Joseph J.* SADC'S transport infrastructure: enhancing the AFCFTA's prospects through regional economic integration // EUREKA: Social and Humanities, 2023. № 1. P. 27.

<sup>472</sup> *Peberdy S., Crush J.* Invisible Trade, Invisible Travelers: The Maputo Corridor Spatial Development Initiative And Informal Cross-Border Trading // South African Geographical Journal, 2001. Vol. 83. № 2. P. 117.

<sup>473</sup> *Mutambara T.E.* Regional transport challenges within the Southern African Development Community and their implications for economic integration and development // Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 2009. Vol. 27. № 4. P. 503.

<sup>474</sup> *Hwang K.-D.* The Concepts and the Levels of Analysis of Politico-Security Regionalism in Southern Africa: The Case of Southern African Development Community (SADC) // Korean Journal of International Relations, 2007. Vol. 47. № 2. P. 199.

values guiding SADC's political agenda. It is only through such unwavering commitment and adherence to these values that we can achieve true regional integration and create a better future for all.

Attaining political unity and stability in the region is the SADC's unwavering commitment. One indication of this commitment is the Protocol, which covers cooperation in politics, defense, and security. It provides a robust framework for member states to work together on matters related to conflict prevention, management, and resolution. The Protocol plays a pivotal role in advancing peace, stability, and security across the region by providing a broad platform for countries to collaborate on diverse political, defense, and security matters<sup>475</sup>. Through this framework, the SADC aims to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts proficiently, ensuring that the region remains peaceful and prosperous.

One key aspect of the protocol is its emphasis on conflict prevention. SADC recognizes that proactive measures are crucial vital to address the underlying reasons why disagreements arise before they escalate into full-blown crises. The protocol encourages member states to engage in early warning mechanisms, dialogue, and mediation to identify and mitigate potential sources of tension and instability. By fostering a culture of dialogue and cooperation, SADC aims to prevent conflicts from erupting and disrupting security and peace in the region.

Moreover, the protocol outlines mechanisms for conflict management and resolution in cases where disputes or conflicts do arise. SADC member states commit to resolving conflicts peacefully through diplomatic means, dialogue, and negotiation. The document calls for the development of mediation and arbitration processes, and also the deployment of peacekeeping or observer missions as needed to assist dialogue and mediation efforts. By providing institutional support and mechanisms for conflict

---

<sup>475</sup> *Leshoele M.* The Role of SADC (or Lack Thereof) in the Political Unification of the Region and/or Continent: An Afrocentric Critique // *Journal of African Union Studies*, 2023. Vol. 12. № 2. P. 85.



resolution, SADC seeks to lessen the effects of conflicts and promote stability and security across the region.

Additionally, the protocol addresses issues related to defense cooperation among member states. The SADC member nations agree to cooperate on security issues, such as military training, joint exercises, and capacity-building projects, while maintaining autonomy and integrity of their territories. This cooperation aims to enhance the collective defense capabilities of member states, strengthen regional security, and deter external threats to peace and stability.

Moreover, SADC has established specialized institutions and mechanisms to support its political integration objectives, such as the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation<sup>476</sup>. This organ serves as a platform for member states to engage in political dialogue, exchange information, and coordinate responses to political crises and security threats. Additionally, SADC's Electoral Observation Missions play a crucial role in promoting democratic governance and boosting the legitimacy of election procedures within member states. These missions are tasked with independently assessing the conduct of elections and providing impartial evaluations of their fairness, transparency, and adherence to democratic principles. By doing so, they contribute to strengthening democracy and the promotion of political stability across the region.

One key aspect of SADC's Electoral Observation Missions is their commitment to ensuring free and fair elections. These missions closely monitor various stages of the electoral process, including voter registration, campaigning, polling, vote counting, and the announcement of results. By observing these processes, they can identify any irregularities, violations of electoral laws, or instances of electoral fraud. Their presence

---

<sup>476</sup> Zhanje S., Jeki L. External Financing Sources and Economic Growth: A PARDL Approach to Selected SADC Countries // African Journal of Business and Economic Research, 2022. Vol. 17. № 2. P. 160.

helps to deter malpractices and provides a sense of accountability, thereby enhancing the integrity of the electoral process.

Moreover, SADC's Electoral Observation Missions serve as a mechanism for promoting transparency and accountability in the electoral process. By conducting thorough assessments and issuing comprehensive reports, these missions provide valuable feedback to member states on areas of improvement and best practices in electoral administration. Their recommendations can inform electoral reforms and policy changes aimed at strengthening democratic institutions and processes.

Furthermore, the presence of SADC's Electoral Observation Missions helps to build public confidence in the electoral process. Their independent and impartial assessments provide assurance to both domestic and international stakeholders that elections are being conducted in accordance with democratic norms and standards<sup>477</sup>. This confidence-building role is essential for promoting political stability and preventing electoral disputes or violence.

Ultimately, SADC's political integration efforts are complemented by initiatives aimed at encouraging credibility, openness, and effective leadership within member states. Through peer review mechanisms and capacity-building programs, SADC supports efforts to strengthen democratic institutions, enhance electoral processes, and combat corruption, thereby fostering a conducive environment for political stability and socioeconomic development<sup>478</sup>.

In conclusion, the transition from SADCC to SADC marked a pivotal moment in the history of regional integration in Southern Africa. By adopting a more comprehensive and participatory approach, SADC became a dynamic and proactive regional entity capable of tackling the diverse obstacles facing the region and leveraging its collective strengths for mutual prosperity and growth. Through

---

<sup>477</sup> *Le Pere G.* SADC: Making sense of uncertainty in Southern Africa // *Development*, 2004. Vol. 47. № 4. P. 103–109.

<sup>478</sup> *Saurombe A.* The role of SADC institutions in implementing SADC treaty provisions dealing with regional integration // *Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal*, 2017. Vol. 15. № 2. P. 470.

expanding its membership, broadening its scope, and improving its interaction with member nations, SADC demonstrated its commitment to fostering an inclusive and collaborative environment that benefits all.

### **3.3 The Challenges and Responses to Maintaining Security and Peace in the Region.**

Similar to numerous other regions worldwide, the Southern African region, faces a multitude of peace and security challenges that stem from a variety of sources, including historical conflicts, socio-economic disparities, political instability, and transnational threats. In response to these challenges, several regional organizations and mechanisms have been established to advance stability, security, and peace in Southern Africa. These efforts involve collaboration among member states, as well as engagement with international partners, to deal with the underlying causes of instability differences, insecurity and to build resilience against future threats.

One of the primary regional organizations dedicated to advancing security and stability in Southern Africa is SADC. The advancement of the SADC security structure has been a gradual process aimed at addressing the region's evolving security challenges. The foundation of SADC's security architecture was laid in the early 1990s, following the transition of the SADCC to SADC<sup>479</sup>. SADC member states recognized the importance of regional stability for economic development due to several interconnected reasons. Firstly, they understood that persistent conflicts and instability within the region could deter foreign investment, disrupt trade, and hinder economic growth. Investors are generally reluctant to commit resources to areas characterized by political unrest or security concerns, as these conditions increase operational risks and undermine profitability. Therefore, by prioritizing security cooperation, SADC member

---

<sup>479</sup> *Nieuwkerk A. van.* The regional roots of the African peace and security architecture: exploring centre-periphery relations // *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 2011. Vol. 18. № 2. P. 170.

states aimed to create a conducive environment for investment and economic development<sup>480</sup>.

Secondly, regional peace and stability are essential for fostering cooperation and integration among neighboring countries. In a volatile security environment, mistrust and conflict can hinder diplomatic relations and impede efforts to collaborate on common goals such as infrastructure development, trade facilitation, and regional integration initiatives. By working together to address security challenges, SADC member states sought to build trust, strengthen regional solidarity, and promote peaceful coexistence, laying the foundation for deeper economic integration and cooperation<sup>481</sup>.

Moreover, the link between peace and development is widely recognized in international development discourse. Sustainable development requires stable governance structures, social cohesion, and security for citizens. In conflict-affected areas, basic services such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure are often disrupted, exacerbating poverty and inequality<sup>482</sup>. By prioritizing security cooperation, SADC member states aimed to mitigate the risk of conflicts erupting or escalating within the region, thereby safeguarding the well-being of their populations and creating conditions conducive to sustainable development.

One of the initial phases in the formation of SADC's security framework was the creation of the body responsible for Politics, Defense, and Security Collaboration, referred to as the OPDSC, in 1996. The OPDSC serves as the principal institutional framework for coordinating security-related matters among SADC member states for

---

<sup>480</sup> *Nieuwkerk A. van*. Subregional collaborative security: Lessons from the OAU and SADC // *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 2001. Vol. 8. № 2. P. 81–94.

<sup>481</sup> *Nathan L*. How should the peace and security performance of SADC be evaluated? // *African Security Review*, 2013. Vol. 22. № 3. P. 201–209.

<sup>482</sup> *Kurebwa J*. Women, Peace and Security in the SADC Region // *International Journal of Civic Engagement and Social Change*, 2018. Vol. 5. № 3. P. 48–63.

several reasons<sup>483</sup>. The establishment of the OPDSC was an essential step taken to meet a significant need for a forum that facilitates constructive conversations, consultation, and collective measures among member states on matters affecting the region. The creation of the OPDSC was a direct response to the realization that regional stability and progress are significantly impacted by security dilemmas, such as political unrest, armed conflicts, and cross-border criminal activities. In addition, by establishing the OPDSC, SADC member states aimed to institutionalize mechanisms for collective decision-making and cooperation in addressing these challenges<sup>484</sup>.

The OPDSC facilitates dialogue and consultation among member states by providing a forum where representatives can evaluate the security situation in the area, share data, and exchange opinions. Member governments can debate new dangers, evaluate the success of current security programs, and pinpoint opportunities for cooperation and coordinated action through frequent gatherings and conferences<sup>485</sup>. Through these engagements, the OPDSC fosters a culture of trust, transparency, and cooperation among member states, enhancing their capacity to address shared security concerns collectively.

Moreover, the OPDSC plays a crucial role in facilitating joint action and coordination on security-related initiatives and interventions<sup>486</sup>. It serves as a coordinating body for regional peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts, enabling member states to pool resources, expertise, and capabilities to respond effectively to security threats. The OPDSC oversees the implementation of regional peace agreements, monitors compliance with security-related protocols, and coordinates peace support missions in conflict-affected areas. By centralizing decision-making and

---

<sup>483</sup> *Nathan L.* SADC's Uncommon Approach to Common Security, 1992–2003 // *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 2006. Vol. 32. № 3. P. 610.

<sup>484</sup> *Cawthra G.* Collaborative Regional Security and Mutual Defence: SADC in Comparative Perspective // *Politikon*, 2008. Vol. 35. № 2. P. 163.

<sup>485</sup> *Piknerová L.* Security Cooperation in SADC: SADC on the Way to Security Community? // *Obrana a strategie (Defence and Strategy)*, 2013. Vol. 13. № 1. P. 61.

<sup>486</sup> *Ibid.*

coordination within the OPDSC framework, SADC member states can leverage collective action to address security challenges more efficiently and effectively, thereby contributing to regional peace, stability, and development. Ultimately, Through the OPDSC, member states have worked to strengthen cooperation, build trust, and enhance collective security in Southern Africa.

Certainly, SADC employs a crucial policy tool called the Strategic Indicative Plan also known as SIPO. The SIPO is a strategic blueprint that outlines shared goals, priority sectors, and precise measures required to achieve regional integration in politics, defense, and security. It serves as a key policy instrument for promoting collaboration among member states of SADC and advancing the region's security agenda. With the SIPO, SADC is committed to bolstering peace and stability in Southern Africa and ensuring the safety and security of its people.

The SIPO is closely related to OPDSC, which serves as the principal institutional framework for coordinating security-related matters among SADC member states. While the SIPO provides the strategic guidance and direction for security cooperation, the OPDSC oversees the implementation of security-related initiatives and activities within the SADC region.

The relationship between the SIPO and the OPDSC is symbiotic, as they work in tandem to address security challenges and promote stability within the region. The SIPO sets the overarching strategic objectives and priority areas for security cooperation, while the OPDSC facilitates the operationalization of these objectives through its various mechanisms and structures.

Through the SIPO, SADC countries work together to identify and address shared security threats such as conflicts, political instability, terrorism, organized crime, and border security concerns. This collaboration leads to the development of effective plans, including diplomatic prevention, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and post-conflict rebuilding efforts.

The OPDSC, on the other hand, coordinates the implementation of these actions and initiatives by facilitating dialogue, consultation, and joint action among member states. It provides a platform for member states to discuss security-related issues, share information, and coordinate their responses to security threats and challenges.

Over the years, SADC has adopted several protocols and agreements to formalize its security architecture and enhance regional cooperation on security matters. The Protocol, which addresses matters of security, defense, and politics, and collaboration, was one such milestone, having been adopted in 2001. The Protocol's adoption was an important milestone in the advancement of SADC's security architecture and regional cooperation initiatives<sup>487</sup>. This protocol was designed to formalize and institutionalize mechanisms for political dialogue, defense cooperation, and security collaboration among member states. By establishing a legal framework for addressing security challenges, the protocol aimed to enhance regional stability, promote peacebuilding, and foster mutual trust and confidence among SADC member states.

One of the key objectives of the protocol was to strengthen political governance and democratic practices in the region by encouraging respect for democratic ideals, and equality for all. It emphasized the importance of free, fair, and credible elections as essential elements of democratic governance and encouraged member states to uphold these standards through regular monitoring and assessment mechanisms. By promoting good governance and democratic values, the protocol sought to prevent political instability and conflicts that could undermine regional peace and security.

Furthermore, the protocol addressed defense and security cooperation by establishing frameworks for collective action and mutual assistance in response to security threats. It emphasized the necessity for collaboration among member nations to combat transnational crime, terrorism, and illicit trafficking, among other security

---

<sup>487</sup> Galadima H.S., *Ogbonnaya U.M.* Regional responses to security and development challenges in East and Southern Africa: lessons and way forward // *African Security Review*, 2018. Vol. 27. № 2. P. 162.

challenges. Additionally, the Protocol was a major step toward Southern Africa's institutionalization of mediation, prevention, and settlement procedures. One of the key aspects mentioned in the protocol was the establishment of principles and procedures for diplomatic engagement, mediation, and the use of sanctions as a last resort in addressing political disputes and security challenges among member states.

Diplomatic engagement was emphasized as a primary means of resolving conflicts, with member states encouraged to engage in dialogue and negotiation to peacefully resolve disputes. The document established principles for diplomatic actions aiming at enhancing communication, trust-building, and collaboration among SADC countries, thus advancing regional stability and peace through diplomatic methods<sup>488</sup>.

In cases where diplomatic efforts failed to resolve conflicts, the protocol outlined procedures for mediation and conflict resolution. SADC member states committed to providing support for mediation efforts, either through bilateral or multilateral channels, to facilitate peaceful negotiations and settlements of disputes. Mediation processes were designed to be inclusive, transparent, and impartial, with the aim of reaching mutually acceptable solutions that addressed the underlying causes of conflict.

However, if all peaceful means of conflict resolution were exhausted, the protocol allowed for the consideration of sanctions as a last resort measure. Sanctions were to be applied in a targeted and proportionate manner, with the objective of coercing parties to comply with SADC principles, norms, and decisions. The use of sanctions was subject to strict conditions and procedural requirements, ensuring that they were employed judiciously and in line with international regulations.

Promoting security and peace requires balancing democracy, rights for humans, and development considerations, the SADC protocol thus reflects to some extent the liberal peace and human security agenda advanced by the UN since the middle of the

---

<sup>488</sup> *Singuwa C., Honrada G. Regional Security Integration in the SADC Region // Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serija 4. Istorija. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija, 2023. № 4. P. 194.*



1990s. According to Anne Hammerstad, the objectives presented by the protocol include both traditional security matters and aspects of human security. Therefore, the worry for self-governing as well as territorial integrity was expressed in the military cooperation between the SADC member states and the signing of the mutual defense treaty in 2003 which coexist with the protection of the population and with the assurance of a stable environment for the promotion of socioeconomic development, which reinforces the recognition of the necessity to address the countries internal security problems<sup>489</sup>.

The protocol defines the specific areas where the OPDSC has the power to act. When it comes to interstate conflicts, the OPDSC has a mandate to intervene in cases where territorial boundaries or natural resources are in dispute, instances of aggression or imminent military force arise, conflicts that pose threats to regional security emerge, or when the territory of a member country not involved in the conflict is at risk.

The OPDSC's mandate is to resolve intrastate conflicts, with a focus on mediating disputes between the government and its citizens or within the population. Under its purview are conflicts that involve severe human rights abuses, military coups, civil wars or threats to legitimate governance. However, it is important to note that the OPDSC's intervention is limited to specific conflict scenarios, and not all conflicts, even those involving SADC countries, fall within its jurisdiction. The protocol lacks clear criteria and procedures for identifying and categorizing conflicts or potential threats, which makes implementation more complex.

In addition to institutional frameworks, SADC has bolstered its security architecture with the establishment of practical mechanisms to improve stability and security in the area. One significant development is the establishment of the Brigade, a

---

<sup>489</sup> Hammerstad A. Domestic threats, regional solutions? The challenge of security integration in Southern Africa // *Review of International Studies*. 2005. Vol. 31. № 1. P. 72.

regional military force tasked with responding to security threats and supporting peacekeeping operations within the Southern African region<sup>490</sup>.

The Brigade, sometimes referred to as the Standby Force, consists of military units contributed by member states and is designed to be rapidly deployable in response to crises or conflicts that threaten regional peace and security<sup>491</sup>. The brigade is trained and equipped to undertake a range of peace support operations, including conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, under the authority of the OPDSC<sup>492</sup>.

Moreover, SADC has established early warning systems and conflict prevention mechanisms to anticipate and address security challenges proactively. These systems include the SADC Early Warning Mechanism (SEWM), which monitors political, social, economic, and environmental developments in the region to identify potential sources of conflict or instability<sup>493</sup>. The SEWM collects and analyzes information from various sources, including member states, regional organizations, and international partners, to generate early warning alerts and recommendations for preventive action. Additionally, SADC has established structures such as the Troika Mechanism, which facilitate dialogue, mediation, and conflict resolution among member states. The Troika Mechanism, comprising the current, previous, and incoming chairs of the SADC Organ, plays a crucial role in facilitating diplomatic efforts to address emerging security challenges and resolve conflicts through dialogue and negotiation.

---

<sup>490</sup> *Okon E.N.* Power and regional security: A comparative discourse on ECOWAS and SADC // *African Social Science and Humanities Journal*, 2020. Vol. 1. № 1. P. 40.

<sup>491</sup> *Ndaguba E.A.* Peace operations in Southern Africa: Challenges and prospects for the Southern African Development Community Standby Force // *The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa*, 2018. Vol. 14. № 1. P. 1-8.

<sup>492</sup> *Muntschick J.* The SADC Standby Force and Its Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre: Uncertain Operational Readiness and Future of an Externally Fuelled Brigade // *The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the European Union (EU)*. Cham: Springer International Publishing. 2017. P. 233.

<sup>493</sup> *Nieuwkerk A. van.* Subregional collaborative security: Lessons from the OAU and SADC // *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 2001. Vol. 8. № 2. P. 86.

In general, it can be observed that the security structure of SADC reflects a multifaceted approach to deal with Southern Africa's security issues. Through institutional mechanisms, legal frameworks, and cooperative initiatives, SADC strives to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. By fostering dialogue, cooperation, and collective action, SADC endeavors to build a secure and resilient Southern Africa capable of confronting both traditional and emerging security threats<sup>494</sup>.

In Southern Africa, there are many different and intricate obstacles to security and stability within the framework of integration in the region, often stemming from historical, political, economic, and social factors. Firstly, numerous nations within the area have experienced political instability, characterized by contested elections, governance issues, and social unrest. For example, in Zimbabwe, political turmoil has often arisen from contested elections and allegations of electoral fraud, resulting in heightened tensions and widespread protests. One prominent instance occurred during the presidential elections of 2008<sup>495</sup>. Following these elections, accusations of widespread irregularities and vote-rigging emerged, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the electoral process. The opposition party called the MDC, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, contested the results, alleging manipulation by the ruling party, ZANU-PF, and its leader, Robert Mugabe<sup>496</sup>.

The disputed election outcome triggered significant civil unrest and protests across the country, as citizens expressed their discontent with the electoral process and demanded transparency and accountability from the government. Security forces were deployed to suppress the demonstrations, resulting in clashes between protesters and

---

<sup>494</sup> The Southern African Development Community (SADC), *A Bright Light in Southern Africa* // *Journal of Social Science and Humanities*, 2022. Vol. 4. № 9. P. 62.

<sup>495</sup> *Aeby M.* Stability and Sovereignty at the Expense of Democracy? The SADC Mediation Mandate for Zimbabwe, 2007–2013 // *African Security*, 2017. Vol. 10. № 3-4. P. 278.

<sup>496</sup> *Bratton M.* Power politics in Zimbabwe (Micheal Bratton) // *The Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 2020. T. 38. № 1. P. 45.

authorities. The heavy-handed response by the government further escalated tensions and led to allegations of human rights abuses<sup>497</sup>.

Subsequent elections in Zimbabwe, including those in 2013 and 2018, also faced allegations of electoral irregularities and manipulation<sup>498</sup>. While the degree of controversy varied across elections, concerns about the integrity of the electoral process persisted, undermining public trust in the democratic system. The recurrent challenges related to electoral transparency and accountability have contributed to a volatile political environment in Zimbabwe, characterized by polarization and instability<sup>499</sup>.

The political turmoil resulting from contested elections and allegations of electoral fraud has had significant ramifications for Zimbabwe's governance, socio-economic development, and regional stability. It underscores the importance of credible, transparent, and inclusive electoral processes in fostering political legitimacy and addressing the root causes of social unrest and political instability.

In response to political turmoil arising from contested elections and allegations of electoral fraud in Zimbabwe, SADC had adopted various measures intended to advance stability, safety, and democratic rule in the region<sup>500</sup>. One of the key approaches had been diplomatic engagement and mediation efforts to facilitate dialogue between conflicting parties and mitigate tensions<sup>501</sup>.

---

<sup>497</sup> *Mlambo A.S.* From an Industrial Powerhouse to a Nation of Vendors: Over Two Decades of Economic Decline and Deindustrialization in Zimbabwe 1990–2015 // *Journal of Developing Societies*, 2017. Vol. 33. № 1. P. 100.

<sup>498</sup> *Edwin Y.* When bullets replace ballots: the role of SADC in promoting peace through democratic governance in Zimbabwe // *Journal of African Union Studies*, 2018. Vol. 7. № 3. P. 148.

<sup>499</sup> *Aeby M.* Making an impact from the margins? Civil society groups in Zimbabwe's interim power-sharing process // *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 2016. Vol. 54. № 4. P. 703.

<sup>500</sup> *Moeno, Thapelo A., and Makhura B. Rapanyane.* "An Afrocentric Examination of SADC's Role in Dealing with Electoral Violence in the Region: The Case of Zimbabwe's 2018 General Elections." *African Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies*, 2023. vol. 12. № 2. P. 85.

<sup>501</sup> Agreement between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations on resolving the challenges facing Zimbabwe. URL:[https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ZW\\_080915\\_Agreement%20between%20ZANU-PF%20and%20MDC%20on%20Resolving%20the%20Challenges%20Facing%20Zimbabwe.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ZW_080915_Agreement%20between%20ZANU-PF%20and%20MDC%20on%20Resolving%20the%20Challenges%20Facing%20Zimbabwe.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

SADC has often deployed electoral observer missions to monitor elections in member states and assess the credibility and fairness of the electoral process. These observer missions play a crucial role in providing independent assessments and recommendations to enhance the transparency and integrity of elections. In instances where irregularities or disputes arise, SADC mediators may facilitate negotiations between political actors to reach consensus and resolve differences through peaceful means<sup>502</sup>.

Furthermore, SADC has emphasized the importance of upholding democratic principles and respecting the people's decision as expressed through free and fair elections. The organization has condemned instances of electoral fraud or manipulation and called for adherence to democratic norms and standards. SADC's collective stance on electoral integrity sends a strong signal to member states about the organization's dedication to encouraging freedom and responsible leadership in the region.

Additionally, SADC stands ready to provide critical assistance to member states in their quest to build strong and reliable electoral systems. From technical aid to voter education, and from enhancing electoral administration procedures to providing essential expertise and resources, SADC is dedicated to fortifying democratic institutions and ensuring that election results are transparent and widely trusted by the public<sup>503</sup>.

Similarly, political transitions in countries like Malawi and Tanzania have indeed been characterized by disputes and unrest, posing challenges to stability in the region. In Malawi, for example, the 2019 presidential elections were marred by allegations of irregularities and fraud, leading to widespread protests and legal challenges. The

---

<sup>502</sup> *Mlambo A.S.* 'The Zimbabwean crisis and international response', *Journal for Contemporary History*, 2006. Vol.31. P. 57.

<sup>503</sup> *Phanice Olasya D.* *Regional Organisations in Peace and Security: A Case study of Southern African Development Community (SADC)* // *Journal of African Union Studies*, 2022. Vol. 11. № 1. P. 87.

political tension surrounding the elections strained relations between the government and opposition parties, contributing to social unrest and economic uncertainty.

Similarly, in Tanzania, the 2020 presidential elections were marred by accusations of electoral fraud and suppression of opposition voices. The disputed election results and subsequent crackdown on dissent triggered domestic and international condemnation, raising concerns about the country's democratic trajectory and adherence to rights for humans. The political upheaval in Tanzania has strained relations with neighboring countries and regional partners, complicating efforts to foster cooperation and integration within SADC.

In the case of Malawi, SADC played a crucial role in facilitating dialogue and mediation to address the political crisis that emerged following the disputed 2019 presidential elections. The organization, through its Electoral Observation Mission, provided technical assistance and recommendations to support the electoral process and ensure its credibility. Additionally, SADC engaged with political stakeholders, including government officials and opposition leaders, to encourage dialogue and find a peaceful resolution to the electoral dispute<sup>504</sup>.

Following the announcement of the election results, which were contested by the opposition, SADC supported efforts to pursue legal avenues for redress while emphasizing the importance of upholding democratic principles. The organization urged all parties to exercise restraint, refrain from violence, and seek peaceful means to resolve their differences. Through diplomatic channels and engagement with regional leaders, SADC sought to de-escalate tensions and promote national reconciliation in Malawi.

Similarly, in Tanzania, SADC closely monitored the political developments surrounding the 2020 presidential elections and subsequent disputes over the electoral

---

<sup>504</sup> *Phanice Olasya D. Regional Organisations in Peace and Security: A Case study of Southern African Development Community (SADC) // Journal of African Union Studies, 2022. Vol. 11. № 1. P. 87.*

process and outcome. As concerns grew regarding allegations of electoral fraud and suppression of opposition voices, SADC reiterated its commitment to democratic governance, electoral integrity, and observance of the rights of people in participating nations.

SADC called for dialogue and inclusive political participation in Tanzania, urging all parties to address grievances through peaceful and legal means. The organization emphasized the importance of upholding democratic norms and ensuring the credibility and transparency of electoral processes. SADC also offered technical assistance and support to facilitate dialogue and mediation efforts aimed at resolving political disputes and fostering national reconciliation.

In general, SADC's responses to political transitions in Malawi and Tanzania underscore its commitment to promoting democratic governance, political stability, and safety in the region. By engaging with national stakeholders, providing technical assistance, and advocating for peaceful conflict resolution, SADC has an important role in promoting democracy and the enforcement of law in its member nations.

The area has been plagued by armed conflicts and uprisings, leading to violence, displacement, and humanitarian emergencies. One such example is the DR Congo, which has been struggling with prolonged conflicts in its eastern regions. These conflicts mainly stem from ethnic tensions, disputes over natural resources, and the activities of armed rebel factions<sup>505</sup>.

The region's ethnic tensions have gotten worse because historical grievances, competition for land and resources, and political manipulation. The DRC is home to a diverse array of ethnic groups, and competition for political power and resources often exacerbates existing ethnic divisions. This has led to sporadic outbreaks of violence between different ethnic communities, particularly in areas where land tenure is contested or where ethnic identities are politicized for strategic purposes.

---

<sup>505</sup> *Nangini C. Visualizing Armed Groups: The Democratic Republic of the Congo's M23 in Focus // Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2014. Vol. 3. № 1. P. 5.*

Competition over natural resources, particularly minerals such as gold, coltan, and tin, has also been a major driver of the conflict. These resources are often controlled by armed groups or illicit networks, leading to conflicts over control of mining sites, taxation, and trade routes. The exploitation of natural resources has fueled corruption, instability, and violence, perpetuating cycles of conflict and undermining efforts to achieve stability in the area.

The existence of rebel factions with weapons further complicates the security situation in the area. These rebel groups, which include both local militias and foreign-backed insurgents, often operate in remote and ungoverned areas, exploiting local grievances and profiting from illicit activities such as resource extraction, extortion, and smuggling<sup>506</sup>. Some rebel groups have ideological agendas, while others are motivated primarily by economic interests or ethnic rivalries<sup>507</sup>. The growth in the number of militias has contributed to a climate of insecurity and impunity, making it difficult for the government to assert control and provide security for the population.

SADC has responded to the conflicts by actively engaging in peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and stabilization efforts aimed at addressing the root causes of instability in the country, particularly in its eastern provinces. One of SADC's key responses has been to facilitate diplomatic negotiations and mediation processes aimed at settling the disputes in the country. SADC has convened summits, conferences, and high-level meetings involving regional leaders, international stakeholders, and representatives of the DRC government and various rebel groups to facilitate dialogue and negotiations<sup>508</sup>. These efforts have resulted in the signing of peace agreements,

---

<sup>506</sup> *Maereser S., Zengeni K.T.* Recurring Armed Conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: an Insight into the SADC Intervention Problematique // *Journal International Studies*, 2017. Vol. 13. P. 138.

<sup>507</sup> *Nangini C.* Visualizing Armed Groups: The Democratic Republic of the Congo's M23 in Focus // *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 2014. Vol. 3. № 1. P. 5.

<sup>508</sup> *Maereser S., Zengeni K.T.* Recurring Armed Conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: an Insight into the SADC Intervention Problematique // *Journal International Studies*, 2017. Vol. 13. P. 141.



ceasefire agreements, and other diplomatic initiatives aimed at ending hostilities and promoting reconciliation.

SADC has also deployed peacekeeping forces to the DRC as part of broader international efforts to stabilize the country and protect civilians from violence. For example, SADC contributed troops to the UN peace-keeping mission in the DRC called (MONUSCO), which has a mandate to protect civilians, support the DRC government in restoring state authority, and facilitate the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups<sup>509</sup>.

In addition to diplomatic and military interventions, SADC has supported efforts to address the underlying drivers of conflict in the DRC, including ethnic tensions and competition over natural resources. SADC has promoted initiatives aimed at fostering inclusive governance, promoting dialogue between different ethnic groups, and promoting sustainable development in conflict-affected areas. These efforts have included support for community-based reconciliation processes, economic development projects, and attempts to increase the DRC's government capacity to provide security and services to its citizens.

In summary, SADC's response to the conflicts in the country has been multifaceted, involving diplomatic, military, and developmental interventions aimed at addressing the root causes of instability and fostering stability, prosperity, and safety within the country in the country and the broader region. While significant challenges remain, SADC's engagement in the DRC reflects the organization's commitment to promoting peace and stability in Southern Africa.

In Mozambique, the insurgency in the northern province of Cabo Delgado has escalated in recent years, resulting in significant casualties and displacement. The insurgency, led by a militant group known as Ansar al-Sunna, also referred to locally as Al-Shabaab, is characterized by attacks on villages, government installations, and

---

<sup>509</sup> *Mlambo V.H., Masuku M.M.* Terror at the front gate: Insurgency in Mozambique and its implications for the SADC and South Africa // *Journal of Public Affairs*. 2021. Vol. 22. P. 38.

security forces<sup>510</sup>. These attacks have led to widespread violence, loss of life, and displacement of civilians, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the region.

The situation in Cabo Delgado is far from simple, with a multitude of factors at play. These include social and economic problems, the exclusion of indigenous groups, and the promotion of radical beliefs. The province, despite being rich in natural resources such as natural gas, has experienced high levels of poverty, unemployment, and inequality, particularly among youth. The lack of economic opportunities and social services has contributed to widespread disillusionment and frustration among the population, which has been exploited by militant groups to recruit fighters and sow unrest.

Additionally, the insurgency in Cabo Delgado has been linked to the illicit economy, including illegal mining, poaching, and smuggling, which provide a source of funding for militant groups and perpetuate instability in the region. The porous borders with neighboring countries also facilitate the movement of weapons, fighters, and contraband, further complicating efforts to address the insurgency.

The Mozambican government has struggled to effectively respond to the insurgency, facing challenges related to capacity, coordination, and legitimacy. Security forces have been accused of human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings and arbitrary detention, while efforts tackle the main reasons of the conflict, such as poverty and marginalization, have been limited.

The escalation of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado has had far-reaching implications for Mozambique's stability and regional security. In addition to causing significant human suffering and displacement, the violence has disrupted economic activities, including investments in the natural gas sector, and raised concerns about the spread of extremism in the region. Addressing the root causes of the conflict and restoring peace and stability in Cabo Delgado will require a comprehensive approach

---

<sup>510</sup> *Mlambo V.H., Masuku M.M.* Terror at the front gate: Insurgency in Mozambique and its implications for the SADC and South Africa // *Journal of Public Affairs*. 2021. Vol. 22. P. 38.

that addresses socio-economic grievances, strengthens security institutions, and promotes inclusive governance and development.

SADC has responded to the insurgency in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province by acknowledging the severity of the situation and offering assistance to the Mozambican government to address the security challenges<sup>511</sup>. SADC's response has been primarily focused on coordinating regional efforts to support Mozambique in its efforts to combat the insurgency and restore peace and stability in Cabo Delgado<sup>512</sup>.

One of the key initiatives taken by SADC was the decision to deploy a military mission, known as the SADC Standby Force, to Mozambique to provide technical assistance and capacity building to the Mozambican security forces<sup>513</sup>. This deployment aimed to enhance Mozambique's ability to effectively respond to the insurgency and restore law and order in the affected areas. Additionally, SADC has facilitated discussions among member states to explore additional ways to support Mozambique, including through financial assistance, intelligence sharing, and logistical support<sup>514</sup>.

SADC's response also includes efforts to tackle the main reasons of the conflict in Cabo Delgado, such as poverty, unemployment, and marginalization. The organization has emphasized the importance of promoting socio-economic development and inclusive governance as part of a comprehensive approach to addressing the underlying grievances driving the insurgency. SADC has encouraged Mozambique to prioritize development projects and initiatives aimed at improving the

---

<sup>511</sup> *Makonye F.* The Cabo Delgado Insurgency in Mozambique: Origin, Ideology, Recruitment Strategies and, Social, Political and Economic Implications for Natural Gas and Oil Exploration // African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research, 2020. Vol. 1. № 3. P. 60.

<sup>512</sup> *Ntaka B.* The Cabo Delgado Insurgency: A Symptom of Governance Failure in Mozambique // The African Journal of Governance and Development (AJGD), 2023. Vol. 12. № 1. P. 33.

<sup>513</sup> *Svicevic M.* Collective self-defence or regional enforcement action: the legality of a SADC intervention in Cabo Delgado and the question of Mozambican consent // Journal on the Use of Force and International Law, 2021. Vol. 9. № 1. P. 140.

<sup>514</sup> *Dzinesa G.A.* The Southern African Development Community's Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM): Policymaking and Effectiveness // International Peacekeeping, 2023. Vol. 30. № 2. P. 201.

livelihoods of communities affected by the conflict and fostering social cohesion and resilience.

In addition, SADC has collaborated extensively with other regional and global partners, such as the UN and the AU, to plan a coordinated response to the Mozambican crisis. This collaborative approach has enabled the pooling of resources, expertise, and diplomatic support to effectively address the security and humanitarian challenges facing Cabo Delgado.

The Southern African region is also plagued by transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and human trafficking. Criminal networks exploit weak governance structures, porous borders, and corruption to carry out illicit activities. For example, South Africa, with its strategic geographic location and well-developed transportation infrastructure, serves as a hub for drug trafficking routes in the region. The country's extensive road, air, and maritime networks provide easy access to neighboring countries and international markets, making it an attractive transit point for drug traffickers. Additionally, South Africa's status as a major economic hub and its relatively porous borders contribute to the ease of smuggling illicit drugs into and out of the country.

Mozambique and Tanzania, on the other hand, are transit points for illegal wildlife trade and human trafficking due to their proximity to wildlife-rich areas and porous borders. Both countries are home to diverse ecosystems and abundant wildlife, making them prime targets for poachers and traffickers seeking to exploit natural resources for profit. Mozambique's coastline and numerous ports provide convenient entry and exit points for illegal wildlife products, while Tanzania's vast land borders offer multiple smuggling routes for traffickers.

In the case of illegal wildlife trade, Mozambique and Tanzania serve as conduits for trafficking endangered species, such as elephants, rhinos, and pangolins, as well as their body parts and derivatives. Poachers often target protected areas and game reserves within these countries, where wildlife populations are abundant, but

enforcement of conservation laws may be lacking. Once smuggled out of Mozambique and Tanzania, these illicit wildlife products are trafficked to other countries, primarily in Asia, where they are sold on the black market for use in traditional medicine, luxury goods, and exotic pets.

Similarly, Mozambique and Tanzania are transit points for human trafficking, with vulnerable individuals being trafficked across borders for various purposes, including forced labor, sexual exploitation, and organ harvesting. Migrants and refugees fleeing conflict, poverty, and persecution in neighboring countries often fall victim to human traffickers who exploit their desperation and lack of legal protections. Trafficking networks operating in Mozambique and Tanzania take advantage of porous borders, corruption, and weak law enforcement to smuggle people across borders and coerce them into exploitative situations.

SADC recognizes the importance of addressing transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking, illegal wildlife trade, and human trafficking, which pose significant challenges to the region's security, stability, and socio-economic development. As such, SADC has adopted various initiatives and measures to respond to these illicit activities, with a focus on enhancing regional cooperation, capacity-building, and law enforcement collaboration among member states<sup>515</sup>.

In response to drug trafficking routes passing through South Africa, SADC has prioritized the strengthening of border controls and law enforcement collaboration between the countries to disrupt illicit drug networks and prevent the flow of narcotics across borders<sup>516</sup>. SADC encourages information sharing, intelligence exchange, and joint operations among law enforcement agencies to identify and dismantle drug trafficking syndicates operating in the region. Additionally, SADC promotes the

---

<sup>515</sup> *Vhumbunu C.H.* Combating Human Trafficking in the Southern African Development Community: Strategies, Challenges, and Opportunities // Strategic Review for Southern Africa. 2020. Vol. 42. № 2. P. 179–203.

<sup>516</sup> *Yesufu S.* Harmonizing Road Transport Legislation in the SADC Region for Crime Prevention // Insight on Africa. 2020. Vol. 13. № 1. P. 28–55.

implementation of regional strategies and action plans to combat drug trafficking, including measures to address drug demand, supply reduction, and alternative development initiatives.

Regarding illegal wildlife trade and human trafficking in countries like Mozambique and Tanzania, SADC has developed regional frameworks and protocols to address these challenges. SADC member states collaborate on wildlife conservation efforts, law enforcement activities, and anti-poaching initiatives to combat illegal wildlife trade and protect endangered species. SADC promotes the passage and implementation of laws against wildlife crime, and also the development of specialized units and task forces to investigate and prosecute wildlife traffickers.

Similarly, SADC promotes regional cooperation to combat human trafficking and protect the rights of victims. Member nations are urged to implement national legislation and policies in compliance with worldwide norms on human trafficking, as well as to enhance cross-border cooperation in identifying, intercepting, and prosecuting human traffickers. SADC equips its member countries to combat human trafficking with efficacious measures by providing technical support, training, and capacity-building assistance. By offering victims refuge, counseling, and rehabilitation programs, it also contributes to the improvement of victim support services.

SADC's stance on transnational organized crime is clear - it's a problem that requires a collective solution. The organization recognizes the need for member nations to work together, providing mutual support and fostering shared accountability. To combat illegal activities such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and illegal wildlife trade, SADC aims to enhance regional partnership. By doing so, the organization can bolster the capabilities of member states to tackle these unlawful activities efficiently and safeguard the security, stability, and prosperity of the Southern African region. SADC's collaborative approach is an effective and persuasive way of tackling transnational organized crime in the region.

Border disputes and territorial claims between neighboring countries remain a source of tension and conflict in the area. For instance, the border dispute between Malawi and Tanzania over Lake Malawi/Nyasa has been a longstanding issue that has strained relations between Malawi and Tanzania and hindered cooperation on regional issues. The dispute revolves around the ownership of a portion of Lake Malawi/Nyasa, Africa's third-largest lake, which is rich in oil and gas reserves, as well as valuable fish stocks. Both Malawi and Tanzania claim sovereignty over the entirety of the lake or significant portions of it, leading to diplomatic tensions and occasional confrontations.

The border dispute has strained relations between Malawi and Tanzania, impacting various aspects of bilateral cooperation and regional integration efforts. The lack of resolution on the issue has hindered progress on joint initiatives and development projects between the two countries, including infrastructure development, trade facilitation, and cross-border investments. Additionally, the dispute has led to a breakdown in communication and trust between Malawi and Tanzania, making it challenging to find mutually acceptable solutions to other regional issues.

Furthermore, the border dispute has also had broader implications for regional stability and cooperation within SADC. The unresolved territorial dispute has created divisions within SADC and undermined the organization's efforts to stability, and economic integration in the region. The inability of Malawi and Tanzania to reach a diplomatic resolution on the issue has hindered SADC's ability to foster greater regional cooperation and solidarity among its member states.

SADC has responded to the border dispute between Malawi and Tanzania over Lake Malawi/Nyasa by facilitating dialogue and mediation between the two countries. SADC, as a regional organization committed to promoting peace, stability, and cooperation among its member states, has recognized the importance of resolving the dispute in a peaceful and diplomatic manner to foster greater regional integration and solidarity.

SADC has played a facilitative role in encouraging Malawi and Tanzania to engage in constructive dialogue and negotiations to find a mutually acceptable solution to the border dispute. The organization has provided a platform for both countries to discuss their grievances, share information, and explore possible avenues for resolution. SADC's involvement has helped to create a conducive environment for diplomatic engagement and conflict resolution, mitigating the risk of escalation and tension between Malawi and Tanzania.

Furthermore, SADC has emphasized the importance of adhering to international law and principles of good neighborliness in resolving the border dispute. The organization has encouraged Malawi and Tanzania to explore peaceful means, such as mediation, arbitration, or legal recourse through international bodies, to address their territorial claims in a fair and transparent manner. By promoting a rules-based approach to conflict resolution, SADC seeks to uphold the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peaceful coexistence among its member states.

Moreover, SADC has underscored the broader implications of the border dispute for regional stability and cooperation. The organization has emphasized the need for Malawi and Tanzania to prioritize regional solidarity and cooperation over narrow national interests in resolving the dispute. SADC has stressed that a peaceful resolution to the border dispute is essential for fostering trust, confidence, and cooperation between the two SADC members and for advancing the broader objectives of integration and development in the region.

Weak governance structures and pervasive corruption undermine efforts to maintain stability in the region, particularly in countries like Zimbabwe, where corruption is endemic. In such countries, governance institutions are often compromised by political interference, lack of transparency, and insufficient



accountability mechanisms<sup>517</sup>. As a result, security agencies may be politicized, and law enforcement efforts may be undermined by corruption and inefficiency.

One way in which weak governance and corruption impact peace and security is by eroding public trust in state institutions. When citizens perceive that government officials are corrupt or incompetent, they may become disillusioned with the state's ability to address security challenges effectively. This lack of trust can undermine cooperation with law enforcement agencies and hinder efforts to combat crime and maintain order.

Corruption within security forces can weaken their capacity to respond to security threats. In countries where bribery and nepotism are prevalent, security personnel may be more concerned with personal gain than with fulfilling their duties to protect the population. This can lead to a breakdown in law enforcement and contribute to a culture of impunity, where criminals feel emboldened to commit offenses without fear of repercussions.

In addition, weak governance structures and corruption can exacerbate social and economic inequalities, which are often underlying drivers of insecurity. When resources are mismanaged or diverted through corrupt practices, marginalized communities may be further marginalized, leading to grievances and social unrest. In Zimbabwe, for example, allegations of corruption within the ruling elite have fueled public discontent and contributed to protests and demonstrations.

SADC recognizes the detrimental impact of weak governance structures and pervasive corruption on security and peace in the region. To address these challenges, SADC has developed frameworks, protocols, and initiatives intended to encourage transparency, good governance and accountability among member states.

---

<sup>517</sup> *Compton Jr.R.W.* “Comparative Regional Integration in SADC and ASEAN: Democracy and Governance Issues in Historical and Socio-Economic Context.” *Regions & Cohesion*, 2013. Vol. 3. № 1. P. 13.

One of the keyways in which SADC responds to weak governance and corruption is through its Protocol against Corruption, which was adopted in 2001. The fight against corruption is a crucial element in fostering transparency and accountability in public institutions. That's why the protocol mandates member countries to take concrete actions against corruption, such as creation of dedicated anti-corruption commissions, passing strong anti-corruption laws, and executing plans to promote honesty and transparency within public institutions. By fostering collaboration and information sharing among the countries, the protocol seeks to strengthen regional efforts to tackle corruption and its detrimental effects on security and peace.

In addition to the Protocol against Corruption, SADC has also established the SADC Anti-Corruption Committee, which serves as a platform for member states to exchange best practices, share information, and coordinate efforts to combat corruption. Through initiatives such as capacity-building workshops, technical assistance programs, and peer reviews, the committee supports member states in strengthening their anti-corruption mechanisms and promoting a culture of integrity and accountability.

Furthermore, OPDSC plays a crucial role in dealing with issues of fraud and governance that affect security and peace in the region. The OPDSC provides a forum for member states to discuss security threats, including those arising from corruption and weak governance, and to develop coordinated responses to address them. By facilitating dialogue and collaboration among member states, the OPDSC contributes to regional stability and trust-building.

In conclusion, the issues of security and peace in Southern Africa require a unified regional initiative to tackle underlying problems, strengthen institutions and foster collaboration between nations. It is pivotal for entities like the SADC to take the

lead in promoting dialogue, resolving conflicts and initiating peacebuilding projects to alleviate these challenges and promote regional unity<sup>518</sup>.

Regional responses to security and peace challenges in the region reflect a comprehensive and collaborative approach involving conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, and addressing non-traditional security threats. Through mechanisms such as peacekeeping missions, peace agreements, and regional protocols, Southern African countries are working together to promote stability and development in the region. However, significant challenges remain, and ongoing efforts are needed to tackle the underlying reasons of conflict and build resilient and peaceful societies in Southern Africa.

---

<sup>518</sup> *Arthur P.* Promoting Security in Africa through Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union's African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) // *Insight on Africa*, 2017. Vol. 9. № 1. P. 12.

## CONCLUSION

The study has conducted an extensive analysis of the distinctive features of regional integration in Southern Africa between 1992 and 2023. The study evaluated the political and economic drivers, different regional integration blocs, and the role of the SADC, leading to some significant discoveries. The findings highlighted the importance of regional integration in promoting economic growth and stability and underscored the need for continued cooperation among member states to achieve sustainable development and shared prosperity.

To start with, Southern Africa's political and economic motivations for regional integration have been pivotal drivers shaping the region's integration trajectory. Political motivations, including the pursuit of peace, stability, and collective security, have propelled countries towards closer collaboration. Economic incentives, such as the desire to enhance market access, attract investment, and achieve economies of scale, have also played a significant role.

Research has demonstrated that the Southern African region's political landscape is marked by a complex interplay of historical legacies, liberation movements, and geopolitical dynamics, all of which have significant implications for regional integration efforts. Post-colonial legacies, stemming from centuries of colonial rule by European powers, have left a profound impact on the socio-political structures of numerous nations in the area. These legacies include deeply entrenched inequalities, ethnic divisions, and governance challenges that continue to shape political dynamics today.

The contribution of liberation movements in the fight against colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa is undeniable. These movements were instrumental in securing independence for numerous nations in the region. However, the transition of these movements into governing parties has had a profound effect on political landscapes. This has sometimes resulted in authoritarianism, political bias, and an

obstacle to democratic governance. The dominance of certain liberation movements in the political arena has contributed to a complex power dynamic within the region, influencing decision-making processes and integration efforts. It is important to acknowledge the role of liberation movements in history while also recognizing the need for continued vigilance to protect democratic values in the present.

The political climate of Southern Africa has been greatly impacted by geopolitical rivalry, both past and present, which has complicated attempts at regional integration. These rivalries stem from various factors, including historical animosities, competition for influence, control over resources, and strategic interests among regional powers and external actors. Historically, Southern Africa has been marked by deep-seated rivalries, particularly between apartheid-era South Africa and neighboring states known as frontline states. During the apartheid regime, South Africa's policy of racial segregation and its aggressive pursuit of regional dominance led to tensions and conflicts with neighboring countries. This historical antagonism has left a legacy of distrust and suspicion, which continues to impact regional relations and integration initiatives.

Additionally, it has been revealed that ongoing disputes over borders and resources further complicate the regional political landscape. Territorial disputes, such as those between Tanzania and Malawi, created tensions that can impede cooperation and integration efforts. Moreover, competition for control over valuable resources, such as minerals, waterways, and energy reserves, fuels geopolitical rivalries and exacerbates regional tensions.

Ideological differences also play a role in shaping geopolitical rivalries in Southern Africa. The region has witnessed competing political ideologies, with some countries aligning with socialist or communist ideologies during the Cold War era, while others leaned towards capitalism or Western ideologies. These ideological differences have played a part in the establishment of alliances and blocs within the region, further influencing regional dynamics and integration initiatives.

Furthermore, external actors, including global powers and international organizations, often play a significant role in exacerbating or mitigating geopolitical rivalries in Southern Africa. Great power competition, particularly during the Cold War, intensified regional conflicts and rivalries as superpowers vied for influence and control over strategic resources. Similarly, the involvement of organizations, such as the UN and the AU, can either exacerbate or alleviate tensions depending on their approach to regional conflicts and disputes.

Despite these challenges, political cooperation has played a crucial role in addressing historical conflicts and promoting stability within the region. Regional organizations such as the SADC have provided platforms for dialogue, mediation, and conflict resolution, helping to prevent and manage conflicts. Moreover, the advancement of democratic government ideals and the respect for human rights have been central tenets of regional integration efforts, contributing to the consolidation of democratic institutions and adherence to the law in many Southern African countries.

In addition to addressing historical conflicts, political cooperation has fostered regional solidarity and a sense of common purpose among Southern African countries. Through joint initiatives and collaborative decision-making processes, region's nations have demonstrated their ability to work towards common goals such as reduction of poverty, advancement of the economy and social progress. Despite the inherent challenges and complexities of the political landscape, the commitment to political cooperation remains a driving force behind efforts to promote peace, stability, and integration in the region.

Economically, the study has shown that regional integration offers numerous benefits that can significantly impact the prosperity and development of the member countries in regional integration groupings such as SADC, SACU, and COMESA. One of the primary advantages is the expansion of trade opportunities within the region. The free flow of products and services between participating nations is made possible by regional integration, which eliminates trade restrictions like import quotas and tariffs.

This facilitates increased trade volumes, promotes specialization based on comparative advantages, and creates a larger market for producers and consumers alike. Enhanced competitiveness is another key benefit of regional integration. Through collaboration and cooperation, Southern African countries can pool their resources and expertise to develop industries and sectors where they have a comparative advantage. By doing so, they can improve efficiency, reduce production costs, and compete more effectively in both regional and global markets. This increased competitiveness not only benefits businesses but also contributes to overall economic growth in the region. Furthermore, regional integration can attract increased foreign direct investment (FDI) to Southern Africa. A larger and more integrated market with streamlined regulations and investment frameworks is more attractive to foreign investors seeking to access new markets and expand their operations. FDI inflows can bring in much-needed capital, technology, and expertise, which can further stimulate economic growth, create jobs, and drive innovation within the region.

However, challenges remain, including uneven implementation, regulatory disparities, and institutional capacity constraints. Overcoming these challenges requires continued commitment to regional integration, strengthened institutional frameworks, and enhanced policy coordination. By addressing implementation challenges, the region can unlock the full potential of integration, promote sustainable economic development, and improve the livelihoods of its people.

In evaluating the regional integration groupings in Southern Africa, it has been shown that the region's modern integration environment includes several regional organizations, such as SACU, COMESA, and AfCFTA. The regional integration groupings play a crucial role in fostering economic growth, trade facilitation, and development cooperation across the region. SACU, COMESA, and AfCFTA serve as vital platforms for enhancing regional economic integration and addressing common challenges faced by member states. Despite facing various obstacles such as institutional capacity constraints, regulatory inconsistencies, and infrastructure deficits,

these groupings have made significant strides in promoting intra-regional trade, investment, and industrial development.

The world's oldest customs union, the SACU, has played an instrumental role in facilitating trade and economic cooperation among its member states. Meanwhile, the COMESA has made significant strides in creating a common market, contributing hugely to the overall economic integration and regional stability. The recent establishment of the AfCFTA presents a new chapter of opportunities for deeper integration and economic transformation in Southern Africa. Together, these organizations represent a beacon of hope for a prosperous Southern Africa.

However, challenges remain, including the need for harmonization of trade policies and regulations, improvement of infrastructure connectivity, and enhancement of productive capacities. Addressing these challenges requires sustained political commitment, effective governance structures, and meaningful collaboration among member states.

In the years ahead, it is imperative for Southern African countries to redouble their efforts in implementing regional integration initiatives, leveraging the synergies between different groupings, and prioritizing inclusive and sustainable development. By harnessing the collective potential of regional integration, Southern Africa can overcome its socio-economic challenges and emerge as a more prosperous and integrated region on the global stage.

It has been demonstrated in the research that the transformation of SADC from SADCC to a comprehensive regional organization demonstrates its unwavering commitment to advancing integration efforts. SADC's focus has expanded beyond economic coordination to encompass political, social, and security dimensions. Consequently, it has transformed into a multifaceted institution that addresses the diverse needs and priorities of its member states. The organization's evolution underscores its dedication to promoting regional cooperation and enhancing the well-being of its citizens.



The (SADC is a driving force behind regional integration projects in Southern Africa. As the cornerstone of economic development, SADC fosters cooperation and tackles common challenges across the region. By establishing SADC as the core of regional integration projects, the region acknowledges the importance of collective action in achieving shared goals. Through its institutional framework, policy initiatives, and strategic partnerships, SADC provides a platform for member states to collaborate on various fronts, including trade facilitation, infrastructure development, and peace and security. By bringing together the nations of Southern Africa, SADC promotes greater stability and prosperity for all, truly making a difference in the region. With SADC's pivotal role in regional integration projects, the region can achieve its full potential and enjoy the benefits of collective growth, development, and prosperity.

Moreover, SADC has adopted a set of principles and approaches that underline its commitment to fostering cooperation and solidarity among its member states. One of the key aspects of SADC's approach is its emphasis on inclusive decision-making processes. Unlike some regional organizations where decision-making is dominated by a few powerful members, SADC prioritizes the involvement of all member states in the decision-making process. This inclusivity ensures that the diverse perspectives and interests of all member states are taken into account, enhancing the legitimacy and ownership of decisions made by the organization.

Consensus-building is another cornerstone of SADC's approach to regional cooperation. Recognizing the importance of consensus in addressing complex regional challenges, SADC encourages member states to engage in dialogue and negotiation to reach agreements that are acceptable to all parties involved. This approach promotes cooperation and prevents unilateral actions that could undermine regional unity and stability. By seeking consensus, SADC fosters a spirit of cooperation and compromise among member states, laying the groundwork for effective collective action.

Capacity development is also central to SADC's efforts to promote cooperation and solidarity among its member states. Recognizing that numerous nations in the

region face capacity constraints in various areas, including governance, infrastructure development, and economic management, SADC provides support and assistance to bolster the capability of its member states. Through training programs, technical assistance, and knowledge-sharing initiatives, SADC helps member states build the skills and expertise needed to address common challenges and achieve shared goals.

However, while the SADC has made significant strides in advancing regional integration, challenges persist that require concerted efforts to overcome. Main among these challenges are peace and security issues and governance shortcomings within the region. Peace and security remain major concerns in Southern Africa, with ongoing conflicts, political instability, and transnational crime posing threats to regional stability. Despite SADC's efforts to address these challenges through initiatives such as the OPDSC and regional peacekeeping missions, more needs to be done to effectively prevent and resolve conflicts, strengthen institutions, and promote good governance.

## LIST OF SOURCES AND LITERATURE

### Sources

#### *a) Normal legislation*

1. African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement. URL: [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36437-treaty-consolidated\\_text\\_on\\_cfta\\_-\\_en.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36437-treaty-consolidated_text_on_cfta_-_en.pdf) (date of access: 09.10.2023).
2. ANC Constitution 1991. URL: <https://www.anc1912.org.za/anc-constitution-1991> (date of access: 07.09.2023).
3. COMESA, Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, adopted 5 November 1993, entered into force 8 December 1994. URL: [https://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/comesa-treaty-revised-20092012\\_with-zaire\\_final.pdf](https://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/comesa-treaty-revised-20092012_with-zaire_final.pdf) (date of access: 09.10.2023).
4. Constitutive Act of the African Union .URL: <https://au.int/en/treaties> (date of access: 07.09.2023).
5. Constitution of the Republic of Angola.2010. URL:[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Angola\\_2010](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Angola_2010) (date of access: 07.09.2023).
6. Constitution of the Republic of Botswana.1966. URL:<https://www.parliament.gov.bw/images/constitution.pdf> (date of access: 07.09.2023).
7. Constitution of the Federal Islamic Republic of The Comoros. 2018. URL: [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Comoros\\_2018](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Comoros_2018) (date of access: 07.09.2023).
8. Constitution of the Republic of Democratic Republic of Congo 2005 (rev. 2011).URL:[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_2011](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_2011) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

9. Constitution of Eswatini 2005. URL: [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Swaziland\\_2005](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Swaziland_2005) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

10. Constitution of the Republic of Lesotho 1993 (rev. 2018). URL: [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lesotho\\_2018](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lesotho_2018) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

11. Constitution of the Republic of Madagascar 2010. URL: [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Madagascar\\_2010](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Madagascar_2010) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

12. Constitution of the Republic of Malawi.2017. URL: [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malawi\\_2017](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malawi_2017) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

13. Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius 2016. URL: <https://cdn.accf-francophonie.org/2019/03/maurice-constitution2016.pdf> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

14. Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique.2007. URL: [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mozambique\\_2007](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mozambique_2007) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

15. Constitution of the Republic of Namibia.2010. URL: <https://www.lac.org.na/laws/annoSTAT/Namibian%20Constitution.pdf> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

16. Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles.1993. URL: <https://seylit.org/akn/sc/act/1994/7/eng@2020-06-01> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

17. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.1996. URL: [https://www.concourt.org.za/images/phocadownload/the\\_text/Slimline-Constitution-Web-Version.pdf](https://www.concourt.org.za/images/phocadownload/the_text/Slimline-Constitution-Web-Version.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

18. Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania.1977. URL: <https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/constitution.pdf> (date of access:07.09.2023).

19. Constitution of SWAPO PARTY. URL: [https://www.politicalpartydb.org/wp-content/uploads/Statutes/Namibia/Namibia\\_Swapo\\_1998.pdf](https://www.politicalpartydb.org/wp-content/uploads/Statutes/Namibia/Namibia_Swapo_1998.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).
20. Constitution of the Republic of Zambia.2016. URL:[https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/amendment\\_act/Constitution%20of%20Zambia%20%20\(Amendment\),%202016-Act%20No.%202\\_0.pdf](https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/amendment_act/Constitution%20of%20Zambia%20%20(Amendment),%202016-Act%20No.%202_0.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).
21. Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe.2013. URL:[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe\\_2013](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013) (date of access: 07.09.2023).
22. Lancaster House Agreement, 21 December 1979. URL:[https://sasspace.sas.ac.uk/5847/5/1979\\_Lancaster\\_House\\_Agreement.pdf](https://sasspace.sas.ac.uk/5847/5/1979_Lancaster_House_Agreement.pdf) (date of access: 05.07.2023).
23. The SACU Agreement, 2002. URL: <https://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=566> (date of access: 07.09.2023).
24. Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, adopted 30 November 1999, entered into force 7 July 2000.URL: <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2487/download> (date of access: 09.10.2023).
25. UN Security Council, Resolution 1736 (2006) The Situation Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/RES/1736 (2006), 22 December 2006. URL: <https://www.refworld.org/legal/resolution/unsc/2006/en/26241> (date of access: 12.02.2023).
26. UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 960 (1994)[Mozambique], S/RES/960 (1994), 21 November 1994. URL: <https://www.refworld.org/legal/resolution/unsc/1994/en/87437> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

27. UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 477 (1980) [New member: Zimbabwe], S/RES/477 (1980), 30 July 1980. URL: <https://www.refworld.org/legal/resolution/unsc/1980/en/8938> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

28. White Paper on South African Foreign Policy. URL: [https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis\\_document/201409/final-draft-white-paper-sa-foreign-policy.pdf](https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/final-draft-white-paper-sa-foreign-policy.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

***b) Documents of international and regional organizations***

29. African Union, Yamoussoukro Declaration 1999. URL: <https://www.iata.org/contentassets/70e363e7f97b4bbfb5daff1c27ff0e29/single-african-air-transport-market.pdf> (date of access: 07.10.2023).

30. AUDA-NEPAD 2022 Annual Report. URL: <https://www.nepad.org/publication/auda-nepad-2022-annual-report> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

31. COMESA document. Marawa, Infrastructure Development, Infrastructure Development Directorate, 2010, 2014. URL: [https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/11991007\\_02.pdf](https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/11991007_02.pdf) (date of access: 09.10.2023).

32. Country Brief South Africa: Counteracting premature deindustrialization. URL: [https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/files/2020-11/UNIDO\\_IAP\\_SDG9 - Country Brief - South Africa\\_v2.pdf](https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/files/2020-11/UNIDO_IAP_SDG9_-_Country_Brief_-_South_Africa_v2.pdf) (date of access: 07.07.2023).

33. Declaration of the Southern African Conference, Lusaka. URL: [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNAAX403.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAX403.pdf) (date of access: 04.09.2023).

34. Declaration & Treaty of SADC 1992. URL: [https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-11/Declaration\\_\\_Treaty\\_of\\_SADC\\_0.pdf](https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-11/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC_0.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

35. Interview with Tanki Mothae (Director of the OPDS) at the SADC Headquarters (09/29/2010). URL: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320256783\\_Regional\\_Security\\_Cooperation\\_and\\_the\\_SADC's\\_Organ\\_for\\_Politics\\_Defence\\_and\\_Security\\_A\\_Picture\\_of\\_Mixed\\_Performance](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320256783_Regional_Security_Cooperation_and_the_SADC's_Organ_for_Politics_Defence_and_Security_A_Picture_of_Mixed_Performance) (date of access: 20.10.2023).

36. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. July 09, 2002. URL: <https://au.int/pt/treaties> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

37. Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology 1996. URL: <https://www.sadc.int/document/protocol-transport-communications-and-meteorology-1996> (date of access: 19.07.2023).

38. Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament March 02, 2001. URL: <https://au.int/pt/treaties> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

39. SADC, Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region, adopted 24 August 1996, entered into force 1 July 1998. URL: [https://extranet.sadc.int/files/6713/2680/2290/20060629\\_protocol\\_comm\\_transport\\_met.pdf](https://extranet.sadc.int/files/6713/2680/2290/20060629_protocol_comm_transport_met.pdf) (date of access: 09.10.2023).

40. SADC, Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (Gaborone, Botswana, 2003). URL: [http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional\\_Indicative\\_Strategic\\_D](http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_D) (date of access: 16.03.2023).

41. Socioeconomic impact of conflict in Africa. URL: <https://www.uneca.org/socioeconomic-impact-of-conflict-in-africa> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

42. The AUC Meets with a High-Level Donor Mission. URL: <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240401/african-union-commission-meets-high-level-donor-mission-multi-hazard-early> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

43. The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, Lusaka 14th - 16th April 1969. URL: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/Lusaka%20Manifesto.pdf> or [https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA00020117\\_32](https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA00020117_32) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

44. The Mogadishu Conference and Declaration, October 1971. URL: [https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9599-21com\\_1981b.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9599-21com_1981b.pdf) (date of access: 07.03.2023).

45. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Submission on Zimbabwe: UPR 26th Session, March 2016. URL: <https://www.refworld.org/policy/upr/unhcr/2016/en/119230> (date of access: 12.02.2023).

46. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Jun 10, 2020. DTM IOM Southern Africa Covid 19 Response - Situation Report 2 (22 May - 4 June 2020). IOM, Southern Africa. URL: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/iom-southern-africa-covid-19-response-situation-report-2-22-may-4-june-2020> (date of access: 19.07.2023).

47. World Bank (2020). The African Continental Free Trade Area. URL: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/the-african-continental-free-trade-area> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

### *c) statistical sources*

48. Celebrating 20 years of Freedom and Democracy. URL: <http://www.statssa.gov.za> (Accessed date: 07.09.2023).

49. Oil and Gas investment in Mozambique. URL: <https://www.ine.gov.mz/> (date of access: 07.09.2023).



50. Regional Strategy for Development of Statistics - 2013 - 2018 (SADC).URL: <https://www.nbs.go.tz/index.php/en/other-statistics/291-regional-strategy-for-development-of-statistics-2013-2018-sadc> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

51. Transport and Infrastructure Stats Brief Quarter 3, 2023.URL: <https://www.statsbots.org.bw/sites/default/files/publications/Transport%20and%20Infrastructure%20%20Stats%20Brief%20Quarter%203%202023.pdf> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

52. Trade Statistics Bulletin – March 2022. URL: [https://nsa.nsa.org.na/new\\_publications/trade-statistics-bulletin-march-2022/](https://nsa.nsa.org.na/new_publications/trade-statistics-bulletin-march-2022/) (date of access 07.09.2023).

53. World Bank. The African Continental Free Trade Area.2020. URL: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/the-african-continental-free-trade-area> (date of access: 16.10.2023).

*d) media sources*

54. Communiqué of 42nd Ordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government. URL: <https://www.gov.za/speeches/communiqu%C3%A9-%C2%A0-42nd%C2%A0ordinary-summit-sadc-heads-state-and-government-17-aug-2022-0000> (date of access: 23.09.2023).

55. keynote address speech by former President of the United Republic of Tanzania, H.E. Benjamin William Mkapa titled: “Build bridges not walls,”. URL: <https://uongozi.or.tz/news/build-bridges-not-walls-former-president-mkapa/> (date of access 23.09.2023).

56. Opening speech for the 2nd COMESA-SADC-EAC Tripartite Summit by H.E. Mr. Erastus Mwencha Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Johannesburg.2011. URL:[https://au.int/sites/default/files/speeches/25452-sp-dcp\\_opening\\_speech\\_-\\_2nd\\_tripartite\\_12.06.11.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/speeches/25452-sp-dcp_opening_speech_-_2nd_tripartite_12.06.11.pdf) (date of access: 07.09.2023).

57. Statement by His Excellency Dr. Mokgweetsi Eric Keabetswe Masisi, President of the Republic of Botswana and Chairperson of the SACU Summit, during

the Investment Roundtable held on 12 - 13 April 2022, in Gaborone, Botswana. URL: [https://www.sacu.int/docs/speeches/2022/Statement\\_HE-President-Masisi.pdf](https://www.sacu.int/docs/speeches/2022/Statement_HE-President-Masisi.pdf) (date of access 07.09.2023).

58. Statement by His Excellency Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, President of the Republic of Mozambique and Chairperson of SADC, on need to speed up economic integration in SADC. URL: <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-president-urges-sadc-to-speed-up-economic-integration-watch-195109/> (date of access: 23.09.2023).

59. Speech By His Majesty King Mswati Iii During The Official Opening Of The 8th Summit Of SACU Heads Of State And Government Held At Mandvulo Grand Hall – Lozitha. URL: <https://www.sacu.int/docs/speeches/2023/SPEECH-OFFICIAL-OPENING-OF-THE-8th-SACU-SUMMIT-JUNE-2023.pdf> (date of access: 23.09.2023).

## **Literature**

### ***a) Russian***

1. Анохин В. В. Ксенофобия в ЮАР //Инязовские чтения, 2022. С. 172–178.
2. Архангельская А.А. Особенности развития и формирования внешнеполитического курса новой Африки в 1994-2004гг // Вестник РУДН. Серия: Международные отношения. 2008. №1. С.110-117.
3. Архангельская А.А., Кочетов Д.В. Динамика внешней политики ЮАР в контексте кризисной внутривнутриполитической ситуации в стране // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2017. № 9 (722). С. 36-42.
4. Архангельская А.А. Международные аспекты создания Южно-Африканского Союза в 1910 г // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2017. № 17(1). С.150-162.
5. Балезин А.С., Притворов А.В., Слипченко С.А., История Намибии в новое и новейшее время. М.: Восточная литература, 1993. С.182-183.

6. Березин В.И. Замбия. Пути завоевания экономической независимости. М., Наука, 1972. 120 с.
7. Бокерия С. А., Сингува Ч. SADCC as the First Step of Regional Integration in Southern Africa // Азия и Африка сегодня, 2023. Выпуск №1 С. 49–56.
8. Брагина Е.А. Малые страны Южной Африки: трудное продвижение // Азия и Африка сегодня, 2020. № 12. С. 64–70.
9. Винокуров Ю.Н., Орлова А.С., Субботин В.А. История Заира в новое и новейшее время. М., 1982. 215 с.
10. Вильданова Г.М. Трехсторонняя зона свободной торговли КОМЕСА-ВАС-САДК //проблемы социально-экономического развития России, 2017. С. 171–174.
11. Выборы в странах Юга Африки. Сборник статей. – М.: Институт Африки РАН, 2020. 366 с.
12. Гавристова Т. М. Африка: «постколониальная библиотека» // Азия и Африка сегодня, 2020. Выпуск №3 С. 80-85.
13. Гавристова Т. М. Постколониальность как реальность, постколониальный дискурс как фантом // Азия и Африка сегодня, 2023. Выпуск №7 С. 72.
14. Гавристова Т. М. Постколониальные нарративы: литература мигрирующего // История – 2022. – Том 13. – Выпуск 3 (113).
15. Гавристова, Т. М. Афрополитизм: альтернатива космополитизму или трансформация идентичности? Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Востоковедение и африканистика, 2017. №9(2). С 159–172.
16. Гавристова Т. М. Африка: литература путешествий // Азия и Африка сегодня, 2018. Выпуск №12 С. 69-74.
17. Гавристова Т. М. О танзанийской нации, её «отце» и «танзафилии» // Азия и Африка сегодня , 2022. Выпуск №9 С. 77-80
18. Громыко Ан. А. Конфликт на Юге Африки. М.: Мысль, 1979. 296 с.

19. Давидсон А.Б. Южная Африка: становление сил протеста (1870-1924 гг.). М.: Главная редакция восточной литературы, 1972. 614 с.
20. Давидсон А.В. ЮАР. В кн.: История Тропической и Южной Африки. 1918–1988. М., Наука, 1989. 412 с.
21. Давидсон А.Б. Матабеле и машона в борьбе против английской колонизации 1888—1897 / Акад. наук СССР. Ин-т востоковедения. — М.: Изд-во вост. лит., 1958. 184 с.
22. Денисова Т.С., Костелянец С.В. Демократическая Республика Конго: политическая нестабильность и фактор Руанды // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения, 2023. Т. 23. №. 1. С. 37–47.
23. Демкина Л.А. Рабочий класс и рабочее движение в Северной Родезии. Народы Азии и Африки. М., 1961. С. 41–52.
24. Демкина Л.А. Первые нерасовые выборы в ЮАР // Африка: суждения и факты. М., Институт Африки РАН, 1994. С. 4–11.
25. Добрякова Н.А., Кармов Т.М., Лобанов В. Б., Труфанов Г.А. Конфликт в Демократической Республике Конго и Россия: Перспективы Урегулирования // Современная научная мысль. 2020. №1. С 142–148.
26. Емельянов, А.Л. Мадагаскар/ История Тропической и Южной Африки, 1918-1988. М.: Наука, 1989. С. 364–383.
27. Зусманович А.З. Империалистический раздел бассейна Конго (1876-1894 гг.). М.: Издательство восточной литературы, 1962. 356 с.
28. Зданевич А. С. История развития политических и социальных процессов на Юге Африки (Конец XVIII-первая треть XIX вв.): дисс. канд. ист. наук: 07.00.03. С.-Петербург. гос. ун-т, 2004. С. 157.
29. Зеленова Д.А. «Советские военные специалисты при АНК в Анголе: военная культура и быт в лагере Какулама» в сборнике «Солидарность в борьбе

с апартеидом: Историческая память в России и Южной Африке» Под ред. ВГ Шубина. Институт Африки РАН, 2023. С.6-12.

30. Зеленова Д. А, Воронина Н. А. ЮАР Сегодня. Институт Африки РАН, 2020. С.36-66.

31. Зеленова Д.А., Андреева Т.А., Баринов А. К., Воронина Н.А. Второй саммит, экономический и гуманитарный форум Россия – Африка: новая глобальная архитектура// Азия и Африка Сегодня, 2023. № 9. С. 5-18.

32. Зинина А.В. Ксенофобия как социально опасный феномен //Актуальные проблемы социальной коммуникации, 2010. С. 168–170.

33. Иванова О. Я. Коморские Острова: Справочник / Отв. ред. Ю.Н. Винокуров; Институт Африки РАН. М.: Восточная литература, 2003. 73 с.

34. Иванова О. Я. Сейшельские острова: Справочник / О.Я. Иванова; Рос. акад. наук. Ин-т Африки. М.: Вост. лит., 2000. 46 с.

35. Карамеев С.Г. Кризис в Мозамбике и угрозы регионального и глобального характера //Азия и Африка сегодня, 2021. №. 6. С. 35–41.

36. Капица Л.М. Юг: путь к экономической независимости // Экономика: вчера, сегодня, завтра, 2018. Т. 8. №. 10А. 442 с.

37. Конева А.Е., Солнцев А.М. Интеграция государств юга Африки //Евразийский юридический журнал, 2015. №. 8. С. 43–46.

38. Костюнина Г.М. Интеграционные процессы в Африке: история и современный этап // Российский внешнеэкономический Вестник, 2016. № 4. С. 34–50; Костюнина Г.М. Интеграция в Африке // Международная экономическая интеграция: учебное пособие / Под ред. Н.Н. Ливенцева. М.: Экономистъ, 2006. С. 297–320.

39. Кассае Ныгусие В.М., Ивкина Н.В. Особенности политического развития Африки в постколониальный период. Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. Федеральное

государственное автономное образовательное учреждение высшего образования  
Российский университет дружбы народов, 2020. Т. 20. С. 22–38.

40. Леденёва М.В., Плаксунова Т.А. Экономический рост и перспективы  
экономического развития стран Африки южнее Сахары // Теоретическая и  
прикладная экономика, 2020. № 2. С. 129–139.

41. Лиокумович Я.Б., Коротаев А.В. Революционные и  
квазиреволюционные события в Южной Африке: Лесото-ЮАР-Ботсвана.  
Системный мониторинг глобальных и региональных рисков: ежегодник, 2022. С.  
75–95.

42. Медведев И.В. Перспективы интеграции региональных объединений  
САДК, SACU и БРИКС в контексте развития экономики России // Финансовая  
аналитика: проблемы и решения, 2016. Т. 21 (303). С. 53–60.

43. Огурцов М.И. "САДК как пример субрегиональной интеграции в  
Африке" Интеллектуальный потенциал XXI века: ступени познания, 2011. №.6.  
С. 141–144.

44. Позднякова, А.П. Республика Малави: справочник. М.: АН СССР, ин-т  
Африки. М.: Наука, 1989. 187 с.

45. Покровский А.С. Монополистический капитал в странах Южной  
Африки. М.: Наука, 1976. 180 с.

46. Пономаренко Л.В. Из истории завоевания Конго // Вестник Российского  
университета дружбы народов. Серия: Всеобщая история, 1997. № 3. С. 68–75.

47. Прокопенко Л.Я. Новые политические элиты в государствах Юга  
Африки. – М.: Институт Африки РАН, 2011. 252 с.

48. Прокопенко Л.Я. Первые леди стран Юга Африки: политика и жизнь  
//Женщина в российском обществе, 2014. №. 4. С. 51–62.

49. Польшиков П.И., Тищенко Т.Ф. Экономика стран Юга Африки. М.,  
1978. 82 с.

50. Рытов Л.Н. Борьба народов Лесото и Ботсваны за независимость (1945–1966 гг.): дисс. канд. ист. наук: 07.00.03. - Москва, 1999. С. 144.

51. Романчук Е. С. Региональная валютно-финансовая интеграция на Юге Африки: проблемы и перспективы введения единой региональной валюты // Финансы и кредит, 2015. №. 28 (652). С. 44–53.

52. Сидорова Г.М. Африка: война идей и война людей в зеркале Демократической Республики Конго. М.: Восточная литература, 2015. 528 с.

53. Сидорова Г.М. Интеграция Демократической Республики Конго в систему международных отношений // Экономические отношения, 2017. Т.7. №4. С. 375-386.

54. Сидорова Г.М. Ботсвана через призму времен и событий // Международная жизнь. 2021. № 8. С. 134-136.

55. Сидорова Г.М. Современные вооруженные конфликты в Африке как объект политического анализа // В монографии: Военные науки versus. Наука о войне в Австрии и в России. Под ред. В.К. Белозёрова. М.: ФГБОУ ВО МГЛУ, 2021. С.134-139.

56. Сидорова Г.М. Совет Безопасности ООН как эффективная организация по обеспечению мира и стабильности в Африке // Дипломатическая служба. 2021. № 1. С. 36-43.

57. Сидорова Г.М. Африка в геополитической структуре XXI века // Вестник Дипломатической академии МИД России. Россия и мир, 2020. № 1(23). С. 30-42.

58. Сидоров В.А. Зимбабве: От Мугабе К Мнангагве // Вестник Томского государственного университета, 2020. №. 457. С. 157–167.

59. Слипченко, С А. Роль "прифронтовых" государств в освободительном процессе на Юге Африки (уроки Зимбабве, проблема Намибии). Академия наук СССР, Институт Африки. – М.,1984. 223 с.

60. Скубко Ю. С., Г. В. Шубин, Социально-экономическое и политическое развитие ЮАР в 2005–2009 гг. М.: Институт Африки, РАН, 2009.
61. Токарева, З.И. Маврикий: Справочник / З. И. Токарева; Рос. акад. наук, Ин-т Африки. М.: Наука, 1992. 165 с.
62. Турукина Т.М. Проблемы политического и социально-экономического развития Федеральной Исламской Республики Коморские Острова (1975–1990). М., 1991. 78 с.
63. Фитуни Л.Л. Развитие экономики независимой Анголы. -М.: Наука, 1981. 174 с.
64. Хазанов А.М. История Анголы в новое и новейшее время. М.: Институт Востоковедения РАН, 1999. 390 с. Хазанов А.М. История Мозамбика в Новое и Новейшее время. М.: ЮНИТИ-ДАНА, Закон и право, 2006. 175 с.
65. Хилова А.А. Борьба с апартеидом в ЮАР: анализ конфликта // International scientific review of the problems of law, sociology, and political science. - Boston, 2019. С. 83–94.
66. Черкасова И.В. Экономическая интеграция на Юге Африки. – М.: Наука, 1993. 214 с.
67. Чуваева М. А. Ксенофонтова Н. А. Республика Замбия: Справочник. - 2-е изд., доп. и перераб. -М., 1996. С. 272.
68. Шарый В. И. Помощь СССР в создании Вооружённых сил Народной Республики Мозамбик. 1964-1991. // Военно-исторический журнал, 2008. № 11. С. 18-20.
69. Шлёнская С.М. Объединенная Республика Танзания. Справочник. М.: Институт Африки РАН, 2014. 261 с.
70. Шитов В.Н. Экономика стран Южной Африки. М.: МГИМО-Университет, 2009. 45 с. Шитов В.Н. Африка Южнее Сахары во всеафриканской экономической интеграции // Мировое и национальное хозяйство, 2010. № 1 (12). С. 35–45.



71. Шубин В. Г. Горячая «холодная война»: Юг Африки (1960–1990 гг.). М.: Издательский дом «ЯСК», 2013. 368 с.

***b)English***

72. Abban S. The Prospect of the Proposed Currency Union on Intra-regional Trade: Southern African Customs Union //Journal of Applied Economic Sciences (JAES), 2020. Vol. 15. №. 70. P. 759-773.

73. Abegunrin L. Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC): Towards Regional Integration of Southern Africa for Liberation //A Current Bibliography on African Affairs. 1986. Vol. 17. №. 4. P. 363-384.

74. Aeby M. Stability and Sovereignty at the Expense of Democracy? The SADC Mediation Mandate for Zimbabwe, 2007–2013 // African Security, 2017. Vol. 10. № 3–4. P. 272–291.

75. Agbeyegbe T. D. On the feasibility of a monetary union in the Southern Africa Development Community // International Journal of Finance & Economics, 2007. Vol. 13. № 2. P. 150–157.

76. Ajibo C. C. African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement: The Euphoria, Pitfalls and Prospects // Journal of World Trade, 2019. Vol. 53. № Issue 5. P. 871–894.

77. Albagoury S. H. African pathway to achieve inclusive growth: COMESA case study // Journal of Humanities and Applied Social Sciences, 2020. Vol. 3. № 2. P. 108–119.

78. Anglin D. G. Economic liberation and regional cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and PTA // International Organization, 1983. Vol. 37. № 4. P. 681–711.

79. Arndt C., Roberts S. J. Key issues in regional growth and integration in Southern Africa // Development Southern Africa, 2018. Vol. 35. № 3. P. 297–314.

80. Ball J., Gastrow C. Angola: Nationalist Narratives and Alternative Histories // Kronos, 2019. № 1 (45). P.52.

81. Booth K., Peter V. Security in southern Africa: after apartheid, beyond realism // *International Affairs*, 1995. Vol. 71. № 2. P. 285–304.
82. Boshoff N. South–South research collaboration of countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) // *Scientometrics*, 2009. Vol. 84. № 2. P. 481–503.
83. Bush R. Dependence and Collective Self Reliance in southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) // *African Affairs*, 1985. Vol. 84. № 337. P. 625–626.
84. Biswas A. Approaches To Regional Integration In Southern Africa // *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, 2000. Vol. 5. № 1. P. 71–90.
85. Cantwell L. Chiefly Power in a Frontline State: Kgosi Lince II, the Bakgatla and Botswana in the South African Liberation Struggle, 1948–1994 // *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 2015. Vol. 41. № 2. P. 255–272.
86. Cawthra G. Collaborative Regional Security and Mutual Defence: SADC in Comparative Perspective // *Politikon*, 2008. Vol. 35. № 2. P. 159–176.
87. Cheluget K., Wright S. COMESA and the Tripartite Free Trade Area: Towards an African Economic Community? // *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 2017. Vol. 24. № 4. P. 481–499.
88. Chettle J. H. The Cambridge History of the British Empire. VIII. South Africa, Rhodesia, and the High Commission Territories // *Canadian Historical Review*, 1964. Vol. 45. № 2. P. 161–162.
89. Cipollina M. The Trade Growth under the EU–SADC Economic Partnership Agreement: An Empirical Assessment // *Economies*, 2022. Vol. 10. № 12. P. 16.
90. Cofelice A. African Continental Free Trade Area: Opportunities and Challenges // *The Federalist Debate*, 2018. Vol. 31. № 3. P. 32–35.
91. Compton Jr, Robert W. “Comparative Regional Integration in SADC and ASEAN: Democracy and Governance Issues in Historical and Socio-Economic Context.” *Regions & Cohesion*, 2013. Vol. 3. № 1. P. 5–31.

92. Davies R. Promoting Regional Integration In Southern Africa // African Security Review, 1996. Vol. 5. № 5. P. 27–38. Davies R. Economic growth in a post-apartheid South Africa: Its significance for relations with other African countries // Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 1992. Vol. 11. № 1. P. 51–71.

93. Friedland E. A. The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference and the West: co-operation or conflict? //The Journal of Modern African Studies, 1985. Vol . 23. №. 2. P. 287-314.

94. Galadima H. S., Ogbonnaya U. M. Regional responses to security and development challenges in East and Southern Africa: lessons and way forward // African Security Review, 2018. Vol. 27. № 2. P. 158–176.

95. Geda A., Kebret H. Regional economic integration in Africa: A review of problems and prospects with a case study of COMESA //Journal of African economies, 2008. Vol. 17. №. 3. C. 357–394.

96. Gerhart G. M., Kahn O. E. Disengagement from Southwest Africa: Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia // Foreign Affairs, 1991. Vol. 70. № 5. C. 208.

97. Gibb R. Regional integration in post-apartheid Southern Africa: the case of renegotiating the Southern African customs union //Journal of Southern African Studies, 1997. Vol. 23. №. 1. P. 67-86.

98. Gibb R., Treasure K. SACU at centenary: theory and practice of democratising regionalism // South African Journal of International Affairs, 2011. Vol. 18. № 1. P. 1–21.

99. Gibb R. The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement: Dependence with Democracy // Journal of Southern African Studies, 2006. Vol. 32. № 3. P. 583–603.

100. Hammerstad A. Domestic threats, regional solutions? The challenge of security integration in Southern Africa //Review of International Studies, 2005. Vol. 31. №. 1. P. 69-87.

101. Handmaker J. Confronting apartheid: a personal history of South Africa, Namibia and palestine // South African Journal on Human Rights, 2020. Vol. 36. № 2–3. P. 275–279.

102. Herbst J., Payne R. J. The Third World and South Africa: Post-Apartheid Challenges // The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 1993. Vol. 26. № 2. P. 397.

103. Hill C. R. Regional co-Operation in Southern Africa // African Affairs, 1983. Vol. 82. № 327. P. 215–239.

104. Hwang K.D. The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa // International Area Review, 2007. Vol. 10. № 1. P. 55–72.

105. Hwang K.D. The Concepts and the Levels of Analysis of Politico-Security Regionalism in Southern Africa: The Case of Southern African Development Community (SADC) // Korean Journal of International Relations, 2007. Vol. 47. № 2. P. 197–221.

106. Jefferis K. R. The Process of Monetary Integration in the SADC Region\* // Journal of Southern African Studies, 2007. Vol. 33. № 1. P. 83–106.

107. Jenkins C., Thomas L. Is Southern Africa ready for regional monetary integration? // Post-Apartheid Southern Africa. – Routledge, 1998. P. 163-188.

108. Jenkins G. P., Safaeimanesh S. Estimation of the potential economic welfare to be gained by the South African Customs Union from trade facilitation // South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences, 2021. Vol. 24. № 1. P.14.

109. Johnson V. D., Dickinson E. International Norms and the End of Apartheid in South Africa // Safundi, 2015. Vol. 16. № 4. P. 355–377.

110. Joseph J. E. The South African Development Community (SADC) and Covid-19: revisiting security community in SADC // EUREKA: Social and Humanities, 2021. № 5. P. 69–81.

111. Joseph J.E. SADC'S transport infrastructure: enhancing the AFCFTA's prospects through regional economic integration // EUREKA: Social and Humanities, 2023. № 1. P. 27–42.
112. Kanduza A. M. SADCC, Liberation Movements and Regional Development in Southern Africa // Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, 1986. Vol. 15. № 1–2. P. 151.
113. Leshoele M. The Role of SADC (or Lack Thereof) in the Political Unification of the Region and/or Continent: An Afrocentric Critique // Journal of African Union Studies, 2023. Vol. 12. № 2. P. 116.
114. Maasdorp G. G. Economic and Political Aspects of Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa // South African Journal of Economics, 1986. Vol. 54. № 2. P. 94–105.
115. Macmillan H. The African National Congress of South Africa in Zambia: The Culture of Exile and the Changing Relationship with Home, 1964–1990\*\* // Journal of Southern African Studies, 2009. Vol. 35. № 2. P. 303–329.
116. Maeresera S., Zengeni K. T. Recurring Armed Conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: an Insight into the SADC Intervention Problematique // Journal International Studies, 2017. Vol. 13. P. 141-160.
117. Maeresera S., Rugeje E. A., Zangeneh K. The Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Recurring Conflict: Whose Conflict Transformation Responsibility? // Journal of International Studies, 2020. Vol. 14. P. 49.
118. Magwape M. SACU and Trade Facilitation: A Post-Covid Pandemic Legal Analysis for Improved Efficiency // Global Trade and Customs Journal, 2023. Vol. 18. № Issue 2. P. 64–73.
119. Makochekanwa A. Welfare Implications of COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area // African Development Review, 2014. Vol. 26. № 1. P. 186–202.

120. Manwa F., Wijeweera A., Kortt M. A. Trade and growth in SACU countries: A panel data analysis // *Economic Analysis and Policy*, 2019. Vol. 63. P. 107–118.
121. Mapako K. Mozambique Armed Conflict: A Semi-Active Volcano in Southern Part of Africa // *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2021. P. 5.
122. Marks S. *The Historiography of Southern Africa: Recent Developments // African Historiography: What History for Whish Africa?* Beverly Hills etc.: Sage Publications, 1986. P. 165 - 176.
123. Martins V. Hegemony, Resistance and Gradations of Memory: The Politics of Remembering Angola's Liberation Struggle // *History and Memory*, 2021. Vol. 33. № 2. P. 106.
124. Merwe J. van der. An historical geographical analysis of South Africa's system of accumulation: 1652–1994 // *Review of African Political Economy*, 2016. Vol. 43. № 147. P. 332.
125. Melber H. Mission Impossible: Hammarskjöld and the UN Mandate for the Congo (1960–1961) // *African Security*, 2017. Vol. 10. № 3–4. P. 254–271.
126. Mlambo D. N. The quest for post-colonial regional integration: examining the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Southern Africa post-1992 // *Journal of African Foreign Affairs*, 2020. Vol. 7. №. 1. P. 23–48.
127. Mlambo V. H., Masuku M. M. Terror at the front gate: Insurgency in Mozambique and its implications for the SADC and South Africa // *Journal of Public Affairs*, 2021. Vol. 22. № S1. P. 77.
128. Mold A. Proving Hegel Wrong: Learning the Right Lessons from European Integration for the African Continental Free Trade Area // *Journal of African Trade*, 2021. Vol. 8. № 2 (Special Issue). P. 132.
129. Mole S. Negotiating with Apartheid: The Mission of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group 1986 // *The Round Table*, 2012. Vol. 101. № 3. P. 253–260.

130. Morapedi W. G. The Dilemmas of Liberation in Southern Africa: The Case of Zimbabwean Liberation Movements and Botswana, 1960–1979 // *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 2012. Vol. 38. № 1. P. 73–90.

131. Moyo I. The African Continental Free Trade Area and informal cross border trade: implications on socio-economic development in Africa // *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 2023. Vol. 41. № 4. P. 408–419.

132. Motelle I. S., Biekpe N. Financial intermediation spread and stability of the banking system in the Southern Africa Customs Union // *Managerial Finance*, 2014. Vol. 40. № 3. P. 276–299.

133. Msindo E., Nyachega N. Zimbabwe's Liberation War and the Everyday in Honde Valley, 1975 to 1979 // *South African Historical Journal*, 2019. Vol. 71. № 1. P. 70–93.

134. Muntschick J., Arkhangelskaya A.A. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the European Union (EU). Regionalism and External Influence. Palgrave Macmillan, 186 p // *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations*, 2020. Vol. 20. № 2. P. 417–420.

135. Nangini, C. Visualizing Armed Groups: The Democratic Republic of the Congo's M23 in Focus // *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 2014. Vol. 3. № 1. P. 89-94.

136. Nathan L. How should the peace and security performance of SADC be evaluated? // *African Security Review*, 2013. Vol. 22. № 3. P. 201–209.

137. Nieuwkerk A. van. Subregional collaborative security: Lessons from the OAU and SADC // *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 2001. Vol. 8. № 2. P. 81–94.

138. Nyathi M. Oversight Institutions of SADC // *The Southern African Development Community and Law*. Cham: Springer International Publishing. 2018. P. 67–106.

139. Ohlson T., Stedman S. J. Security in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa // Security Dialogue, 1993. Vol . 24. № 4. P. 415–428.
140. Páez L. A Continental Free Trade Area: Imperatives for Realizing a Pan-African Market // Journal of World Trade, 2016. Vol. 50. № Issue 3. P. 533–562.
141. Pallotti A. Tanzania and the 1976 Anglo-American Initiative for Rhodesia // The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2017. Vol. 45. № 5. P. 800–822.
142. Ramutsindela M. Perspectives on regionalism in (southern) Africa //GeoJournal, 2005.Vol. 62. №. 1/2. P. 107–110.
143. Riedel J., Slany A. The potential of African trade integration – Panel data evidence for the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite // The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 2019. Vol. 28. № 7. P. 843–872.
144. Rousseau N. Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: the Soweto Intelligence Unit and Southern Itineraries // Journal of Southern African Studies, 2014. Vol. 40. № 6. P. 1343–1361.
145. Simon D. Odén, Bertil (ed.), “Southern Africa after Apartheid: Regional Integration and External Resources” (Book Review) // Third World Planning Review, 1994. Vol. 16. № 3. P. 33.
146. Singuwa C., Honrada G. Regional Security Integration in the SADC Region // Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serija 4. Istorija. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija, 2023. № 4. P. 192–201.
147. Shubin V. G. “Moscow and Zimbabwe’s Liberation.” Journal of Southern African Studies. 2017. vol. 43. № 1.P. 225–233.
148. Shubin V. G. “Unsung Heroes: The Soviet Military and the Liberation of Southern Africa.” Cold War History. 2007.vol.7, № 2. P. 251–262.
149. Söderbaum F. Rethinking regions and regionalism //Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 2013. C. 9-18.



150. Songwe V., Macleod J. A., Karingi S. The African Continental Free Trade Area: A Historical Moment for Development in Africa // *Journal of African Trade*, 2021. Vol. 8. № 2. P. 23.

151. Stewart J., McCarthy C. An appropriate model for joint regional action in southern Africa after apartheid // *Development Southern Africa*, 1995. Vol. 12. № 3. P. 401–411.

152. Thompson C. B. African Initiatives for Development: the practice of regional economic cooperation in Southern Africa // *Journal of International Affairs*, 1992. Vol. 46. №. 1. P. 125-144.

153. Thompson C. B. Regional challenges to globalisation: perspectives from Southern Africa // *New Political Economy*, 2000. Vol. 5. №. 1. P. 41–57.

154. Tshivhasa Tshedza S., Stewart Lee K. How will AfCFTA Impact on South Africa's Socioeconomic Position? // *Journal of African Foreign Affairs*, 2023. Vol. 10. № 3. P. 103–120.

155. Vickery K. P., Omer-Cooper J. D. History of Southern Africa // *African Economic History*, 1988. № 17. P. 297.

156. Vickers B. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Small States in the EU–SADC EPA Negotiations // *The Round Table*, 2011. Vol. 100. № 413. P. 183–197.

157. West M.O. The Rise Of An African Middle Class: Colonial Zimbabwe, 1898-1965. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2002. // *Africa Today*, 2004. Vol. 50. № 3. P. 150–152.

158. Whann C. A., Oden B. Southern Africa after Apartheid: Regional Integration and External Resources // *African Economic History*, 1994. № 22. P. 155.

159. Wilburn K., Gewald J.-B. Herero Heroes: A Socio-Political History of the Herero of Namibia, 1890-1923 // *African Studies Review*, 2000. Vol. 43. № 2. P. 310.

160. Whitaker J. S., Lee M. C. SADCC: The Political Economy of Development in Southern Africa // *Foreign Affairs*, 1990. Vol. 69. № 2. P. 188.

161. Young T. B. Oden and H. Othman, *Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: a post-apartheid perspective*. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1989, P. 243, SEK 170, ISBN 91 7106 298 X. // *Africa*, 1991. Vol. 61. № 3. P. 436–436.

162. Zaire D., Warikandwa T. V. *The African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement: Aiding Intra-African trade towards deeper continental integration* // *Journal of Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice*, 2021. Vol. 7. № 2. P. 16–44.

163. Zelenova D.A. *From Egypt to South Africa: the rise and fall of assistance from Moscow in Africa's decolonisation*, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 2022. Vol. 48 №5. P.1-3.

164. Zerihun F. M., Breitenbach M. *Why So Much Pessimism about Economic Integration in Africa? The Case of the Southern African Development Community* // *African Journal of Business and Economic Research*, 2019. Vol. 14. № 3. P. 33–52.

#### **Internet Sources**

165. Abimbola O. *Shaping the Future of Multilateralism Africa's free-trade area signals intent for a new kind of relationship with the EU*. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. Cologne, Germany. 2021. URL: <https://eu.boell.org/en/2021/05/19/shaping-future-multilateralism-africas-free-trade-area-signals-intent-new-kind> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

166. Akinkugbe, Olabisi D., *A Critical Appraisal of the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (January 14, 2021)*. Forthcoming: *International Economic Law from a (South) African Perspective*, Franziska Sucker and Kholofelo Kugler(eds.) (JUTA Law, South Africa; 2021), URL: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3734608> (date of access: 16.10.2023).

167. African Union. *The Integrated Corridor Approach - "A Holistic Infrastructure Planning Framework to establish PIDA-PAP 2"*. 2020. URL: <https://pp2.au-pida.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/English-Strategic->

Note\_Integrated-Corridor-Approach-and-Selection-Criteria-AUC.pdf (date of access: 16.10.2023).

168. African Development Bank. 2022.URL: <https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/african-development-bank-african-continental-free-trade-area-secretariat-sign-11-million-institutional-support-grant-agreement-53780> (date of access: 17.10.2023).

169. Apiko P., Woolfrey S., Byiers B. The African Continental Free Trade Area. Political Economy Dynamics of Regional Organisations in Africa. Discussion paper. European Centre for Development Policy Management.2010. URL: <https://ecdpm.org/application/files/3116/5546/8595/Promise-African-Continental-Free-Trade-Area-AfCFTA-ECDPM-Discussion-Paper-287-December-2020.pdf> (date of access: 17.10.2023).

170. Boateng B.F., Dankyi, B.O. The AfCFTA May Be the Last Opportunity for Africa's Economic Transformation.2020.URL: <https://acetforafrica.org/research-and-analysis/insights-ideas/commentary/the-afcfta-may-be-the-last-opportunity-for-africas-economic-transformation/> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

171. Development of Mozambique's Port and Rail Systems, Port and Corridor Cooperation: Den Haag. <http://portandcorridor.org/> (date of access: 25.11.2023).

172. Existing transport corridors and the ones waiting full implementation in Southern Africa. URL:[https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/11991007\\_02.pdf](https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/11991007_02.pdf) (date of access: 11.03.2023).

173. Hancock K.J.What Role for the EU in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU): Advocate, Cajoler, or Bully?.2010. URL: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1740862> (date of access:21.09.2023).

174. International Monetary Fund (IMF): Direction of Trade Statistics: Yearbook 1988, pp. 248-429. URL: <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781451981230/9781451981230.xml> (date of access: 04.10.2023). Cited in the "The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern

and Southern Africa: Achievements, Problems and Prospects.” Africa Spectrum.1989. vol. 24. №.2. P. 165.

175. Matlosa K. ‘Democratization at Crossroads: Challenges for the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections’, Institute of Security Studies, Paper 118, 2005. URL:<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/98759/PAPER118.pdf> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

176. SADC, Free Trade Area (2012). URL: <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/free-trade-area/> (date of access: 03.16.2023).

177. SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan. URL: [https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-08/Regional\\_Infrastructure\\_Development\\_Master\\_Plan\\_Executive\\_Summary.pdf](https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-08/Regional_Infrastructure_Development_Master_Plan_Executive_Summary.pdf) (date of access: 07.05.2023).

178. Tanzania and Zambia want to upgrade the ‘Uhuru Railway’ – but can they? URL:<https://theconversation.com/tanzania-and-zambia-want-to-upgrade-the-uhuru-railway-but-can-they-190659> (date of access: 19.07.2023).

179. The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects. World Bank, 2020.URL: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34139/9781464815591.pdf>, (date of access: 18.10.2023).

180. The Lobito Corridor: Washington’s Answer to Belt and Road in Africa. URL: <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-lobito-corridor-washingtons-answer-to-belt-and-road-in-africa/> (date of access: 07.05.2023).

181. The Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA). URL:<https://www.aupida.org/pw2020/#:~:text=The%20Programme%20for%20Infrastructure%20Development,of%20the%20Abuja%20Treaty%20%2C%20The> (date of access: 17.10.2023).

182. The results for the average annual growth rate of GDP percentage for the period 1980-1987 were obtained from the World Development Report, World Bank.

1989. P. 164-169; and P. 174-175.  
 URL:<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/97d36d98-ce0c-516d-bfa6-d57cbd4da318/content> (date of access: 30.09.2023).

183. Van der Merwe C. "Zuma urges SACU to tackle EPA negotiations as united front" *Engineering News Online* 23 April 2010. URL: <http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/zuma-urges-sacu-to-tackle-epa-negotiations-as-united-front-2010-04-22> (date of access: 25.09.2023).

184. Matlosa K. 'Democratization at Crossroads: Challenges for the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections', Institute of Security Studies, Paper 118, 2005. URL:<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/98759/PAPER118.pdf> (date of access: 07.09.2023).

185. Laurie N. *Community of Insecurity: SADC's Struggle for Peace and Security in Southern Africa*. Farnham: Ashgate. Return to ref 2012 in article: URL: <https://www.routledge.com/Community-of-Insecurity-SADCs-Struggle-for-Peace-and-Security-inSouthern/Nathan/p/book/9781138250758> (date of access: 19.10.2023).

186. Ngoma, N. *Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa: An Analysis of Regional Security in the Southern African Development Community*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 2005. URL: [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/111753/2005\\_06\\_01\\_Prospects.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/111753/2005_06_01_Prospects.pdf) (date of access: 19.10.2023).

187. *Poorest Countries in Africa Today (Ranked)*. URL: <https://a-z-animals.com/blog/poorest-countries-in-africa-today-ranked/> (date of access: 22.10.2023).

188. Solomon, H., Ngubane S. *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Reflections on SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation*. SAIIA Report. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. 2003, Vol.33, URL:

[https://books.google.ru/books/about/One\\_Step\\_Forward\\_Two\\_Steps\\_Back.html?id=kW7dxQEACAAJ&redir\\_esc=y](https://books.google.ru/books/about/One_Step_Forward_Two_Steps_Back.html?id=kW7dxQEACAAJ&redir_esc=y) (date of access: 20.10.2023).

189. Tanzania and Zambia want to upgrade the ‘Uhuru Railway’ – but can they? URL:<https://theconversation.com/tanzania-and-zambia-want-to-upgrade-the-uhuru-railway-but-can-they-190659> (date of access: 19.07.2023).

190. The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects’ (World Bank, 2020) URL:<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34139/9781464815591.pdf> (date of access: 10.10.2023).

191. The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects’, (World Bank, 2020). URL: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34139/9781464815591.pdf> (date of access: 18.10.2023).

192. Van der Merwe C. "Zuma urges SACU to tackle EPA negotiations as united front" Engineering News Online 23 April 2010. URL: <http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/zuma-urges-sacu-to-tackle-epa-negotiations-as-united-front-2010-04-22> (date of access: 25.09.2023).

193. Why Congo’s M23 Crisis Lingers On. URL:<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2023/05/why-congos-m23-crisis-lingers-on/> (date of access: 22. 10.2023).

**ABBREVIATIONS**

- AU- African Union
- ACCORD - African Centre for The Constructive Resolution of Disputes
- ACP - African, Caribbean, and Pacific
- AFCFTA - African Continental Free Trade Area
- ANC- African National Congress
- APSA- African Peace and Security Architecture
- ASYCUDA- Automated Data Management System
- CODESA- Convention for a Democratic South Africa
- CCA- Common Customs Area
- CET- Common External Tariffs
- CP -Conservative Party
- COMESA- Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
- CONSAS- Constellation of Southern African States
- CCR - Centre for Conflict Resolutions
- CMA - Common Monetary Area
- COSATU- Congress of South African Trade Unions
- CU- Customs Union
- CSTO- Committee of Senior Trade Officials
- DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo
- EAC- East African Community
- EPA- Economic Partnership Agreements
- ESAMI- Eastern and Southern African Management Institute
- EU- European Union
- FLS- Frontline States
- FTA- Free Trade Area
- FDI- Foreign Direct Investment

FRELIMO- Mozambique Liberation Front  
FNLA- National Front for the Liberation of Angola  
GDP- Gross domestic product  
GIGA - German Institute of Global and Area Studies  
GNP- Gross National Income  
GATT- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  
GNU- Government of National Unity  
HCT- High Commission Territories  
IGADD- Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Development  
INE- Instituto Nacional de Estadística  
IOM- International Organization for Migration  
ISS- Institute for Security Studies  
MERCOSUR- Bienvenidos al Mercado Común del Sur  
MPLA- National Front for the Liberation of Angola  
MoU - Memorandum of Understanding  
MNR- Mozambique National Resistance  
MULPOC - Multi-National Programming And Operating Centres  
NBS- National Bureau of Statistics  
NP- Nationalist Party  
NSA- Namibia Statistics Agency  
NEPAD- New Partnership for Africa`s Development  
OAU- Organization of African Unity  
OPDSC- Organ for Politics, Défense and Security Cooperation  
PTA -Preferential Trade Area  
PIDA- Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa  
RENAMO - Mozambican National Resistance  
REC-Regional Economic Community  
RISDP- Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan



REPSS- Regional Payment and Settlement System  
RMA - Rand Monetary Area  
SADF- South African Defence Force  
SWAPO -Southwest Africa People's Organization  
SAMIM- SADC Mission in Mozambique  
SACP- South African Communist Party  
SADC- Southern African Development Community  
SADCC- Southern African Development Coordination Conference  
SADC -Southern African Development Community  
SAIIA - South African Institute of International Affairs  
SEWM- SADC Early Warning Mechanism  
StatsSA- Statistics South Africa  
SIPO- Strategic Indicative Development Plan  
TANZAM - Tanzania-Zambia Railway  
TDCA- Trade, Development, And Cooperation Agreement  
TFTA- Tripartite Free Trade  
TWR- Transboundary Water Resources  
UN- United Nations  
UNECA- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa  
UNITA- National Union for the Total Independence of Angola  
UNGA- United Nations General Assembly  
UNSC- United Nations Security Council  
UNHCR - UN High Commissioner for Refugees  
USTDA- US Trade and Development Agency  
WTO- World Trade Organization  
YD- Yamoussoukro Declaration  
ZANU- Zimbabwe African National Union  
ZAPU- Zimbabwe African People's Union